


After Bourdieu

Influence, Critique, Elaboration



Edited by

David L. Swartz and Vera L. Zolberg

AFTER BOURDIEU

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Influence, Critique, Elaboration

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Introduction: Drawing inspiration from Bourdieu

DAVID L. SWARTZ and VERA L. ZOLBERG

Recognition of a scholar's contribution can take various forms, ranging from the perspective of the disciple to that of the critic. Disciples carry and propagate the faith, transmitting it to new generations. Whereas some offer valuable insights into the scholar's thoughts and practices, there can be costs to discipleship. Defense of conceptual and methodological orthodoxy can stifle further intellectual development and lead to sectarian allegiance.

By contrast, the critic brings assessment and evaluation, identifying those rough edges and slippery slopes where the disciple fears to tread. Criticism, properly conducted, identifies the strengths as well as limits of any novel theoretical perspective. The polemical critic, however, not so much evaluates as dismisses the work for failing to meet the standards of some opposing theoretical persuasion. With a theoretical axe to grind, the polemicist anxiously wishes to score points of intellectual distinction rather than offer insights of genuine evaluation.

This collection of papers devoted to the recognition of the importance of Pierre Bourdieu assiduously avoids both extremes: devotion to or profanation of a "sacred" work. Rather, it charts a course that may frustrate disciples and polemicists alike. It offers ample testimony to the importance of how Bourdieu's work has inspired further sociological research; yet, it offers some critical insights that suggest gaps in or ways to elaborate portions of Bourdieu's work in different areas. By following this more sinuous path, the papers offer a deeper understanding of Bourdieu's work and illustrate creative research inspired by his oeuvre.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) was a prolific thinker and social scientific researcher. He published numerous books and articles (many translated into several different languages), directed a research center (Centre de Sociologie de l'Éducation et de la Culture), founded and guided the important journal, *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, and edited for over twenty five years the highly regarded collection of books “le sens commun” (Éditions de Minuit). In 1996 he launched a new publishing venture “Raisons d’agir” that continued after his death. Since 1982 he had been professor of sociology at the famed Collège de France.

His most widely known work, *Distinction: A Critique of the Judgement of Taste* [1979], has been ranked as the 6th most important social scientific work of the 20th century.¹ His influence in the social sciences has been substantial, interdisciplinary, and international, extending from many who worked closely with him, such as Frédéric Lebaron and Gisèle Sapiro, to those who have only read portions of his total oeuvre, such as Nick Couldry and Gunnar Lind Haase and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, to mention just those whose papers appear in this volume. We have not included an overall presentation or assessment of Bourdieu’s oeuvre as numerous other works already do that.² The papers included here testify to the broad range of theoretical and empirical concerns that animated Bourdieu’s work and have inspired numerous social scientists in their own intellectual quests.

In the two years following his untimely passing, numerous tributes, conferences, colloquia, special sessions at professional meetings all over the world have testified to the significant impact that Bourdieu has had on the social sciences. The impetus for this collection of papers stems from a conference on Bourdieu at Boston University organized by David Swartz with the collaboration of Vera Zolberg.³ The five core papers presented at that conference (Dianteill, Kauppi, Lareau and Weininger, Lebaron and Sapiro) are included in this volume. The remaining papers came as unsolicited submissions to *Theory and Society*. Pierre Bourdieu is no stranger to that journal. His influential work has clearly been felt across its pages ever since he joined Alvin Gouldner and Randall Collins as an editor in 1974–1975. The journal published two of Bourdieu’s widely cited papers: “The social space and the genesis of groups” (volume 14, 1985) and “Vive la Crise! For heterodoxy in Social Science” (volume 17, 1988, pp. 773–787). In addition, *Theory and Society* has carried several commentaries and

critical evaluations of his work, notably papers by Rodney Benson, Rogers Brubaker, Nick Crossley, and John Myles.⁴ Indeed, it is the 1985 article by Rogers Brubaker that can truly be said to have served as one of the best introductions to Bourdieu's thought for the American social scientific public. It is for this reason that we include it in the present collection.

Intellectual origins & orientations

We begin by providing an overview of Bourdieu's life as a scholar and a public intellectual. The numerous obituaries and memorial tributes that have appeared following Bourdieu's untimely death have revealed something of his life and career, but few have stressed the intersection of his social origins, career trajectory, and public intellectual life with the changing political and social context of France. This is precisely what David Swartz's "In memoriam" attempts to accomplish. In it he emphasizes the coincidence of Bourdieu's young and later adulthood with the period of decolonization, the May 1968 French university crisis, the opening up of France to privatization of many domains previously entrusted to the state (*l'état providence*), and, most threatening to post-World War II reforms, the emergence of globalization as the hegemonic structure of the 21st century.

An orienting theme throughout Bourdieu's work warns against the partial and fractured views of social reality generated by the fundamental subject/object dichotomy that has plagued social science from its very beginning. Reflecting back over more than thirty years of work, Bourdieu observes that overcoming this binary opposition has been "the most steadfast (and, in my eyes, the most important) intention guiding my work."⁵ Bourdieu sees the field of social science as being dominated by this "rock-bottom antinomy upon which all the divisions of the social scientific field are ultimately founded."⁶ Moreover, these binary oppositions, such as theory versus empirical observation, materialism versus idealism, micro-versus macro-sociology, structure versus history, quantitative versus qualitative methods, economism versus culturalism, causal explanation versus interpretive understanding, operate as social – indeed political – as well as conceptual classifications that undergird narrow and rigid divisions between the disciplines, subfields, and theoretical schools. They "haunt, like theoretic ghosts, the academic mind,"⁷ dividing the social sciences into warring camps where research frequently reduces

to one of posturing for one side or the other. For Bourdieu, the solution lies not in finding a new or returning to an old unifying paradigm but rather in practicing a genuinely reflexive and critical social science that requires transcending the subject/object dichotomy by systematically relating agents and structures and by situating all social scientific inquiry within the broader context of power relations that embrace the researchers as well as the objects of their investigations. To this end, Bourdieu proposes a theory of practice that integrates culture, power, and social structure within his key concepts, such as habitus and field, and calls for their reflexive application in every substantive empirical investigation.

Rogers Brubaker's article "Rethinking classical theory: The sociological vision of Pierre Bourdieu" represents an early attempt in English to offer an analytical overview and critical appraisal of this metatheory guiding Bourdieu's work, particularly through an analysis of *Distinction*. Arguing that "metatheory matters," Brubaker shows how this metatheoretical consciousness informs Bourdieu's concept of habitus, his conception of social class, and his analysis in *Distinction* of the character of modern stratification structures in contemporary France. Representing an enduring insight into Bourdieu's metatheoretical project for the social sciences, the 1985 paper has been widely cited by Bourdieu scholars and is republished here for the first time.

Yet, Brubaker has changed subsequently his view on how this early statement and Bourdieu's social theorizing should be understood today.⁸ Reflecting back on the 1985 article Brubaker invites us to see Bourdieu's metatheory less in terms of systematic theoretical formulations and more in terms of a set of intellectual dispositions that emerged from two particular intellectual contexts: that of the post-World War II French intellectual field organized around the opposition between Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialism and Claude Lévi-Strauss's structuralism and that of Bourdieu's encounter with classical social theory, particularly the writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Brubaker offers in his 1985 paper an analytical reading of Bourdieu. He now proposes adding a dispositional reading of Bourdieu's social theory, one that calls for seeing Bourdieu's metatheoretical concerns in terms of Bourdieu's own intellectual habitus, and invites us to consider how we might appropriate Bourdieu's sociological orientation – indeed any social theory – as sets of dispositions or

thinking tools for substantive investigation rather than as standard academic classifications delinating theoretical schools of thought. Metatheory matters for Bourdieu not as a subfield of theory but as a set of thinking tools for guiding empirical research.

Bourdieu devoted relatively little attention to the study of religion but drew substantially from the classical tradition in the sociology of religion in developing some of his basic concepts, notably his concept of field. Here presented for the first time in revised English translation is Erwan Dianteill's paper "Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of religion: A central and peripheral concern"⁹ that explores what other scholars have frequently noted; namely, Bourdieu's frequent use of religious terminology, such as sacred/profane, ritual, prophets and charisma, in his analysis of culture. Bourdieu wrote that the "sociology of culture is the sociology of religion of our day." In Bourdieu's view, dominant culture, particularly that legitimated by the school system, took on forms of sacredness and ritual that could be analyzed by analogy to the classical sociological analyses of religion. Classical texts on religion by Durkheim, Mauss and Weber in particular informed significantly Bourdieu's approach to culture.

By contrast, Bourdieu did not devote much scientific attention to religion *per se*.¹⁰ Dianteill attributes that relative disregard of religion in large part to Bourdieu's personal dispositions. Bourdieu himself was not religious; indeed, as Dianteill points out, Bourdieu shared the strongly anti-clerical attitudes typical of French Enlightenment thinkers. Dianteill insightfully suggests that Bourdieu's anti-clericalism may have limited his view of the continuing relevance of religious phenomena for sociological investigation; and his concept of field, while applicable to the centralizing authority of Roman Catholicism, seems limited in situations of religious pluralism with a wide variety of indigenous religious movements.

Another paper that offers insights into Bourdieu's early conceptual development is Frédéric Lebaron's "Pierre Bourdieu: Economic models against economism" that provides a corrective to considerable misunderstanding of Bourdieu's relationship to neo-classical economics. Lebaron addresses the frequent charge that Bourdieu's theory of action harbors a materialist economic reductionism, similar in general orientation to the human capital view of Gary Becker. Bourdieu sharply denied the charge, yet it persists. Lebaron traces the

origins of Bourdieu's critical dialogue and collaboration with French economists during the 1958–1966 period when Bourdieu first outlined his “general economy of practices.”

Bourdieu is critical from the beginning of applying the neo-classical economic model of human action in all the social sciences. Moreover, even in economics, culture and symbolic power need to be introduced into the equations. Furthermore, Bourdieu breaks early with a rational action model by positing in his concept of habitus that most human action occurs tacitly without conscious calculation. Yet, Bourdieu does employ economic language in his sociology of culture as a way of demystifying arenas of human activity (high culture in particular) that are commonly thought to be without vested interest. Lebaron argues that this “double” conceptual move – culture is interested and economics is cultural – needs to be kept in mind in order to understand Bourdieu's general economy of practices as both “economic” and yet not “economistic.”

Lebaron also notes that the concept of cultural capital originates out of the empirical observation in the 1958–1966 period of Bourdieu's work that educational achievement and cultural practices were more highly correlated with education than with income. This empirical observation motivated Bourdieu's application of the term “capital” to ostensibly non-economic power sources, a conceptual strategy that Bourdieu elaborated considerably in subsequent work.

Culture and fields

Probably the work that initially brought Bourdieu's name to the forefront of both sociological and public debate was his analysis (in collaboration with Jean-Claude Passeron) in *The Inheritors* (1964)¹¹ of persisting social and cultural inequities in French higher education. The central idea of that work that university students are socially differentiated by their inherited cultural capital rather than by just their individual abilities and achievement resonated broadly with student activists and social scientific researchers alike. It is fitting, therefore, to include the study by Annette Lareau and Elliot Weinger, who in “Cultural capital in educational research: A critical assessment,” take stock of the influence of cultural capital in English language published educational research. Without doubt, of all Bourdieu's concepts, cultural capital has generated the most empirical research and had the

most impact on particular subfields, such as culture and education, in North American sociology.

The Lareau and Weininger paper raises the important sociology of knowledge issue of what happens to sociological concepts when they are imported from one national context to another. In the case of cultural capital, its importation into North American academic culture changed its meaning in two ways foreign to Bourdieu's original conceptualization. Cultural capital became associated with "highbrow" aesthetic culture and became analytically and causally distinguished from technical forms of knowledge or competence. The authors review Bourdieu's educational writings to find that neither of these two meanings is essential to Bourdieu's understanding of the concept. They find, instead, a definition of cultural capital that stresses dominant group capacity to impose advantageous standards of evaluation whatever their form to be more fruitful in exploring the intersection of institutionalized evaluative standards of schools and the educational practices of families belonging to different social classes. They review a growing number of recent studies, including their own, that employ this more Bourdieusian view of culture as a form of capital.

In 1997 Swartz¹² observed that compared to all the attention accorded cultural capital and habitus, Bourdieu's concept of field had been neglected. This is no longer the case and the papers by Sapiro, Couldry, and Kauppi illustrate the considerable amount of research today drawing inspiration from Bourdieu's field perspective. In "Forms of politicization in the French literary field" Gisèle Sapiro employs the concept of field to understand the role of political stance in shaping the careers among twentieth century French writers. Like Dianteill, Sapiro notes Bourdieu's recourse to Max Weber's sociology of religion to describe the prophetic and charismatic style employed by French literary figures in their politics. And it is position within the literary field rather than political party membership or social class location that distinguishes the various types of political expression among French writers ("notabilities," "esthetes," "avant-garde," and "writer-journalists"). Sapiro is able to correlate the writer's field position with his conception of literary work and form of politicization – demonstrating the usefulness of Bourdieu's concept of field for political as well as cultural analysis.

A long-time and careful observer of Bourdieu's work, Nicholas Garnham¹³ observed a striking paradox in Bourdieu's extensive analysis of fields of cultural production yet neglect of TV and the mass media. Likewise Bourdieu had very little to say about the state – an object of considerable theorizing and research in political sociology – until his later years. It was relatively late in his career that Bourdieu began devoting much attention to these two important substantive areas in modern societies. His explosive, polemical, and widely read indictment of media journalism in 1996 clearly marked his interest in the mass media.¹⁴ As Rodney Benson shows,¹⁵ some close research associates of Bourdieu, particularly Patrick Champagne,¹⁶ had in fact developed a vigorous and empirically informed critique among close followers of Bourdieu of the media in France. The concept of field proved to be key in shaping what might be called the distinctively Bourdieusian approach to media sociology.

In "Media meta-capital: Extending the range of Bourdieu's field theory," Nick Couldry examines this field-based school of research. He finds that, while strong in providing detailed explanations of the internal workings of the media field, this approach falls short of explaining the apparent importance and influence of the media in society more generally. To address this shortcoming, Couldry proposes drawing on two other conceptual moves in Bourdieu: his early formulation of symbolic power and his late view of the state as the ultimate arbiter of the legitimate means of symbolic violence and hence the source of a kind of metacapital to adjudicate the competing claims of all other forms of capital. Couldry suggests, therefore, an elaboration of portions of Bourdieu's thought to outline a research program for identifying the role of the state and the mass media and their interrelationship in the categorization and classification of the social world.

Economics as a cultural and social domain

In "Flesh and the free market: On taking Bourdieu to the stock exchange," Richard Widick brings Bourdieu's view of practices as embodied knowledge to bear upon a new substantive area for empirical research: the highly competitive, gaming world of traders in the stock exchange. Widick draws on habitus and Bourdieu's view of action as practice to describe traders' talk, their cultural production, and their bodily and gendered performances. He finds evidence of a gendered, trader habitus in this virtually exclusive world

of male competition. But he objects to Bourdieu's frequent recourse to cognitivist metaphors in describing bodily knowledge and proposes to supplement this view of the logic of practice with the logic of identification found in Freud. Traders not only think like traders; they also identify with charismatic supertrader heroes. Widick sees in several of Bourdieu's later theoretical statements – particularly in *Pascalian Meditations*¹⁷ a conceptual move towards greater openness to some psychoanalytical interpretation. Although beyond the scope of this collection, the relationship between Bourdieu's socioanalysis and psychoanalysis with respect to human action merits fuller exploration.

If cultural capital has been widely recognized as an important sociological concept, Bourdieu's view of social capital has not found the same success. Yet as Alejandro Portes points out,¹⁸ Bourdieu's formulation of social resources as a form of capital is theoretically more compelling than the more popular versions proffered by James Coleman and Robert Putnam. The paper "On the Wealth of Nations: Bourdieconomics and social capital" by Gert Tinggaard Svendsen and Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen draws on Bourdieu's concept.

The Svendsens recognize, as Lebaron points out, that Bourdieu's understanding of capital does not reduce to material forms. Indeed, as economists, the Svendsens wish to broaden the institutional approach to political economic analysis to include non-material power resources such as social networks and membership. They in fact coin the term "Bourdieconomics" to do that and draw upon Bourdieu's understanding of social capital as a form of power that facilitates trust and informal human exchange in ways to reduce transaction costs and thereby enhance economic growth. They propose to integrate social capital as a factor of production into the analysis of economic growth and income differences. They offer preliminary results of their own cross-national research among Western and Eastern European countries to suggest that countries (e.g., Denmark) with high social capital tend to have high per capital income.

Culture and politics

We have already noted that a consistent theme in Bourdieu is the effort to transcend traditional dualisms long debated in the social sciences. One of these persistent antinomies in the history of the social sciences is the materialism/idealism opposition. Bourdieu

rejected that opposition as a false dichotomy motivated more by politics than by scientific rigor. He conceptually extended culture to the realm of interest and simultaneously extended interest to the realm of culture, as already noted in Lebaron's paper. For Bourdieu, interest and culture stand not in fundamental opposition but are relationally linked; the pursuit of material interest is inseparable from a cultural understanding of just what that interest might be and culture, even in its most abstract expression, is never devoid of interest. One particularly vivid discussion of this idea comes in the concluding chapter of *Distinction* where Bourdieu identifies classes as classification struggles. Chad Goldberg, in "Haunted by the specter of communism: Collective identity and resource mobilization in the demise of the Workers Alliance of America," builds on this Bourdieusian argument in offering a historical case study of the demise of the Workers Alliance of America, a powerful, nation-wide movement of the unemployed formed in 1935 and dissolved in 1941.

Though Bourdieu is not known as a social movement theorist, Goldberg deftly applies Bourdieu's classification struggles to build a bridge between two traditions of social movement research, resource mobilization/political process theories and new social movements theoretical emphasis on collective identity. Bourdieu's stress on the importance of symbolic power in classification struggles provides an important corrective to each. Goldberg's study illustrates that political mobilization does not presuppose an already established political identity. Nor does political identity require a clear objective base in order to form. Both identity and mobilization can form simultaneously and dialectically out of struggle itself.

The next two papers take up more directly the relationship of Bourdieu to politics, a dimension of Bourdieu's life and work that thus far has been largely neglected by most scholars. In "Bourdieu's political sociology and the politics of European Integration," Niilo Kauppi identifies key features of Bourdieu's political sociology that Kauppi conceptualizes as a structural constructivist theory of politics. Kauppi finds that Bourdieu's structural constructivism provides important theoretical tools for a critical analysis of European integration.

Drawing on Bourdieu's concepts of political capital and political field, Kauppi presents some key studies illustrating how aspects of Bourdieu's sociology of politics are being used to generate useful

research on European integration. The European Union is currently a transnational political field in formation. Kauppi observes that at this stage of its development this new political entity is taking on some of the functions of the nation-state but is slow to develop a European civil society and effective democracy.

As Kauppi points out Bourdieu never studied the European Union but sharply condemned the neoliberal form it has been taking in recent years. Indeed, by the late 1990s Bourdieu had become the leading public intellectual of social scientific stature at the head of the anti-globalization movement in France and in other Western European countries.

The paper by Swartz examines Bourdieu's political activism as a committed social scientist. "From critical sociology to public intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu and politics" situates Bourdieu's political activism in his last years relative to his professional career and the changing character of the French intellectual field in relationship to politics and the mass media. It argues that Bourdieu moved to a central location in the French intellectual field, that the field itself was transformed by the growing influence of the mass media, and that the failures of the French Socialists in power and the emergence of globalization as a unifying national issue all combined to open for Bourdieu a public intellectual role to play that was not possible in his earlier years.

These twelve papers offer but a glimpse of the many ways Bourdieu's oeuvre has inspired new research, critical reflection, and creative elaboration. Their publication here we hope will further the aims of the committed social scientific scholarship that is the hallmark of Pierre Bourdieu's life and work.

Notes

1. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]). The ranking comes from a 1997 International Sociological Association survey. See <http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/books/>
2. Some notable books in English on Bourdieu's work include Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), Bridget Fowler, *Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory: Critical Investigations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997),

- Derek Robbins, *The Work of Pierre Bourdieu: Recognizing Society* (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991) and *Bourdieu and Culture* (London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), and David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997).
3. The October 18–19, 2002 *Conference on Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002): Social Scientist & Public Intellectual* received financial support from the Boston University Department of Sociology and College of Arts and Sciences, the Humanities Foundation, and the French Cultural Services of Boston. We wish to thank the Department of Sociology Chair, John Stone and staff, including Katie McNamera and particularly Marie Mota, for their extraordinary support. On April 26, 2002 Vera Zolberg organized *A Symposium on Pierre Bourdieu* at the New School for Social Research and gratefully acknowledges support from a Title VI Grant of the US Department of Education and The Rockefeller Foundation.
 4. Rodney Benson, “Field theory in comparative context: A new paradigm for media studies,” *Theory and Society* 28/3 (1999), Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking classical sociology: The sociological vision of Pierre Bourdieu,” *ibid.* 14/6 (1985), Nick Crossley, “The phenomenological habitus and its construction,” *ibid.* 30/1 (2001), and John Myles, “From habitus to mouth: Language and class in Bourdieu’s sociology of language,” *ibid.* 28/6 (1999).
 5. Pierre Bourdieu, “Social space and symbolic power,” *Sociological Theory* 7 (1989).
 6. Pierre Bourdieu, “Vive la crise! For heterodoxy in social science,” *Theory and Society* 17-5 (1988).
 7. *Ibid.*
 8. See Rogers Brubaker, “Social theory as habitus,” in *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone (Chicago, 1993) and the prefatory note to “Rethinking classical theory.”
 9. See Erwan Dianteill, “Pierre Bourdieu et la religion. Synthèse critique d’une synthèse critique,” *Archives de Sciences sociales des Religions* 118 (2002).
 10. His study with Monique de Saint Martin, “La sainte famille. L’épiscopat français dans le champ du pouvoir,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 44/45 (1982) is one notable exception.
 11. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *The Inheritors: French Students and their Relation to Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979 [1964]).
 12. See Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*.
 13. See Nicholas Garnham and Raymond Williams, “Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of culture,” *Media, Culture, and Society* 2/3 (1980) and Nicholas Garnham, “Bourdieu, the cultural arbitrary, and television,” in *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Graig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993).
 14. See Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television* (New York: New Press, 1998 [1996]).
 15. See Rodney Benson, “Field theory in comparative context: A new paradigm for media studies,” *Theory and Society* 28 (1999).
 16. Patrick Champagne, *Faire l’opinion. Le nouvel espace politique* (Paris, 1979).
 17. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000 [1997]).

18. See A. Portes, "Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998).

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INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS & ORIENTATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

In memoriam: Pierre Bourdieu 1930–2002

On January 23, 2002 sociology lost one of the most influential French thinkers of our time, Pierre Bourdieu. His death, following a brief bout with cancer, prompted public acknowledgment from all sections of French society ranging from intellectuals and grassroots activists to the French president and prime minister. Much of the press throughout Western Europe (and several U.S. newspapers) eulogized his death with comments from leading intellectuals of many countries. Within professional sociology his productivity was prolific and consequential. An International Sociological Association survey placed *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1979)¹ as the sixth most important social scientific work of the twentieth century.² *Contemporary Sociology* (May, 1996) reviewed *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1972) as one of the ten most influential books of the past 25 years. The *Social Science Citation Index* shows Bourdieu to have become the most frequently cited French social scientist since the early 1990s. Thus, his intellectual influence had become thoroughly international, including Asia and particularly Latin America, as well as Western Europe and North America.

Author of over forty books and five-hundred articles in several languages, Bourdieu founded and guided the journal, *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* for over 25 years, the collection of books (*Le sens commun*) with Editions de Minuit for over 25 years and in 1996 started his own publishing house Editions Liber-Raison d'Agir. His appeal, however, was not limited to the profession of sociology but much broader, particularly in the last several years, as he came to play an important and highly visible role of public intellectual in France and Western Europe. Given the number of close associates that worked with him over the years and the much larger network of social scientists drawing direct influence in their work from him, it is no exaggeration to say that Bourdieu founded a veritable school of sociology, the most important in France since Emile Durkheim.

Bourdieu's career

Pierre Bourdieu was born in 1930 into a lower-middle-class family; his father was a small farmer who became a postman in the village of Lasseube in Southwestern France. He spent his early years in this remote rural region of Béarn and spoke the regional dialect. A particularly gifted and industrious student, he first entered the Lycée de Pau (1941–1947), then the prestigious and academically selective Parisian Lycée Louis-Le Grand (1948–1951). In 1951, he entered the academically elite Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris where he prepared the agrégation in philosophy. Jacques Derrida was a classmate. Louis Althusser taught there. Alain Touraine preceded Bourdieu at the ENS in 1945 and Raymond Boudon followed in 1954. He simultaneously took courses at the Faculty of Letters in Paris (1951–1954).

ENS is known for cultivating an abundance of *esprit critique*, and in this Bourdieu excelled. Little escaped his critical flair: peers, professors, the school itself. Of humble social and cultural origins, Bourdieu experienced ENS not only as a miraculous survivor of strenuous academic selection, but also as a cultural and social outsider. This personal experience of alienation within French academe motivated him to submit French schooling – indeed all institutions – to critical examination. Indeed, one finds Bourdieu normalizing this critical disposition as a desirable – if not necessary – ingredient for the successful pursuit of sociology itself. It is striking that Bourdieu's self-perception of being an outsider to the French intellectual world informs, throughout his life, his sharply critical posture toward this very world in which his phenomenal rise to intellectual renown occurred.

After finishing the agrégation in philosophy in 1955, Bourdieu, like so many agrégés before him, went to the provinces to teach philosophy at the secondary level. He began teaching at the Lycée Banville in Moulins (1954–1955) just outside of Paris. But the war with Algeria intervened, and he was called into military service in Algeria (1958–1960). Colonial Algeria and the war for liberation were important to Bourdieu's career for it was there that he actually began his social scientific work as a “self-taught” ethnologist among the Kabyle peasant communities. His first book, *Sociologie de l'Algérie* (1958), several subsequent books and papers, and his early and revised formations of his theory of practices in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1972) and *The Logic of Practice* (1980) were directly informed by this first fieldwork experience.

Like many French intellectuals, Bourdieu opposed the French colonial war effort and for this reason was eventually obliged to leave Algiers and return to Paris. There he assumed an appointment as one of Raymond Aron's teaching assistants at the Sorbonne. He taught at the Sorbonne from 1961 to 1962 and then at the Faculty of Letters at the University of Lille through 1964. In 1964 he became one of the directors of studies at the Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. He refused to complete the state doctorate degree, which is the standard requirement for those seeking chairs in the French universities. Bourdieu made his early career in research centers and seminar rooms rather than university lecture halls.

For a time, Raymond Aron was an important institutional sponsor as Bourdieu assumed direction of Aron's research center in 1964. Sharp differences soon emerged after the 1964 publication of *The Inheritors*, in which Bourdieu, along with his co-author Jean-Claude Passeron, advanced stinging criticism of the class-based character of the French university population and of student culture. He soon broke with Aron in disagreement over the 1968 French university crisis and set up his own research center (Centre de Sociologie de l'Education et de la Culture). In 1970 Bourdieu and Passeron would publish their landmark book *Reproduction: In Education, Society and Culture*, which has become one of the contemporary classics in the sociology of education.

Extensive surveys of French consumer practices, cultural tastes, and lifestyles and further analysis of his Algerian data in the 1970s culminated in two major books, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1979) and *The Logic of Practice* (1980), which helped Bourdieu gain entry in 1981 into the Collège de France, the pinnacle of French intellectual life. *Distinction* was also a commercial success that brought him considerable media attention. The new public notoriety, however, did not diminish his research productivity. The 1980s brought to fruition his cumulative empirical and critical study of the French university and the system of the *grandes écoles*. His study of the Paris university faculties and professorate culminated in the 1984 publication of *Homo Academicus*. The research project on the *grandes écoles*, begun in the early 1970s, finally was published in *The State Nobility* in 1989. Near the end of the decade he began a new research project on public housing policy in France and that led to several articles in *Actes* and culminated in the 2000 publication of *les Structures sociales de l'économie*.

The early 1990s brought further research and publication successes. In 1992, he published *The Rules of Art*, which assembles his work on Flaubert – a sort of sociological response to Sartre’s work on Flaubert – and the rise of artistic and literary fields in France. In 1993 the publication of *The Field of Cultural Production* brought together several major essays on art, literature, and culture that he had written over the 1968–1987 period. The research on housing was followed in the early 1990s by a massive interviewing project of lower-middle-class individuals on the theme of social suffering and exclusion. This research led to the 1993 publication of *The Weight of the World*, which was also a commercial success. His call for a critical and reflexive practice of sociological investigation would find expression in 1992 with the widely read *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (coauthored with Loïc Wacquant). In 1993 he received the CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique) Gold Metal for outstanding contributions to scientific research. (This prestigious award is seldom given to someone in the social sciences – Lévi-Strauss received it in 1968.) Several subsequent and important books include *On Television* (1996), *Pascalian Meditations* (1997), *Masculine Domination* (1998), and *Acts of Resistance* (1998). In late 2001, *The Science of Science and Reflexivity* appeared in French and three more books completed just prior to his death will soon appear. The most complete listing of his works can be found at the following web site: <http://www.iwp.uni-linz.ac.at/lxe/sektktf/bb/HyperBourdieu.html>

The public intellectual

While an extraordinarily productive sociologist, Bourdieu also became in the 1990s, following the death of Foucault (1984), the leading public intellectual in France. Prior to the 1980s and 1990s, Bourdieu rarely made public political declarations in the tradition of Parisian intellectuals. His efforts during the 1960s and 1970s had focused on developing a professional sociology as distinct from the academic sociology taught in the universities and the media-oriented pop sociology that flourished in French intellectual circles. He wanted to transform sociology into a rigorous research enterprise that would be critical though not prophetic, theoretical though empirically researchable, and scientific though not positivist. To that end he devoted his energies to creating a research center, a sociological journal and a network of researchers that would institutionalize and legitimize his vision for sociological inquiry. Indeed, Bourdieu’s silence during the May 1968

student uprising was conspicuous, because virtually all other leading French sociologists at the time took public positions regarding the student movement.

Yet, even Bourdieu's earliest work has a political dimension. While drawing a sharp distinction between politics and the scientific work of sociology, Bourdieu insists on the political relevance of sociology. For him, sociology is to be the study of power. Since effective exercise of power requires legitimation, the practice of sociological research has the effect of unmasking and debunking hidden, taken-for-granted power relations shaping social life. His earliest Algerian work on peasant attitudes toward time spoke critically of French colonialism and efforts to modernize traditional communities. *The Inheritors* contributed to the growing critical consciousness of class inequalities in French higher education during the May 1968 student movement. *Reproduction* informed a generation of labor leaders and activists as well as students, teachers, and sociologists of the subtle inequalities in education. But not until after entry into the Collège de France in 1981, and particularly after the death of Foucault (1984), did Bourdieu begin more frequent direct political involvements. Armed with both the intellectual prestige of the Collège de France and the scientific legitimacy of the 1993 CNRS Gold Metal award, by which the French scientific community gave special recognition to sociology as a science and Bourdieu as its most recognized spokesperson, Bourdieu could intervene politically with an authority not available to him in earlier years. And intervene he did. He began to sign more public declarations, participate in demonstrations, grant more interviews, appear on television, and join political protest groups. He became France's leading public intellectual.

Change in his institutional position only partially explains Bourdieu's rapid ascendancy to the public intellectual position that seemed to many to be in line with that held by Sartre and Foucault before him. The attack against welfare state provision by Thatcher in England and Reagan in the United States spread to Western Europe. To his considerable disgust, even the Socialists in France began to advocate market-oriented reforms that would reduce both the size and responsibilities of the welfare state. Though traditionally critical of state power, Bourdieu came to view the new era of globalization and fiscal constraints on state spending as even more threatening to the well-being of communities. His research in *The Weight of the World* (1993) undoubtedly sharpened his awareness of and gave voice to disenfranchised and

marginalized individuals and groups who experience directly the dislocation, precariousness, and constraints imposed by reduced state social services. The tremendous success of *The Weight of the World*, in terms of sales, public debate and media attention it provoked, brought to Bourdieu a new level of visibility as a public intellectual. This success opened up for Bourdieu the possibility of a new and effective political role based on his scientific authority.

While a long-time critic of media-oriented intellectuals (whom he dismissed as superficial), Bourdieu became increasingly convinced that the marketing orientation of cultural and political life had so advanced that it had become virtually impossible for alternative viewpoints to gain a fair public hearing. He viewed the arena of public debate as increasingly monopolized by technocrats and journalists pushing out artists, writers, and scientists. The voices of grassroots activists, immigrants, the unemployed, and labor activists were too easily dismissed as “irrational” and “unrealistic” in the climate of globalization and austerity that were justified in the neo-liberal language of financial necessities. Bourdieu came to believe in the urgency of his role as a critical intellectual and social scientist to speak forcefully against this neo-liberal discourse that he believed has come to exercise a powerful censoring effect on public debate. He denounced as the “neo-liberal scourge” the euphemized language of financial rigor, flexibility, and efficiency as harboring the market interests of dominant and privileged groups. His sharply focused criticism of neo-liberal bias in media journalism in his little “red book” *On Television* (1996) was a major publishing success and provoked sharp debate over the role of the mass media in France. Yet, Bourdieu believed that his more direct political involvements did not compromise his rigorous and objective practice of sociology as a science. In his words, the challenge was to “think politics without thinking politically.”

Finally, I should also note that Bourdieu’s unexpected death is grieved not only within the scholarly and intellectual milieu. Even more than Foucault before him, Bourdieu had touched the political sentiments of thousands of grassroots activists, labor leaders, immigrants, peasants, teachers, transit employees, homeless advocates, gays and lesbians – a wide range of individuals and groups who benefitted least from the triumphal forces of globalization and privatization of the public sector. He brought to their diverse concerns a sense that within the distant and august halls of French science and high culture they had been heard, understood, and their cause defended by one, Pierre Bourdieu.

Notes

1. Publication dates are for the original French versions of the cited works.
2. In addition, *The Logic of Practice* was ranked 4th and *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* 48th. The only other French thinkers to make it into the top 50 were Emile Durkheim and Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (16th).

Boston University

David L. Swartz

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CHAPTER 2

Rethinking classical theory

The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu

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Prefatory note

The paper reprinted here grew out of a close reading of Bourdieu's work undertaken while writing an M.A. thesis on Bourdieu at the University of Sussex in 1980. At that time, *La Distinction* (1979) and *Le Sens pratique* (1980) had just been published in French. The first statement of Bourdieu's general theoretical stance had been translated in 1977 as *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, but the only other books available in English dealt with Algeria or with education. Several important articles and book chapters by Bourdieu had been published in English, but these were not widely known or readily accessible. Only a few articles about Bourdieu's work had appeared in English. In the English-speaking world, anthropologists and sociologists of education were familiar with the work, but broader audiences in the social sciences and humanities were not.

Five years later, when the paper was published in *Theory and Society*, this had already begun to change. *Distinction* appeared in English in 1984, and wider audiences were becoming interested in Bourdieu's work. In subsequent years, of course, virtually all of Bourdieu's major work has become available in English, and a large secondary literature has developed. And Bourdieu's own *oeuvre* continued to grow in rich new directions, yielding such important books as *Homo Academicus*, *The State Nobility*, *Pascalian Meditations*, and *The Rules of Art*.

This paper should be understood in context, then, as an early attempt in English to come to terms with Bourdieu's work, and particularly with *Distinction*, through an analysis of the systematic metatheory that, I argued, informed all Bourdieu's work up to that point.

In a subsequent paper,¹ I adopted a different perspective on Bourdieu's work, following Bourdieu's lead in thinking about his theory – and about social theory more generally – in dispositional terms, i.e. in terms of a particular sociological habitus. When I first encountered Bourdieu's work, for example, I collected a dozen or so definitions – or what I took to be definitions – of “habitus” in an attempt to pin down its precise meaning. Only later did I come to believe that Bourdieu was not so much defining as characterizing the concept of habitus in a variety of ways in order to communicate a certain theoretical stance or posture, to designate – and inculcate – a certain sociological disposition, a certain way of looking at the world. The same could be said of the other fundamental concepts: interest, capital, strategy, field, and so forth.

Thinking about theory as habitus, I suggested, enables one to think *with* Bourdieu *about* Bourdieu – and sometimes even against Bourdieu. It enables us to examine his schemes of sociological vision with the aid of those same schemes. It enables us to appropriate his theory in a practical, sociologically productive manner. As Bourdieu noted, his own work grew out of a practical appropriation of the “thinking tools” available in the sociological tradition:

the elaboration and the transmission of effective and fertile methods of thinking have nothing to do with the flow of “ideas” such as one normally imagines it To understand scientific works, which unlike theoretical texts, call forth practical application and not contemplation, . . . one has to make the way of thinking which is expressed [in such works] function practically à propos a different object, to reactivate it in a new act of [intellectual] production.²

Confronted with Bourdieu's own work, we would do well to seek to “master practically, by incorporating as an habitus” the thinking tools that Bourdieu made available.

It should go without saying that such a practical appropriation need not be an uncritical one. Just as Bourdieu was fond of describing his relation with “canonical” theorists in terms of “thinking with a thinker against that thinker,” so we can and should think with Bourdieu against Bourdieu. But this can best be done by appropriating his sociological dispositions, his thinking tools, making them ours and making our own use of them, testing in practice their practical productivity (along, of course, with dispositions and thinking tools appropriated from other sources).

In the later article, I went on to analyze Bourdieu's key concepts and metatheoretical propositions as designators of particular intellectual dispositions or sets of dispositions. This reading suggested a set of questions about and criticisms of Bourdieu's work, and sociological work more broadly, somewhat different from those I arrived at in the earlier article. I mention three of these here.

First, the shared habitus or "collective practice of the same *modus operandi*"³ that is central to collaborative work and to schools of thought is epistemologically ambivalent. It fosters cumulative research and enhances intellectual productivity, since practices governed by shared habitus, as Bourdieu put it, are "immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted," rendering unnecessary "close analysis of the nuances of another's practice and tacit or explicit inquiry ('What do you mean?') into his intentions."⁴ Yet this taken-for-grantedness has its intellectual costs as well. How can one best manage the tension between the productivity and cumulativeness that are fostered by shared habitus and the uncritical stance that the automaticity of mutual understanding may produce among persons with similar intellectual dispositions?

Second, the disposition to analyze the social world in terms of a basic duality between subjective and objective, and the world of social research in terms of a basic opposition between subjectivism and objectivism, is both immensely productive and occasionally unduly constraining. This central disposition of Bourdieu's sociological habitus equipped him to capture in a remarkably rich and subtle manner the "intrinsically dual" nature of social life, at once objective and subjective, external and internal, material and symbolic, patterned yet improvised, constrained yet (conditionally) free, and to integrate these moments in all his sociological accounts. Yet his polarized readings of various fields and subfields of social theory and research, invariably enabling him to locate his own "constructivist structuralism" by intellectual triangulation vis-à-vis one-sided objectivist and subjectivist alternatives, are sometimes strained and predictable.

Third, the schemes of perception, apprehension, and thought that Bourdieu internalized in the course of his philosophical and ethnological formation predisposed him towards highly systemic sociological accounts, structured around correspondences,

symmetries, homologies, and fundamental binary oppositions. I do not mean to suggest that Bourdieu's schemes of sociological vision make no place for tension, conflict, dissidents, or transformation; they do. But they disposed him to see tension and conflict in systemic terms, and as structured by a small number of fundamental oppositions. This is an enormously productive disposition. But it can incline the theorist to read the social world in too systemic a manner, in a manner that risks imposing a systematic coherence on a messy, unruly, and in some respects unsystematic reality.

Bourdieu was arguably the most important and influential social theorist of the last quarter of the 20th century. If his remarkable *oeuvre* proves enduringly influential, as I believe it will, this will reflect not only the power and sophistication of his theoretical synthesis, but also the fact that the "thinking tools" comprising that synthesis were developed not in abstraction from but in continuous engagement with empirical research, and because those tools – designed for and developed in the context of collective sociological work – have been appropriated, indeed were designed to be appropriated, by other researchers. Thinking of theory as habitus can help us understand what the appropriation of such theoretical thinking tools entails in practice.

Los Angeles, March 2004

One of the most fertile and influential voices in recent French social theory has been that of Pierre Bourdieu. A sociologist of unusually broad intellectual formation, Bourdieu has produced, during the last two decades, a wide-ranging body of work remarkable for its theoretical sophistication and for its ethnographic acuity, and constituting one of the most significant of recent attempts to adapt the theoretical legacy of classical social theory to the empirical study, from a broadly critical perspective, of contemporary society.

Largely through the assiduous efforts of Richard Nice, much of this work is now available in English.⁵ Yet knowledge of Bourdieu's work among Anglophone readers remains fragmentary. Anthropologists are familiar with his early ethnographic studies of Kabylia and with the metatheoretical discussions of *Outline of a Theory of Practice*; sociologists of education debate his work on the role of the educational system in perpetuating class-based differences in power and prestige;

and sociologists of culture have recently begun to draw on his theory of the production and consumption of symbolic goods. But few students in these fields, and even fewer outside them, are aware of the full range and power of Bourdieu's work. As Nicholas Garnham and Raymond Williams have suggested, such "fragmentary and partial appropriation of what is a rich and unified body of theory and related empirical work ... can lead to a danger of seriously misreading the theory."⁶

The recent publication in English of *Distinction* should appreciably lessen this danger: for this sprawling masterwork brings together in a single volume many of the themes that have exercised Bourdieu since the early 1960s. *Distinction*, however, is a difficult and (as Bourdieu warns in his preface to the English-language edition) a "very French" work: it is not for the uninitiated. It thus may be helpful to offer here an analytical overview and critical appraisal of Bourdieu's work, focusing on its central and unifying concern with social class and the reproduction over time of class-based power and privilege.

Sources

Understanding French social theory, as Charles Lemert has argued in these pages (and as Bourdieu's own theory of symbolic production, reflexively applied to his own work, would imply), requires a prior understanding of the particular intellectual "fields" within which it is produced, as well as an understanding of the peculiarly text-centered literary culture that is the backdrop for all French intellectual work.⁷ Any close reader of Bourdieu can testify to the truth of this claim. The problems Bourdieu addresses and the solutions he proposes are defined in the course of elaborate though not always explicit arguments with other texts and traditions. While a thorough examination of the multiple intellectual sources and contexts of his work is beyond the scope of this article, something must nonetheless be said, by way of introduction, about two crucial intellectual contexts.

The first is the opposition in the post-war French intellectual field between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss. (Bourdieu, born in 1930, came of intellectual age just as the impact of Lévi-Strauss's work was beginning to make itself felt: *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* was published in 1949.) This "exemplary confrontation" was doubly significant for the development of Bourdieu's work. In the first

place, it furnished divergent models of intellectual vocation, with Lévi-Strauss (whose seminar at the Collège de France Bourdieu attended) suggesting “to a whole generation a new way of conceiving intellectual activity” and opposing a kind of “metascientific enthusiasm for science” to Sartre’s posture as a “total” intellectual, decisively turned towards politics.”⁸ Second, and in this context more important, it set against one another, in a relation of fruitful tension, two radically different approaches to the study of social life: Sartre’s voluntarism and Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism. Sartre’s emphasis on the creativity, freedom, and undetermined power of choice of the individual subject and Lévi-Strauss’s emphasis on the causal power of structures operating independently of the consciousness of agents came to be seen by Bourdieu as antithetical poles of a basic opposition between subjectivism and objectivism, an opposition discernible in different guises throughout the history of social thought and constituting, in his view, the chief obstacle to the construction of an adequate theory of society. All of Bourdieu’s work, seen in this light, represents an effort to “transcend the antagonism which sets these two modes of knowledge against each other and at the same time to preserve the insights gained by each position.”⁹

I shall have more to say later about Bourdieu’s attempt to avoid the twin dangers of subjectivism and objectivism. Here, however, I wish to consider a second (and more important) intellectual source of Bourdieu’s work: classical social theory, especially the writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.¹⁰ The central concern with class and reproduction and the critical, oppositional tone of Bourdieu’s writings have misled some into reading him as a Marxist.¹¹ Marxists themselves, on the other hand, have tended to regard him as a Durkheimian, excessively concerned with the integrative functions of culture. Paul DiMaggio, in a judicious review article, proposed a compromise formula: Bourdieu’s work, he suggested, represents a marriage of Durkheim and Marx.¹² Bourdieu is indeed indebted to Marx and Durkheim for his theoretical program, which may be described as an attempt to unite the (sketchy) Marxian program for a sociology of reproduction with the Durkheimian program for a genetic sociology of symbolic forms.¹³ But if Bourdieu’s programmatic aims are derived from Marx and Durkheim, the substance of his theory owes most to Max Weber.

Bourdieu appropriates from Weber the conceptual resources for a theory of the social functions of symbolic goods and symbolic practices. From Weber's conception of the particular styles of life and attributions of honor or dishonor that define status groups, he develops (most fully in *Distinction*) a systematic theory of the relation of life-styles and their attendant marks of distinction to material conditions of existence – a theory, in Weberian terms, of the relation of stratification by status to stratification by class.¹⁴ From the Weberian notions of charisma and legitimacy, he develops a systematic theory of symbolic power and its relations to economic and political power.¹⁵ And from Weber's notions of ideal goods and ideal interests (as well as other themes and concepts developed by Weber in his sociology of religion), he constructs a general theory of the “economy of symbolic goods” and its relation to the material economy – a theory of the production and consumption of symbolic goods, the pursuit of symbolic profit, the accumulation of symbolic capital, and the modes of conversion of symbolic capital or power into other forms of power.¹⁶

From Durkheim, as suggested above, Bourdieu appropriates an explicit program: the program for a genetic sociology of symbolic forms, the aspiration to explain the “social genesis of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action.”¹⁷ For Bourdieu, as for Durkheim, this program is based on the hypothesis of a correspondence between social structures and symbolic structures. Enunciated by Durkheim in the conclusion to *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, the program is echoed by Bourdieu in the conclusion to *Distinction* (itself an investigation of the “elementary forms” of cultural life, such as the search for distinction that gives the book its name): “the cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the world are internalized, ‘embodied’ social structures.”¹⁸ And Bourdieu follows Durkheim in emphasizing the social as well as cognitive functions of “collective representations” and “primitive classifications”¹⁹ – though he conceives these as functions of domination, while Durkheim conceives them as functions of “logical and social integration.”²⁰ Bourdieu, in short, revives the Durkheimian effort to construct a sociological theory of knowledge and social perception, but is critical of the “illusion of consensus” that informs Durkheim's thought.²¹

Bourdieu's appropriation of themes from Marx, in particular from the “middle Marx” of the Theses on Feuerbach and the *German*

Ideology, seems evident and straightforward. The primacy of class as the unit of analysis; the emphasis on the practical activity involved in the production and reproduction of social life; the notion that social being determines consciousness – these Marxian themes are salient in Bourdieu’s work. And Marx’s first thesis on Feuerbach is the kernel of Bourdieu’s effort to develop an adequate theory of practice (it stands as the epigraph to his *Outline of a Theory of Practice*). But the real significance of Bourdieu’s relation to Marx lies less in his appropriation of specific themes and perspectives than in his attempt to round out the Marxian system by integrating, with the help of conceptual tools derived chiefly from Weber, the study of the symbolic and the material dimensions of social life. Instead of segregating the study of the symbolic realm (religion, language, education, art, ideology – in short, culture, broadly understood) from the study of the material economy, and thus in effect relegating the study of culture to an “idealist semiology,” Bourdieu’s substantive theory, like the vast theory Marx envisioned but never constructed, is premised on the systematic unity of practical social life. Contra Daniel Bell, for example, who posits a “disjunction of realms” at the heart of social life and an attendant disjunction at the heart of social science,²² Bourdieu conceives society as a system of relatively autonomous but structurally homologous fields (*champs*). The theoretical understanding of fields of symbolic production and consumption requires not a radically different mode of reasoning from that required for the theoretical understanding of the (material) economy, but an extension and generalization of this mode of thinking. It requires, in short, the “generalized” or “radical” materialism exemplified in Weber’s work: “far from countering Marx’s theory, as is commonly thought, with a spiritualist theory of history, [Weber] carried the materialist mode of thinking into domains which Marxist materialism in effect abandons to spiritualism.”²³ “Generalized materialism” is perhaps somewhat misleading: Bourdieu means to emphasize not so much the materialism (though in his view the ultimate conditioning factors of all practices are material) as the generalization of a way of thinking that might better be called the “sociology of interest” – a mode of thought which conceives all practices, even the most ostensibly disinterested, as “economic [i.e. interested] practices directed [though often unconsciously] toward the maximizing of material and symbolic profit.”²⁴

What is distinctive about this economic but not economic theory, and what distinguishes it from attempts by Gary Becker and others

to extend the “economic approach to human behavior” to domains outside the traditional province of economics, is its specifically sociological dimension: its attention to class-based variations in the meanings and uses of nominally identical goods and activities,²⁵ to the social constitution of the various modes of interest, investment, and profit,²⁶ and especially to the class-based, systematically unequal distribution of the instruments needed to appropriate and accumulate both material and symbolic goods. (One can appropriate cultural goods, for example, only if one has internalized the necessary schemes of appreciation and understanding – schemes the development of which presupposes the “distance from economic necessity” that is the fundamental privilege of membership in a “privileged” class.²⁷) This original class-based inequality engenders others: it leads in particular to class-based inequalities in the chances of realizing material or symbolic profit in the various fields of activity – in school, on the job market, on the “marriage market,” in one’s everyday consumption practices - and in the chances of accumulating power in the form of material or symbolic capital.

At the risk of crude oversimplification, it may be suggested in summary that Bourdieu attempts to systematize Weber’s thought in a quasi-Marxian mode and to “subjectivize” Marxian thought by incorporating the Durkheimian concern with symbolic forms and the Weberian concern with symbolic power and symbolic goods in its systematic view of the social world as a structure of class-based power and privilege.

The Objective and the Subjective

Every sociological practice, theoretical or empirical, rests on an implicit or explicit metatheory – a general conceptual framework for the understanding of human social life. Metatheory matters: it is consequential for substantive work, determining (in part) the kinds of problems that are posed, the kinds of explanations that are offered, and the kinds of techniques of empirical study that are employed. This holds a fortiori of Bourdieu, whose systematic and explicit metatheory informs all of his substantive theoretical and empirical work, not least his conception of class and his theory of class reproduction.

Bourdieu’s metatheory, as suggested above, is constructed with reference to a set of problems that he subsumes under the rubric “objectivism vs. subjectivism.” His argument for the need to “tran-

scend” this opposition – an argument that finds repeated expression throughout his work – runs roughly as follows. Objectivism explains social life in terms of mind-independent and agent-independent elements such as material conditions of existence; subjectivism, by contrast, appeals to mind-dependent and agent-dependent elements such as the conceptions and beliefs of individuals. Neither of these one-sided modes of thought can comprehend the “intrinsically double” nature of social reality. Social life is materially grounded and conditioned, but material conditions affect behavior in large part through the mediation of individual beliefs, dispositions, and experiences. Social life exists only in and through the symbolically mediated experience and action of individuals, but these individuals have been formed under definite material conditions of existence, and their every activity – including their symbolizing activity – depends on social facts existing prior to and independently of that activity. Subjectivism ignores the external constraints placed on agents by thing-like social facts and the social formation of every “subject”; but objectivism ignores the “objectivity of the subjective”²⁸ and the “reality of the representation,”²⁹ because it does not recognize that the experience individuals have in and of social reality and the conceptions they form about it are partly constitutive of that reality. Only a theory based on a conceptualization of the relation between material and symbolic properties, and between external, constraining social facts and experiencing, apprehending, acting individuals, can be adequate for the human sciences.

Few social theorists would challenge this argument, which might well have been endorsed by theorists as distant from one another as Parsons and Marx (Parsons indeed explicitly constructs his theory with reference to the problem of the relation between objective conditions and subjective norms and values). If the argument is uncontroversial, this is because the problem of the relation between objective and subjective elements in social life, posed on this level of generality, is not a real problem at all. Objective and subjective are not “dimensions,” “aspects,” “elements,” or “factors” in social life. They are merely paired concepts, complementary terms of an extremely general and abstract conceptual opposition. Only when specific meanings are assigned to “objective” and “subjective” does the problem of the relation between the two cease to be a pseudo-problem. Consider the following successive specifications.

There is, in the first place, the problem of the relation between the material or physical constituents of the social world and the mental, symbolic, or meaningful aspects of social life. Even this is not a single problem, but a number of related problems, of which I will mention only two. First, with respect to the exercise of power, how should one conceive the relation between physical force and such things as claims to or acknowledgments of legitimacy? Second, with respect to the ways in which material objects are used in social life, how should one conceive the relation between the physical attributes of a material object and the categories in terms of which it is apprehended, such as “useful,” “valuable,” “dangerous,” “impure,” or “distinguished”? With respect to these problems, “subjectivism” denotes idealism, “objectivism” a reductionist materialism.

Second, there is the problem of the relation between economic and non-economic, in particular cultural, aspects of social life. This problem, like the first, is really a number of related problems. How should one conceive the relation between economic interests and other interests, in particular “ideal interests” in Weber’s sense? Between economic privilege or power and other forms of privilege or power, in particular power deriving from the social estimation of honor or dishonor? Between economic institutions and institutions such as the kinship system, the educational system, the legal system, the cultural system? With respect to these problems, “objectivism” denotes economism, which holds that ideal interests are mere epiphenomena of economic interests; that economic power is the source of social status; and that social phenomena in general are determined, at least “in the last instance,” to use that wonderfully elastic and ambiguous phrase that shields economistic theories from falsification, by the strict logics of material production and exchange. Against economism are ranged theories emphasizing the autonomy (often fudged as “relative autonomy”) of ideal interests vis-à-vis economic interests, the (relative) autonomy of non-economic sources and modes of exercise of power and privilege, or the ultimate cultural conditioning of all social phenomena, including economic phenomena.

Third, there is the problem of the relation between the objective validity of theoretical knowledge about social life, constructed by outside observers without reference to agents’ conceptions, and the subjective certainty of agents’ perceptions and representations of social life. “Subjectivism” here denotes the strategy of phenomenological

social theory, which attempts to grasp the “knowledge that guides conduct in everyday life,” as Berger and Luckman put it,³⁰ on the grounds that the everyday conceptions of agents – conceptions developed “in and for practice,” in Durkheim’s words – are what “really” determine what they do. Objectivism, on the other hand, is exemplified by Marxist or structuralist social theory insofar as it denies the real efficacy or scientific significance of agents’ understandings of their own activity, of phenomenology’s “everyday knowledge.” Objectivism in this sense asserts the ontological or explanatory primacy of “models,”³¹ “generative mechanisms,”³² or “deep structures”³³ – entities discernible by deep-seeing theorists but invisible to the agents whose conduct they are held to regulate.

Fourth, there is the problem of the relation between what is “in” individuals and what is external to them. (This is not the same as the problem of the relation between symbolic and material things. For some partly material things of social significance – strength, dexterity, and all kinds of capacities to perform specific physical actions – are incorporated in individuals, while some partly symbolic things – all those that constitute objective culture in the Simmelian sense – exist in an objectified state that is independent of and external to individuals.) Here “subjective” designates what is in individuals, whether temporarily, as a fleeting desire or passing thought, or enduringly, as a settled disposition, an “ingrained” habit, a “deep-seated” prejudice, or an acquired taste; “objective” designates what is independent of and external to individuals. “Subjectivism” indicates a methodological or ontological individualism, while “objectivism” refers to a range of positions opposed to individualism in either form, including both structuralism and functionalism and, paradigmatically, Durkheim’s social theory, with its injunction to “treat social facts as things” external to individuals and constraining them from without.

Fifth, there is the problem of the relation between mechanical and teleological modes of social causality. Here “objectivism” designates a mechanistic, subjectless conception of causality, one resting on a theory of persons as more or less mechanical respondents to environmental stimuli, as in behaviorism, or as bearers of objective relations, caught in the play of structural determinants beyond their knowledge and control, as in Althusserian Marxism; “subjectivism” denotes a teleological conception of social causality, based on a voluntaristic or rationalistic theory of persons as subjects acting for

reasons rather than from causes.

Sixth, there is the problem of the relative epistemological status of agents' conceptions and scientists' conceptions. With respect to this problem, the conceptions of agents are termed "subjective," while those of external observers are termed "objective." "Subjectivism" in this context indicates the epistemological thesis (advanced, for example, by Winch) that scientific conceptions must be built up from agents' conceptions; while "objectivism" denotes the contrary thesis (advocated, for example, by Durkheim and in general strongly upheld in French social thought) that agents' conceptions, while pragmatically serviceable, are (for the special purposes of social science) epistemologically unreliable, and for this reason must be disregarded by scientists.

Seventh, there is the problem of the relation between those aspects of social life that can and those that cannot be grasped scientifically through the use of controlled and formalized techniques. From another point of view, this is the question of the relation between "crystallizations" of social reality, understood as distributions at a given moment of observable properties among a given population, and the continuous flux of social reality, understood as the unbroken unity of social life as actually experienced in unfolding over time. In this context, "objective" denotes the formalized techniques used to apprehend social reality in a more or less crystallized form, as well as to what it is that can be apprehended using such techniques; while "subjective" refers to the informal techniques, paradigmatically those of a novelist like Proust or Joyce, used to apprehend life-in-flux, and to what it is that can be apprehended using those techniques. "Objectivism" here means positivism or empiricism, and in particular the exclusive reliance on operationalizable techniques, while "subjectivism" denotes a rejection or devaluation of formal and self-consciously scientific techniques in favor of informal techniques capable of apprehending social reality as experienced.

Eighth, and last, there is the problem of the relation between the theoretical and the practical points of view, between the cognitive interests of the observer of social life and the practical interests of the participant. Here "objective" means theoretical, and "subjective" means practical; "objectivism" suggests an arrogant scientism, "subjectivism" an epistemological skepticism or relativism. The problem is a double

one: on the one hand, to recognize the inherent limitations of theoretical knowledge of an essentially practical subject matter, and, on the other hand, having acknowledged these limitations, to construct appropriate conceptual foundations for an objective science of the subjective, that is, for systematic theoretical knowledge of practical social life.

Symbolic Power and Cultural Capital

These problems (all of which are addressed at some point by Bourdieu) fall roughly into three clusters. The first three are concerned with the relation between mind-independent and mind-dependent aspects of social life, the next two with the relation between agent-independent and agent-dependent aspects of social life, and the last three (which are of epistemological rather than metatheoretical significance) with the relation among the conceptions, techniques, and points of view of the detached observer and those of the involved participant. I will ignore this last group of problems, except to say that Bourdieu endorses Durkheim's epistemological objectivism, arguing that social science must break decisively with agents' self-understandings;³⁴ that he attempts in his substantive work to integrate the statistical analysis of distributions of "matter" with the ethnographic or novelistic appreciation of subtle inflections of "manner";³⁵ and that he develops an account of the inherent limitations of all theoretical knowledge of practical social life in an effort to free theoretical knowledge from additional and unnecessary limitations imposed by lack of awareness of these inherent limitations.³⁶ The first two problem-clusters I will discuss in some detail in this and the next section. For Bourdieu's responses to these problems, in the context of critical debate with Marxism and structuralism, are of crucial importance in understanding his effort to construct a social theory capable of understanding contemporary modes of class structure and class reproduction.

The first problem-cluster draws its significance from debates internal to the tradition of French Marxist thought. Because Marx never systematically developed his ideas about historical materialism or about class and class structure, theorists building on these underdeveloped aspects of his thought have had a rich and unencumbered interpretive space in which to work. The result has been a luxuriant growth of rival interpretations. It is in the context of this polemically charged interpretive space that Bourdieu's response to the first problem-cluster must be understood: it is directed against

crudely reductionist interpretations of historical materialism, against economistic interpretations of social class, and against structuralist denials of the scientific significance of agents' subjective self-understandings. These objectivist variants of Marxism, according to Bourdieu, cannot account for the "specific contributions that representations of legitimacy make to the exercise and perpetuation of power."³⁷ Nor can they account for the importance of the accumulation of non-economic goods and resources for the exercise and perpetuation of power, even economic power. Finally, the objectivist devaluation of the significance of agents' self-understandings overlooks the crucial role that false beliefs – what Bourdieu calls *méconnaissance* or misrecognition – play in maintaining the power and privilege of dominant classes. In order to account for these symbolic, cultural, and cognitive aspects of the exercise and reproduction of class-based power and privilege, Bourdieu develops a theory of symbolic violence,³⁸ a theory of symbolic goods and symbolic capital,³⁹ and a theory of the real efficacy of agents' representations – in particular their misrepresentations – of social reality.⁴⁰ These theories (I'm using the term "theory" rather loosely) come together in a general metatheoretical account of what Bourdieu calls the "economy of practices." This account rests on three core claims: that symbolic interests and economic interests are distinct and irreducible modes of self-interest; that symbolic capital and economic capital are distinct though (under certain conditions and at certain rates) mutually convertible forms of power, obeying distinct logics of accumulation and exercise; and that the logic of (symbolic or economic) self-interest underlying certain practices (including, in contemporary society, most practices in the cultural domain) is misperceived as a logic of disinterest, and that this misperception is what legitimates these practices and thereby contributes to the reproduction of the social order in which they are embedded.

This general metatheoretical account of the "economy of practices" informs all of Bourdieu's more specific theoretical analyses and empirical investigations. Consider, for example, his analysis of the functioning of what he calls, following Karl Polanyi, the archaic economy – an "economy in itself" but not "for itself." Seen from the point of view of the detached observer, exchange in the archaic economy is regulated by self-interested strategies and tacit calculations. But this "objective truth" (assuming for the sake of argument that it is an objective truth) is

not acknowledged by the participants, who hold to the “sincere fiction of a disinterested exchange”:

the “idolatriy of nature,” which makes it impossible to think of nature as a raw material or ... to see human activity as labor, i.e., as man’s struggle against nature, tends, together with the systematic emphasis on the symbolic aspect of the activities and relations of production, to prevent the economy from being grasped as an economy, i.e., as a system governed by the laws of interested calculation, competition, or exploitation.⁴¹

Self-interest, in this economy, is not reducible to material interest. Calculations of self-interest, broadly understood as any implicit or explicit reckoning of “costs” and “profits” of any kind, extends to “*all* the goods, material and symbolic, ... that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after ... which may be ‘fair words’ or smiles, handshakes or shrugs, compliments or attention, challenges or insults, honor or honors, powers or pleasures ...”⁴² Just as self-interested calculation extends, tacitly or explicitly, to symbolic as well as material goods, so power exists in the form of symbolic as well as economic capital. Even economic power has a crucial symbolic dimension. To understand, for example, the economic power exercised by a powerful family, one must consider

not only their land and instruments of production but also their kin and their clientele ... , the network of alliances ... to be kept up and regularly maintained, representing a heritage of commitments and debts of honor, a capital of rights and duties built up in the course of successive generations and providing an additional source of strength which can be called upon when extra-ordinary situations break in upon the daily routine ... , requiring the unpaid assistance of a more extended group The strategy of accumulating a capital of honour and prestige ... allows the great families to make use of the maximum workforce during the labour period.⁴³

Power in the form of symbolic capital is perceived not as power, but as a source of legitimate demands on the services of others, whether material, such as help at harvest time, or symbolic, such as the expression of deference; and it is precisely this perception or misrecognition that makes it effective as a form of power. Symbolic power and economic power are mutually (though neither instantaneously nor automatically) interconvertible in definite ways; it is this interconvertibility that justifies their sociological treatment as different forms of the same thing. But this basic thing, power tout court, cannot fruitfully be identified with economic power, for under some conditions – almost universally in pre-market economies – purely economic power is powerless, and must be converted into

symbolic power in order that it may be misperceived, legitimated, and thereby exercised.

Nor is the impotence of purely economic power confined to the pre-capitalist world. The golden era of “self-regulating” markets has been receding for over a hundred years, and it is increasingly necessary for economic power to clothe, conceal, and legitimize itself (through, for example, investments by corporations in the “Bank of Public Good-Will”) in order to make itself fully effective.⁴⁴ What holds for corporations holds also for classes and their members. Classes increasingly take the form of status groups, founded on distinctive styles of life and not (or so it appears) on dominant positions in a structure of power and privilege; class conflict, based on awareness of systematic differences in power and privilege, tends in consequence to yield to strategies of competition and emulation, based on perceptions of the social worth of different life-styles.⁴⁵ And individuals in dominant classes, with fewer opportunities than in the age of the family firm and untaxed estates to directly transmit economic power, must rely increasingly on the transmission of power and privilege in other forms – especially in the form of “cultural capital.”

Bourdieu developed the concept of cultural capital to explain differences in educational performance and cultural practices that remained unexplained by economic inequalities. Cultural or symbolic goods differ from material goods in that one can “consume” them only by apprehending their meaning. This is true for the cultural goods one encounters in museums and concert halls but also for those one encounters in school; it holds for works of art, but equally for mathematical equations, literary texts, or philosophical arguments. (It also holds equally for works of popular culture, and for all consumption goods that have symbolic meaning or value over and above their use-value.) Individuals can appropriate these goods, can apprehend their meaning, only if they already possess the necessary schemes of appreciation and understanding. The concept of cultural capital denotes the ensemble of cultivated dispositions that constitute such schemes of appreciation and understanding. These dispositions are cultivated in a double sense: in the evaluative sense, they are “refined”; and in the descriptive sense, they are the product of a process of (conscious or unconscious) cultivation.

The process of cultivation through which cultural capital is accumulated begins in the family and takes the form of an investment of time (whether the time of hired specialists or the parents' own time). This investment returns dividends in school and university and, partly through the mediation of educational experience, in social contacts, on the "marriage market," and on the job market. The payoff, to be sure, is not automatic. Because cultural capital exists in an incorporated state, as a system of internalized dispositions, the payoff is contingent on the existence of gate-keeping mechanisms that regulate access to desirable positions by somehow taking account of cultivated dispositions – by attending, for example, to the intangibles of style or manner. One such gate-keeping mechanism, according to Bourdieu, is the examination (and, more generally, the whole set of evaluative practices) in the French educational system. Empirical studies reveal that the criteria used by teachers in evaluating students' work are not neutral with respect to students' social origin, for they put a great deal of emphasis on language and style, which, more than any other aspects of educational performance, are heavily dependent on cultural capital and hence on a cultivated family background.⁴⁶ Similar informal and often unconscious mechanisms of selection and evaluation regulate hiring and courtship practices, helping in the latter case to explain the high degree of class endogamy.⁴⁷

Cultural capital exists not only in the form of incorporated dispositions but also in the objectified, socially certified form of academic degrees. As desirable positions in the job market increasingly require formal educational qualifications, it becomes essential for parents to invest in a good education for their children, meaning one that will have sufficient "scarcity value" to be profitable on the job market. This process of investment Bourdieu describes as the conversion of economic into cultural capital. In the United States as in France, the postwar boom in higher education, with its unintended inflationary and devaluationary consequences, can be explained as a response to the increasingly important role played by cultural capital in its objectified form – by educational credentials – in regulating access to desirable jobs.⁴⁸

The Habitus

Consider now the second cluster of problems: those concerning the relation between agent-dependent and agent-independent aspects of social life. These problems were brought into focus by the debates

sparked by the spectacular rise (and subsequent routinization) of structuralism in the French intellectual field. Though Bourdieu's early ethnographic studies were those of a "happy structuralist,"⁴⁹ he joined these metatheoretical debates as a critic of structuralism, in particular of its "realism of the structure" and the correlative exclusion of "subjects" – active individuals and their dispositions, aspirations, expectations – from social explanation. And if the notions of symbolic power and cultural capital mark Bourdieu's distance from certain modes of Marxist thought, the notion of *habitus* marks his distance from structuralist thought.

The *habitus* is defined abstractly as the system of internalized dispositions that mediates between social structures and practical activity, being shaped by the former and regulating the latter. The use of this dispositional concept to complement structural concepts, like the use of conceptions of symbolic power and cultural capital to complement conceptions of economic power, is intended to correct the one-sided objectivism characteristic of post-war French social theory. Just as certain variants of Marxist thought tend to reify abstractions such as "modes of production," so structuralist thought tends to reify conceptions of underlying generative structures and to treat them as "agents responsible for historical action or as a power capable of constraining action." Such purely structural explanations, according to Bourdieu, are at best abbreviated explanations, for structures "do not exist and do not really realize themselves except in and through the *system of dispositions* of the agents."⁵⁰ Adequate explanations must therefore take account of the *habitus* – the system of dispositions that mediates between inert structures and the practices through which social life is sustained and structures are reproduced or transformed.

Two examples may show how Bourdieu deploys this metatheoretical concept in his substantive theoretical and empirical work. The first illustrates how dispositions lead individuals to act in a way that reproduces the social structure (more precisely, the regularities constitutive of it) without radically transforming it. Following Gaston Bachelard, Bourdieu calls this mechanism the "causality of the probable." That such a mechanism exists is suggested by the fact that even when other things, in particular academic performance, are equal, the propensity for a student from a given class to abandon his studies increases as the probability of access to higher levels of the educational system, calculated for the average member of

his class, decreases. It is not suggested that agents have a precise knowledge of these probabilities or a disposition to reproduce them. The argument is that a person, by virtue of belonging to a particular class, has an “objective future.” Apprehended by social scientists as a set of conditional probabilities, it is apprehended by members of the class themselves in a cruder but more practically potent form as a shared modal understanding of eventualities as possible or impossible, normal or exceptional, probable or improbable, and hence as a shared evaluation of certain expectations and aspirations as “reasonable” and of others as “unreasonable.” The fairly consistent frequencies with which things do or do not occur within the immediate horizons of experience of members of the same class ensure a rough correspondence between statistical regularities and internalized expectations and aspirations; the latter in turn directly regulate conduct and ensure that the former will be roughly reproduced. The whole analysis, of course, presupposes the absence of rapid changes in social structure.⁵¹

The specific social efficacy of dispositions – and the inadequacy of any explanation that bypasses them – is especially evident in cases of rapid social change. For in such cases dispositions, adapted to the social conditions under which they were formed, may be “out of phase” with the social conditions under which they must function. To analyze these instances of dispositional lag, Bourdieu develops the concept of the “hysteresis effect,” taking the name from the physical phenomenon of magnetic effects lagging behind their causes.⁵² Consider again the example of dispositions toward education. In consequence of the “*explosion scolaire*” – the rapid increase, in all social classes, in secondary and higher education – the labor-market value of diplomas has fallen, creating a “structural mismatch” between educational and occupational aspirations, generated in and oriented to an earlier state of affairs, and real opportunities. The resultant “collective disillusionment,” according to Bourdieu, explains the “disaffection towards work” and the “anti-institutional cast of mind” characteristic of a generation “inclined to extend to all institutions the mixture of revolt and resentment it feels toward the educational system,” and these in turn explain “all the refusals and negations of the adolescent counter-culture.”⁵³ It should be clear from this analysis that Bourdieu is not committed, as some critics have suggested, to a model of “quasi-perfect” social reproduction. Under certain circumstances the “dialectic of mutually self-reproducing objective chances and

subjective aspirations,” and with it the taken-for-granted legitimacy of the social order, may break down: “an abrupt slump in objective chances relative to subjective aspirations is likely to produce a break in the tacit acceptance which the dominated classes ... previously granted to the dominant goals.”⁵⁴

As is suggested by this last example, the habitus is conceived in three distinct sets of relations: to the conditions under which it was formed, to the immediate situation of action, and to the practices it produces. The habitus is thus a concept made to do an extraordinary amount of theoretical work. The theoretical weight falling on it is especially evident in Bourdieu’s various efforts at comprehensive definitions of the habitus, as for example a “system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a *matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions* and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems.”⁵⁵ Doubts inevitably arise about the usefulness of any concept so vague and versatile. It is tempting to dismiss the concept of habitus as a *deus ex machina*,⁵⁶ as another in the series of dialectical do-it-all-sprung on generations of unsuspecting sociology students by the ever-resourceful French. But the linked concepts of structure, habitus, and practice are not intended to constitute a theory, and it would be unfair to evaluate them by criteria we use to evaluate theories. They are metatheoretical notions, designed to focus attention on the kind of conceptual framework that is required of any adequate sociological theory, namely one that incorporates dispositional as well as structural concepts. In the remainder of the article, I focus on Bourdieu’s attempt to grasp simultaneously dispositional and structural, symbolic and material, cultural and economic, in short, subjective and objective dimensions of class structure and class culture in contemporary France.

Class

Bourdieu’s studies of class structure, class cultures, and class reproduction in contemporary France draw heavily on his metatheory, especially on the notions of symbolic power, cultural capital, and the habitus. The distinctiveness of these studies – distinctiveness that owes much to their metatheoretical grounding – can perhaps best be elucidated by situating Bourdieu’s conception of class with reference to the Marxian and Weberian conceptions. Because of

his central concern with class and reproduction, Bourdieu is often perceived (especially in the Anglo-American intellectual world, where his sharp criticisms of Marxism are not well known) as working within a broadly Marxian tradition. Yet his extremely general and transhistorical conception of class, defined by its place in a metatheoretical account of the full range of social life in any society, is very different from Marx's conception of class, defined in reference to its place in a theoretical account of the specific internal dynamic and immanent logic of the capitalist mode of production.⁵⁷ The conceptual space within which Bourdieu defines class is not that of relations of production, but that of social relations in general. Class divisions are defined not by differing relations to the means of production, but by differing conditions of existence, differing systems of dispositions produced by differential conditioning, and differing endowments of power or capital.

This extremely general conception of class is no closer to Weber's than it is to Marx's conception of class. For Weber, as for Marx, class is a mode of social grouping defined by a specific set of social relations – in Weber's case, market relations. “Class situation,” he writes, “is ultimately market situation.”⁵⁸ Yet Bourdieu's general approach to the study of the class structure as a structure of power and privilege is distinctly Weberian. For Weber's distinction between classes and status groups is at root a distinction between two modes of existence and exercise of power – between power that is exercised and accumulated in accordance with the strictly impersonal laws of the market and power that is exercised and accumulated in accordance with conventionally or juridically guaranteed status distinctions that permit particular groups to monopolize particular material or ideal goods or opportunities. Bourdieu systematically develops this notion of different modes of existence and exercise of power, seeing in the analogy between power and energy remarked by Bertrand Russell – both exist in many forms, mutually interconvertible under certain conditions, with no one form constituting the source of the others – the “principle of a unification of social science.”⁵⁹ Besides this basic Weberian notion of mutually irreducible but potentially interconvertible forms of power, Bourdieu develops a number of subsidiary Weberian themes. The notion of a hierarchy of prestige or honor that is irreducible to any economic base; the notion that positively privileged status groups tend to develop a distinctive style of life; the notion that this stylization of life often requires an

inhibition of strict or blatant economic calculation; and the notion that positively privileged status groups tend to legitimize their privilege through the cultivation of a sense of “natural” dignity and excellence – these and other ideas articulated by Weber in the seminal essay on “Class, Status and Party” are appropriated, and developed by Bourdieu.

In one crucial respect, however, Bourdieu departs from Weber’s analysis. For Weber, power (of particular amounts and kinds) is constitutive of group being: possession of a definite configuration of market power or status privilege, in so far as this determines “specific life chances,” i.e., specific probabilities of appropriating ideal or material goods, is what defines classes and status groups. For Bourdieu, power, though an important characteristic of a class, is not in itself constitutive of class. Rather, the distribution of power is produced and sustained through the practices of classes constituted by shared conditions of existence and the shared dispositions engendered by shared conditionings. Thus class is formally defined as the set of

biological individuals who, being the product of the same objective conditions, are endowed with the same habitus: social class (in itself) is inseparably a class of identical or similar conditions of existence and conditionings and a class of biological individuals endowed with the same habitus, understood as a system of dispositions shared by all individuals who are products of the same conditionings.⁶⁰

This definition envisions the perfect coincidence of divisions established by differences in external conditions of existence and divisions established by differences in internalized dispositions; indeed on this view it is precisely the coincidence of these divisions, and not either one of them alone, that constitutes class divisions.

Class thus defined is treated by Bourdieu as a *universal explanatory principle*. This sharply distinguishes Bourdieu’s conception of class from those of Marx and Weber, both of which had definite and limited explanatory aims – for Marx, to comprehend the dynamic consequences of the differential situation of groups with respect to the means of production in the modern capitalist economy; for Weber, to isolate and analyze one dimension of the distribution of power in any market society. For Bourdieu, by contrast, class and habitus, the twin linchpins of his metatheory, together explain anything and everything. Dispositions (the habitus) directly govern conduct, and because classes are defined as individuals sharing the same dispositions as well as the same external conditions of existence, class becomes the

principle of intelligibility of all conduct, and sociology can take as its aim to “determine how class condition is able to structure the whole experience of social subjects.”⁶¹

Bourdieu’s conception of class usefully focuses attention on the pervasive class conditioning of practices in all domains of social life and on the mechanisms – especially class-specific dispositions – through which this pervasive effect is exerted. But the definition of class in terms of the coincidence of shared external conditions of existence and shared dispositions is problematic. For neither the system of internalized dispositions nor the totality of external conditions and conditionings is directly accessible to the sociologist, who can only impute shared dispositions or shared conditions of existence to groups of individuals on the basis of certain techniques. The sociologist can take data accessible to him as indicators of conditions of existence or of dispositions; or he can attempt in an ethnographic or novelistic fashion to grasp directly the particular “physiognomy” of an environment⁶² or the “whole view of the world and of existence” that is expressed in a particular complex of tastes⁶³ and claim thus to have grasped the “essence” of external conditions or of internalized dispositions. Insofar as he relies on statistical analyses, he is likely to find that groups constructed because they share properties taken as indicators of conditions of existence do not in fact share properties taken as indicators of dispositions, i.e., that the relationship between properties representing conditions of existence and properties representing dispositions is discouragingly weak. Insofar as he relies on ethnographic or novelistic techniques, he may indeed construe class, in accordance with the formal definition, as the coincidence of shared conditions of existence and shared dispositions, but he will not be able to demonstrate that any such classes actually exist. To be sure, the problem is a familiar one: it is the old realism-nominalism problem that haunts all efforts to transform theoretical categories into categories suitable for empirical research and especially for statistical analysis. But the tension between Bourdieu’s “strong” theoretical definition of class, which gives class its wide explanatory power in his system, and the “weak” nominal definition of class that must be used for purposes of statistical analysis, raises this problem in an especially acute form.

***Distinction* Classes as Status Groups**

Distinction is a rich and complex work, organized around an open-ended program – to study the symbolic dimensions of class structure and class struggles in contemporary France⁶⁴ – rather than around a single problem. The analysis begins with Weber’s conception of the “stylization of life” characteristic of status groups, but departs from Weber in arguing that status groups are “not . . . a different kind of group from classes, but are rather dominant classes denied as such, or, so to speak, sublimated and thereby legitimated.”⁶⁵ *Distinction* may be read as an attempt to substantiate this thesis and thus to unite Weberian and Marxian perspectives by studying classes *in the form of status groups*, focusing not on their external conditions of existence (which are, in the last instance, the fundamental source of their power and privilege) but on their shared dispositions and their “objectively harmonized”⁶⁶ practices, which are perceived by others as positive or negative signs of natural or social worth, and which thereby contribute to the legitimation of the social order.

If it is not easy to pin down Bourdieu’s analysis of class in *Distinction*, this is because he is concerned with sources and manifestations of class differences on four distinct levels of analysis. On the most concrete level, he is concerned with class-based differences in the ensembles of consumption habits, leisuretime activities, and tastes in works of art, food, dress, and home furnishings, etc., that make up a style of life. The analyses on this level, especially those in the ethnographic mode, make for the most engaging reading in *Distinction*. Thus (to take an example from “the archetype of all taste,” the taste for food), we learn that working-class men don’t like fish, it being excessively delicate, insufficiently filling, and eaten “with restraint, in small mouthfuls, chewed gently, with the front of the mouth, on the tips of the teeth (because of the bones),” in a way that “totally contradicts the masculine way of eating . . . with whole-hearted male gulps and mouthfuls.” To this masculine way of eating there correspond ways of talking, laughing, blowing the nose, indeed an entire “practical philosophy of the male body as a sort of power, big and strong, with enormous, imperative, brutal needs.”⁶⁷ Or we learn that gymnastics, “a sort of training for training’s sake,” is practiced disproportionately by the middle classes, especially by *cadres moyens*, medical employees, and teachers, i.e., by those “especially anxious about appearance and therefore about their body-for-others”; while mountaineering appeals to fractions of the dominant class richer in cultural than in

economic capital, paradigmatically professors, because it “offers for minimum economic costs the maximum distinction, distance, height, spiritual elevation, through the sense of simultaneously mastering one’s own body and a nature inaccessible to the many.”⁶⁸ These and innumerable other differences in style of life are richly characterized: statistical evidence and ethnographic description are effectively and imaginatively supplemented by photographs, interviews, and substantial extracts from advertisements, brochures, popular magazines, etc.

But *Distinction* is more than a vast “ethnography of France.”⁶⁹ It aspires to explain the coherence of choices in different domains of activity – coherence that justifies talk of a style of life – and to explain the class-based differences in life style. Both intra-class coherence and inter-class differences in life style are explained in terms of class habitus, i.e., class-specific systems of internalized dispositions. This is the second level of analysis. The petty-bourgeois habitus, for example, which is held to explain affinities among the cultural, linguistic, ethical, political, and even reproductive practices and preferences of the middle classes, is characterized by a “concern for conformity which induces an anxious quest for authorities and models of conduct,” by an “insatiable thirst for rules of conduct which subjects the whole of life to a rigorous discipline,” by “asceticism, rigour, legalism, the propensity to accumulation in all its forms.”⁷⁰ This stands in contrast with the “bourgeois ethos of ease, a confident relation to the world and the self . . . which supports and authorizes all the inner or manifest forms of *certitudo sui*, casualness, grace, facility, elegance, freedom, in a word, naturalness.”⁷¹ Or, to take another example, the tastes of working-class people in theatre, painting, photography, cinema are explained as the product of an anti-aesthetic disposition, founded on an expectation of “continuity between art and life,” a hostility towards formal experimentation, an insistence on the primacy of expressive or representational content over form.⁷² This “pragmatic, functionalist ‘aesthetic,’ refusing the gratuity and futility of formal exercises and of every form of art for art’s sake,” is just one manifestation of a generalized dispositional antipathy to formality and formalism, a generalized commitment to the substantial, the “real,” the sincere, the straightforward that explains not only preferences in works of art but “all the choices of daily existence” including modes of eating, socializing, dressing, and home furnishing.⁷³

Differences in class habitus are themselves explained by differences in conditions of existence, above all by what are rather vaguely and abstractly characterized as different degrees of “distance from necessity”⁷⁴: this is the third level of analysis. Thus the aesthetic disposition of the bourgeoisie, or, more generally, its “distant, detached or casual disposition towards the world or other people,” has as its social structural prerequisite the “suspension and removal of economic necessity and [the] objective and subjective distance from practical urgencies.”⁷⁵ Similarly, working-class pragmatism and functionalism are grounded in conditions of existence that afford no resources for keeping necessity at a distance and thus allow no escape from “ordinary interests and urgencies.”⁷⁶

These “variations in objective and subjective distance” from the “material constraints and temporal urgencies” of the world⁷⁷ are themselves explained by differences in volume and composition of “capital,” broadly understood as “the set of actually usable resources and powers,” the most important of which are economic capital and cultural capital.⁷⁸ This is the fundamental (and also the most abstract) level of analysis, and it is on this level that Bourdieu constructs his basic model of the contemporary French class structure. The two-dimensional concept of volume and structure of capital (unlike the one-dimensional concept of distance from necessity) permits the analysis and explanation of intra-class as well as inter-class variations in life style and dispositions. Thus the opposition between the “‘bourgeois’ right-bank taste” of professionals and executives and the “‘intellectual’ or left-bank taste” of artists and professors – an opposition “between two world-views ... symbolized ... by Renoir and Goya, ... rose-coloured spectacles and dark thoughts, boulevard theatre and avant-garde theatre, the social optimism of people without problems and the anti-bourgeois pessimism of people with problems”⁷⁹ is explained by the fact that professors, rich in cultural capital, are (relatively) poor in economic capital, while executives and professionals, rich in economic capital, are (relatively) poor in cultural capital.

It is crucial that the coincidence of divisions on these four levels of analysis be demonstrated, for the argument of *Distinction* rests on the premise that status groups, characterized by different life styles, are *nothing but* classes whose objective power base is misperceived. It is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of different styles of life. It

must be demonstrated in addition that differences in life style conceal differences in power, and that life styles are linked to definite external conditions of existence via definite systems of dispositions.

The statistical analyses Bourdieu carries out in an effort to support his theoretical argument rely heavily on data about the resources, practices, and preferences of members of different occupations. Occupation is treated as an indicator of two sorts of things. On the one hand, it is an indicator of a whole set of properties of individuals that are directly determined or shaped by occupational environment or by position in the system of production. These include not only, relation to the means of production, and hence class in the Marxian sense, and degree of market power, and hence class position in the Weberian sense, but also other forms of power that may be accumulated at work (such as a “capital” of economically or politically powerful social acquaintances made at work or a “capital” of skill that may be built up – or depleted). On the other hand, occupation is treated as an indicator of an entire complex of “secondary properties” that characterize each occupational group, properties determined not directly by position in the system of production or by the intrinsic characteristics of different occupations, but indirectly by the mechanisms that control access to occupational positions by selecting or rejecting new members according to implicit or explicit criteria. These are properties, such as level of education, sex ratio, age distribution, geographical distribution, distribution according to social origin, etc.⁸⁰

The multivalence of occupation as an indicator is central to Bourdieu’s treatment of class in *Distinction*. For occupation, as a conveniently operationalizable category of social research, is correlated with consumption habits and with indicators of dispositions, but often only quite weakly. To explain the correlations, but also to explain why they are not stronger, is a central task of *Distinction*. Premised on the dual thesis that class is defined by shared dispositions as well as shared conditions of existence and that status groups are nothing but concealed classes, the argument must explain why statistical analysis reveals only relatively weak correlations between indicators of class such as occupation and indicators of dispositions and life styles.

This is done in the following manner. Classes are by definition homogeneous. Occupational groups are relatively homogeneous: the selective mechanisms regulating access to occupational positions

tend to ensure a certain degree of homogeneity. But occupations, especially when defined by the “relatively abstract categories imposed by the necessities of statistical accumulation,”⁸¹ are not sufficiently homogeneous to constitute classes, for there are real, class-constitutive divisions within each abstractly defined occupational group – within the category of *cadres*, for example – along the lines of such “secondary properties” as age, sex, level of instruction, or social, ethnic, or geographical origin. To the extent that *cadres* of different age, sex, and social origin are the products of different conditions of existence and are endowed with different dispositions, then – in consequence of Bourdieu’s formal definition of class – they must be considered members of different classes. The point bears reiteration, for it underlines the distinctiveness of Bourdieu’s theory of class. Age, sex, and ethnicity are not principles of division that cross-cut class divisions: they *constitute* class divisions (more precisely, they are indicators of class-constitutive differences in conditions of existence and dispositions). Class is not one mode of social grouping among others: it is the generic name for all social groups distinguished by their conditions of existence and their corresponding dispositions.

There is no single property that is both suitable for statistical analysis and an adequate indicator of class as defined by Bourdieu (though occupation, especially when more precisely specified than is the case in most survey data, comes closest). This is a necessary implication of his rejection of a single-factor definition of class (like those of Weber or Marx, for example) in favor of a definition in terms of two total systems of factors, external conditions of existence on the one hand and internalized dispositions on the other. Not statistical analysis, but only a “work of construction” that takes explicit account of the “network of secondary characteristics”⁸² on the side of conditions of existence and of the “practical coherence”⁸³ of consumption habits and life styles on the side of internalized dispositions can succeed in understanding classes as “(relatively) homogeneous sets of individuals characterized by sets of properties that are statistically and ‘socio-logically’ interrelated.”⁸⁴

This work of construction takes its inspiration from an unlikely pair: Weber and Proust. On the one hand, it can only be called ideal-typical, in that it is “formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete ... concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged ... into a

unified analytical construct [that], in its conceptual purity . . . cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.”⁸⁵ Professors characterized by an “aristocratic asceticism”⁸⁶ or rising members of middle classes characterized by “tension and pretension”⁸⁷ doubtless exist; but these striking ensembles of dispositions can be taken as characteristic of classes, indeed as part of the definition of classes or class fractions, only in an ideal-typical sense: such dispositional characterizations must be understood not as a “description of reality” but as aiming “to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description.”⁸⁸ On the other hand, Bourdieu’s analyses proceed with a Proustian sensitivity to the subtle differences in manner that constitute an inexhaustible source of perceived and therefore real social distinctions and divisions, especially within the labyrinthine upper reaches of French society:

Knowing that “manner” is a symbolic manifestation whose meaning and value depend as much on the perceivers as on the producer, one can see how it is that the manner of using symbolic goods, especially those regarded as attributes of excellence, constitutes one of the key markers of “class” and also the ideal weapon in strategies of distinction, that is, as Proust puts it, “the infinitely varied art of marking distances.”⁸⁹

The product of this Webero-Proustian method is an extraordinarily rich ethnographic account of the innumerable manners of distinguishing oneself (positively or negatively) in contemporary French society. But when does a distinction between two manners of distinguishing oneself constitute a class division? Are there as many classes as there are manners of distinguishing oneself, i.e., styles of life? This question remains entirely abstract and unanswerable unless one recalls that class, on Bourdieu’s definition, cannot be self-subsistent but is always relative to a particular sociological problem. For the criteria of similarity that determine whether a group of individuals share sufficiently similar external conditions of existence and sufficiently similar internalized dispositions to constitute a class are necessarily problem-relative. And because *Distinction* is oriented not to a single problem, but to a tangled ensemble of problems constitutive of a whole sociological program, one should not expect to find a single set of divisions that, in Bourdieu’s view, constitute *the* class structure of contemporary France.

Among this network of problems, however, it is possible to distinguish one fundamental problem – the concern to give an overall account of the French social structure as a structure of power and privilege, taking account of symbolic as well as material power, cultural as well

as economic privilege. For this purpose two sets of group-based differences are relevant: differences in total amount of power or capital a concept that is intelligible only on the (problematic) assumption that the different forms of power are mutually interconvertible at definite rates – and differences in kinds of power or capital possessed by groups with roughly similar total amounts of power. Bourdieu adopts the traditional threefold division into working class, middle class, and dominant class or bourgeoisie as adequate for the conceptualization of differences in overall level of power. His distinctive contribution to the study of class structure, though, is in his analyses of intra-class divisions. In these analyses, both middle and upper classes (though not the working class) are conceived as internally structured around the opposition between fractions relatively poor in economic capital but relatively rich in cultural capital (particularly school teachers and the “new cultural intermediaries”⁹⁰ in the middle classes and professors in the upper classes) and fractions relatively rich in economic capital but relatively poor in cultural capital (shopkeepers and artisans in the middle classes, industrial and commercial proprietors in the upper classes). In between, in each class, are fractions characterized by intermediate amounts of both kinds of capital (middle management in the middle classes, and top management and the liberal professions in the upper classes). These structural oppositions help to explain intra-class differences in attitudes and practices – differences, for example, between the repressive anti-modernism of the declining group of craftsmen and small shopkeepers, who tend to reject in the name of traditional values the contemporary “laxity in matters of . . . credit, child rearing or sex,” and the psychologically oriented hedonism of the “new petite bourgeoisie.”⁹¹ It is above all the subtle analyses of such intra-class oppositions that make *Distinction* a brilliant and engaging ethnographic portrait of the contemporary French class structure.

Conclusion

If Bourdieu’s ethnographic portrait of the contemporary French class structure is compelling, his theoretical understanding of class is less satisfactory. By virtue of its strategic location at the intersection of shared external conditions of existence and shared internalized dispositions, shared configurations of power and shared styles of life, class is the universal explanatory principle in Bourdieu’s metatheory of social life. Defined by the complete system of “pertinent properties,” by the “whole set of factors operating in all areas of practice – volume

and structure of capital, defined synchronically and diachronically . . . , sex, age, marital status, place of residence,”⁹² class ceases to designate (as it does in Marx or Weber) a particular mode of social grouping: it becomes a metaphor for the total set of social determinants.

Class structure is synonymous with social structure; class struggles are assimilated to sexual, generational, regional, ethnic, and occupational struggles; and class theory merges with sociological theory in general.

The extreme generality of Bourdieu’s conception of class, and its strategic location at the center of a systematically unified metatheory, mark Bourdieu’s distance from Weber, whose skepticism toward general theory and general concepts may be worth recalling in conclusion:

For the knowledge of historical phenomena in their concreteness, the most general laws, because they are the most devoid of content are also the least valuable. The more comprehensive the validity, – or scope – of a term, the more it leads us away from the richness of reality since in order to include the common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it must necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence *devoid* of content.⁹³

Bourdieu’s social theory is marked by a strong tension between the impulse toward generality – manifest especially in his conceptions of habitus and class – and the concrete novelistic richness of his accounts of particular practices, institutions, and rituals, from the ritual exchanges of honor (and aggression) in Kabylia to the ritual exchanges of honor (and aggression) in academia. This tension explains the distinctive virtues and defects of Bourdieu’s treatment of class in *Distinction*. For his brilliant ethnographic dissections of the practices and pretensions of the various classes and class fractions resist the metatheoretical systematization to which they are nonetheless subjected: the result is an engaging if ultimately contradictory attempt to sustain simultaneously the perfect systematicity of the social world and the infinitely rich concrete diversity of human practices.

Notes

1. Rogers Brubaker, “Social Theory as Habitus,” *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives*, eds. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone (Cambridge, England: Polity Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 212–234.
2. Pierre Bourdieu, “The genesis of the concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘field,’” *Sociocriticism* 2/2 (1985): 15–16.
3. *Ibid.*, 12.

4. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a theory of practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
5. [The article and notes have been reprinted unchanged, and hence do not take account of the large body of more recent work by and about Bourdieu. Eds.] Nice has translated four important books by Bourdieu (as well as a number of articles) in recent years: *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (co-authored by Jean-Claude Passeron, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977); *The Inheritors* (co-authored by Jean-Claude Passeron, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and *Distinction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). Two other books by Bourdieu – *Questions de Sociologie* and *Le Sens Pratique* – are also being translated by Nice and will be published by Wesleyan University Press. For a complete listing of English translations of Bourdieu's work through 1979, see *Media, Culture and Society* (1980) 2, 295–96; a bibliography of his French publications appears in *Revue française de science politique* (1980) 30, 1223–27. Most of his recent work has appeared in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, which Bourdieu has edited since its founding in 1975. Among recent English translations, see especially “The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods,” *Media, Culture and Society* (1980) 2, 261–93.
6. Nicholas Garnham and Raymond Williams, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Culture: an Introduction,” *Media, Culture and Society* (1980) 2, 209. (For other discussions in English of Bourdieu's work, see Paul DiMaggio, “Review Essay: On Pierre Bourdieu,” *American Journal of Sociology* (1979) 84 (6), 1460–74; Pekka Sulkunen, “Society Made Visible – on the Cultural Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu,” *Acta Sociologica* (1982) 25 (2), 103–115; Richard Jenkins, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Reproduction of Determinism,” *Sociology* (1992) 16, 270–281; and John Thompson, “Symbolic Violence: Language and Power in the Writings of Pierre Bourdieu,” in *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1984), 42–72). Though not especially surprising, given the current academic division of labor, it is ironic that the reception of Bourdieu's work has largely been determined by the same “false frontiers” and “artificial divisions” that his work has repeatedly challenged (see *Questions de Sociologie*, (Paris: Minuit, 1980), 30, 35 and especially 52, where Bourdieu suggests that his own work depends on uniting the traditionally ethnological concern with systems of classification and the traditionally sociological concern with social classes.)
7. Charles Lemert, “Literary Politics and the *Champ* of French Sociology,” *Theory and Society* (1981) 10, 645–69. Bourdieu's theory of knowledge, presented in Bourdieu, J.-C. Chamboredon, and J. C. Passeron, *Le Métier de Sociologue*, 3rd edn., (Paris: Mouton, 1980), requires of sociology and the other social sciences reflexive attention to their own condition of production. “The sociology of sociology is not ... one ‘speciality’ among others but one of the first conditions of a scientific sociology” (*Questions de Sociologie*, 22). For an introduction to Bourdieu's conception of the fields within which symbolic production takes place, see “Intellectual Field and Creative Project,” in *Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education*, ed. Michael F. D. Young, (West Drayton, England: Collier Macmillan. 1971).

8. *Le Sens Pratique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1980), 8. The opposition between the Lévi-Straussian and Sartrean models of intellectual vocation, Bourdieu writes, encouraged in those considering careers in social science “the ambition to reconcile theoretical and practical intentions, the scientific vocation and the ethical or political vocation, . . . through a more humble and responsible manner of accomplishing their work as researchers” (ibid.). Bourdieu was indeed guided in his early studies of Algerian society during the Algerian war by an ambition to unite theoretical and practical aims (see the long preface to *Le Sens Pratique*), and he continues to regard his sociological work as one of demystification and deconsecration, as a work committed to revealing “hidden bases of domination” and thus to undermining the “misrecognition of the mechanisms on which it is founded” (*Questions de Sociologie*, 7, 13, 28). But while the themes of his early book *Les Héritiers* (an account of the pervasive and deeply inegalitarian effects of social origin in the experience of French university students) were taken up by student radicals in 1968, French Marxists and others on the left have criticized his work for what they have taken to be its pessimistic or even quietistic political implications. Even sympathetic commentators such as Nicholas Garnham and Raymond Williams, who believe Bourdieu’s work constitutes a “progressive political intervention,” are critical of the “functionalist/determinist residue in [his] concept of reproduction which leads him to place less emphasis on the possibilities of real change and innovation than either his theory or his empirical research makes necessary” (pp. 222–23). Bourdieu himself – to the consternation of certain (very) “critical theorists” – has devoted much more attention to the relation between sociological theory and sociological practice (especially in *Le Métier de Sociologue*) than to the relation between sociological theory and political practice.
9. *Le Sens Pratique*, 43. Because of the dominance of structuralist, objectivist modes of thought in postwar French social theory, Bourdieu devotes most of his metatheoretical attention to a critique of objectivism. For his criticism of Sartre’s voluntaristic theory of action and subjectivist conception of society, see *Le Sens Pratique* 71–78 and *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 73–76.
10. For the specific importance of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber as cardinal points of reference for Bourdieu in the construction of his own theory, see *Reproduction*, 4–5; “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” *Revue française de sociologie* (1971) 12, 295–334, esp. 295–300; and *Questions de Sociologie* 24–25. Here as elsewhere Bourdieu presents the task of theory-construction as one of “integrating in a coherent system the contributions of the different partial and mutually exclusive theories, without yielding to scholastic compilation or to eclectic amalgamation” (“Genèse et structure,” 295). Apparent contradictions, between Marx and Weber for example, can be transcended by “going back to the common root” (*Questions de Sociologie*, 25). For Bourdieu’s most sweeping exercise in theoretical synthesis, see the short article on “Symbolic Power,” in ed. Denis Gleeson, *Identity and Structure: Issues in the Sociology of Education*, (Nafferton, Drifffield, England: Nafferton Books, 1977), where the insights to be “integrated (and transcended)” are those of Kant and Cassirer, Sapir and Whorf, Hegel, Saussure and Lévi-Strauss as well as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.
11. Bourdieu has in fact reserved some of his sharpest criticisms for Marxism. See for example, the conclusion to “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” in this issue, in which Marxism is characterized as the “most powerful obstacle

to the progress of the adequate theory of the social world.” For a subtle reading of Bourdieu’s work that places it in a (broadly conceived) Marxian tradition, see Garnham and Williams.

12. DiMaggio, 1461.
13. “If one takes seriously at the same time the Durkheimian hypothesis of the social genesis of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action and the fact of class divisions, one is necessarily led to the hypothesis that there exists a correspondence between social structures (properly speaking, power structures) and mental structures, a correspondence that establishes itself via the intermediary of the structure of symbolic systems such as language, art and religion” (“Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 300).
14. See the Preface to the English edition of *Distinction*, xi–xii: “The model of the relationships between the universe of economic and social conditions and the universe of life-styles which is put forward here [is] based on an endeavor to rethink Max Weber’s opposition between class and *Stand*.”
15. See especially *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, and “Symbolic Power.”
16. The theory of the economy of symbolic goods is developed in the following articles: “Outline of a Sociological Theory of Art Perception,” *International Social Science Journal* (1968) 20 (4), 589–612; “Le marché des biens symboliques,” *L’Année Sociologique* (1971) 22, 49–126; “Genèse et structure du champ religieux”; “Une interprétation de la théorie de la vie religieuse selon Max Weber,” *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* (1971) 12(1), 3–21; and “The Production of Belief.” For the conception of symbolic capital and its relation to economic capital, see *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, esp. 171–183.
17. “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 300.
18. *Distinction*, 468. For Bourdieu, as for Durkheim, this hypothesis provides a sociological answer to questions raised by Kant. Durkheim claimed that his sociological theory of knowledge would conserve “the essential principles of the [Kantian] apriorists” while grounding itself in the “positive spirit” of the empiricists (*Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, (New York: Free Press, 1965, 32); similarly, Bourdieu admits to the “perhaps immoderate ambition of giving a scientific answer to the old questions of Kant’s critique of judgment, by seeking in the structure of the social classes the basis of the systems of classification which structure perception of the social world and designate the objects of aesthetic enjoyment” (*Distinction*, xiii–xiv).
19. It is a recurrent theme of *Distinction* that even the most sophisticated cultural and social appraisals and evaluations are structured by a small number of (logically) primitive principles of classification – e.g., oppositions between high and low, spiritual and material, fine and coarse, light and heavy, unique and common, brilliant and dull – that are grounded in the “fundamental structures of society” above all in the “opposition between the ‘elite’ of the dominant and the ‘mass’ of the dominated, but also in the opposition between “two principles of domination . . . , material and intellectual” (*Distinction*, 468–69).
20. “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 297–300.
21. *Reproduction*, 4; “Genèse et structure,” 297; *Distinction*, 480.
22. Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 8–15.
23. *Le Sens Pratique*, 34.

24. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 183. See also *Questions de Sociologie*, 25: "Against the typical regression of Marxism towards economism, which knows only the economy in the narrow sense of the capitalist economy and which explains everything by the economy thus defined, Max Weber extends economic analysis (in the generalized sense) to regions ordinarily abandoned by economics, such as religion. Thus, he characterizes the Church . . . as monopolizing the control of the goods of salvation. He suggests a radical materialism that would investigate economic determinants (in the broadest sense) in regions such as art or religion where an ideology of 'disinterestedness' reigns." For Bourdieu's own analyses of the "economic" logic of interest, investment, accumulation, and profit in fields of activity as diverse as high fashion, science, and conversation, see (in addition to *Distinction* and the works cited in note 15) "Le couturier et sa griffe," *Actes de la recherche* (1975) 1, 7–36; "The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason," *Social Science Information* (1975) 14, 19–47; "The Economics of Linguistic Exchanges," *Social Science Information* (1977) 16, 645–68.
25. *Distinction*, 20–22, 178, 209–213.
26. *Questions de Sociologie*, 33–35. For Bourdieu's criticism of the human capital theory of Gary Becker, see "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable," *Revue française de sociologie* (1974) 15, 36.
27. *Distinction*, 2–3, 5, 53–56.
28. *Le Sens Pratique*, 233–44.
29. *Distinction*, 482–94.
30. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1967), 33.
31. Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Social Structure," in *Structural Anthropology*, (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
32. Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism* (Brighton, England: Harvester Press, 1979), chs. 1 and 2.
33. 33 Jean Piaget, *Structuralism* (Routledge, 1971), 98; Maurice Godelier, "Anthropology and Economics," in *Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 45.
34. See especially the analyses in *Le Métier de Sociologue*.
35. *Distinction*, esp. 18–22 and 65f.
36. *Le Sens Pratique*, 43–70, esp. 46–47 and 56–58.
37. *Reproduction*, 5; cf. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 22.
38. See Part One of *Reproduction* and "Symbolic Power."
39. See n. 16 above.
40. For a clear, short statement of the importance of *méconnaissance*, with reference to the practice of gift-giving, see *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 4–5.
41. *Ibid.*, 171–72.
42. *Ibid.*, 178.
43. *Ibid.*, 178–79.
44. *Le Sens Pratique*, 231 n. 28.
45. The increasing social attention paid to styles of life is itself economically conditioned: the functioning of the advanced capitalist economy "depends as much on the production of needs and consumers as on the production of goods This economy demands a social world which judges people by their capacity

- for consumption, their ‘standard of living,’ their life-style, as much as by their capacity for production” (*Distinction*, 310).
46. Pierre Bourdieu and Monique Saint Martin, “Les Catégories de l’entendement professoral,” *Actes de la recherche* (1975) 3, 68–93; see also *Reproduction*, 141–76. (The emphasis placed on style seems to be much heavier in the French than in the English or American educational systems.) One implication of this analysis is that the achievement of the liberal utopia, in which all forms of inheritance of economic resources would be abolished and free education would be provided at every level for all who were “qualified,” would not suffice to transform formal equality of opportunity into real equality of opportunity. “The educational system can . . . ensure the perpetuation of privilege by the mere operation of its own internal logic” (*Inheritors*, 27). For students from culturally privileged backgrounds would begin their formal educational careers with rich endowments of cultural capital, and these initial advantages would be compounded and recompounded over the years. Even economic power would continue to be a source of (indirectly) inheritable privilege. For the economically powerful – those with the “power to keep economic necessity at a distance” (*Distinction*, 55, trans. altered) – would be better placed than others to cultivate, by making use of their own greater leisure or of the services of hired cultivators, the appropriate dispositions and capacities in their pre-school children.
 47. *Distinction* 152, 241–43.
 48. On the concept of cultural capital, see Bourdieu, “Les trois états du capital culturel,” *Actes de la recherche* (1979) 30, 3–6. On strategies of reconversion (of one form of capital into another) and the inflationary and devaluatory consequences of the boom in higher education, see *Distinction* 125–66. On the usefulness of analogical concepts such as degree inflation, cultural capital, and symbolic markets, see Jean-Claude Passeron, “L’inflation des diplômes: remarques sur l’usage de quelques concepts analogiques en sociologie,” *Revue française de sociologie* (1982) 23, 551–84.
 49. *Le Sens Pratique*, 22. The long autobiographical preface to this work gives a full account of Bourdieu’s early enthusiasm for and subsequent disenchantment with structuralist modes of analysis.
 50. “Structuralism and the Theory of Sociological Knowledge,” *Social Research* (1969) 35(4), 705. For the most sustained discussion of the concept of habitus, see *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. esp. chs. 2 and 4.
 51. “Avenir de classe et causalité du probable,” esp. 9, n. 15. See also *Reproduction*, 155f.
 52. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* 78, 83. Bourdieu’s most extensive analysis of dispositional lag is contained in his study of colonial Algeria in the course of its adjustment to an imported and imposed money economy. Largely as a result of the massive rural clearances carried out during the war, agents endowed with economic and temporal dispositions oriented to a traditional agrarian economy were uprooted and suddenly forced to confront an urban money economy. The traditional dispositions had to be transformed, through a process of “creative reinvention,” in order that individuals could adapt to the demands and opportunities of the new economy. But dispositions “do not change in the same rhythm as economic structures,” and the period of transition and readaptation generated much confusion, “as if these societies were not contemporary with themselves,” as well as great hardship for those groups whose dispositions were most closely

- oriented to the traditional economic order and who were thus least well equipped to adjust to the demands of the emerging money economy. See *Algeria 1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); quotations from 4 and 5.
53. *Distinction*, 143–44.
 54. “Avenir de classe,” 5; *Distinction*, 168.
 55. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 82–83.
 56. As Paul DiMaggio has suggested in his “Review Article,” 1464.
 57. Marx, too, had a general, transhistorical conception of class what Giddens (*The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*, (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 27) calls his “abstract or ‘pure’ model of class domination” – but it was never systematically elaborated. Much confusion in discussions of class has resulted from the failure to distinguish between this undeveloped general conception of class and class conflict and his systematically articulated analyses of the structure, genesis, and dynamic consequences of class divisions in capitalist society. (See also Tom Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society*. (George Allen & Unwin, 1965). 23).
 58. Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 928.
 59. *Le Sens Pratique*. 209.
 60. *Ibid.*, 100.
 61. *Algeria 1960*, 2.
 62. *Le Sens Pratique*, 100.
 63. *Distinction*, 269.
 64. Though *Distinction* is about contemporary France, Bourdieu claims (in the Preface to the English edition) that its basic analyses of the “relationships between the universe of economic and social conditions and the universe of life-styles” are “valid . . . for every stratified society” (xi–xii). What is not made clear in *Distinction* – or elsewhere in Bourdieu’s work – is the level of generality at which such sweeping validity is claimed. Is it only the metatheoretical, purely formal propositions – e.g., the propositions about the relationships between conditions of existence, habitus, and practice – that are universally valid? Or do the substantive arguments – e.g., about the “changes in the mode of domination” (*Ibid.*, 154, 311) or about the increasing importance of cultural capital vis-a-vis economic capital – also have a cross-cultural validity? The uniqueness of the Parisian haute bourgeoisie (*Ibid.*, xi) and the French educational system would seem to restrict the scope of at least some of Bourdieu’s generalizations about the relationships between class and culture. As Bourdieu himself notes, it is “only by using the comparative method . . . that one can . . . avoid unjustifiably universalizing the particular case” (*Ibid.*). It is to be hoped that the analyses in *Distinction* will themselves soon be treated in comparative perspective.
 65. *Le Sens Pratique*, 241.
 66. *Distinction*, 173.
 67. *Ibid.*, 79, 190–92.
 68. *Ibid.*, 213, 219.
 69. *Ibid.*, xi.
 70. *Ibid.*, 331.
 71. *Ibid.*, 339.

72. *Ibid.*, 32–34. For a pointed contrast between the pure aesthetic of (certain fractions of) the bourgeoisie and the anti-aesthetic ethos of the working class, see *ibid.*, 4–5.
73. *Ibid.*, 199, 376.
74. *Ibid.*, 53–56.
75. *Ibid.*, 376, 54.
76. *Ibid.*, 56.
77. *Ibid.*, 376.
78. *Ibid.*, 114. Sometimes Bourdieu distinguishes three main forms of capital: economic, cultural, and social, the last a “capital of social connections, honorability and responsibility” (122) that may yield advantages on the job market, on the marriage market, in a political career, etc. See also “Le capital social,” *Actes de la recherche* (1980) 31, 2–3.
79. *Distinction*, 292; compare 283, 286.
80. *Ibid.*, 101–106.
81. *Ibid.*, 244.
82. *Ibid.*, 106.
83. *Le Sens Pratique*, 145.
84. *Distinction*, 259.
85. Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Free Press, 1949), 90.
86. *Distinction*, 176, 214, 219, 286.
87. *Ibid.*, 331–38.
88. Weber, *Methodology*. 90.
89. *Distinction*, 66.
90. *Ibid.*, 325. Bourdieu’s analyses of the ethos and life-style of the “new petite bourgeoisie” (354–71) are among the most suggestive in the book.
91. *Ibid.*, 350, 346. The intra-class opposition between fractions with differing “asset structures,” according to Bourdieu, is not merely a structural and static one: in the middle and especially the upper class, it engenders ongoing struggles to define the “dominant principle of domination” – struggles to determine the relative importance of economic, cultural, or social capital in attaining or maintaining privileged social positions and to secure the “best conversion rate for the type of capital with which each group is best provided” (*ibid.*, 254, 310). It is hard to know what to make of these abstract formulations. Despite much abstract talk of class struggles in *Distinction*, the concrete struggles Bourdieu discusses in any detail are not the struggles of classes or class fractions, but (1) struggles of individuals and families to preserve or enhance their powers and privileges over time or to transmit them across generations; and (2) the struggles of occupational groups or fractions of such groups for material or symbolic rewards. Though the former are class-conditioned struggles (it is a great merit of Bourdieu’s work to have demonstrated this in rich ethnographic detail), they can hardly be considered class struggles; indeed they are the very opposite of struggles informed by consciousness of collective interest. And though the latter could be considered class struggles given Bourdieu’s elastic and highly general conception of class, it is not clear what theoretical gain would result from assimilating the struggles of occupation-based status groups (as they would be called in a broadly Weberian tradition) to the struggles that directly affect the destinies of the more inclusive groups traditionally conceived as classes.

92. Ibid., 106. 112.

93. Weber, *Methodology*, 80.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Tom Bottomore for originally calling my attention to Bourdieu's work and for his comments on an earlier version of this essay. Thanks also to William Outhwaite, Steve Jackobs, Bill Heffernan and Joe McCahery for their suggestions. All works cited, unless otherwise indicated, are by Bourdieu; translations from works in French are my own.

**Pierre Bourdieu and the sociology of religion:
A central and peripheral concern¹**

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Religion has the status of a “paradoxical object” in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. The articles that address the topic directly are very few in number, and none of his major works tackles this subject. Compared to the sociology of art, culture, or education, the study of power or social deprivation, the sociology of religion occupies a marginal space within the Bourdieu corpus. Yet certain of his most important concepts come out of the social sciences of religion. Inherited from Mauss or Durkheim, the concept of *belief*, which is a condition of existence of any *field*, is a manifest example. Even the elaboration of this latter concept, according to Bourdieu, springs from intermeshing research on the sociology of art begun around 1960 and the “beginning of the chapter devoted to religious sociology in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*”² by Weber. He writes: “I constructed the notion of field both *against* Weber and *with* Weber, by thinking about the analysis he proposes of the relations between priest, prophet and sorcerer.”³ Another example can be found in the reading of Erwin Panofsky’s *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism* in which Bourdieu forged the definition of *habitus*. Indeed, in 1967, Bourdieu translates this text, one chapter of which is dedicated to “the habit-forming force” in the case of education and the

common culture of Catholic clerics and the architects of the cathedrals around Paris. The homology of structure between medieval philosophy and gothic architecture originates according to Panofsky within a common *habitus*. In the epilogue written by Bourdieu, one finds for one of the first times in his work an explicit definition of *habitus*:⁴

A system of schema [that] constantly orient choices, which, though not deliberate, are nonetheless systematic; which, without being arranged and organized expressly according to an ultimate end, are nonetheless imbued with a sort of finality that reveals itself only *post festum*.⁵

Habitus is thus defined as a “system of thought schemes, of perception and of action,” a “*modus operandi*.”⁶ This last expression, coming directly from scholastic philosophy, is taken up again in a little-known text⁷ in which Bourdieu makes a complete diagram of the oppositions among objectivism, subjectivism, and his own “theory of practice.” He defines the “*modus operandi*” (*habitus*) as the very object of sociology itself and it is as such that he intends to undertake its study. It is therefore inside the history of medieval art and philosophy impregnated with Catholicism that the French sociologist finds the model for one of his principal concepts. In Bourdieu’s work, the notions of “belief,” “field,” or “*habitus*” always result from the social sciences of religion (sociology, anthropology, and history). From this point of view, Bourdieu’s work is almost a “generalized” sociology of religion (with religion presenting in paradigmatic fashion properties common to all spheres of symbolic activity). In this perspective, David Swartz clearly shows to what extent Bourdieu’s sociology of culture is a tributary of the sociology of religion.⁸

The goal of this article is to present Bourdieu’s contribution to the social sciences of religion while concurrently reading his anthropological and sociological corpus. Can one speak of “religion” in societies in which institutional religions do not exist or are exceptionally weakened? Does the notion of religious field remain pertinent in non-segmented or increasingly secular societies? Or, in other words, is the “religious” limited to the religious field?

The study of Bourdieu’s works suggests negative responses to these questions. The sociological validity of the concept of religious field is limited by the absence of a monopoly of symbolic production in certain agrarian societies on the one hand, and the growing uncertainty about the limits of field on the other. This latter is notably due to the appearance of new professions specializing in “symbolic work”

and to the “de-coupling” of belief and institutional allegiance. In Bourdieu’s ethnographic enterprise, it appears that the symbolic informs the entirety of social life without the existence of an autonomous institution that would allow for a “religious field.”⁹ What then forms the institutional space of religion from a social space that possesses little differentiation?¹⁰ In fact, religious field seems to correspond precisely to the historic occidental religions, notably the Judaism and Catholicism analyzed in the dialectic between internal and external relations, and a certain “dissolution of the religious” that can be observed in occidental societies today.¹¹ I return in the conclusion to the paradox cited earlier whose elucidation exposes the limits of Bourdieu’s sociology of religion: why, when the study of religious acts is at the heart of his principal concepts, does religion occupy such a marginal space within his work?

The social genesis of the religious field

According to Bourdieu, three major sociological theories of religion exist, symbolized by three names: Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. These theories seem mutually exclusive. It therefore becomes a question of “situating oneself in the geometric space of different perspectives, that is to say, in the point that allows for perception of what can and cannot be perceived from each point of view.”¹² What thought processes remain from these three perspectives? Durkheim’s contribution is explicitly expressed by Bourdieu while Marx’s and Weber’s seem less clearly distinguishable.

From Durkheim’s *Elementary Forms of The Religious Life*, Bourdieu retains the idea that the sociology of religion must be considered as a dimension of the sociology of knowledge. Religion is an instrument both of communication and knowledge; it allows for harmony between the meaning of signs and the meaning of the world. It has for function the *logical and social integration* of “collective representations” and, in particular, that of religious “forms of classification.”¹³

Weber’s contribution to the sociology of religious field is decisive, because it lays the groundwork for escaping from the sterile alternative arising between religious subjectivism and unmediated Marxist reductionism.¹⁴ Also from Weber comes the idea that the sociology of religion is a dimension of the sociology of power; mythic discourse must be attached to the religious interest of those who produce,

disseminate, and receive it. A historical genesis exists for the specialized religious bodies, the clerics, constituting the foundation of the religious field's relative autonomy. These religious professionals have strategies for obtaining a monopoly of hierocratic constraint, of the goods of salvation. The religious field therefore appears as the complete system of positions between religious agents, their objective competitive relations or their transactions.¹⁵

Finally, it seems that Bourdieu keeps Marx's notion of ideology as a "transfiguration of social rapports into supernatural rapports, thus inscribed in the nature of things and justified by them."¹⁶ Religion assumes, in this perspective, a *political* function of conserving social order. It is difficult to differentiate between Marx's and Weber's influence to the extent that both place the sociology of religion within the confines of political and economic sociology.

In *The Logic of Practice*, arguments about magic are especially close to the Durkheimian problematic and are even more precisely Maussian. In "Genesis and structure of the religious field," Marx and Weber dominate.

The omnipresent symbolic in agrarian societies: *The Logic of Practice*

In *The Logic of Practice*, a synthesis of Bourdieu's anthropological works, "religion" is less an issue than rituals, magic, institutions of magic, and illocutionary force, and particular cases of symbolic power (the word "religion" is notably absent from the thematic index as is the word "symbol"). Kabyle society, organized around agricultural jobs and a limited number of craft activities (such as weaving, a specifically female occupation), is not familiar with autonomous clerics, but it is integrally structured by the "demon of analogy," a system of schemas constituted by binary oppositions whose initial partition "counterposes male and female, dry and wet, hot or cold..."¹⁷ Close to the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss in the analysis of logical principles organizing "savage thought,"¹⁸ Bourdieu distances himself from it through his enhanced attention to the incorporated dispositions, which generate symbolic practices that are *imperfectly systematic*.

According to him, one can completely understand "all the practices and ritual symbols on the basis of two operational schemes which, being natural processes culturally constituted in and through ritual

practice, are indissolubly logical and biological, like the natural processes they aim to reproduce (in both senses) when they are conceived in terms of magical logic. On the one hand, there is the reuniting of separated contraries, of which marriage, plowing and quenching are exemplary cases, and which engenders life, as the realized reunion of contraries; and, on the other hand, there is the separation of reunited contraries, with, for example, the sacrifice of the ox and harvesting, enacted as denied murders.”¹⁹ Yet if the logic of ritual calls for joining or separating contraries, it also requires that the transgressions they objectively signify be made socially acceptable.

Magic thus functions as a collective denial of necessary acts of transgression (joining the disjointed or splitting the unified). Without these, the separated contraries would remain sterile. Transgression allows for the reproduction of the vital order, the reproduction of the group, but it is excessively dangerous and requires therefore a collective construction, public and practical, denying the objective meaning of rite. How can the contrary exigencies be ritually reconciled? The practical meaning at work in the legitimate magic of rites, which makes symbolic acts of transgression acceptable, is in fact a *double meaning*: affirmation of unity in the separation of contraries; affirmation of the separation in their unification. The joining of contradictory principles can only be realized in authorization accorded circularly to the group and by the group at the moment of the ritual:

The whole truth of collective magic and belief is contained in this game of two-fold objective truth, a double game played with truth, through which the group, the source of all objectivity, in a sense lies to itself by producing a truth whose sole function and meaning are to deny a truth known and recognized by all, a lie that would deceive no one, were not everyone determined to be mistaken.... In the case of the harvest, the social truth to be collectively denied is unambiguous: harvesting (*thamegra*) is a murder (*thangert*, designates the throat, violent death, revenge; and *amgar*, the sickle), through which the earth, fertilized by ploughing, is stripped of the fruits it has brought to maturity.²⁰

In Kabyle social life, rites of litation that imply a (denied) solution of continuity are balanced by propitiatory rites. Their logic is one of “management” of the antagonism that threatens the natural and social order. They permit the transition between opposing principles, in particular the trouble-free passage from one period of the year to another: the feminization of the masculine in autumn, the masculinization of the feminine in spring, summer and winter being symbolically purely masculine and feminine.

In *The Logic of Practice*, the heuristic value of the distinction made between magic and religion is denied, for this opposition must be understood as the stakes of a symbolic struggle that has nothing to do with Kabyle society. Use of the term “magic” aims to disqualify, in segmented societies, the symbolic practices of the dominated, the dominators reserving for themselves the term “religion.” These categories are inseparable from the creation of a religious field, with its competing stakes among priests, sorcerers, and prophets in Europe and the Near East. They are not relevant in societies with little segmentation. Bourdieu writes: “The institution of licit (*lah'lal*) periods or moments, the mandating of persons who serve as ‘screens’ (the family charged with opening the plowing, inaugural parallel-cousin marriages, etc.) and the organization of major collective ceremonies in which the group authorizes itself, are three aspects of the same operation, which is essential to all legitimate ritual (one confuses everything by identifying the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate magic with the – socially contested – distinction between religion and magic). The authority the group grants itself, either as a whole or in the person of one of its mandated members, is the basis of the illocutionary force at work in all social rituals.”²¹

The preceding analysis exhibits accents that are clearly Maussian. Magic has a social foundation – *belief* – and a social efficiency that are associated with it: “In definitive,” writes Mauss, “it is always society that pays itself in the forged money of its dream. The synthesis of the cause and effect only occurs in public opinion.... We should consider magic as a system of *a priori* inductions, used under the pressure of need by groups of individuals.”²² Likewise, magic, for Mauss and Hubert, is “at once an *opus operatum* in terms of the magic and an *opus inoperans* in terms of technique.”²³ This same idea is taken up and generalized by Bourdieu: “The specifically magic character of this completely social force is invisible so long as it is exercised only on the social world, separating or uniting individuals or groups with frontiers or bonds (marriage) no less magic than those instituted by the knife or the knot in magic, transmuting the social value of things (like the fashion designer’s label) or persons (like the educational qualification). On the other hand, it appears quite openly when, in a kind of innocence, confidence, abandonment imposed by extreme distress and disarray, groups attempt to use the power that they give themselves, in one of the circular operations which are the basis of the entirely efficacious magic of the collective, beyond its limits of validity, that is, on the natural world that does not depend on the group but on which the group depends.”²⁴

In summary, Bourdieu's anthropological works stress the social conditions of rite efficiency outside the religious field, which is absent from Kabyle society. There are no institutionalized intermediaries (it would seem) between the group and itself: there of course exist families responsible for cutting the first wheat sheaves of the harvest, for example, but this function is not constant. The religious institutions whose genesis and structure Bourdieu studies play an entirely different social role.

The constitution of religious institutions: "Genesis and structure of the religious field"

Bourdieu's sociology of religion is, first and foremost, a sociology of Catholicism. The accent thus falls on the process of monopolization of power by a single institution: The Catholic Church. From this point of view, the highest concentration of hierocratic power is reached in Western Europe before the Reformation. It is the genesis of this monopolization that most interests Bourdieu. The question of competition between clerics, new and old, comes in second to inquiries about the emergence of a central religious power within Christianity. This modern competition is, on the contrary, of great importance to North American sociology, which often focuses on religious pluralism, processes of fusion and division of denominations, and religious individualism, the federal government guaranteeing religious freedom and refusing all support to a single religion ever since the eighteenth century. From this point of view, Bourdieu's sociology of religion clearly depends on a particular social situation, namely the existence in France of a quasi-monopolistic religion that has maintained organic links with the state for several centuries.

To explain this process of concentration, the French sociologist gets his inspiration largely from Max Weber's works on ancient Judaism and the emergence of Christianity. For Bourdieu, the "separation of intellectual labor and material labor" is at the origin of two intimately linked processes that can be qualified as subjective and objective: the creation of religious field on one hand, and, on the other, the process of rationalization of beliefs and rites. In the footsteps of Max Weber, Bourdieu recalls how closely tied religious conduct is to the natural vicissitudes of rural life for the peasantry, whereas urbanization encourages a "rationalization" and "moralization of religious needs relatively independent from natural conditions."²⁵ What is more, urbani-

zation promotes the development of a corps of professionals dealing with salvation goods. City clergy contribute to the internalization of faith, to the introduction of ethical criteria – of “good” and “evil,” the notion of “sin” – at least in the Judeo-Christian context. To the conjunction of priests’ interests with those of certain categories of urban laity can also be attributed the domination of monotheism in Palestine, and in Jerusalem in particular.

The two preceding processes have several correlations: the constitution of a religious field that is relatively autonomous and characterized by the production, reproduction, and diffusion of religious goods and services, and also by a growing institutional complexity; the “moralization” of religious practices and representations likewise characterizes the religious field. One thus goes from myth to religious ideology (monopolization of the hierocratic constraint by a corps of professionals); from taboo to sin (transfer of the notion of impurity from the magical order to the moral order); from a vengeful God to a just and good God (attribution of increasingly “social” qualities to divinity).²⁶

The constitution of a religious field is accompanied by the dispossession of religious capital of laymen towards a group of religious specialists who produce and reproduce a body deliberately organized around secret knowledge. It can thus be said that different social formations fall between two poles: popular religious self-consumption and specialists who monopolize religious production completely. These two extreme positions are defined by the opposition between a practical mastery of thought schemata acquired through simple familiarization on the one hand, and, on the other hand, conscious savant mastery, acquired through intentional and institutionalized pedagogical action. They also acquire structure through ritual-myth systems and religious ideologies – that is, literate reinterpretations of these systems according to internal or external interests linked to the constitution of states and to class antagonisms.²⁷

It should be noted that even in the case of societies with little differentiation, Bourdieu suggests importing methods of sociology into ethnology: the latter must go beyond culturalism and conceive of religion as a social fact tied to other social phenomena, notably to the division of labor. Ethnology must be able to incorporate mythic or religious discourse into its social conditions of production while concentrating in particular on the formation and characteristics of privileged agents of magico-religious activity. Of course, this does not

mean that collective religious representations must be evacuated from the field of research; it is simply a matter of understanding their *relative* autonomy within the general social structure.

Finally, the oppositions separating profane from sacred and magic from religion are the symbolic translations of the monopolization by the clergy at the expense of the laity of relations to the supernatural. Calling a practice “profane” or “magic” is a way for the clergy to disqualify it, and above all to disqualify the group practicing it. The notion of magic is therefore an accusatory category used to devalue religious practices considered illegitimate, particularly the practices of conquered peoples or social outcasts. During the Christianization of Europe, for example, pagan religions were attacked this way. To speak of “magic” also gives one the means to label acts of protest deemed as willfully profaning dominant religion (e.g., inverting the crucifix, unbridled sexuality of midnight revels, unorthodox reading of the Bible) by certain dominated groups who see in such inverted religious forms a means of overthrowing the social hierarchy. For Bourdieu, the “religion/magic” distinction is of a political nature; it illustrates those “classification struggles” that always accompany class struggle. In other words, one can deduce, from the progress of the division of religious labor and the history of the religious field, the distinctions between fundamental categories of religious thought and practice.

Structuring and de-structuring of religious field

The process of autonomy for religious field does not imply absolute independence vis-à-vis temporal authorities, in particular political ones. In Bourdieu’s sociology, here very influenced by Marxism, perhaps even by Althusser’s version of it, religious practices and representations contribute primarily to an essentially conservative “vision of the world.” They render the relative absolute while legitimating the arbitrary nature of domination. Also, from the social origin of religious personnel and their trajectory within the institution – one example of which can be found in the structure and history of the “corps” of bishops in the French Catholic church²⁸ – Bourdieu attempts to explain at once the homogeneity of the episcopate and the division of religious labor at its heart, this division allowing the institution to respond to religious demand.

Religious interests and social function of the religious (internal relations, external relations)

A properly religious *interest* exists. It can be defined in a “strictly sociological manner, i.e., as the legitimizing expression of a social position.”²⁹ During the 1990s, Bourdieu gave a feminist twist to this Marxist inspiration: religion plays a role in legitimizing male dominance over women. “The Church,” he writes without nuance, is “inhabited by the profound antifeminism of the clergy” and it “explicitly inculcates (or inculcated) a familial morality entirely dominated by patriarchal values.”³⁰ It should be added that, in certain cases, religion (or, more exactly, magic) can allow for an (illusory) solution to social suffering: “Magical hope is the aim for the future that belongs to those who have no future.... Revolutionary millennialism and magical utopia are the sole aim for the future available to a class lacking an objective future.”³¹ Religious interest, as defined by Bourdieu, is the operator of homology between the religious field and the general structure of social rapports.

Relatively autonomous compared to social structure, the religious field is ordered by both internal and external stakes. The positions of powers in the field result from the confrontation of “*religious demand* (i.e., the religious interests of different groups or classes of laymen) and *religious offer* (i.e., the more or less orthodox or heretical religious services).”³² The position of power that a religious formation occupies within the field depends on the power of the social group from which it draws its support. This support, in a dialectical relationship, depends in turn on the position of the group of producers in the field. This relationship explains the observed homology of structure between the social and religious fields: the dominants of the religious field base their domination on that of the dominant classes of the social order, while prophets count on dominated groups in order to modify the state of power relations within the field. Likewise, the action of the prophet is stimulation for reforming religious field as well as social structure. It appears therefore that the “functioning” of the religious field is the product of an internal rivalry between different parties (the main ones being the Church, prophets, sects, and magicians) and their relationship with the lines of force in the general architecture of social relationships.

One specific case studied by Bourdieu seems particularly relevant: the group of French bishops at the end of the 1970s.

The social origins of bishops and effects on the organization of the Catholic Church

The partnership between Bourdieu and Monique de Saint-Martin explores a limited number of dimensions opened by the 1971 articles. It is principally a question of understanding the processes that lead bishops as a group to deny all internal differentiation corresponding to their social origin. Going beyond the image of homogeneity produced by the body of professionals, one can associate social class origin with the position occupied inside of the ecclesiastical institution, as long as one also takes into account structural deformations: “the same dispositions possibly leading to positions and different or even opposing stances in differing states of field, which instigates weakening, if not the cancellation of the statistical relationship with the original class.” In other words, no mechanical relationship exists between social origin and position within the Church.

In these conditions, analysis reveals two groups in the Episcopal corpus: “on the one hand, the ‘oblates,’ who, dedicated to the Church since early childhood, invest totally in the institution to which they owe everything, who are prepared to give all to the institutions that gave them everything and without which they would be nothing. On the other hand, the bishops who, ordained later, owned, before their entry into the Church, not only inherited social capital but also significant educational capital, and who held because of this a more distant relationship (a relationship less directed toward the temporal) towards the institution, its hierarchy and its stakes.”³³ The stances held by this latter group can only be understood by taking historical evolution into account. The same “aristocratic” *habitus* that characterized the “inheritors,” who in the past would have defined the role of the hieratic and solemn bishop, can now lead to the avoidance of appointments that are too common, to the acceptance of “missionary” dioceses, or to the search for theologian status. The opposition between the two categories is formal and non-substantial: “the antagonists ... can exchange their position in completely good faith: if one of them, usually the dominant one, who has the privilege of audacity, decides to change, then the other can only maintain the opposition by changing too.”³⁴

How does the body of bishops position itself “in the field of religious power, and more generally in the field of symbolic power”?³⁵ The bishops are in some ways “caught in the crossfire”: they oppose, on one hand, the central political power of ecclesiastical organisms,

showing little interest in local realities; and, on the other hand, they oppose theologians and monks, who are oriented towards “central symbolic power ... less occupied by temporal things that preoccupy those ‘responsible.’”³⁶ Assuming this median position in the Catholic church, bishops can fully accomplish the work of unification that they are charged with. Their cohesion is reinforced by common dispositions (they are all men, often from large families, and born in small villages) and a homogenizing education. Thus, the episcopate forms a field of *moderate* competition.³⁷

The adjustment between religious supply and demand is not the product of a transaction, as Max Weber envisioned, but rather the effect of an involuntary homology of structure, “each cleric producing according to his trajectory and his position a product more or less adjusted to the demand of a particular category of laymen.”³⁸ The Church, as a field, is defined by its unity and its diversity. This apparent contradiction results in fact from a large capacity of adaptation: it enables the Church “to treat as similarly as possible a clientele [that is] distributed (varying according to time) between social classes, sex and age groups, or to treat as differently as possible the clients who, however different they are, share their Catholicism.”³⁹ This capacity to treat different demands under the appearance of unity is reinforced by the intrinsically polysemic religious discourse that hides behind a single discourse a plurality of meanings related to different social positions, thus reinforcing the subjective confusion of objective social limits. Religious discourse tends to deny social conflicts or at least to euphemize them. Bourdieu even affirms that discursive procedures of double meaning and euphemism are “profoundly characteristic of religious discourse in its universality.”⁴⁰

This transfiguration of power relationships, in particular economic ones, by the dominating religious agents is illustrated by the management by the episcopate of the professional demands of laymen who work for the Church and who are on the borderline between volunteers and wage-earners. The hierarchy denies the economy of the Church as one governed by economic laws, that is to say, one based on salary, price, and the law of supply and demand. “The laugh of bishops,” when exposed to a discourse that treats the Church as a business, reveals the “truth of the religious enterprise, which is to have two truths: an economic one and a religious one, which denies the first.”⁴¹ The episcopate’s laughter is a reaction to an incongruity, one that is unveiled to them, and one that is not without foundation, because the

lay church staff members they depend on are in reality a cheap source of labor.

All in all, Bourdieu conceives of the Church as an ensemble of mechanisms and processes legitimizing a social position and presenting itself under an objectified form, be it material (buildings, clothes, liturgical instruments, etc.), or be it in the form of social technology (canon law, liturgy, theology, etc.). At the incorporated stage, the Church is consubstantial to the Catholic *habitus* generated by the Christian family and consecrated by rites of institution that aggregate while separating. "In the end, the Church only exists as a living institution, that is to say one that can act and assume its own reproduction within the relation between its two modes of incarnation..."⁴²

Towards a dissolution of the religious field?

Without speaking of evolutionism in its classical sense, Bourdieu's religious sociology is nonetheless characterized by the special attention paid to historical processes concerning the constitution of religious institutions. Those processes are not realized independently of general changes affecting social structure (for example, progress in the division of labor and urbanization). Bourdieu does not use the concept of "religious field" with regard to agrarian societies such as the Kabyles because they lack, according to him, institutions and specialized professionals. Thus, can we talk about "religion" if there is no "religious field"? It might be preferable to select terms like "symbol" or "ritual," because those two concepts do not imply the existence of religious institutions. Concerning the symbolic activity, one cannot use the same terms for agrarian societies (that are less differentiated and in which the "demon of analogy" informs and unifies all the dimensions of the social structure) and for societies that are strongly segmented (where symbolic production is concentrated around specific and relatively autonomous institutional spaces, of which religious field constitutes one of the main ones).

Paradoxically, modern societies characterized by a high degree of social division of labor are also the ones in which historic religions, and in particular Catholicism, are in decline. A "dissolution of the religious" appears: "One can see a redefinition of the limits of the religious field, the dissolution of the religious in a larger field is

accompanied by a loss of the monopoly of the cure of souls in its former sense, at least at the level of the bourgeois clientele.”⁴³ The limits of the religious are not clearly defined anymore: certain profane professions, psychologists, analysts, or marital counselors replace clergy in their therapeutic function. In a dialogue with Jacques Maitre, author of numerous books of social psychopathology applied to individuals deeply involved in Catholicism, Bourdieu declares that “it is very possible that psychoanalysis today, in the general consciousness, takes on a function quite analogous to what religion was”⁴⁴ for these persons. Thus, “...religious field has been dissolved into a field of a larger symbolic manipulation...”⁴⁵

On the one hand, the refusal of blind obedience to the prescriptions of clerics comes from an increase in instructional level, which leads less to a rejection of a religious “posture” than to a rejection of the spiritual delegation. This (relative) denial of the legitimacy granted to the Catholic institution thus contributes to the development of autonomous sects, to the “gathering of charismatic little prophets,” and more generally, to a disjunction between cultural orthodoxy and actual practices and beliefs. As a consequence, the legitimacy of the institutional religious word competes with new forms of legitimacy and new professions that often rest upon a pseudo-scientific discourse, such as astrologists, numerologists, or graphologists, for example. The formerly dominant clergy becomes dominated by clergy who claim scientific authority (to impose values and truths that in fact are neither more or less scientific than those of the past authorities).⁴⁶

The emergence of an aesthetic feeling towards representations whose original goal is to arouse faith is also a clue to the regression of “religious belief” vis-à-vis “aesthetic belief.” In a same place (the Santa Maria Novella church observed by the sociologist in 1982), practices simultaneously dealing with museography and devotion are juxtaposed, which shows the heterogeneity of the public’s aims in the “admiration” of a “Virgin with a Rosary” or of the “Presentation to the Temple.” The devotional use of statues and icons has not yet completely disappeared but it is more concerned with works whose characteristics are less formal, those that “have an expressive function of the representation of their referents.”⁴⁷

It should finally be noted that the “dissolution of the religious” does not mean, for the sociologist, a regression towards an undifferentiated state of symbolic activity. The “new symbolic agents,” which are

located outside of the religious institution, coexist with a Catholic institution tending to become a “church without any faithful,”⁴⁸ who often oppose it, but who also contribute to improve the position of the Church, as can be seen, for example, by the influence of psychoanalysis on modern religious thought. The symbolic activity at the margins of the religious field, which fosters a certain confusion concerning its limits, does not, however, signify its disappearance.

Conclusion: Dignity and indignity of religion as an object of social science

Symbolic power – certainly not limited to the religious domain – is practiced in it more clearly than in other fields of social activities, and that is probably why a main part of the architecture of Bourdieu’s sociology has been constructed around the study of religion. Symbolic power is indeed what enables the constitution of givens through its enunciation, “to make visible and to make believable, to confirm or to transform the vision of the world, and, in this way, the action on the world, therefore in the world.” It is “a quasi-magical power that enables acquiring the equivalent of what is obtained by (physical or economical) force. This power is only possible if it is recognized, that is to say, unrecognized as arbitrary.”⁴⁹ In this perspective, religion appears as an essentially symbolic activity, as a symbolic form, that is to say, like a body of practices and representations (rites and beliefs) whose efficacy is not of a material order (like a physical force, for instance). The symbolic encompasses language but it includes a larger set of human actions. The symbolic defines also the connotative function of signs, linguistic or otherwise. The power of symbol rests upon what it does not explicitly say, upon what it supposes without openly explaining it. It leads to a relation of meaning that is socially founded, signifying that symbolic power is not created outside of the opposing stances that are characteristic of the social structure in its entirety. If symbol has its own efficiency, this efficiency is nonetheless linked to the genesis of the structure of social space. More precisely, concerning the symbolic power of language, symbolic power necessitates “the belief in the legitimacy of words and in the one who repeats them, a belief that is not the responsibility of the words to produce.”⁵⁰ In other terms, symbolic power is not self sufficient, its foundation lies in the general rapports of domination of which it can appear as a “sublimation.”

Between efficiency itself and ideological dependency, between *sui generis* order and *superstructure*, the religious act is neither idealized nor a simple reflection (more or less deformed) of social structure. The secret of this dependence/independence of religious symbolic power is to be found in the intermediary structure that constitutes the center of Bourdieu's sociology of religion: *religious field*. The notion of *habitus* completes the preceding in the sense that it associates with a specific field a type of specific interest that is irreducible to the interests of other fields – in particular, economic ones. “In order for a field to function, there must be stakes and people ready to play the game [people who are] endowed with the *habitus* implying knowledge and recognition of the immanent laws of the game, of the stakes, etc.”⁵¹ A specifically religious interest is thus associated with religious field.

Religious field provides a very singular example of the “governed liberty” characteristic of secondary structures in mechanisms of domination (in which the economical and political seem to occupy a central position, at least in industrialized societies). For Bourdieu, religious field must not be conceived of as an immutable reality: a structural genesis exists for it in relation to transformations of social structure, and, according to him, the dissolution of what is religious becomes visible in societies moving towards secularization. While any religious institution tends to be presented as an ahistorical reality, identical to itself in any given time or place, necessary historical analysis reveals the processes behind the constitution of beliefs, rites, and institutions.

It can then be asked why the sociology of religion is of such limited quantitative scope in Bourdieu's corpus, since it gave Bourdieu a large part of his conceptual architecture and since he, more than anyone, was aware of its origins taken from the heart of Durkheim's, Weber's, and, not negligibly, Marx's sociological thought.

This gap stems from a fundamental uncertainty about the possibilities of sociological study of religion. For Bourdieu, religion is in fact an object that is, sociologically speaking, nearly impossible. During the 1982 annual colloquium of the Association Française de Sociologie de Religions, he questions the scientific validity of the sociology of religion when it is practiced by “producers who participate to varying degrees in the religious field.”⁵² All sociologists of religion are confronted by the following quasi-unsolvable contradiction: “When one is *one of them*,” he states, “one participates in the inherent belief in the belonging to a field whatever that field may be (religious, academic,

etc.), and, when one is not *one of them*, one risks first forgetting to inscribe belief into the model . . . , and, second, being deprived of useful information.”⁵³ The first barrier (i.e., belonging in one way or another to a religious institution), can lead to adopting a religious point of view on religion, to practicing a religious sociology rather than a sociology of religion. To avoid this (which is “difficult” but not “impossible” according to Bourdieu), it is necessary to practice “an objectification without complaisance . . . of all links, of all forms of participation, of subjective or objective belonging, even the most tenuous.”⁵⁴ The second barrier (*not being one of them*) is not scientifically any less dangerous. The victim here falls into the positivist trap by approaching religion from an exclusively external point of view, “like a thing,” without seeing the subjective forces of religious activity, and in particular the unconditional adhesion to revealed truths.

A certain affinity exists therefore between this second posture and “Republican” social sciences. It has already been underlined that Catholicism was for many centuries a state religion in France, with a strong presence in the school system, particularly in higher education. One of the most important projects of the republican regime of the 1880s was precisely to disengage French society of the Catholic institution’s hold.⁵⁵ In the educational domain, the Third Republic inaugurated obligatory primary education, free and secular, completely independent of any religious institution.⁵⁶ The end of the nineteenth century was thus a violent period of anti-clericalism, one that led to the 1905 law separating church and state. The Catholic Church lost its status of official religion at that time.

It is in this anti-clerical context that French sociology is born. It constituted itself largely in opposition to the intellectual hold of religion, and singularly against Catholic influence in the university at the turn of the twentieth century. In one sense, being a sociologist necessarily meant not being Catholic, not being “*one of them*” (which might seem surprising in North America where the status of insider is frequently valued for guaranteeing access to trustworthy information rather than as a hindrance for science). Bourdieu was not exempt from this form of anti-clericalism. In the conclusion to the conference on “the new clergy,” this unambiguous declaration appears: “The question of the “new clergy” would perhaps not have missed its target had it been able to lead to the founding of a new anti-clericalism.”⁵⁷ This conclusive sentence was dropped from the second version of *Choses dites*. This penance assuredly speaks to a certain malaise, one that Bourdieu tries to explain in an interview with Jacques Maître:

I had to rediscover in my own mind all the mutilations that I had inherited from the secular tradition and reinforced by the implicit presuppositions of my science. There are subjects that one does not tackle, or only with the greatest prudence. There are ways of approaching certain subjects that are a little dangerous and, finally, one accepts the mutilations that science had to accept in order to constitute itself. One feels obliged – by an implicit adhesion that is linked to entry into the profession – to put between parentheses all that comes from the order of traditional objects of religion and metaphysics. There is a kind of repression that is tacitly required of the professional.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, this pittance of sympathy does not completely explain the gap between the recognized theoretical importance of religion and the small amount of research and publications in the area. After all, Bourdieu dedicated a work to criticizing male domination, another to denouncing the power of television. To religion's case must be added Bourdieu's conviction that religion is a *declining institution* in differentiated societies. In other words, Bourdieu manifested no inclination for religious activity (while his taste for art and literature, and of course pedagogy, is well known), but this distance was doubled by the idea that religion no longer has the social hold that it had at the time of Weber or Durkheim, who had made it a central object of their sociology. Bourdieu therefore had no *negative interest* in religion (while he takes on the media or the "Nobility of State," whose power is seen as contemporary).

Thus, this double orientation probably led Bourdieu to reduce the social role of instituted religions while singularly focusing his attention on the Catholic Church. In the studies on the Kabyles, Islam is completely absent, as if a strict division exists between agrarian societies without a religious institution and differentiated societies in which religion would be entirely monopolized by the Church before disappearing at the same time as it. But, if the Catholic Church no longer has the economic or political power it had, does that mean that *religious* beliefs and practices have disappeared from modern societies? Little is less clear. First, while focusing on Catholicism, and in particular on French Catholicism, which was the state religion until the twentieth century, Bourdieu assuredly minimized the importance of the question of religious pluralism that cannot be ignored in North America. What is more, a definition of "religion" centered on "religious field" (that is, on the battles between specialists in their relationships with global social structure) only somewhat allows for the study of religious phenomena that take place beyond the power of clerics, even when these are the "new clerics." This error of perspective might

have been avoided by leaving more room for the religious act outside of the institution, *including in differentiated societies*. By turning our attention to the individual “bricolage” of beliefs, to the network organization of amateurs of esotericism, to the non-bureaucratic organization of certain Pentecostals, to the original power structure found in Santeria, for instance, one avoids the impasse created by simply reporting the Catholic Church’s loss of social power.

Notes

1. Translated from “Pierre Bourdieu et la religion: synthèse critique d’une synthèse critique,” which first appeared in *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 2002, 118 (April-June): 5–19. The work has been revised and modified by the author for the American edition. [Translator’s note: I have tried, when possible, to use previous translations of Bourdieu’s works by Richard Nice and others. These works are listed as such here. All other translations are my own.]
2. Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words*, translated by Matthew Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 22.
3. *Ibid.*, 49.
4. In 1962, Bourdieu already used the concept of habitus in the study of peasant celibacy in Bearn, but this concept, at this stage of his career, was defined, following Marcel Mauss, as a set of body techniques. (I thank Gisèle Sapiro for this useful remark.) See the recent re-edition of the study: Pierre Bourdieu, *Le bal des célibataires – Crise de la société paysanne en Béarn* (Paris: Seuil, 2002).
5. Pierre Bourdieu, “Postface” to Erwin Panofsky, *Architecture gothique et pensée scolastique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), 161.
6. Bourdieu, “Postface” to *Architecture gothique et pensée scholastique*, 162.
7. Pierre Bourdieu, “Pratique rituelle et discours,” *Bulletin du Centre Thomas More* 21 (1978): 3–10.
8. David Swartz, “Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Economy of Symbolic Power,” *Sociology of Religion* 57 (1996): 71–85. In a forthcoming article (“Spiritual Capital: Theorizing Religion with Bourdieu against Bourdieu”), Bradford Verter adopts a rather different point of view on the sociology of religion in Bourdieu from the view of Swartz and from my own. According to Verter, Bourdieu’s sociology of religion is somewhat cursory and “Voltairean”; it is within his cultural sociology, more highly developed and complex, that one can find the necessary tools for forging new concepts useful in studying religions – for example, the idea of “spiritual capital” that Verter defines very precisely. Such an approach seems particularly innovative.
9. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, translated by Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
10. Pierre Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” *Revue Française de sociologie* XII/2 (1971), 295–334.
11. See Pierre Bourdieu and Monique de Saint-Martin, “La Sainte Famille: l’épiscopat français dans le champ du pouvoir,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 44–45 (1982): 1–53. Concerning the “dissolution” of the religious, refer to “Le champ religieux dans le champ de manipulation symbolique,” in Collectif, *Les nouveaux*

- clercs – Prêtres, pasteurs et spécialistes des relations humaines et de la santé* (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1985), 255–261 – this was reprinted partially under the title “La dissolution du religieux” in *Choses dites* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1987), 117–123.
12. Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 295.
 13. *Ibid.*, 297.
 14. Pierre Bourdieu, “Une interprétation de la théorie de la religion selon Max Weber,” *Archives européennes de sociologie* 12 (1971): 1.
 15. *Ibid.*, 6.
 16. Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 300.
 17. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 223.
 18. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).
 19. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 223.
 20. *Ibid.*, 234.
 21. *Ibid.*, 240.
 22. Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, “Esquisse d’une théorie générale de la magie,” in *Sociologie et anthropologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), 119.
 23. *Ibid.*, “Esquisse d’une théorie générale de la magie,” 135.
 24. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 240.
 25. See note 7, “Orders, Classes and Religions,” in Max Weber, “Les types de communalisation religieuse (sociologie de la religion),” in *Economie et société* (Paris: Plon, 1971).
 26. Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 303.
 27. *Ibid.*, 304–306.
 28. Pierre Bourdieu and Monique de Saint Martin, “La Sainte Famille l’épiscopat français dans le champ du pouvoir.”
 29. Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 311–312.
 30. Pierre Bourdieu, *La domination masculine* (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 92–93.
 31. Pierre Bourdieu, *Algérie 60* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1977), 90–91.
 32. Bourdieu, “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” 319.
 33. Bourdieu and Saint Martin, “La Sainte Famille: l’épiscopat français dans le champ du pouvoir,” 4–5.
 34. *Ibid.*, 16.
 35. *Ibid.*, 222.
 36. *Ibid.*, 28.
 37. *Ibid.*, 31.
 38. *Ibid.*, 34.
 39. *Ibid.*, 35.
 40. *Ibid.*, 46.
 41. Pierre Bourdieu, “Le rire des évêques,” in *Raisons Pratiques – Sur la théorie de l’action* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 204.
 42. *Ibid.*, 51.
 43. Pierre Bourdieu, *Choses dites* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1987), 120. [Translator’s note: The chapter called “La dissolution du religieux” is not included in the English translation of *Choses dites* (*In Other Words*) quoted earlier on. This is thus my translation, as are all references cited as *Choses dites*.]
 44. Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Maître, “Avant-propos dialogué,” in Jacques Maître, *L’autobiographie d’un paranoïaque – L’abbé Berry (1878–1947) et le roman de Billy, Introïbo* (Paris: Anthropos, 1994), XVI.

45. Pierre Bourdieu, *Choses dites*, 121.
46. *Ibid.*, 123.
47. Pierre Bourdieu, "Piété religieuse et dévotion artistique," *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 105 (December 1994): 73.
48. Pierre Bourdieu, "Propos sur l'économie de l'église," in *Raisons Pratiques – Sur la théorie de l'action* (Paris, Seuil, 1994), 216.
49. Pierre Bourdieu, "Sur le pouvoir symbolique," *Annales ESC*, XXXII/3 (1977): 410.
50. *Ibid.*, 411.
51. Pierre Bourdieu, "Haute culture et haute couture," in *Questions de sociologie* (Paris: Edition de Minuit, 1984), 114.
52. Pierre Bourdieu, "Sociologues de la croyance et croyances de sociologies," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 63/1 (1987): 156.
53. *Ibid.*, 156.
54. *Ibid.*, 160.
55. René Rémond, *L'Anticléricalisme en France de 1815 à nos jours* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), 75.
56. Republican power did not, however, suppress Catholic primary, secondary, and higher education when it was *private*, and it continued to exist in parallel with public education. In other words, the obligatory nature of primary education did not necessarily imply secular schooling since children could be placed in private institutions. The coexistence of the two concurrent educational systems set the stage for numerous political confrontations all during the twentieth century as measures favoring either private or public education came before the National Assembly. Massive protests were organized in all the major cities for one or the other "camps." This structural confrontation has been called the "War of Two Frances," Catholic and secular France, an opposition that only partially corresponds to the political dichotomy of "right/left."
57. Pierre Bourdieu, "Le champ religieux dans le champ de manipulation symbolique," in Collectif, *Les nouveaux clercs – Prêtres, pasteurs et spécialistes des relations humaines et de la santé* (Genève: Labor et Fides, 1985), 261.
58. Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Maître, "Avant-propos dialogué," XV.

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CHAPTER 4

Pierre Bourdieu: Economic models against economism¹

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The use of economic analogies by Bourdieu has often been at the center of much criticism and discussion. For some scholars, it reveals an “economistic” vision of the social world too much inspired by neoclassical economics.² For example, Alain Caillé analyzes this view as a particular variant of the “utilitarian” conception that has been gaining strong influence across the social sciences. He argues that through the “economicization” of his sociological language, Bourdieu has legitimized a reduction of the diversity of human behaviors to the general quest for personal *material* benefit or satisfaction. Even if Bourdieu sometimes criticizes that sort of “Beckerian” reduction, it is right that Bourdieu has put personal interests (often denied) at the center of his model and has expressed a strong skepticism for moral or normative explanations that are common indigenous perspectives, especially in the spheres of religion and cultural production.³

For other scholars, the economic analogy is a kind of mechanical metaphor, inspired by a holistic vision of society. Bourdieu is accused of generalizing determinist Marxist conceptions of individual action and culture by reducing them to socioeconomic infrastructures, especially the class structure defined by capital inequalities. His notions of interest, capital, etc. are (supposed to be) defined by objective class conditions, that is to say, by structural (or global) determinist dimensions. Individuals, especially artists and creators, are denied any singular capacity of creation and of rational action corresponding to cognitive autonomous strategies or representations.⁴

One could say that Jean-Claude Passeron's position in this debate⁵ is an attempt to clarify the consequences and to assess the limits of using "metaphors" imported from economics, especially "inflation" and secondly "market" and "capital." Passeron⁶ insists first on the possibilities of empirical accumulation related to this systematic use, which should not be restrained by a positivist kind of auto-censure: these metaphors are sorts of generative matrices of new, dense and stimulating observations. But at the same time, they appear to be limited by various kinds of "inadequacies," especially when they are transposed too mechanically from one frame to another. This is a third kind of criticism, much more centered on the limits of validity of what one could call a "linguistic" economic formalization of social realities. This criticism cannot be reduced to one of the previous two. It opens a discussion about the nature of "economic" words (in which sense they derive from a particular disciplinary frame and correspond to particular sorts of objects, defined as "economic") and about the notion of "economic analogy," which is often used with Bourdieuan notions of "capital" and "market."

1958–1966: Seven field studies

One way to understand Bourdieu's "economic" language, and to discuss and refute most of the contradictory criticisms, is to return to the very first occurrences, during the period 1958–1966 (the focus of this article), of what Bourdieu would call a "general economy of practices" in *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique*.⁷ By 1965–1966, Bourdieu had already participated in seven important empirical "social and economic" (collective) studies, dealing with various objects that occasioned confrontations with economic theories:

- *The transition of traditional society to capitalist modernity and the transformation (rationalization) of economic ethos (the “Algerian period,” which yielded several publications from 1958 to 1977).*⁸ This early work allows a first incursion into the discussion of the “rational action model,” which begins to be popular particularly at the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and among young government economists. This discussion is related to both ethnographic and statistical observations of work, employment, and time structures in Algeria. It is also a period when Bourdieu begins to use Marxist notions in a completely different frame and even meaning, such as the notion of “simple reproduction,” which he applies to the cyclical conception of time prevailing in traditional society.
- *The somehow rather similar transition occurring at the very same time in the Southern region of France where Bourdieu was born (Béarn), generating a particular form of anomie among young male peasants (the “Béarn study” with a first article published in 1962).*⁹ This work allows him to reflect on the expansion of a “market economy” inside traditional societies, especially its consequences regarding the transmission of capital through marriages, which appear to be a central point for the reproduction of economic inequalities. “Inheritance” is the most clearly “economic” object and concept that stimulate Bourdieu’s sociological theoretical work since this time. It will be extensively used in the inquiry about French students and as a basis for the notion of “reproduction strategies” developed later.¹⁰
- *The way a deposit bank deals with the various social characteristics of its customers and the way it organizes the concrete interactions between demand and supply of credit (the *Compagnie Bancaire* study).*¹¹ This is a more direct incursion inside the sphere of money and finance, where Bourdieu and co-researchers come back to the original notion of “credit” (and “saving”), which appears to be related to trust and to be embedded in concrete social relations structured by inequalities of resources. It is a moment when Bourdieu starts to come to grips with marketing professional discourses and management issues. He relates the acquisition of credit to the possession of a personal capital and relates the variations of consumer’s perceptions of credit to their economic and cultural resources.
- *The economic and social determinants of inequalities in schooling, especially at the university (which will be published in *Les Héritiers* [*The Inheritors*] in 1964).*¹² This study is the heart of the shift from

an economic definition of inheritance (*patrimony* and especially *land*) to a generalized definition, where land or monetary/financial capital are particular cases of “things” families transmit to their children in order to maintain or improve their position inside society: class values, cultural hierarchies, and practices.

- *The determinants of cultural practices, such as photography (the “Kodak survey” published in 1965 with the official support of the CEO of Kodak-Pathé).*¹³ These cultural practices are related to the general process of inheritance and reproduction of the social order. But they are *not* presented as depending mainly on economic resources as they are sometimes considered in critical progressive discourses. Cultural resources and class ethos are denied but very influential (and related) explanatory factors of practices. The reproduction of families is put at the center of the use of photography. Esthetic conceptions of photography are related to social uses, class ethos, and to the distribution of cultural resources.
- *The determinants of cultural practices of museum visits (the “museum survey,” published in 1966).*¹⁴ This survey will be the strongest and most direct attempt by Bourdieu and Darbel to use the power of mathematical formalization and statistical validation, deriving from economics, to analyze a cultural practice. It shows the comprehensive appropriation by Bourdieu of “microeconomic” and “econometric” perspectives and their provocative transposition to the realm of culture, where the notion of “cultural level” plays a central role as central indicator of non-economic sociological and cultural factors.
- *The social dimensions of global economic changes in France after World War II and especially the question of the reproduction of social inequalities in a rapidly growing economy (the “colloque d’Arras” held in June 1965, its acts published in 1966).*¹⁵ This is the most intense and formal occasion of confronting leading economists on their own terrain, namely macroeconomic changes, and to put together theoretical and empirical insights that help to “formalize” the challenge to economics.

During this intense period of collective work, which one could describe as a sort of intellectual (and collective) “cauldron,” Bourdieu begins to build, in a very practical manner, his own theory of society. He uses these various fields as sorts of matrices in a process of generalization, extension, and transfer (crossing fields and objects, hybridizing methods and concepts, and comparing results). This program continued collectively and individually even after 1966.

Two central aspects of the 1958–1966 period, which have often been forgotten by critics, are briefly presented below: the close but very particular link between his work and economics as a growing scientific discipline during these years, and the criticism Bourdieu develops against the “economic model” as a general scientific tool for the social sciences. If one insists upon only one of the two sides of the coin, one risks misunderstanding Bourdieu’s original scientific *habitus* and intellectual project. This “double” position, however, opens the possibility of an “integrated” vision of social and economic factors of practices, due to the introduction of the “cultural” and above all the “symbolic” dimensions.

Bourdieu was close to economics and economists: From Alger to Arras

During the years 1958–1966, Bourdieu is in close intellectual and personal contact with young government statisticians and economists from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), who had been educated by neoclassical economists like Edmond Malinvaud, who had himself discovered “modern” economic theory at the Cowles Commission.¹⁶ These contacts are very intense in Algeria where Bourdieu works in close cooperation with Alain Darbel, Claude Seibel, and a few others.¹⁷ During this period, very innovative survey methodologies are tested and applied in a context of (paradoxically) relatively unconstrained work for young government economists (especially regarding questions about the definition of “work,” “employment/unemployment,” etc.).¹⁸

In the following years, these contacts remain strong and this cooperation is recognized by government officials of the INSEE, which, at that time, was considered to be one of the central places of the Keynesian spirit inside the French administration.¹⁹ The “colloque d’Arras” in June 1965 (Arras conference, June 1965) is organized under the auspices of Claude Gruson, who was the general director of the INSEE in the 1960s. In the preface of the *acts* of the Arras conference published with the signature “Darras” in 1966 in Bourdieu’s collection *Le sens commun*, Gruson underlines the profound originality and the various interests of the confrontation among economists, demographers, and sociologists.

The general theme of the Arras conference is economic expansion, its determinants and its effects. The participating economists paint a

broad picture of a process of quick recovery after World War II and describe a rapidly changing economy, which gives birth to many structural problems (including inflation). But the entire book – and not only the parts or chapters written by Bourdieu, Darbel, and other sociologists from the Centre de Sociologie européenne – is centered on the question of social inequalities *within* economic changes. Many authors (sociologists, economists) evoke the “mechanisms of transmission of economic and cultural heritage,” which contribute to a surprisingly strong social “inertia” in a period during which the discourse of change is everywhere (with the theory of “Massification”). Thus, from Algeria to *La domination masculine*,²⁰ we find a permanent and central scheme of Bourdieu’s sociological thought; namely, tendencies to inertia are most of the time under-evaluated, and they are not the simple consequence of economic reproduction (for example, exploitation) or material/physical constraints. Even in a period of strong economic changes, cultural and symbolic factors limit drastically the “fluidity” or the “flexibility” of society.²¹ This view opposes popular journalistic conceptions of change (“massification” in the 1960s; “globalization” today), but also a conception of economy in which changes are easy because actors react rapidly to new conditions. Rational actors are actors without a past, oriented to the future, and constantly adapting their actions to their objectives without reference to their social experience. (This capacity is linked to the idea of “adjustment” used about markets.) For all these reasons, Bourdieu is very skeptical of a mechanical conception of the economy: he is too concerned about social differences in the dispositions toward various kinds of behavior (“rational” or not) to accept the fictive microeconomic foundations of a mythical macroeconomic story.

A careful look at the book reveals a closer connection between Bourdieu and the young economists and statisticians working at the INSEE. In a chapter on the end of Malthusianism in France after World War II, Bourdieu and Darbel try to understand the link between the evolution of birth rates and fertility, on one hand, and the global social and economic changes, on the other hand. They discuss work by demographers using what we call now rational action models to explain the growth of birth rates in France. They show that in these matters economic rationality is particularly difficult to isolate from various social factors, such as what they call “systems of value” or ethos. These kinds of factors always affect the “decision” to procreate and the “chosen” number of children. But the authors are not afraid of economic models. They write the equation of the marginal cost of a

child and conclude that it goes through a minimum in the middle classes, which is coherent with statistical observations.

The problem with a simplified rational model is, as they say, that it does not explicitly include an analysis of the complex and multiple social determinants of economic expectations: the mean number of children can be schematized as the consequence of a large number of factors, including social moral, group moral, level of instruction, economic security, etc. Econometric techniques such as linear regression (the same could be said today about logistic regression) fail to isolate correctly one factor from another because of the problem of multi-collinearity. Here, Darbel appears as a good student of Edmond Malinvaud, who exposes very brilliantly in his seminars and books the limits of regression techniques due to multi-collinearity²² (very common with the kind of data we have to deal with in social sciences). In other works, Bourdieu and Darbel go rather far in an attempt to “model” practices as economists do, without losing possible sociological explanatory factors.²³ Yet in these same studies, they remained disappointed by the technical limits of econometrics (regression techniques). A few years later Bourdieu would discover with great interest the new data analysis methods, invented in the first half of the 1960s by Jean-Paul Benzécri, which allow summarizing of dense statistical information.²⁴

In Bourdieu’s works about education and culture, the economic language, which had been tested during this period, would become the vector of criticism against idealism, and the way to introduce the possibility of explanation and modeling in sectors that are profoundly resistant to scientific “objectivation” (heritage, capital, investment, interest, accumulation, profit, price, but also reproduction, class struggle, surplus value, etc.). The “market” analogy is used for “non-profit” practices, like the production of symbolic goods, language, etc.²⁵ This “economic analogy” clearly contradicts the idea of “free” creation: Bourdieu is clearly “utilitarian,” if that means that he refuses the charismatic ideology of creation and its “anti-causal” (and “anti-scientific”) vision of art, the enchanted conceptions of family relations, the normative idealization of science, etc., and all the universes where interests are *denied* or at least *euphemized*. Norms or values would not be efficient if they were not embodied in specific interests. This does not mean that he reduces social interests to economic ones, on the contrary; he will develop the “economic analogy” to grasp the specificity of symbolic objects and to systematize the hypothesis that certain

universes (such as art, science, and bureaucracy) can define economic interests as impure and secondary in comparison to specifically pure (“relatively autonomous”) symbolic interests.²⁶ The central problem here, discussed to a certain extent by Passeron, is the question of the limits of the analogy, not because it is sometimes empirically inadequate (and useful as such) as Passeron thinks, but because any economic term can be understood in either a restrictive or a “generalized” meaning. For example, the notion of “educational market” used by Bourdieu about the French system of education means that whatever the official structure of the educational institutions (public or private) agents are obliged to make *choices* inside a spectrum of differentiated possibilities, that institutions are to a certain extent in *competition* against each other, and that the “game” has *winners* and *losers*. It *does not* mean that there exists a general “price mechanism” in the monetary sense. If Bourdieu speaks about “prices” on the “linguistic market,” he *does not* mean that these “prices” are measured in “monetary” units, which is an element of a purely economic definition of a “price.” If educational credentials are evaluated by the society through wages, levels of qualification they provide, etc., their process of “devaluation” is *not* measured and socially quantified as can be the rate of exchange. One could say that Bourdieu gives economic terms a non-monetary and a non-quantitative meaning as if “social evaluation” was a general phenomenon, whereas strictly monetary or quantitative evaluations are historically specific constructs giving birth to the “economic field.” This brings one back close to a Durkheimian hypothesis, which had been at the basis of a sociological reconstruction of economic objects.

Economics as a scholastic fallacy: A wrong philosophy of practice

The critical use of economic models and econometric techniques is clearly consistent with Bourdieu’s idea, developed a few years later,²⁷ that neoclassical theory is a particular case of the scholastic fallacy. He develops this idea into an explicit point of view in theoretical texts related to the Algerian period: *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique* (in 1972), *Algérie 60* (1977), *Le sens pratique* (1980, translated into English in 1990). Economic theory will be taken as a key example of both hyper-subjectivism and objective mechanism produced in specific social conditions. It is a theory that confuses the things of logic with the logic of things, and makes ordinary economic agents reason like pure theoreticians. “*Denying the pretension of economic agents to possess adequate knowledge of economic mechanisms, the academic economist*

claims for himself a monopoly on the total point of view and declares himself capable of transcending the partial, particular viewpoints of particular groups."²⁸ In this sense, Bourdieu describes neo-classical theory as an "imaginary anthropology" that oscillates between the subjectivism of "free, conscious choice" and a quasi-mechanical objectivism (because there is often only one rational solution to a problem).²⁹ Similarly, neo-classical theory reduces markets to an idealized vision that is far removed from the social reality of empirical markets. The use of mathematics in this construction tends to reinforce this asocial and imaginary aspect. The hegemony of rational action theory in economics, and its success in sociology, are founded on this scholastic bias. But the hegemony and success of rational action theory also stems from the increasing autonomy of the economic field in the sense that this theory can be seen as a mythological formalization of this process. Economic agents are supposed to behave naturally as profit or utility "maximizers" and markets are supposed to adjust (through variations of prices or quantities) as "natural processes" without any institutional or social interference. "*The 'rational-actor' theory, which seeks the 'origin' of acts, strictly economic or not, in an 'intention' of 'consciousness,' is often associated with a narrow conception of the 'rationality' of practices, an economism which regards as rational . . . those practices that are consciously oriented by the pursuit of maximum (economic) profit at a minimum (economic) cost.*"³⁰ Bourdieu's criticism is not limited to the "narrowness" of such a vision of rationality: since the beginning of his sociological work, he has rejected the hypothesis of complete consciousness; he rejects the idea that economic objectives are the most "rational" (such a view is absurd in the literary or the intellectual field where "commercial" behaviors are stigmatized by the *avant-garde*); and, most importantly, he does not think that a *hypothesis* of rationality explains anything. On the contrary, Bourdieu contends that forms and types of rationality have to be explained sociologically. Degrees of knowledge of the issues determine, for example, the "rationality" of responses to an opinion poll, and they are directly related to social factors. The question of the "rationality" of actors is not a question *a priori* but an empirical question in each case study (for example, at each state of a field).

We find in the case of neo-classical theory an example of a belief, close to the *illusio* of the economic field, that is presented as a "pure theory" of this field: similarly, many of the principles of literary analysis reproduce and formalize literary belief(s), especially the autonomy of literary criteria that isolate texts from social reality. The most radical

neo-classical economists try to generalize this economic *illusio* to the whole of social reality, with results that usually contradict those of the other social sciences. Bourdieu's "general economy of practice" is the precise opposite of this attempt, showing the specificity of the fields of cultural production where an *economy of supply* develops by rejection of economic criteria.³¹

The appearance of some success for neo-classical theory is due to the fact that in *specific* sectors of social life (for example, the financial markets, educational enrollments, and collective bargaining) economically strategic behaviors have expanded to such an extent that they can present sufficient regularity to be "deduced" from abstract models without incurring very many obvious errors of prediction: people sometimes behave "reasonably" enough to be "represented" as pure "maximizers" (which they are not). Their decisions become probable from a microeconomic point of view even if this point of view is an illusion, when considered as the product of a universal or natural competence.³² In this sense, Bourdieu has constantly challenged the point of view adopted by microeconomic reasoning.

The symbolic dimension as the integrating vector between economic and social factors

There is a more direct intellectual line that permits us to reconstruct the particular scientific operations of appropriation/criticism that Bourdieu develops during the period 1958–1966: as Lévi-Strauss taught, social reality is fundamentally "symbolic," and "economic" aspects derive from specific symbolic operations of definition that tend to give autonomy to a particular sphere of reality from more mixed situations. In this sense, Bourdieu tries, during this period, to rethink the (symbolic) process that gives birth to a social order where "economic capital" (an "economic cosmos" of "capitalism") leads the movement to de-naturalize this social order by bringing into light its symbolic foundations (A synthesis of these points can be found in Bourdieu's later writings).³³

In *Sociologie de l'Algérie*,³⁴ Bourdieu had already briefly analyzed certain "symbolic exchanges," which he describes as completely mixed with more "material" exchanges that thereby limit the possibility of capitalist accumulation because they create *duties* in the traditional logic of honor. In *Le partage des bénéfices*, the authors try to integrate

the analysis of economic changes (practiced in the “state of the art” at the INSEE) into a comprehensive picture of more complex social and cultural changes of French society. Economic changes appear in this book as “embedded” in symbolic structures.

I want to show now that four particular objects, studied in the early 1960s, allow Bourdieu to promote, on an empirical basis, a more general conception of the relation between economy and society, which can be seen as a “radical correction” to economism. In each case, he accepts some aspects of the economic theorization and observations (such as words, schemes, techniques, and facts), but he “corrects” them with reference to the symbolic dimensions in which they are “embedded”: microeconomics – and econometrics – can be fruitful *if* they are completely re-interpreted in a symbolic frame. The results of this process of correction/integration include the following series of empirical theses developed during the 1958–1966 period, but that still challenge common “economic” explanations:

1. Economic inequalities (revenues, patrimonies, etc.) are embedded in the differentiation of *class ethos*. If one isolates these inequalities from the distribution of other resources and from the logic of *habitus*, it is difficult to understand how they can perpetuate, or, on the contrary, reduce or increase in certain historical periods. Economism (whether in its neoliberal, Keynesian, or Marxist versions) often appears as a kind of naïve optimism concerning the possibilities of change and innovation. The reproduction of the economic order depends not only on the transmission of the economic heritage, but also on dispositions, cultural capital, etc., all factors that are denied by operational or technocratic visions of the society.
2. Demographic changes, such as the evolution in birth rates, results from familial “choices,” which depend *among other factors* on different systems of embodied value (including religious ones) and on particular relations to the future that are linked to social trajectories: for example, the “cost of a child” is seldom either a subjective or an objective causal factor that figures in the decision to have a child. Microeconomic models can only give formal frames and systems of explicit possible causalities, but they do not offer credible substantive hypotheses here. They have to be “read” through sociological eyes. They may help prevision, but give no explanation.
3. Consumption practices can vary significantly at the same level of

revenue or wealth, showing the importance of lifestyles that relate to class living conditions through the mediation of class *habitus*. (This thesis is completely consistent with Halbwachs and the Durkheimians.) During the post-World War II period of rapid economic expansion and growth of mass consumer markets, household and individual consumption depended highly on the quest for symbolic differences in a relational social system, which is then called “social space” in *Distinction*. The quest for differences focuses on the quality and the way of using goods rather than on the purchase or possession of goods (for example, television). These qualitative dimensions of economic practices are *made invisible* by economic *data* and *concepts* (which are the product of the expansion of the economic *illusio*); they need to be deconstructed or at least contextualized if one wishes to avoid a structurally biased perception of social reality. (This later leads Bourdieu to the theme of an “economy of happiness,” which is close to the contemporary critical discussion of “economic indicators” like GDP.)³⁵

4. Educational performance and cultural practices depend more on cultural capital than on economic resources. This finding paves the way for a generalized use of “capital” in the analysis of cultural practices and production. The notion of capital is typically a “non-economistic” economic category, which leads to the apparently redundant notion of “economic capital.” Although seemingly redundant on “economic capital,” the notion of capital is stripped of its typically narrow designation as a form of material or financial property. The transposition of this notion of capital to any specific social field strengthens the pluralistic character of interests, resources, accumulation, and profits. The analogy of the “game” and the notion of *illusio* will systematize this pluralistic vision of social space. But if social space is pluralistic, this does not mean that no field tends to dominate the others: in fact, the “economic field” tends to subordinate all other fields, including the political field and all the fields of cultural production, especially in the 1980s-1990s.³⁶

This short (and necessarily simplified) study of the emergence of “economic discourse” in Bourdieu’s thought leads to a general conclusion. *Two* distinct moves appear simultaneously between 1958 and 1966 in Bourdieu’s relations to economics: first, a move into the core of economics, especially into microeconomics, inspired by an attempt to *objectify* social realities, especially in universes resistant to this “objec-

tification” (like the literary field); second, a move beyond the scholastic point of view created by economists (and outside their particular political commitments to Marxism, Keynesianism, neoliberalism, etc.). The “symbolic” dimension of social realities becomes the *tool*, deriving from the Durkheimian tradition, that helps Bourdieu maintain a consistently radical sociological viewpoint in his effort to generalize an “economic” discourse, which will no longer be purely “economic.” Maybe this double move – the formal economicization of his analysis of the symbolic order and the symbolic explanation of the foundation of economic reality – is one of Bourdieu’s most personal “trade secrets” (“secrets de fabrique”), possibly related to his own uniquely “divided” (“clivé”) scientific *habitus*.³⁷

Notes

1. This article is the expanded version of a communication at the Bourdieu Conference at Boston University, October 2002. I thank David Swartz and Niilo Kauppi for their comments on the first version of this text.
2. Alain Caillé, “La sociologie de l’intérêt est-elle intéressante?” *Sociologie du travail*, 23/3 (1981): 257-274; Olivier Favereau, “Penser (l’orthodoxie) à partir de Bourdieu. Ou l’économie du sociologue,” Communication au séminaire IRIS, 2000.
3. See here the recent issue of the *Economic Sociology. European Newsletter* 4/2 (2003), especially the articles by Richard Swedberg and Bernard Convert. I also thank Marie-France Garcia, Johan Heilbron, Odile Henry, and the other participants to the group “economic sociology” at the Centre de Sociologie européenne for our discussions about Bourdieu and economics.
4. See, for example, Pierre-Michel Menger, “Temporalité et différences interindividuelles: l’analyse de l’action en économie et en sociologie,” 3, July–September (1997): 587–633.
5. Jean-Claude Passeron, “L’inflation des diplômes: remarques sur l’usage de quelques concepts analogiques en sociologie,” *Revue française de sociologie* 23 (1982): 551–584.
6. Ibid. See also Jean-Claude Passeron, *Le raisonnement sociologique. L’espace non-poppérien du raisonnement naturel* (Paris: Nathan, 1991).
7. Pierre Bourdieu, *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie kabyle* (Paris/La Haye: Mouton, 1972).
8. Pierre Bourdieu, *Sociologie de l’Algérie* (Paris: PUF, 1958); P. Bourdieu, *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie kabyle* (Paris/La Haye: Mouton, 1972). P. Bourdieu, *Algérie 60: structures économiques et structures temporelles* (Paris: Minuit, 1977).
9. P. Bourdieu, “Célibat et condition paysanne,” *Etudes rurales* 5–6, April–September, (1962): 32–136.
10. P. Bourdieu, *Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie kabyle* (Paris/La Haye: Mouton, 1972).
11. See “unpublished report” of 1963: Bourdieu, Boltanski, Chamboredon, “La banque et sa clientèle,” Rapport du Centre de Sociologie européenne (Paris: CSE, 1963).

12. P. Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, *Les Héritiers. Les étudiants et la culture* (Paris: Minuit, 1964).
13. P. Bourdieu, Luc Boltanski, Robert Castel, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, *Un art moyen, essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie* (Paris: Minuit, 1966).
14. P. Bourdieu, Alain Darbel, *L'amour de l'art, les musées d'art et leur public* (Paris: Minuit, 1966).
15. Darras, *Le partage des bénéfiques. Expansion et inégalités en France* (Paris: Minuit, 1966).
16. See Frédéric Lebaron, "La croyance économique. Les économistes entre science et politique," (Paris: Seuil, 2000): 67–71.
17. P. Bourdieu, Alain Darbel, Jean-Pierre Rivet, Claude Seibel, *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie* (Paris-La Haye: Mouton, 1963).
18. These points are developed by Marie-France Garcia in an oral communication, Centre de Sociologie européenne, September 2002.
19. See François Fourquet, *Les comptes de la puissance. Aux origines de la comptabilité nationale et du plan* (Paris: Encres, 1980).
20. P. Bourdieu, *La Domination masculine* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1998).
21. The notions of habitus, cultural capital, and distinction are central already in Bourdieu's texts of *Le partage des bénéfiques* (Paris: Minuit, 1966).
22. For a recent point of view on this issue, see Henry Rouanet Henry, Frédéric Lebaron, Viviane Le Hay, Werner Ackermann, Brigitte Le Roux, "Régression et analyse géométrique des données: réflexions et suggestions," *Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines* 40, 160, (2002): 13–45.
23. P. Bourdieu, Alain Darbel, *L'amour de l'art, les musées d'art et leur public* (Paris: Minuit, 1966). See also the formula in P. Bourdieu, *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Minuit, 1979).
24. For Bourdieu, the mathematical formalization of economics cannot be criticized in itself, but in the way that it allows neo-classical economists to separate economic logic even further from the social and historical conditions in which it is embedded. The use of simple models and the practice of hypothesis testing simulate the experimental method without any chance of obtaining universal conclusions, because they are not explicitly understood as historical and contextual. The simplified models of economics are mostly very removed from the ethnographic or sociological observations of the underlying realities. Bourdieu has therefore intensively used geometric data analysis (GDA) methods, which rest on a simple epistemological principle expressed by Benzécri: 'the model follows the data, not the reverse.' Guided by a sociological frame-model, the sociologist does not presuppose any strong relation between two or three variables but tries to explore the entire system of interrelations among many variables and, simultaneously, to reveal the distances between agents (which can be individuals, enterprises in a market, etc.). This use of GDA reveals structural homologies, for example, between global social space and specific fields of production (such as, the field of *home builders*), which permit an understanding of the social process of fit between market supply and demand.
25. P. Bourdieu, "Le marché des biens symboliques," *L'Année sociologique* 22 (1971): 49–126. P. Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques* (Paris: Fayard, 1982).
26. He frequently uses the expression "maximization of material and symbolic capital" in "Les stratégies matrimoniales dans le système des stratégies de reproduction," *Annales* 4–5, July–October, (1972): 1105–1127. This expression clearly shows the attraction of neoclassical schemes in Bourdieu's thinking.

27. First of all, P. Bourdieu, *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique, précédé de Trois études d'ethnologie kabyle* (Paris/La Haye: Mouton, 1972).
28. P. Bourdieu, *Le Sens pratique* (Paris: Minuit, 1980), English translation: *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 28.
29. *Ibid.*, 46–47.
30. *Ibid.*, 50.
31. P. Bourdieu, *Les Règles de l'art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1992). P. Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1994), English translation: *Practical Reasons* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
32. P. Bourdieu, "Avenir de classe et causalité du probable," *Revue française de sociologie* 15/1 (1974): 3–42.
33. P. Bourdieu, *Algérie 60: structures économiques et structures temporelles* (Paris: Minuit, 1977). P. Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1994), English translation: *Practical Reasons* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). P. Bourdieu, *Les structures sociales de l'économie* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2000).
34. P. Bourdieu, *Sociologie de l'Algérie* (Paris: PUF, 1958).
35. P. Bourdieu, *Contre-feux* (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 1998).
36. In *Le partage des bénéfices*, Bourdieu already appears as a strong critic of the Keynesian optimism, which was a dominant ideology in the middle of the 1960s. His criticism is particularly directed against a naïve kind of economism where growth in stability means social optimum. Thirty years later, Bourdieu would develop a very similar criticism of neoliberalism and of economic science as its main theoretical source. Some scholars see this criticism as political or ideological inflexion or conversion; it can better be described as a rather rare expression (among intellectuals) of theoretical and political continuity and consistency.
37. P. Bourdieu, *Science de la science et réflexivité* (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 2001).

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CULTURE AND FIELDS

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CHAPTER 5

Cultural capital in educational research: A critical assessment

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Cultural capital is widely recognized as one of the late Pierre Bourdieu's signature concepts. Indeed, twenty-five years after texts such as Bourdieu and Passeron's *Reproduction* were first translated, they continue to play a significant role in English-language sociology. The concept of "capital" has enabled researchers to view culture as a resource – one that provides access to scarce rewards, is subject to monopolization, and, under certain conditions, may be transmitted from one generation to the next. As a result, emphasis on cultural capital has enabled researchers in diverse fields to place culture and cultural processes at the center of analyses of various aspects of stratification. In Bourdieu's own work, the concept was used most prominently in research on education and consumption and taste.¹

English-language researchers have applied and developed the concept in these areas as well as others.² Not all of the work has been favorable. Halle³ found the concept to be of limited value in his study of paintings and art in New York homes. Lamont⁴ critically assessed the concept in her work on symbolic boundaries. Nevertheless, although not as predominant as the “sister concept” of social capital, the impact of the concept of cultural capital in studies of inequality is beyond dispute.

Bourdieu developed the concept of cultural capital in the context of his educational research, and it is in the sociology of education that it has had its most sustained impact on English-language audiences. Indeed, Bourdieu’s arguments concerning culture are now a staple of textbooks in the sociology of education.⁵ Moreover, in nearly all economically advanced countries, schools play a crucial and growing role in the transmission of advantage across generations.⁶ Therefore, any comprehensive assessment of the concept of cultural capital must necessarily come to grips with its role in education.⁷ In this article, we scrutinize the English-language literature on cultural capital and education and find it to be wanting.⁸ We argue that a dominant interpretation, resting on two crucial premises, has emerged concerning cultural capital. First, the concept of cultural capital is assumed to denote knowledge of or competence with “highbrow” aesthetic culture (such as fine art and classical music). Second, researchers assume that the effects of cultural capital must be partitioned from those of properly educational “skills,” “ability,” or “achievement.” Together, these premises result in studies in which the salience of cultural capital is tested by assessing whether measures of “highbrow” cultural participation predict educational outcomes (such as grades) independently of various “ability” measures (such as standardized test scores). We find this approach inadequate, both in terms of Bourdieu’s own use of the concept and, more importantly, with respect to what we see as its inherent potential. We therefore suggest the need for a broader conception that stresses the micro-interactional processes through which individuals comply (or fail to comply) with the evaluative standards of dominant institutions such as schools.⁹

Our article is organized in the following fashion. The first section reviews a number of studies, demonstrating that a dominant interpretation of the concept of cultural capital has developed. Second, we return to Bourdieu’s writings on education to discern where these premises stand vis-à-vis his discussions of cultural capital and schooling. We suggest that the “highbrow” interpretation was not essential to

Bourdieu's conceptualization of cultural capital. We therefore assert that it has unnecessarily narrowed the terrain upon which cultural capital research operates. Furthermore, we find little in Bourdieu's writings to support the premise that cultural capital is understood to be distinct from (and causally independent of) "skill" or "ability." To the contrary, this assumption appears to be characteristic of sociological perspectives (such as the status attainment tradition) alien to Bourdieu. In the third section, we attempt to develop a broader conception of cultural capital. We provide what we see as the core elements of a definition. Our conception emphasizes micro-interactional processes whereby individuals' strategic use of knowledge, skills, and competence comes into contact with institutionalized standards of evaluation. These specialized skills are transmissible across generations, are subject to monopoly, and may yield advantages or "profits." This conception is one that we feel to be more in keeping with Bourdieu's understanding and, more importantly, has greater potential than the dominant interpretation. In order to illustrate this conception, we briefly present ethnographic data on the relations of families of young children and their contact with various institutions, including the school, in the final section. Here, we also note some studies that have drawn on conceptions of cultural capital closer to our own view.

The dominant interpretation of cultural capital

Table 1 presents a chronological list of English-language educational studies that make use of the concept of cultural capital, and which reflect to varying degrees what we consider to be the "dominant interpretation." We have selected articles and books that present the results of empirical research in education, broadly conceived, resting on an explanatory framework that *explicitly and centrally* invokes cultural capital. The list represents our judgment concerning the most influential research and (in the case of articles) publications.¹⁰ (Works that use the concept of cultural capital in an alternative fashion are listed on Table 2, and are discussed in more detail at a later point.)

In our view, the dominant interpretation of cultural capital in educational research can largely be traced back to the work of Paul DiMaggio, and in particular, his 1982 article on the relation between cultural capital and school success. In this work, DiMaggio conceives of cultural capital as a factor capable of more completely filling out models of the "status attainment process."¹¹ He interprets cultural capital in terms of

Table 1. Selected examples of educational research using the concept of cultural capital

Year	Author	Title/source	Definition of cultural capital	Measurement of cultural capital	Differentiates cultural capital from
1982	DiMaggio	Cultural Capital and School Success, <i>ASR</i>	"instruments for the appropriation of symbolic wealth socially designated as worthy of being sought and possessed"	<i>attitude</i> (i.e., students' interest in art, music, and literature as well as a self-image scale "I am a cultured person") <i>activities</i> (students created arts, performed, attended arts events, read), <i>information</i> about literature, music, and art (e.g., famous composers)	ability (vocabulary test score)
1985	DiMaggio and Mohr	Cultural Capital, Educational Attainment, and Marital Selection, <i>AJS</i>	"interest in and experience with prestigious cultural resources"	<i>attitude</i> (i.e., students' interest in art, music, and literature as well as a self-image scale "I am a cultured person") <i>activities</i> (students created arts, performed, attended arts events, read), <i>information</i> about literature, music, and art (e.g., famous composers)	general ability (composite measure of achievement and ability tests), high school grades
1985	Robinson & Garnier	Class Reproduction among Men and Women in France, <i>AJS</i>	"linguistic and cultural competence" ... Purchasing and borrowing books, attendance at museums, theater, concerts, styles of speech and interpersonal skills	educational credentials [would have preferred involvement in art, music, and literature and linguistic and interaction style]	

Table 1. (Continued)

Year	Author	Title/source	Definition of cultural capital	Measurement of cultural capital	Differentiates cultural capital from
1986	De Graaf, P.	The Impact of Financial and Cultural Resources on Educational Attainment in the Netherlands, <i>SoE</i>	"appropriate manners and good taste" ... Values of formal culture and <i>beaux arts</i> (classical music, theater, painting, sculpture, and literature)	parents' reading (library visits per month, hours of reading) and parents' cultural visits (theater visits, museum visits, historical building visits)	
1990	Farkas, Grobe, Sheehan, and Shaun	Cultural Resources and School Success, <i>ASR</i>	"informal academic standards by which teachers reward more general skills, habits, and styles"	work habits, disruptiveness, appearance and dress, days absent, basic skills	Basic skills (Iowa Test), coursework mastery (district social studies test), educational attainment
1990	Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & Robert	Cultural Reproduction Theory on Socialist Ground, <i>RSSM</i>	"cultural assets, in general ... control over cultural resources and disposal over cultural resources" [definition of cultural reproduction theory rather than cultural capital <i>per se</i>]	cultural consumption: parents: cinema, theater, and museum trips in youth; reading in youth; <i>son</i> : reading frequency, theater, museum, and concert trips	academic achievement (i.e., gpa), previous gpa on earlier diplomas
1990	Katsillis and Rubinson	Cultural Capital, Student Achievement and Educational Reproduction: The Case of Greece, <i>ASR</i>	"competence in a society's high status culture, its behavior, habits, and attitudes"	attendance at theater and lectures, visits to museums and galleries	academic achievement (i.e., gpa), previous gpa on earlier diplomas

Table 1. (Continued)

Year	Author	Title/source	Definition of cultural capital	Measurement of cultural capital	Differentiates cultural capital from
1995	Mohr and DiMaggio	The Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Capital, <i>RSSM</i>	"prestigious tastes, objects, or styles validated by centers of cultural authority, which maintain and disseminate societal standards of value and serve collectively to clarify and periodically to revise the cultural currency"	16 measures of students' participation in, attitude towards, and knowledge about arts and literature: interest in attending symphony concerts, plays, arts events, and reading as well as self-evaluation "I am a cultured person"	
1996	Aschaffenburg & Maas	Cultural and Educational Careers: The Dynamics of Social Reproduction, <i>ASR</i>	"dominant cultural codes and practices, linguistic styles, aesthetic preferences, styles of interaction" ... institutionalized as legitimate	<i>Child cultural capital</i> : classes in music, arts, dance, art or music appreciation / <i>Parent cultural initiatives</i> : play music, go to museums, go to art performances, encourage child to read	
1996	Kalmijn and Kraaykamp	Race, Cultural Capital, and Schooling: An Analysis of Trends in the United States, <i>SoE</i>	"high status cultural signals, such as attitudes, behaviors, preferences, and credentials, ... commonly used for social and cultural inclusion and exclusion"	did parent attend performances of plays, classical music, go to art museums, encourage child to read	educational attainment
1999	Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell	Race, Cultural Capital, and Educational Resources: Persistent Inequalities and Achievement Returns, <i>SoE</i>	"widely shared, high status cultural signals" and "tangible household educational resources" (pictures, books, etc.)	cultural trips, cultural classes, household educational resources	

Table 1. (Continued)

Year	Author	Title/source	Definition of cultural capital	Measurement of cultural capital	Differentiates cultural capital from
2000	De Graaf, De Graaf, and Kraaykamp	Parental Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment in the Netherlands, <i>SoE</i>	“widely shared high-status cultural signals (behaviors, tastes, and attitudes)”	<i>Parental cultural capital</i> : beaux arts (museums, music and dance performances, plays)	parental educational attainment, parental “human capital” (reading behavior)
2001	Sullivan	“Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment” <i>Sociology</i>	“familiarity with the dominant culture in the society, and especially the ability to understand and use ‘educated’ language” ... importance of linguistic competence	<i>children’s cultural capital</i> : activities (i.e., type and amount of reading, type of tv program, type of music, museum, concert, play), test of cultural knowledge, vocabulary test scores, <i>parents’ cultural capital</i> : children’s reports on parents’ reading, newspapers taken, type of music, and cultural activities	
2002	Dumais	Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus, <i>SoE</i>	“‘linguistic and cultural competence’ and broad knowledge of culture that belongs to members of the upper classes”	asked parents if you or child ever: attended concerts, went to art museums; has your child ever taken art, music, or dance classes outside of school, borrowed books from library	ability test scores, gpa
2002	Eitle and Eitle	Race, Cultural Capital, and the Educational Effects of Participation in Sports, <i>SoE</i>	“high status cultural signals, such as attitudes, behaviors, preferences, and credentials, ... commonly used for social and cultural inclusion and exclusion”	trips to museums, art, music, dance classes	Achievement test scores, grades

AJS = American Journal of Sociology; *ASR* = American Sociological Review; *RSSM* = Research in Social Stratification and Mobility; *SOE* = Sociology of Education.

the Weberian notion of “elite status cultures” – that is, as the “specific distinctive cultural traits, tastes, and styles” of individuals who share a “common sense of honor based upon and reinforced by shared conventions.”¹² Cultural capital is thus definitionally yoked to “prestigious” cultural practices, in DiMaggio’s interpretation.¹³ The particular traits, tastes, and styles constitutive of cultural capital are “arbitrary,” in the sense that “status honor ‘may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality.’”¹⁴ The concept is operationalized as a latent factor that, within the constraints of available data, can be indirectly discerned via measures of attitudes towards and participation in “high” culture. DiMaggio’s assumption – attributed to Bourdieu and others – is that any (net) association between cultural capital and students’ grades stems from tendencies of “teachers ... [to] communicate more easily with students who participate in elite status cultures, give them more attention and special assistance, and perceive them as more intelligent or gifted than students who lack” the requisite traits, tastes, and styles.¹⁵

DiMaggio’s article is also notable for the particular place it assigns to cultural capital in the process of status attainment. Indeed, much of the article is devoted to demonstrating that his measure of cultural capital is associated with the grades students receive independently of standardized test scores, and to comparing the magnitudes of these effects. Cultural capital is thus understood to be conceptually and causally distinct from what DiMaggio refers to throughout as “measured ability.” Cultural capital, in other words, is seen as a supplementary resource – one that is ancillary to “ability” – that students may draw on in interests of school success. This leads DiMaggio to hypothesize that cultural capital should exercise its greatest effects on students’ grades in “nontechnical subjects”.¹⁶

English, History, and Social Studies are subjects in which cultural capital can be expected to make a difference; standards are diffuse and evaluation is likely to be relatively subjective. By contrast, Mathematics requires the acquisition of specific skills in the classroom setting, and students are evaluated primarily on the basis of their success in generating correct answers to sets of problems.¹⁷

Thus, in DiMaggio’s explanatory model, the causal power of tastes and styles flourishes precisely to the extent that that of “technical” skill recedes. As a result, the model may be said to rest on a quasi-Weberian distinction between rational and traditional aspects of educational evaluation. These aspects are assumed to be both *analytically and empirically* separable.¹⁸

DiMaggio followed up the 1982 article with two co-authored pieces that further pursued the subject of cultural capital. The first undertook a longitudinal analysis of the effects of cultural capital measures during high school on an array of subsequent outcomes (college attendance, graduation, etc.).¹⁹ The second attempted to untangle various aspects of the transmission of cultural capital.²⁰ Both drew on the same definition and same measures of cultural capital.

It is our contention that DiMaggio's work – and in particular, the first two articles – set the stage for much (but not all) of the English-language research on cultural capital that followed. More specifically, we argue that the majority of subsequent researchers have taken over the two assumptions that we have thematized: a conceptualization of cultural capital in terms of prestigious, “highbrow” aesthetic pursuits and attitudes, and an insistence that it be conceptually and causally distinguished from the effects of “ability.” Together, we maintain, these two assumptions have crystallized into what can be described as a dominant interpretation.

Most of the remaining articles in Table 1 conceptualize cultural capital in terms similar to DiMaggio's notion of an “elite status culture.” For example, Kastillis and Rubinson, Kalmijn and Kraaykaamp, Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell, De Graaf, De Graaf, and Kraaykaamp, and Eitle and Eitle, all invoke “high status” practices or cues in specifying the meaning of cultural capital.²¹ Similarly, De Graaf refers to “appropriate manners” and familiarity with the “*beaux-arts*.”²² Robinson and Garnier share a similar understanding of cultural capital – one closely tied to participation in “highbrow” cultural forms – although in their case a lack of indicators compels them to measure it via educational credentials.²³ Elsewhere, however, we find much broader definitions. Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Robert, for example, allude simply to cultural “assets” and “resources”; similarly, Aschaffenburg and Maas invoke the notion of “dominant cultural codes.”²⁴ Nevertheless, in both of these articles the list of *indicators* used to construct measures of cultural capital is heavily tilted towards “highbrow” (and “middle-brow”) cultural activities. For Dumais, the knowledge and competence constitutive of cultural capital are tied – at a definitional level – to the “culture that belongs to members of the upper classes”; and here again, the indicators by means of which a measure is constructed primarily capture “highbrow” participation.²⁵

Just as the majority of the cultural capital research in Table 1 exhibits an interpretation of cultural capital that derives from or remains consistent with the one originally advocated by DiMaggio, many also share his insistence that cultural capital stands apart from “skills” or “ability.” Thus, Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Robert, Kastillis and Rubinson, Kalmijn and Kraaykaamp, Dumais, and Eitle and Eitle all develop explanatory models that control for some aspect of educational performance – such as test scores or grade point average – that can be taken as indicators of skills or ability.²⁶ The latter, in turn, are understood to be distinct from cultural capital.²⁷

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the approach to cultural capital these articles take does not vary. For example, in a study of English pupils in their final year of compulsory schooling, Sullivan examines students on a broad range of possible components of cultural capital including activities (i.e., reading, television, music, and cultural participation), cultural knowledge, and language (i.e., test scores).²⁸ She attempts to determine inductively which cultural practices and skills should be deemed “capital” and why. Her data lead her to suggest that reading, rather than arts participation, is significant, and that its effect is due to the provision of “intellectual resources which help pupils at school” rather than status “prejudice” on the part of teachers. These intellectual resources – “cultural knowledge” and “vocabulary” – begin to dissolve DiMaggio’s sharp distinction between a status culture, which revolves around prestige, and “ability,” which revolves around technical skill and knowledge. In a related vein, De Graaf, De Graaf, and Kraaykamp attempt to decompose cultural skills and knowledge (broadly conceived) into reading behavior, on the one hand, and participation in highbrow cultural pursuits, on the other.²⁹ When reading behavior turns out to be the more powerful factor in their explanatory model, the authors equivocate over whether to conceptualize it as an alternative dimension of cultural capital, or as an altogether different factor – that is, as “human capital.”³⁰

A different understanding animates the work of Farkas, Grobe, Sheehan, and Shaun.³¹ Eschewing the notion of an elite status culture, they conceptualize cultural capital in terms of “informal academic standards by which teachers reward more general skills, habits, and styles.” They measure it by means of indicators of school behavior, academic habits, and motivation (for example, homework completion, dress, and disruptiveness). For Farkas et al., these “noncognitive” characteristics influence students’ grades indirectly, by contributing to

the acquisition of “cognitive” capacity. However, they also influence grades directly, via teachers’ propensity to perceive and reward students for “good citizenship,” above and beyond what would be warranted by their mastery of course material. In certain respects, the distinction between cultural capital and “ability” reaches its logical conclusion in Farkas’s recent extension of this work.³² Here, a basic sociological framework is proposed that recognizes four forms of capital: alongside of economic and social capital, “noncognitive” skills, habits, and styles are identified with cultural capital, while “cognitive” capacity is identified with “human capital,” understood in terms similar to those of economists.³³

Thus, the articles in Table 1 are rife with variations in analytic focus, conceptualization, and argument. Nevertheless, nearly all are fundamentally guided by one of the assumptions that were identified in DiMaggio’s original work on cultural capital, and many of the articles are characterized by both assumptions. This research, in other words, tends to conceptualize cultural capital in terms of “highbrow” status practices, and on this basis, assumes that it exerts effects independently of “skills,” “technical ability,” or the like. It is on these grounds that we refer to a dominant interpretation.

Revisiting Bourdieu’s writings on cultural capital

As the cultural capital literature has accumulated, consideration of Bourdieu’s writings on education has largely receded.³⁴ It is therefore reasonable to ask where the core assumptions of the dominant interpretation stand with respect to Bourdieu’s own conception of cultural capital and its role in the educational process. It must be emphasized that in raising this question, we are not advocating fidelity to Bourdieu as an end-in-itself.³⁵ Rather, we believe that such an exercise may help to clarify certain points of confusion. Ideally, we hope that it will help to facilitate a more robust use of the concept of cultural capital in educational research.

Cultural capital and “highbrow” pursuits

The “highbrow” conception attains a prima facie plausibility from Bourdieu’s own interest in status collectivities, understood as lifestyle groups that form around affinities of cultural consumption. In partic-

ular, *Distinction* goes to great lengths to document the existence in France of status groups characterized by coherent lifestyles.³⁶ This study presents compelling empirical evidence that “highbrow” interests and pursuits form an essential component of the “art of living” characteristic of the dominant class. The text is replete with examples of how taste in home furnishings, clothing, food preferences, musical interests, and other cultural dimensions assumes variable contours in different fractions of French society. Nevertheless, *Distinction* establishes only a diffuse plausibility for the assumption that familiarity with “highbrow” culture is of fundamental importance in providing advantages to students in the educational system. To be sure, *Distinction* devotes considerable attention to the role of education in facilitating status group membership through the provision and certification of cultural competences. Nevertheless, this text allots very little consideration to the educational process itself. In other words, Bourdieu does not here elaborate the process by which “inherited cultural capital” contributes to educational outcomes (or what he likes to term “scholastic cultural capital”). But it is precisely the question of the impact of cultural capital on educational outcomes that the English-language literature tends to pursue. Thus, *Distinction* provides only indirect support for the “highbrow” interpretation.

Much of the impetus for the “highbrow” interpretation of cultural capital appears to have instead come from the widely-cited article “Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction” (written in 1971), a translation of which appeared in Karabel and Halsey’s influential 1977 collection of essays on education.³⁷ In this article, Bourdieu provides a definition of cultural capital that makes no reference to “highbrow” interests and practices: the term is said to denote “instruments for the appropriation of symbolic wealth worthy of being sought and possessed.”³⁸ (DiMaggio quotes this definition in his 1982 study.) The essay does, however, employ a variety of measures of arts participation – including museum visits, reading habits, theater attendance, classical music appreciation, and the like – as “sufficient” indicators of cultural capital. It would appear that it is Bourdieu’s use of these indicators that has inspired much of the English-language appropriation of the cultural capital concept.

Nonetheless, close inspection of this essay does not unambiguously warrant such an appropriation. For we also find Bourdieu stating here that the educational system’s ability to reproduce the social distribution of cultural capital results from “the educational norms of those

social classes capable of imposing the ... criteria of evaluation which are the most favourable to their products.”³⁹ He elaborates this claim by declaring that

It is in terms of this logic that must be understood the prominent value accorded by the French educational system to such subtle modalities in the relationship to culture and language as affluence, elegance, naturalness, or distinction....⁴⁰

Bourdieu's remarks highlight two important issues. On the one hand, he did see a congruity between the aptitudes rewarded by the school and the styles and tastes that engender status group inclusion among members of the dominant class: the “subtle modalities in the relationship to culture” that he names do indeed recall the cultural attributes of the dominant class as described in *Distinction*. On the other hand, Bourdieu also indicates that this concept of cultural capital was intended to reflect the peculiarities of the French context that was being analyzed. Thus, the question arises whether Bourdieu considered congruity between educational norms and status practices to be *essential* to the concept of cultural capital, and, if so, whether they necessarily take a “highbrow” aesthetic form.

Bourdieu's later expositions of cultural capital provide little support for this possibility. Indeed, his essay “The Forms of Capital” – his most sustained elucidation of the meaning of the concept – contains no mention of an affinity for or participation in highbrow cultural activities.⁴¹ Instead, this discussion asserts, in highly generic terms, that any given “competence” functions as cultural capital if it enables appropriation “of the cultural heritage” of a society, but is unequally distributed among its members, thereby engendering the possibility of “exclusive advantages.”⁴²

Examination of Bourdieu's writings thus suggests that the association of cultural capital with “subtle modalities in the relationship to culture and language [such] as affluence, elegance, ... or distinction” – and by extension, with participation in “highbrow” cultural activities – may well have been intended to apply only to the French context. Lamont and Lareau explicitly drew attention to this possibility some fifteen years ago when they argued that before the *effects* of cultural capital could be analyzed in a given context, its *content* had to be empirically specified.⁴³ Nevertheless, relatively little work in educational research has attempted a specification of this sort.⁴⁴ Ironically, strong empirical evidence has been presented indicating that the exclusive respect tradi-

tionally accorded to “highbrow” cultural pursuits has largely dissolved, at least in some English-language countries.⁴⁵ It thus seems unlikely that in these contexts the distribution of unequally distributed, highly valued, and monopolized cultural resources that shape school success is primarily, or best, captured by measures of “highbrow” cultural participation.

Cultural capital and “ability”

The second dimension of the dominant interpretation – the assumption that cultural capital is both conceptually distinct from and causally independent of “technical” skill or knowledge – is, if anything, more problematic. Indeed, consistent with earlier critics, we would maintain that this assumption results from adherence to the premises of the U.S. tradition of status attainment research, in which “ability” and related concepts tend to play a prominent role.⁴⁶ We can identify nothing in Bourdieu’s writing that implies a distinction between cultural capital and “ability” or “technical” skills. Instead, we argue that he considers them to be irrevocably fused.

At a *prima facie* level, Bourdieu’s critical stance towards Becker and other theorists of human capital suggests caution concerning the separation of cultural capital and technical knowledge or ability.⁴⁷ Bourdieu writes that human capital theorists’

studies of the relationship between academic ability and academic investment show that they are unaware that ability or talent is itself the product of an investment of time and cultural capital.⁴⁸

More concretely, however, statements can be located throughout Bourdieu’s writings that directly address the assumption that cultural capital is distinct from technical skills or ability. Thus, for example, in a foray into the sociology of science, he asserts:

to attempt to distinguish those aspects of scientific competence (or authority) which are regarded as pure social representation, symbolic power, marked by an elaborate apparatus of emblems and signs, from what is regarded as pure technical competence, is to fall into the trap which is constitutive of all competence, a *social authority* which legitimates itself by presenting itself as pure technical reason.... In reality, the august array of insignia adorning persons of “capacity” and “competence” – the red robes and ermine, gowns and mortar boards of magistrates and scholars in the past, the academic distinctions and scientific qualifications of modern researchers ... – modifies

social perception of strictly technical capacity. In consequence, judgments on a student's or a researcher's scientific capacities are *always contaminated* at all stages of academic life, by knowledge of the position he occupies in the instituted hierarchies....⁴⁹ [emphasis in original]

Bourdieu maintains here that to attempt to differentiate the effects of factors linked to status from those linked to a pure "technical competence" is to "fall into [a] trap." More specifically, his (admittedly cryptic) argument has two interrelated dimensions. First, he insists that claims of technical competence act as a strategic *resource*, by means of which individuals may seek to legitimate their position in a status hierarchy. Secondly, he asserts that evaluations of technical competence are inevitably affected (or "contaminated") by the status of the person being assessed.

Bourdieu's view on this question finds clearer expression in *The State Nobility*, his last major work on education, and a text that has largely gone uncited in the English-language cultural capital literature. In a section of this work entitled "The Ambiguities of Competence,"⁵⁰ Bourdieu undertakes a discussion of credentials, or what he elsewhere calls "institutionalized" cultural capital.⁵¹ The section is concerned, in particular, with the relation between credentials and jobs, asking on what grounds school certificates provide access to positions.

In taking up this question, Bourdieu explicitly distances himself from a "technocratic" account, in which credentials transparently verify the "knowledge and skills" necessary for effective or efficient job performance. However, he also rejects the "radical nominalism" according to which credentials signify nothing more than the social elevation of their bearers.⁵² In contrast to both, Bourdieu maintains that, from a sociological perspective, credentials must be understood to certify simultaneously two forms of competence on the part of the holder. On the one hand, Bourdieu does acknowledge that certificates and degrees do guarantee a technical capacity. On the other hand, however, certificates and degrees also attest to a "social competence," understood as a sense of social dignity on the part of the holder (and a corresponding capacity to set herself apart from others). The competence underlying the credential, in other words, has both a technical dimension and a status dimension. Bourdieu's argument is precisely that these two forms of competence cannot be disentangled, and that cultural capital therefore includes both *indissolubly*. First, he asserts that,

dominants always tend to impose the skills they have mastered as necessary and legitimate and to include in their definition of excellence the practices at which they excel.⁵³

Secondly, and more broadly, he maintains that actors themselves continuously distinguish between the “technical and the symbolic,” or between attributes of “skill” and attributes of status. The impetus for the distinction that they draw between these two forms of “competence” lies in their strategic interests – interests that vary according to their labor market position:

what is ascribed to skill and to dignity, to doing and to being, to the technical and the symbolic, varies greatly according to the hierarchical position of title and jobs to which they give access.⁵⁴

Consequently, the boundary separating “technical” from “social” competence is at least partly a social construct: it is a result of conflicts between actors pursuing opposing interests. Thus, for Bourdieu, to attempt to partition the different dimensions of competence on analytic grounds is to lose sight of this contestation.

In our view, these remarks on the relation between credentials and jobs are an accurate gauge of Bourdieu’s more general view of cultural capital. As such, they reveal how far apart he stands from the interpretation that animates much of the English-language literature.⁵⁵ Effects of “status,” for Bourdieu, are not distinct from those of “skill” (or by extension, “ability”). Cultural capital amounts to an irreducible amalgamation of the two.

Although we have devoted considerable space to a demonstration that the dominant interpretation of cultural capital is inconsistent with Bourdieu’s own thoughts on education, it is not our intention to dismiss the body of research undertaken on the basis of this interpretation out of hand. To the extent that researchers have been able to isolate substantial effects for cultural capital – understood in terms of “high-brow” cultural orientations and partialled from measures of “skill” or “ability” – their work presents striking evidence of the continuing power of status to have an impact on educational processes. Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined above, we do not believe this research has exhausted the potential contained in the cultural capital concept.

Towards an expanded conception of cultural capital

If what we have termed the “dominant interpretation” is deemed problematic, what are the alternatives? In seeking to answer this question, we turn first to a group of studies that have largely or entirely avoided the dominant interpretation. These studies are more consistent with our own view of cultural capital. Nevertheless, they have not, by and large, attained the same visibility as some of those in Table 1. Nor have they been integrated into the intellectual debates on cultural capital. (For example, these studies generally are not cited in the articles in Table 1 or in Kingston’s recent review piece on cultural capital.)⁵⁶ As a result, they have not triggered a general reconsideration of the cultural capital concept. In the second part of this section, we therefore attempt a reassessment.

Alternative accounts of cultural capital and education

The studies in Table 2 cover different topics and seek to answer different questions. Consequently, differences are apparent in their understandings of cultural capital, highlighting the difficulty of producing a parsimonious definition. However, similar themes are apparent across these studies that, we believe, point the way towards a coherent alternative account of cultural capital.⁵⁷

Patricia McDonough uses the concept of cultural capital in her qualitative study of influences on the college choice process. The study compares and contrasts the resources that schools offer to students in the course of this process. Most of it is devoted to a discussion of what she calls “organizational habitus.” Nevertheless, she also directly addresses the role of “parental cultural capital” in certain places. For McDonough, cultural capital comprises the “first-hand” knowledge that parents have of the college admission process, particularly knowledge that they do not get from schools (e.g., a detailed understanding of the significance of SAT scores, the possibility of raising SAT scores through tutoring, and the availability of private college counselors to tutor children and guide them through the college admission process, as well as the initiative to secure private tutors).⁵⁸ By contrast, Diane Reay, in *Class Work*, a study of mothers of school-age children in London, defines cultural capital as “confidence to assume the role of educational expert, educational knowledge, effectiveness in getting teachers to respond to . . . complaints, ability to compensate for perceived

Table 2. Additional studies of cultural capital in educational research

Year	Author	Title/source	Definition of cultural capital	Measurement of cultural capital
1996	Smrekar	<i>The Impact of School Choice and Community in the Interest of Families and Schools</i>	“social and cultural resources ... [of] linguistic styles, authority patterns, dispositions from the home of habits, objects, and symbols affirmed by schools”	difficulty helping with homework for some, familiarity (or lack thereof) with teachers’ technical language, material resources (i.e., books, transportation)
1997	McDonough	<i>Choosing Colleges: How Social Class and Schools Structure Opportunity</i>	“a symbolic good ... precisely the knowledge that elites value yet schools do not teach”	knowledge of non-school college counselors, SAT tutors, timing of applications, and the importance of enrollment of children in organizations with ample resources to guide students through college application process
1998	Reay	<i>Class Work: Mothers’ Involvement in their Children’s Primary Schooling</i>	“a broad array of linguistic competencies, manners, preferences, and orientations ... subtle modalities in the relationship to culture and language”	confidence to assume role of educational expert, educational knowledge, effectiveness in getting teachers to respond to their complaints, ability to compensate for perceived deficits in children’s schooling
1999	Lareau and Horvat	Moments of Social Inclusion and Exclusion: Race, Class, and Cultural Capital in Family-School Relationships, <i>SoE</i>	“parents’ cultural and social resources become forms of capital when they facilitate copliance with dominant standards in school interactions”	“parents’ large vocabularies, sense of entitlement to interact with teachers as equals, time, transportation, and child care arrangements to attend school events during the school day”

Table 3. (Continued)

Year	Author	Title/source	Definition of cultural capital	Measurement of cultural capital
2001	Blackledge	The Wrong Sort of Capital: Bangladeshi Women and Their Children's Schooling in Birmingham, UK, <i>Intr'n'l Journal of Bilingualism</i>	cultural resources in the home that facilitate adjustment to school, especially linguistic structures	speaking English, feeling comfortable approaching the teacher, reading English, writing English, reading a story at bedtime
2003	Carter	"Black" Cultural Capital, Status Positioning, and Schooling Conflicts for Low-Income African American Youth, <i>Social Problems</i>	"cultural attributes, codes and signals ... a set of tastes, schemes of appreciation and understandings ... for linguistic, musical, or interactional styles"	(students' reports of) language use, especially slang, clothing styles, silence or talkativeness in class, interactional styles with teachers; argues that there are "non-dominant" styles that provide currency and status in community settings that are not valued at school

SoE = *Sociology of Education*

deficits in children's schooling."⁵⁹ In a related vein, Blackledge shows how mothers from Bangladesh living in England assiduously instruct their children in Bengali, but do not have sufficient English language skills to assist with homework. Despite these mothers' intensive efforts, they are not viewed as being sufficiently devoted to their children's education by the teachers, since their efforts do not comply with teachers' standards for parent involvement. Thus, Blackledge considers competence with the English language a form of cultural capital.⁶⁰ Back in the United States, Lareau and Horvat discuss a school in a midwestern community in which teachers place a premium on parents taking a positive and trusting attitude in their interactions with educators. However, the legal history of racial discrimination, including patterns of racial segregation in the town's schools, make it difficult for some African-American parents to comply with educators' standards of appropriate parent-school relationships. Yet, when African-American parents display anger or frustration about racial insensitivity in the schools, educators dismiss these parents as unhelpful and "difficult." In this instance, being white made it easier for parents to comply with the standard of a trusting, non-hostile relationship with the school.⁶¹ In a somewhat different vein, Prudence Carter asserts that there are "dominant" and "non-dominant" forms of cultural capital, in the sense that certain cultural resources facilitate students' ability to "maintain valued status positions within their communities."⁶²

Despite their differences, these studies do share (albeit to varying degrees) a clear focus on the *standards* that educators use to evaluate students or their parents. Furthermore, these works do not uncritically accept given institutional standards as legitimate, and then seek methods for boosting parents' and students' compliance with them (in contrast to authors such as Epstein and Hart and Risley).⁶³ Instead, they examine the ways in which cultural resources help families comply with these standards. This double vision, encompassing both institutional standards and the actions of individuals in complying with them, is critical to any discussion of cultural capital in our view, and points the way towards an expanded definition of cultural capital. Thus, our definition differs from the dominant definition in important ways. The elements that are considered under the rubric of cultural capital are broader. Indeed, the prospect that teachers reward students' competence in highbrow aesthetic culture becomes merely *one* empirical possibility among many others. There is also a renewed focus on institutional standards more broadly conceived than art and music. In all cases it is necessary to document the formal and informal standards

used to allocate rewards. Second, academic skills have to be drawn under the purview of cultural capital research. In other words, measures of academic performance should not be excluded from cultural capital research. Indeed, following Bourdieu, we must examine the factors involved in the creation of these standards.

Reconsidering cultural capital

Some fifteen years ago, Lamont and Lareau attempted to dissect the concept of cultural capital and its varying uses. In the course of doing so, they developed a definition of cultural capital in terms of “institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion.”⁶⁴ According to this interpretation, the existence of cultural capital presupposes a strong social consensus concerning those status signals deemed worthy of recognition. Additionally, Lamont and Lareau also criticized the incorporation of cultural capital into status attainment models, insisting that such analyses overlook a significant dimension of conflict that was clearly part of the original concept: the constitution of cultural capital, they argued, takes the form of micro-political contests over legitimization of particular status signals.⁶⁵

In the ensuing years, it is striking that many of those who have appropriated this definition have stressed the key phrase “high status cultural signals,” while downplaying the terms that flanked it – notably “institutionalized,” on the one hand, and “attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials,” on the other. This appears to have led researchers to view the Lamont and Lareau definition as consistent with a “highbrow” interpretation of cultural capital, despite the fact that they explicitly argued against such an assumption when the concept is to be applied to a context outside of France.⁶⁶

We are therefore inclined to expand the definition of cultural capital. As we noted earlier, in our view the critical aspect of cultural capital is that it allows culture to be used as a resource that provides access to scarce rewards, is subject to monopolization, and, under certain conditions, may be transmitted from one generation to the next. Moreover, it is critical to stress the socially determined character of cultural capital. We therefore return to Bourdieu’s explication of cultural

capital in terms of “the educational norms of those social classes capable of imposing the ... criteria of evaluation which are the most favorable to their” children.⁶⁷ This motif – the imposition of evaluative criteria – is one that recurs throughout Bourdieu’s work, in his discussions of social exchanges situated within fields operating as cultural “markets.”⁶⁸ In our view, it comprises the core of the cultural capital concept. As such, it implies a relative lack of independence – a “heteronomy”⁶⁹ – in the relation between the school system and a class (or classes) capable of carrying out such an imposition.⁷⁰ At the same time, however, it also implies that the competencies that function as cultural capital are not fixed once and for all.

This account of cultural capital is highly abstract. Hence, its use necessarily presupposes empirical documentation of particular evaluative criteria. There are two important components. First, studies of cultural capital in school settings must identify the particular expectations – both formal and, especially, informal – by means of which school personnel appraise students.⁷¹ Secondly, as a result of their location in the stratification system, students and their parents enter the educational system with dispositional skills and knowledge that differentially facilitate or impede their ability to conform to institutionalized expectations. Studies must document variations among students and parents in their ability to meet the standards held by educators.⁷² Moreover, although a consensus may well hold over the nature of the expectations at any given moment, students and parents are also differentially endowed with the knowledge and skills that enable them to influence the way that they are applied for evaluative purposes.⁷³ It is these dynamics that we believe must be captured in cultural capital research. In addition, as noted above, we believe that technical skills, including academic skills, should not be excluded from any discussion of cultural capital. Although we have no doubt that status signals form one element of the competencies that students and parents are able to leverage, they do not exhaust the issue.

Cultural capital and interactions with institutional agents

To illustrate our understanding of cultural capital, we present some empirical material from Annette Lareau’s research based on in-depth interviews with the mothers and fathers of 88 white and African-American families, intensive observations of 12 of those families, and for most children, school observations when the children were 9 and

10 years of age.⁷⁴ In this discussion, we seek to demonstrate the importance, at the micro-interactional level, of skills and competencies consistent with our understanding of cultural capital, as well as social class differences in their distribution.⁷⁵ We begin by addressing the question of the evaluative standards operative in various institutional arenas that young children come into contact with, and then we proceed to detail the attempts of parents from different social classes to promote their children's success within these arenas. To be sure, Bourdieu's concepts cannot be isolated from one another. Thus, in addition to cultural capital, our presentation draws on various ideas that were central to Bourdieu's thought, including those of class-specific dispositions (*habitus*) and a generalized strategic conception of agency.

Institutionalized standards

Conceptions of children have changed over time.⁷⁶ Moreover, professionals have significantly altered their advice about the appropriate methods of child rearing.⁷⁷ These changes in the norms surrounding childrearing also carry over into parents' interactions with key professionals and institutions. Thus, for example, as Hays has noted, professionals have gone from instructing mothers to follow dutifully and acquiescently the advice of doctors to (with the advent of Dr. Spock) norms centered on "trusting oneself."⁷⁸ Indeed, professionals and semi-professionals have established standards of responsibility for parents covering different aspects of children's lives, ranging across schools, leisure activities, and institutions such as health care.⁷⁹ Generally these standards stress the importance of parents being "active," "involved," "assertive," "informed," and "educated" "advocates" for their children.⁸⁰ In doing so, these professionals and semi-professionals have to create a historically specific set of evaluative criteria against which the performances of parents (and by extension, their children) are judged. However, what the professionals and semi-professionals have failed to grasp, in our view, is that the various childrearing skills and practices that they elevate are not evenly (or randomly) distributed across social classes.

In summary, although a full exposition of this approach must be outside of this article, the emphasis on the importance of active parent involvement in a wide variety of settings is virtually universal and widely praised. However, as we show below, social class affects the likelihood of parents' compliance with these institutional standards. In their encounters with institutional officials, middle-class parents ex-

hibit a unique sense of entitlement; and in seeking to realize their (perceived) prerogatives, they pursue interactional strategies and deploy cultural resources that are absent among their working-class and poor counterparts. Because these institutional settings call for active, engaged, and assertive parents, middle-class parents appear to be more capable of effective compliance. In the space below, we compare the experiences of the parents and guardians of a middle-class African-American girl and an African-American girl living in a public housing project, when they undertake institutional interventions on behalf of their children. The mothers are interacting with different institutions; their daughters attend different schools. Nevertheless, profound differences are observable in the micro-interactional skills that they display.

The Marshall family

The Marshalls are a middle-class, African-American family who live in an expansive suburban home (valued at around \$200,000) located on a quiet, circular street in a predominantly white suburban community, situated near the boundaries of a major city. Mr. and Ms. Marshall are both college graduates. Ms. Marshall has a Master's degree and works in the computer industry. Her husband is a civil servant. They have two daughters: ten-year-old Stacey and twelve-year-old Fern.

Ms. Marshall routinely shepherded her daughters through institutions and intervened when problems emerged. In one case of particular interest, Stacey was not admitted to her school's gifted program (she missed the cut-off score on the entry test by two points). Ms. Marshall determined that the school district would accept scores from private testing services. Using her informal networks, she located someone who offered the service and paid \$200 to have her daughter re-tested. She then took the scores back to the district, and, even though Stacey still was just below the cut-off, advocated on behalf of her daughter to an administrator. Ms. Marshall was ultimately successful, and Stacey was admitted to the gifted program. This example illustrates both the strategies and techniques that Ms. Marshall used to supervise, monitor, and intervene in her daughters' lives, a pattern we observed with other middle-class parents, black and white. The results of these interventions can be significant. Gifted programs, for example, enable children to be exposed to special curricula. They also mark them as unusually "talented," which may shape teacher expectations. Track placement in elementary school is influential in shaping track place-

ment in middle school and high school. In all of these ways, Ms. Marshall gained a payoff for her daughter. What must be emphasized, however, is that it was the district's willingness to accept private testing and the administrators' readiness to respond to parental entreaties that rendered her strategy effective.

Additionally, not only did the middle-class parents in our data routinely intervene in various institutions on behalf of their children, they also clearly transmitted the required skills to them, as well. Children watched their parents deal with institutional officials concerning matters both serious and minor. In the space below we discuss in detail the interventions that Ms. Marshall made in her daughter's gymnastic program. We also observed her engage in similar actions in other settings, such as a doctor's office; and she reported yet others to us concerning her daughters' school (the data on this family were collected during the summer). It is our view that the skills and strategies Ms. Marshall used so effectively in the gymnastics program are very similar to those she used with other institutions, and in particular, the children's school. Moreover, as we show, she also directly trained her children to develop their own nascent skills in calmly but directly pursuing their interests with people in positions of authority.

Stacey had begun gymnastics in a township program in which she had excelled. According to Ms. Marshall, however, the transition to a private gymnastics club was difficult:

Suddenly, the first day in [gymnastics] class, everything that Stacey did, you know, ... even, even though she was doing a skill, it was like, "Turn your feet this way," or ... "Do your hands this way." You know, nothing was very, very good or nothing was good, or even then just right. She [Tina, the instructor whom Ms. Marshall believes to be of Hispanic descent] had to alter just about everything [Stacey did]. I was somewhat furious ...

When the class ended and she walked out, Stacey was visibly upset. Her mother's reaction was a common one among middle-class parents: She did not remind her daughter that in life one has to adjust, that she will need to work even harder, or that there is nothing to be done. Instead, Ms. Marshall focused on Tina, the instructor, as the source of the problem:

We sat in the car for a minute and I said, "Look, Stac," I said. She said, "I-I," and she started crying. I said, "You wait here." The instructor had come to the door, Tina. So I went to her and I said, "Look." I said, "Is there a problem?" She said, "Aww ... she'll be fine. She just needs to work on certain

things.” Blah-blah-blah. And I said, “She’s really upset. She said you-you-you [were] pretty much correcting just about everything.” And [Tina] said, “Well, she’s got – she’s gotta learn the terminology.”

Ms. Marshall acknowledged that Stacey wasn’t familiar with specialized and technical gymnastics terms. Nonetheless, she continued to defend her daughter in her discussion with the gymnastics instructor:

I do remember, I said to her, I said, “Look, maybe it’s not all the student.” You know, I just left it like that. That, you know, sometimes teaching, learning and teaching, is a two-way proposition as far as I’m concerned. And sometimes teachers have to learn how to, you know, meet the needs of the kid. Her style, her immediate style was not accommodating to – to Stacey.

Ms. Marshall thus asserted the legitimacy of an individualized approach to instruction, and her assumption that the instructor should adapt to the needs of the child. Although her criticism was indirect (“Maybe it’s not all the student. . . .”), Ms. Marshall made it clear that she expected her daughter to be treated differently in the future. In this case, Stacey did not hear her mother speak with the instructor, but she did know that her feelings were being transmitted in a way that she, as a young girl, could not do herself.

Moreover, in other moments Ms. Marshall directly trained her daughter to prepare for encounters with institutional agents. For example, although quite talented in gymnastics, Stacey had been unable to execute one key movement (called a “kip”) on the parallel bars. Ms. Marshall objected to how Tina (who called Stacey “lazy”) was managing the problem. She and her daughter therefore decided that Stacey should decline the invitation she had received to be part of the club’s “elite” gymnastics team. In the course of doing so, Ms. Marshall trained her daughter – in a way that a manager might prepare for an important meeting – to think through her response to Tina ahead of time:

Before Stacey went to the next class, I said, “What are you gonna to say to them, if they ask you why?” And she said, “I’m . . .” You know, I said, “I think you better sit down and think about it.” “Cause,” I said, “They might ask you.” And sure enough, they did. . . . And we talked about it. I said, I said, “It might be feasible for you to just say that you just decided that you weren’t ready for it.” You know. And leave it at that.

The response from the instructor to Stacey's prepared statement served to antagonize Ms. Marshall further:

I remember Stacey came out that night from class, and she – she got in, crying. She said, “You were right. She did ask me.” And I said, “Well, what did you say?” She said, “We told ‘em that I just didn't think I was ready for it.” And I said, “Well, what did they say?” She said, “Tina just went Humm” [said in a disdainful, haughty voice]. You know, like that. And here I'm thinking to myself, well, I don't really think that was appropriate.

In this case, Ms. Marshall was unable to avoid difficulties in her daughter's institutional experience. What she did do, however, was transmit to Stacey a sense of entitlement in her dealings with institutional agents. Furthermore, she taught her daughter to rehearse interactions in advance and to assess critically the stance of people in positions of authority. Other middle-class parents in our study undertook similar “training” exercises with their children. In doing so, they transmitted to them a sense of entitlement and a propensity to intervene as well as a set of techniques for doing so. Indeed, the process of transmission revealed tightly interlocked dispositions concerning institutional agents and particular “skills” oriented to managing interactions with them that were characteristic of the middle-class families in our data. It is our contention that techniques and “skills” of this sort may be fruitfully conceptualized as a form of cultural capital.

To be sure, possession of this capital (and the associated dispositions) did not automatically entail its activation. To the contrary, there was typically a considerable amount of both hesitating and strategizing in middle-class parents' decisions to intercede on behalf of their children. Ms. Marshall, for example, routinely waited and watched before intervening.⁸¹ Nevertheless, middle-class parents – and in particular, mothers – regularly sought to improve institutional outcomes for their children. And, in the course of doing so, they also sought to instill in the children the skills needed eventually to undertake such interventions on their own behalf, as well as a taken-for-granted belief that they were entitled to use these skills. A different pattern, however, emerged with working-class and poor families in our study, as the case study from the Carroll family reveals.

The Carroll family

Ten-year-old Tara Carroll and her twelve-year-old brother Dwayne live with their maternal grandmother in a three-bedroom apartment. Two uncles also stay at the apartment, one living there more or less full time and the other intermittently. Tara and Dwayne's mother, Cassie, has her own apartment but she is in regular, daily contact with her children. The two were born during a particularly difficult time in their mother's life; among other things, she was struggling with a drug problem. Thus, Tara and Dwayne have lived from birth with their grandmother, who, as their guardian, receives public assistance (AFDC) to help her pay for their food, clothing, and shelter.

Cassie's situation had recently improved. She had a job with a collections company, making telephone calls to try to recover money owed by credit cardholders with outstanding debts. She now shared some childcare responsibilities with her mother.⁸² All interaction with the school, for example, fell to Cassie. She conscientiously attended parent-teacher conferences and other school-related events. The children's father was in prison, and although they saw him from time to time before he went to jail (and sometimes accompanied their mother when she made trips to the prison), he did not play a significant role in their lives. At the time of our data collection, Tara was a fourth grader at Lower Richmond School.⁸³

A number of adults helped facilitate Tara's school experience. Her grandmother, Ms. Carroll, got her up and ready for school each day. In the afternoon, she supervised her homework. Ms. Carroll had a house rule (not always followed) that her grandchildren could not go out and play until their homework was complete. Indeed, the adults in Tara's life often stressed the importance of doing well in school. Although resources were very tight, Tara's mother scraped together the money – over \$200 – to purchase the program “Hooked on Phonics” (advertised on television). She also regularly attended parent-teacher conferences. Thus, both Cassie and Ms. Carroll wanted to help Tara succeed educationally. Indeed, the importance of showing interest in school was a common theme in the Carroll home. Ms. Carroll repeatedly stressed to her daughter the importance of going to school, as she noted in an interview:

It's good to show interest. And like I told my daughter Cassie, take time off. Go up there and check on your kids and see what's going on so you won't be in the dark. Work with those teachers and when they know you're concerned it makes them feel good and they'll be more concerned. They're human. You understand what I'm saying.

In addition, in their routine interactions, family members stressed the importance of being assertive and “fighting for your child,” as in this exchange one weekday afternoon between Ms. Carroll and Tara’s aunt, Patty:

Mrs. Carroll did say to Patty, “Did you hear about Dwayne? Did Cassie tell you? They said Dwayne is teaching the other kids. He does not need to be in that class.” Patty said, “Yeah, he is a smart kid.” Mrs. Carroll said, “I knew he shouldn't; he was on the honor roll. I don't know how it happened.” Patty said, “Cassie should have said something right in the beginning. They should not have done that.” Mrs. Carroll said, “When it's your child, you have to fight.” Patty said, “Yeah.”

Thus, the Carroll adults appeared to hold an ideology that parents should “fight” for their children when the school did not act in their best interests. Yet despite their acceptance of dominant norms concerning childrearing, the Carrolls did not handle their child’s schooling in the same manner as their middle-class counterparts.

For example, in a parent-teacher conference, Tara’s mother listened with interest, volunteering that she had bought her daughter “Hooked on Phonics.” However, she was far less assertive than most of the middle-class mothers we observed. Thus, during the conference, the teacher persistently pronounced Tara’s name differently than the family did at home. (Rather than calling her “Ti-ray,” she called her “Tar-rah.”) At one point, the teacher got up from the conference table and, still talking, walked over to her desk to pick up a piece of paper, all the while referring to “Tar-rah.” Under her breath, Tara’s mother whispered, “It’s Ti-ray, Ti-ray” in a frustrated tone; but when the teacher returned, she did not correct her pronunciation. Nor did Tara’s mother ask detailed, substantive, questions, or probe, test, or challenge the teacher about her daughter’s educational experiences. In short, she turned responsibility over to the teacher. This contrasted with her behavior in other settings, in which we witnessed Tara’s mother being quite vocal and assertive. Thus, the difference in her demeanor cannot be attributed to her personality.⁸⁴

At least in part, the lack of assertiveness that Tara's mother exhibited stemmed from the fact that some of the information provided by the teacher was difficult to follow. Although seeking to be friendly and approachable, the teacher, an African-American woman, often used jargon such as "word attack skills" and "written comprehension" in the conference:

Teacher: This is her reading test, which in 4th grade is comprehending. That's what I want to see, not only – she can pronounce any word. Her word attack skills are very good so she can read above her reading level, but what I'm really concerned with is if she understands what she's reading. And right now she does.... She is a solid 4th grade reader, both in reading and in comprehension.... She came up in written comprehension from a "C" to a "B" because what I'm looking for is more grown up writing and some more organization to her writing and this, on the back, is her first draft and she rearranged things and this is her second draft. You can see a big difference.

Thus, full participation in the interactions such as this one presupposes a degree of competence with educational terminology that is by no means universal among parents.⁸⁵ In the course of the conference, the teacher – adhering to dominant educational standards – also stressed the importance of parent involvement, requesting active educational assistance on the part of the mother:

The math, that's the only thing. Keep drilling her with the math, with her basic skills so that she's more comfortable with it and that just comes from drilling. With word problems, the thing that you can do with her is what I do with my daughter cause my daughter's weakness is math, also. That's not uncommon for a kid to have a weakness in math or in another subject.

Unlike middle-class parents, however, Tara's mother did not follow up this suggestion by asking questions. She did not quiz the teacher or push her own agenda, as middle-class parents were prone to do. Her passivity, however, was not the result of indifference. Instead, our data suggest that it stemmed from a combination of her belief that education was the province of professional educators, rather than parents, and her sense of deference towards persons in positions of institutional authority.

As we have noted, Tara Carroll's mother and grandmother acknowledged that they were expected to promote Tara's educational success actively. They did not, however, have the same resources to bring to bear as their middle-class counterparts: unfamiliar with educational jargon, Tara's mother was unsure how to fulfill their expectations. Similarly, despite recognizing its legitimacy, she was disinclined to

adhere to the norms of “active” parental involvement by challenging officials in positions of authority or advocating on behalf of her child. As a result, Tara’s encounters with institutions such as the school were significantly different from those of Stacey Marshall.

Conclusion

In this article we have attempted to assess the results of the importation of the cultural capital concept into English-language educational sociology. We have argued that over the course of the last two decades, a dominant interpretation has developed. This interpretation rests on two assumptions, first codified in the work of DiMaggio: that the concept of cultural capital refers exclusively to knowledge of or competence with “highbrow” cultural activities, and that as such, it is distinct from, and causally independent of, “technical” ability or skill. Our review of the literature supports the contention that these assumptions have pervaded much of the research on cultural capital.⁸⁶ Furthermore, we have attempted to demonstrate that the dominant interpretation cannot claim strict fidelity to Bourdieu’s own understanding of cultural capital, and thus need not be taken for granted by researchers seeking to use the concept. Finally, on the basis of our reading of Bourdieu’s work, we have attempted to develop an alternative interpretation of cultural capital that does not restrict its scope exclusively to “elite status cultures,” and that does not attempt to partition it – analytically or empirically – from “human capital” or “technical” skill. As we have shown, this approach stresses the importance of examining micro-interactional processes whereby individuals’ strategic use of knowledge, skills, and competence come into contact with institutionalized standards of evaluation. Students and parents differ, we assert, in their ability to comply with institutionalized standards of evaluation or, put differently, they have different skill levels for managing institutional encounters. We have stressed that these specialized skills are transmissible across generations, are subject to monopoly, and may yield advantages or “profits.” Status signals, including “highbrow” competence, may indeed be one element of the competences that students and parents draw on in their institutional encounters, but we do not feel that these signals exhaust the issue.

Our interpretation of cultural capital is considerably more abstract than the dominant interpretation. It emphasizes that aspect of Bourdieu’s thought that we consider fundamental to his discussions of

cultural capital: the direct or indirect “imposition” of evaluative norms favoring the children or families of a particular social milieu. As such, any use of this interpretation necessarily presupposes a careful documentation both of the particular evaluative criteria that operate in a given institutional arena, and of the factors affecting the application of these criteria to students of different social backgrounds. We find this interpretation appealing because it permits maximum empirical variation, while still retaining the core idea that culture can function as “capital.” In particular, because it is centered on the existence and operation of evaluative norms associated with a specific location in the stratification system, this interpretation is tied to the idea of a (relative) monopoly over cultural skills and competences that can yield “profits.” To suggest the potential usefulness of this interpretation, we have provided a concrete example of research guided by it.

We hope to see work in cultural capital continue, but with a much broader scope, in keeping with the approach that we have suggested. As noted above, academic skills should not be excluded from the purview of cultural capital research. Academic skills are, instead, part of what we should be conceiving of as cultural capital. (It is also important to understand how academic skills are constructed and legitimized as meritorious, as Bourdieu suggested.) But other questions loom. One important area of future investigation is the question of how markets for cultural capital are constructed. Kevin Dougherty noted the need to

theorize about the role social groups play in shaping organizations so that they [organizations] will demand certain cultural attributes monopolized by those very groups.... A given possession only becomes capital if a market has been constructed in which that possession is demanded and therefore can yield a return.⁸⁷

Thanks in large part to the legacy of Bourdieu, the premise that culture cannot be ignored in studies of stratification is now broadly accepted throughout much of sociology. The concept of cultural capital has been central to the development of this theoretical orientation. For this reason, the evaluation and assessment of the cultural capital literature is warranted, and we hope that our attempt to develop such an appraisal will trigger further reflection on the part of researchers seeking to understand the relation between education and stratification in “advanced” societies.

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Notes

1. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Sage Publications, 1990 [1970]); Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]).
2. See, for example, Bonnie Erickson, "Culture, Class, and Connections," *American Journal of Sociology* 102/1 (July 1996): 217–251; Michèle Lamont, *Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Bethany Bryson, "Anything But Heavy Metal," *American Sociological Review* 61/5 (1996): 884–899; and David Halle, *Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); as well as numerous educational researchers discussed below.
3. Halle, *Inside Culture*.
4. Lamont, *Money, Morals, and Manners*.
5. Jeanne Ballantine, *The Sociology of Education: A Systematic Analysis* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 80–81; Cornelius Riordan, *Equality and Achievement: An Introduction to the Sociology of Education* (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1997), 66.
6. Michael Hout, "More Universalism, Less Structural Mobility: The American Occupational Structure in the 1980's," *American Journal of Sociology* 93/3 (1988): 1358–1400.
7. Thus, in this article, we focus on the literature in sociology of education; we do not provide an analysis of cultural capital in other research areas such as the sociology of culture.
8. Our article here obviously is indebted to an earlier piece, written by the first author with Michèle Lamont, which examined cultural capital in the American context: Michèle Lamont and Annette Lareau, "Cultural Capital: Allusions, Gaps and Glissandos in Recent Theoretical Developments," *Sociological Theory* 6 (Fall 1988): 153–168. However, it does diverge from the earlier piece in certain respects: it incorporates more recent studies, it focuses exclusively on the conception of cultural capital in sociology of education (rather than critically evaluating the concept and its use in a variety of areas of sociological research), and it centers

theoretical attention on the importance of institutional standards in any definition of cultural capital, stressing this point somewhat more sharply than the earlier article had. Lamont's subsequent work has maintained an emphasis on status signals deriving from the earlier paper, extending it to a focus on moral boundaries. See Lamont, *Money, Morals, and Manners*; Michèle Lamont, "Introduction: Beyond Taking Culture Seriously," *The Cultural Territories of Race*, ed. Michèle Lamont (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); and Michèle Lamont, *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class and Immigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

9. Others, including George Farkas, have stressed the importance of micro-interactional processes in cultural capital research: "[This research] . . . argues for future attempts to deepen our understanding of the micro-processes underlying stratification outcomes by providing data on the way that gatekeeper judgments are constructed from a myriad of day-to-day interactions." George Farkas, R. Grobe, D. Sheehan, and Yuan Shuan, "Cultural Resources and School Success: Gender, Ethnicity, and Poverty Groups Within an Urban District," *American Sociological Review* 55 (1990): 127–142: 128. However, in his empirical research, Farkas emphasizes the importance of work habits, an element that differs from the factors that we considered to be critical to any conception of cultural capital, as our discussion below reveals.
10. Research centered on other Bourdieusean concepts (e.g., habitus) is excluded from the list, as is research that, in our view, runs together distinct concepts (e.g., cultural capital and social capital). Strictly for reasons of space, we also have excluded studies by authors already represented on the list, on the grounds that the additional studies were very similar to those included *with respect to the questions considered here*.
11. Paul DiMaggio, "Cultural Capital and School Success," *American Sociological Review* 47 (April 1982): 189–201, 199.
12. DiMaggio, "Cultural Capital and School Success," 189.
13. See especially page 191 of DiMaggio, "Cultural Capital and School Success."
14. *Ibid.*, 189–190, quoting Weber.
15. *Ibid.*, 190.
16. *Ibid.*, 199.
17. *Ibid.*, 194.
18. We must note that Bourdieu often drew a distinction between "traditionalistic" and "rationalized" systems of institutional education in his early work. However, in contrast to DiMaggio (and many of the English-language sociologists who followed), Bourdieu did not ground this distinction in the *content* of the culture inculcated or evaluated by the school (that is, in a distinction between "technical" and "non-technical" subject matters and competences). Rather, a "rationalized" pedagogy, for Bourdieu, was defined as one in which the degree of cultural continuity or discontinuity between the home and school milieus was explicitly accounted for in the school's pedagogical practice (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron, *Reproduction*, 53). Thus, the particular content of the culture inculcated and evaluated by the school was irrelevant to his formulation. We return to this question in the following section.
19. Paul DiMaggio and John Mohr, "Cultural Capital, Educational Attainment, and Marital Selection," *American Journal of Sociology* 90 (1985): 1231–1261.
20. John Mohr and Paul DiMaggio, "The Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Capital," *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 14 (1995): 167–199.

21. John Kastillis and Richard Rubinson, "Cultural Capital, Student Achievement, and Educational Reproduction," *American Sociological Review* 55 (April 1990): 270–279; Matthias Kalmijn and Gerbert Kraaykaamp, "Race, Cultural Capital, and Schooling: An Analysis of Trends in the United States," *Sociology of Education* 69 (1996): 22–34; Vincent J. Roscigno and James W. Ainsworth-Darnell, "Race, Cultural Capital, and Educational Resources: Persistent Inequalities and Achievement Returns," *Sociology of Education* 72 (July 1999): 158–178; Tamela McNulty Eitle and David Eitle, "Race, Cultural Capital, and the Educational Effects of Participation in Sports," *Sociology of Education* 75 (2002): 123–146; and Nan Dirk De Graaf, Paul M. De Graaf, and Gerbert Kraaykaamp, "Parental Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment in the Netherlands: A Refinement of the Cultural Capital Perspective," *Sociology of Education* 73 (2000): 92–111.
22. Paul M. De Graaf, "The Impact of Financial and Cultural Resources on Educational Attainment in the Netherlands," *Sociology of Education* 59 (1986): 237–246.
23. Robert V. Robinson and Maurice Garnier, "Class Reproduction Among Men and Women in France," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (1985): 250–280.
24. Harry B.G. Ganzeboom, Paul De Graaf, and Peter Robert, "Cultural Reproduction Theory on Socialist Ground," *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 9 (1990): 79–104; Karen Aschaffenburg and Ineke Maas, "Cultural and Educational Careers: The Dynamics of Social Reproduction," *American Sociological Review* 62 (August 1997): 573–587.
25. Susan A. Dumais, "Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus," *Sociology of Education* 75 (2002): 44–68.
26. Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Robert, "Intergenerational Transmission of Inequalities in Hungary"; Kastillis and Rubinson, "Cultural Capital, Student Achievement, and Educational Reproduction"; Kalmijn and Kraaykaamp, "Race, Cultural Capital, and Schooling"; Dumais, "Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success"; and Eitle and Eitle, "Race, Cultural Capital, and the Effects of Sports."
27. Paul Kingston discusses many of these same studies in a critical essay, "The Unfulfilled Promise of Cultural Capital Theory," *Sociology of Education* Extra Issue (2001): 88–99. Kingston is troubled by the lack of empirical evidence documenting the power of cultural capital in educational research, and by this research's conceptual variety at the definitional level. As our article makes clear, we see more intellectual coherence in the "dominant approach" than does Kingston. Because the concept of cultural capital that the majority of the literature uses is narrow and incomplete, we maintain that it is premature to conclude that the concept is of limited value on the grounds that a more robust theoretical foundation might yield different empirical results.
28. Alice Sullivan, "Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment," *Sociology* 35/4 (2001): 893–912.
29. De Graaf et al., "Parental Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment."
30. See page 96 of De Graaf et al., "Parental Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment."
31. Farkas et al., "Cultural Resources and School Success: Gender, Ethnicity, and Poverty Groups within an Urban District."
32. Farkas does, however, break with an implicit assumption of much of the literature in his argument that cultural capital (in his sense of the term) is causally related to "cognitive" skills.
33. George Farkas, "Cognitive Skills and Noncognitive Traits and Behaviors in Stratification Processes," *Annual Review of Sociology* 29 (2003): 541–562.

34. David Swartz, "From Human Capital to Cultural Capital: The Influence of Pierre Bourdieu on American Sociology of Education," 2002, Radio Broadcast, France Culture, on the World Wide Web at <http://www.radiofrance.fr/chaines/france-culture/speciale/specialebourdieu/index.php>. Accessed 15 April 2003.
35. We thus mention, only in passing, that the majority of English-language literature on cultural capital departs from Bourdieu in a number of ways that are not discussed in this article. First, nearly all researchers who have taken up the cultural capital concept – with the partial exception of Mohr and DiMaggio (Mohr and DiMaggio, "The Intergenerational Transmission") – weld it to a notion of social class that is largely alien to Bourdieu. Secondly, throughout his career, Bourdieu rejected the assumptions about causality inherent in standard multivariate techniques; in contrast, the majority of English-language cultural capital researchers make use of these techniques. On both issues, see Elliot B. Weininger, "Class and Causation in Bourdieu," ed. Jennifer Lehmann, *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* (Amsterdam: JAI Press, 2002), 21: 49–114; and Elliot Weininger, "Pierre Bourdieu on Social Class and Symbolic Violence," in *Alternative Foundations of Class Analysis*, ed. Erik Olin Wright (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press).
36. Bourdieu, *Distinction*.
37. P. Bourdieu, "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction," Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, editors, *Power and Ideology in Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 487–511.
38. *Ibid.*, 488.
39. *Ibid.*, 495.
40. *Ibid.*, 495.
41. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) 241–258.
42. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," 245, esp. note 6.
43. Lamont and Lareau, "Cultural Capital."
44. A partial exception to this oversight can be found in research that attempts to determine inductively which facets of culture merit the appellation "capital." See Sullivan, "Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment." However, insofar as an element of culture is elevated to the status of capital solely on the basis of its superior predictive power in such studies (vis-à-vis an outcome such as grades), the actual mechanisms implicated in cultural capital "effects" remain obscure.
45. See, for example, Richard Peterson and Roger M. Kern, "Changing Highbrow Taste: From Snob to Omnivore," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 900–907; and Bryson, "Anything but Heavy Metal," for the U.S. case; see Michèle Lamont and Virag Molnar, "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences," *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (2002): 167–195, for a discussion.
46. Lamont and Lareau, "Cultural Capital."
47. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital."
48. *Ibid.*, 244.
49. Pierre Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field," trans. Richard Nice, *French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal Since 1968*, ed. Charles Lemert (New York, Columbia, 1981) 257–292, 258 (emphasis in original).
50. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, trans. L. Clough (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 116–123.
51. Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital."
52. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996 [1989]), 119.

53. Bourdieu, "Masculine Domination Revisited," 119.
54. *Ibid.*, 119.
55. This point holds irrespective of whether or not one judges Bourdieu's arguments compelling.
56. Paul Kingston, "The Unfulfilled Promise of Cultural Capital Theory."
57. As various reviewers have noted, the books and articles listed in Table 2 primarily use qualitative methods, while those in Table 1 use quantitative methods. It is possible that the capacity of qualitative methods to capture routine aspects of daily life facilitated the development of a broader understanding. Still, although our conception of cultural capital (elaborated below) is particularly amenable to qualitative techniques, we do not claim an intrinsic connection. To the contrary, the potential of quantitative research is as yet not fully developed, largely as a result of the fact that most such studies have had to draw on data that were not collected explicitly for the purpose of analyzing cultural capital. Indeed, researchers adhering to the "dominant interpretation" have often noted the constraints that derive from having to undertake secondary analysis.
58. For example, McDonough writes, "parents had first-hand college information that they brought to bear on their daughters' choice processes and they have other relevant cultural capital. For example Mr. Ornstein knew his daughter's SAT scores ... could be improved through formal coaching, and he hired a private counselor to help identify schools at which those SAT scores would not be an admission hinderance." Patricia M. McDonough, *Choosing College: How Social Class and Schools Structure Opportunity* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997): 150. See also Peter W. Jr. Cookson and Caroline Persell, *Preparing for Power* (New York: Basic, 1985).
59. Reay studies 33 mothers whose children attend a working-class or a middle-class school in London. In her book, she discusses extensively the work of Annette Lareau, especially *Home Advantage: Social Class and Parental Intervention in Elementary Education* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000 [1989]). Reay argues that, compared to Lareau, it is necessary to focus on the gendered nature of parent involvement, on differences in the character of schools located in working-class and middle-class communities, on the active and involved nature of working-class mothers in their children's school lives, and on variations within working-class and middle-class families. See Diane Reay, *Class Work: Mothers' Involvement in Their Children's Primary Schooling* (London: University College London, 1998). Still, both Lareau and Reay conclude that the role of parents, and especially mothers, in activating cultural capital is critical to understanding class differences in children's school experiences.
60. Adrian Blackledge, "The Wrong Sort of Capital," *International Journal of Bilingualism* 5/3 (2001): 345–369.
61. Annette Lareau and Erin McNamara Horvat, "Moments of Social Inclusion and Exclusion," *Sociology of Education* 72 (January 1999): 37–53.
62. Prudence Carter, "'Black' Cultural Capital, Status Positioning, and Schooling Conflicts for Low-Income African American Youth," *Social Problems* 50/1 (2003): 136–155, 137.
63. Joyce Epstein, *Schools, Family and Community Partnerships* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001); Betty Hart and Todd R. Risley, *Meaningful Differences in the Everyday Experiences of Young American Children* (Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes, 1995). However, the work by Claire Smrekar, *School Choice in Urban America: Magnet Schools and the Pursuit of Equity* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999) is less critical on this point than the other studies in Table 2.

64. Lamont and Lareau, "Cultural Capital," 156.
65. *Ibid.*, 159–161.
66. *Ibid.*
67. Bourdieu and Passeron, "Cultural Reproduction," 495.
68. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 67–72.
69. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 88.
70. To be sure, such an "imposition" need not be direct, but can instead be carried out by what Bourdieu referred to as "agencies of consecration." See Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 96.
71. Studies would document the criteria for advancement in schools, such as skills needed to get good grades and score highly on tests, as well as other formal and informal ways that educators evaluate students. In the study of the influence of family background on schooling, for example, it is also important to document the ways in which educators presume that parents have the educational skills to assist children with homework, help children organize their time for school projects, drive children to stores to get materials for school projects, ask informed, detailed questions in parent-teacher conferences, and otherwise comply with educators' standards. The key is to study parents' actions *in the ways schools define* as crucial, as well as parents' efforts to promote school success in ways that educators do not value. For example, educators' standards lead them to value parents who read to their children nightly in elementary school more highly than parents who scrape together scarce economic resources to purchase educational equipment such as "Hooked on Phonics" (advertised on television). Not all parents' actions to support education are given equal weight by educators.
72. What might this mean? To take only one area, researchers would study variations by social class in terms of parents' detailed, accurate knowledge of how organizations work. This might include questions of how parents' level of knowledge about how to request special services, such as gaining access to the gifted program or their knowledge of teachers' reputations and strategies for getting their children placed with a particular teacher. Educators often use specific language terms that they expect parents to know (such as "auditory reception problems" or even "vocabulary development") that exceed the linguistic skills of many parents. Parents who do understand these terms, or have the sense of entitlement to ask for a definition, gain advantages over those who do not. In a related vein, parents also differ in the skills they have, sometimes rooted in their workplace experiences, to approach institutional settings to make requests. Educators have a preferred way of being approached by "clients," one that stresses parents' deference and their expression of "concern." Thus, parents' familiarity with the schools' organizational routines, educators' linguistic terms, and the micro-interactional standards for professional-client interaction are all aspects that need to be studied in an effort to understand cultural capital in families' efforts to advance young children's academic careers.
73. See Lareau and Horvat, "Moments of Exclusion."
74. See Lareau, "Invisible Inequality." Portions of the discussion of the Marshall family appeared in Annette Lareau's book, *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003). The author is grateful to University of California Press for permission to reprint those sections here. The families were drawn primarily from public schools in a midwestern community and from one city and one suburban school in a large Northeastern metropolis. The

study began when children were in third grade with classroom observations. Letters were sent to parents; separate two-hour interviews were held with mothers and fathers as well as educators. Families were from middle-class, working-class, and poor homes. Class was defined by parents' work situations and their educational levels. A subsample of 12 families was recruited for additional study. When children were in fourth grade, there were intensive home observations of these families including the two described in this article. (The families were paid \$350 for their participation.) The observations included from about 12 to 14 visits to the first three families in the study (including the Carroll family) but then increased to 20 visits, usually daily, for the remaining nine. The first author was assisted in the research by a multi-racial team of research assistants. Because the classrooms did not provide sufficient numbers of children for all of the conceptual categories, particularly for black middle-class families and poor white families, additional families were recruited outside the school from social service agencies, other schools, and informal social networks. For these families, including the Marshall family, we do not have observations at school. For additional methodological details, see Lareau, *Unequal Childhoods*.

75. Briefly, Lareau argues in "Invisible Inequality" and *Unequal Childhoods* for the existence of social class differences in the logic of childrearing. She asserts that in middle-class families, black and white, a coherent pattern can be observed, that she terms "concerted cultivation." This cultural orientation entails a focus on parents' active development of children's skills and talents. By contrast, working class and poor families, both black and white, exhibit an orientation to what she terms the "accomplishment of natural growth." In this case, parents feel compelled to keep children safe and provide them with shelter, food, and love; but they then presume that children will grow and thrive spontaneously. Her book, *Unequal Childhoods*, elaborates these differences across different domains of daily life, including leisure time, language use, and interaction with representatives of institutions. We hasten to add here that there are differences within social class in how these broad cultural orientations are enacted: some parents are shy, some are outgoing, some are anxious, some are more relaxed, etc. While space does not permit us to take them up here, they are detailed in *Unequal Childhoods*.
76. Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1962); Viviana A. Zelizer, *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
77. Julia Wrigley, "Do Young Children Need Intellectual Stimulation? Experts' Advice to Parents, 1900–1985," *History of Education Quarterly* 29/1 (Spring 1989): 41–75.
78. Sharon Hays, *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
79. For a discussion of cultural capital that emphasizes the historicity of educational standards, see Jan C. C. Rupp, and Rob de Lange, "Social Order, Cultural Capital and Citizenship: An Essay Concerning Educational Status and Educational Power Versus Comprehensiveness of Elementary Schools," *Sociological Review* 37 (1989): 668–705. Rupp and de Lange understand cultural capital in terms of "resources of knowledge and culture" and the power to determine which elements of knowledge and culture will function as resources. However, they do not always recognize the role that professionals may play, especially in the contemporary period, in mediating between social classes and particular institutions.
80. U.S. Department of Education, "What Works," (1996) Washington, D.C.
81. See Lareau, *Unequal Childhoods*, chapter 9, for a detailed discussion of the children's

- complaints that “Art” the bus driver was “racist.” There was an initial period of hesitation on the part of Ms. Marshall, but after the children provided additional evidence, she ultimately pursued the matter with district officials.
82. There is some ambiguity in the roles each woman plays in the children’s lives. Cassie, for example, often defers to her mother on key decisions, such as whether Tara and Dwayne could be in the study. On the other hand, Ms. Carroll often defers to her daughter. Thus, when the children complain about attending a tutoring project in the housing development office, she accepts Cassie’s decision that they need not participate: “I guess they didn’t like it They said [the adult tutors] had attitudes And so they complained to their mother about the attitudes, and she said, “Don’t send them down there.” So I don’t I think they just didn’t want to go. Period. I didn’t take it to heart. I really didn’t take it seriously. I just didn’t send them.”
 83. Both her third- and fourth-grade teachers adored her. They described her (privately) as one of their favorites.
 84. This teacher viewed Tara’s mother in very positive terms, as she reported after the conference: “[Tara’s mother] cares about her kids, she definitely does. She cares about her kids. She’s always been interested. Tara is one that is going to be all right. She’s gonna make it Tara’s a great kid, I mean, definitely a great kid. She has trouble with math but other than that she’ll be OK. She’ll get it. She’s real sweet. I hope it works out for her mom to get out of [the housing project]. That would be really good for her and Tara, too.”
 85. Of course, not all middle-class parents immediately know what terms such as “word attack skills” mean; however, their overall level of educational competence is far higher than that of working class and poor parents. As policy reports routinely decry, rates of illiteracy are very high in America. In our observations, working-class and poor parents, even high school graduates, frequently could not, for example, figure out a child’s height if it was given in inches, would stumble over the word “heredity,” did not know what a “tetanus shot” was, and so forth. Displays of this sort of competence (as well as the confidence to ask questions) were integral to the interactional style of middle-class parents in conferences with teachers (see Elliot B. Weininger and Annette Lareau, “Translating Bourdieu into the American Context: The Question of Social Class and Family-School Relations,” *Poetics: Journal of Empirical Research on Literature, the Media and Arts*, forthcoming).
 86. In his first article on the subject, DiMaggio stated that observational documentation of the “elite status culture” he assumed to be operating was necessary before cultural capital research could progress. DiMaggio, “Cultural Capital and School Success,” 191. Lamont and Lareau subsequently declared that such a project was essential to the vitality of the concept: “[d]ocumenting the socially and historically specific forms of American cultural capital is now an urgent empirical task” (Lareau and Lamont, “Cultural Capital,” 162). Nevertheless, despite the fact that both of these articles are widely cited in the educational literature, researchers who adhere to the dominant interpretation of cultural capital have made little effort in this direction.
 87. Personal communication, Kevin Dougherty, letter to authors, June 12, 2003.

CHAPTER 6

Forms of politicization in the French literary field

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In France, from the time of the Dreyfus Affair in to the late 1960s, the writer has exemplified the figure of the “intellectual” who engages in public life in the name of his symbolic power. The importance of the role played by the figure of the politically committed intellectual in legitimating ideological causes throughout the twentieth century has led political historians¹ to define intellectuals as an object of study in their own right. However, by making them an independent object, political historians cut the ideological commitment of these cultural producers off from its main source of legitimacy, which is the writers’ actual practice as professionals. This neglects the fact that writers (or artists, sociologists, scientists) engage in public life as professionals and that they proclaim the continuity between their commitment and their conception of their work. In opposition to this trend in the political history of intellectuals, the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu² shows that the ethical, aesthetic, and political options of individuals are intimately linked, both through their habitus and

through the position they occupy in the social space and in a given field, suggesting that relations should be sought between writers' modes of political action and their conception and actual practice of their own work. This is also the approach taken by the social historians and sociologists of intellectuals.³

In this article, I attempt to systematize the close relations between literature and politics, previously demonstrated in empirical studies of specific historical situations.⁴ First, I look at the question of the politicization of writers from both a historical and a theoretical angle, using Pierre Bourdieu's concept of literary field and Max Weber's concept of prophetism. Second, I suggest a model for analyzing types of politicization depending on the position the writer occupies in the literary field, through four ideal-typical figures of committed writers.

Politicization of the French literary field

The politicization of the French literary field resulted from three factors: the autonomy it gained in the nineteenth century, its lack of professional development, and the competition with newly emerging professions that dispossessed it of some of its domains of competence. I argue that these features account for the writers' most characteristic mode of politicization: prophesying.

The autonomization of literary activity

In Pierre Bourdieu's theory, the concept of field is related to the historical process of differentiation of fields of activity and of specialization – with the development of a body of specialists – as described by Max Weber. While Bourdieu first forged the concept for the literary sphere,⁵ he then went on to develop an analysis of the religious field, through a rereading of Weber's sociology of religion⁶ before applying it to the scientific world⁷ and to the other spheres of cultural production, especially the field of art.⁸ At the same time, he backed the concept with the notion of “autonomy,” then under discussion by Marxist theoreticians, to develop a sociology of art that went beyond the theory of “art as a pure reflection of reality.” What Bourdieu was developing, then, was thinking about how the literary field became autonomous of religious, political and economic forces. He construed this process essentially with respect to the new economic constraints

imposed on writers by the industrialization of the book-publishing market. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the literary field began to be structured around the opposition between a pole of large-scale production, regulated by the law of the market and sales, and a pole of restricted production in which value is based on peer recognition.⁹ This conception of autonomy may readily be seen as comparable to the claims to autonomy expressed by the new professional groups.

The literary field was also becoming independent of the sphere of political power.¹⁰ While the State had ceased to control the book market as it had during the Ancien Régime, it did continue to control writings, and literature in particular, through legislation punishing political offenses and affronts to high morals and religion. It was under the Second Empire, with the tightening of the political and moral control of literature, that the most extreme form of writers' demand for autonomy took shape, with the theory of art for art's sake,¹¹ whose most famous representatives, Flaubert and Baudelaire, were both prosecuted for offending public morality and religion. Indeed, readership increased considerably with the extension of schooling and the development of small presses, making the issue of the political and moral influence of writers and of their writings more topical than ever before.

At first this process caused the literary world to encapsulate itself, but as new publics developed, new forms of universalization came to be sought. The more liberal attitude toward writings under the Third Republic, which threatened to devalue the writer's words since it was no longer terribly risky to express one's opinions or to publish a realistic novel, elicited debate over "the social responsibility of writers." Two antagonistic views – one conservative, the other progressive – clashed during the Dreyfus Affair, the event that marked the birth of "the intellectual." One sign of the emergence of a new symbolic power based on secularized cultural capital was that this category included writers and academic scholars who spoke up in the name of their autonomy and specific expertise and in defense of a value inherent in their "profession": the paradigm of "truth" (in the judiciary investigation) was opposed to the reason of State and the interest of the army, both non-professional arguments adduced by the authorities as well as by conservative intellectuals.¹² Indeed, political commitment at the autonomous pole of the intellectual field has usually taken the form of the defense and universalization of professional values such as "truth," "justice," and "freedom of expression."

However, this momentary unification of the intellectual field masks the process of differentiation of intellectual activities and the competition between professions for the control of some domains of competence,¹³ which accelerated with the new expansion of the intellectual professions in the late nineteenth century,¹⁴ and hastened the autonomization of the literary field. The specialization and professional development of three groups of experts – scholars (first in medicine, of course, with Pasteur, then in the humanities, in what was to become the social sciences), journalists, and politicians – deprived writers of some of their domains of intervention and competence, that is, the moral and social issues, journalistic writing and politics. Scholars in the humanities and the social sciences as well as journalists set themselves off from writers by importing the objectivist paradigm. The American model of informative and investigative journalism became an alternative model to the older literary and political form of journalism. From the end of the nineteenth century on, “one out of three well-known journalists henceforth had nothing in common with the man of letters, as opposed to one out of five thirty years earlier,” according to Marc Martin.¹⁵ In the course of the democratization process, politics also became a profession, as described by Max Weber.¹⁶ Whereas previously a writer’s career might be a stepping-stone to politics – a poet, such as Lamartine, could also be a member of parliament – this was no longer the case. People like Barrès, Maurras, and Aragon, the twentieth-century embodiments of that model, are exceptions to the rule. Inversely, Sartre’s failed attempt to found a political party, the *Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire* (RDR), in 1947, is a counter-example. It was the creation of the “Ecole libre des sciences politiques” in 1871 and the development of a science of administration that introduced the scientific paradigm in the field of politics.¹⁷ Lastly, in the late nineteenth-century republican university the scientific culture imported from Germany took preeminence over the old literary culture based on rhetoric and judgment, particularly in the new scholarly disciplines, the humanities, and the social sciences, with the creation of the *Nouvelle Sorbonne* (around Durkheim in sociology, Lanson in literature, and Seignobos in history).¹⁸

This new division of expert labor accounts for the combat led by writers, with scholars in the classical disciplines and the Catholic Church as allies, against positivism and scientism at the turn of the twentieth century.¹⁹ They defended those specifically literary values of imagination, inventiveness, and taste as opposed to positive knowledge, observation, and method. They fought specialization with a

demand for broader competence and the capacity to elaborate “general ideas” grounded in the general culture dispensed by the classical humanities. At the time, secondary schooling – the “lycée” – was reserved for the children of the dominant class, who formed a small elite (at the end of the nineteenth century, no more than 2 percent of boys in an age cohort successfully passed the baccalauréat examination). In 1902 the republican government introduced reforms aimed at including the modern (i.e., scientific) curriculum, which was open to middle class children, in secondary schools. The 1902 reform set up four paths leading to the baccalauréat, one of which, sciences-and-languages, allowed students to enter the University without any knowledge of Latin.²⁰ This was the reform that elicited the ire of advocates of the classical humanities and of Latin as a social barrier.

Political prophetism

Like other professions, the writers’ claim for autonomy, with respect to the economic, political, and religious authorities, was conveyed through the assertion of their specific values: the defense of beauty and truth, sincerity, integrity, disinterestedness, and responsibility.²¹ These values were to be reinvested and universalized in the political combats in which they engaged in the late nineteenth century, as a way of reasserting their symbolic power. However, in these combats, they found themselves in competition with the new professional groups who asserted their expertise to justify their action; this was the case for the new social sciences in particular, including statisticians, demographers, economists, and sociologists. Writers, who had no positive knowledge of their own, found themselves rather fragile, socially speaking, at a time when scientific values were asserting themselves in opposition to general learning and the gentlemanly values.

Furthermore, the new professions were infringing on the traditionally literary domains of competence. Whereas, for instance, the historical novel had been one of the most favored genres for writing national history in the early nineteenth century,²² the new positivist history dispossessed writers of their competence with respect to the past. The present also partially escaped them, with the development of informational newspapers and investigative journalism, with their factual and increasingly informative treatment of current events, and with the rise of sociologists specializing in the study of social phenomena.²³ Consequently, many writers fell back on the portrayal of the subjective,

intimate, inner life through psychological novels, depicting feelings, despite the fact that this realm had been taken over by psychologists and psychoanalysts.²⁴ There did remain one domain of intervention in which no group of experts had exclusive competence: that is, predicting the future. Whence political prophesying as the privileged mode of political intervention.

Prophetic discourse, grounded less in expert knowledge than in the aptitude for “emotional preaching,” is a particularly appropriate mode of universalization for writers, those producers of collective representations whose legitimacy rests on their charisma. From the turn of the nineteenth century, secularization and liberalization tended to transfer the sacred functions from the religious world to the literary world, thus producing a vocational and prophetic model of the writer, as illustrated by the romantic movement.²⁵ This literary prophetism had a political dimension, since it went hand in hand with the process of the cultural creation of national identities,²⁶ and later with the revolutionary movement of 1848. Similarly, writers participated in the sociology of social groups and the construction of collective identities, the regionalist movement and community groups (catholic, proletarian, etc.).²⁷ Prophetic discourse was also perfectly adapted to the demand by the new political entrepreneurs in the upcoming democratic system for charismatic legitimacy. The new political parties were the first to take in intellectuals who were “organically” tied to them, as Gramsci put it.²⁸ More generally, the shattering events that disrupted life in France – the Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, World War I, the rise of communism and fascism, the defeat in 1940, and the wars of decolonization in the 1950s – as well as the instability of the parliamentary system and the crises produced by the country’s modernization, elicited a demand for prophecies, to which writers were to respond.

A prophetic message is one that breaks with the established order. “The prophet,” says Bourdieu, “is a man made for crises, for situations in which the established order topples and the entire future is in a state of suspense.”²⁹ In Max Weber’s theory of religion,³⁰ the prophet and the priest have in common the ideological nature of their message, with its coherent vision of the world, in contradistinction to the magician, whose action has a more practical orientation and is guided by more immediate interests. Weber does make it clear, however, that the prophet, with his preference for emotional preaching, is always closer to the demagogue and the political publicist than to the head of a philosophical school of thought. But the main difference between the

prophet and the priest is that the former does not get his mandate from a “corporate enterprise of salvation.” Whereas the priest gets his symbolic power from the institution that mandates and pays him wages for his work, “the prophet exerts his power simply by virtue of his (superlative) personal gifts”³¹ and his charisma. He acts because of a personal calling and does not earn a living through his prophecies, which are given freely. This selfless, disinterested nature of the calling may definitely be seen in modern writers who personally commit themselves to a universal cause, as Émile Zola did in the Dreyfus Affair.³²

Bourdieu propounds a more functionalist and relational reading of Weber’s theory of religion.³³ The most important element is the opposition between the priest and the prophet. This refers to their position in the division of labor in the symbolic manipulation of the laity, with the producers of a systematic vision of the world on one side, and, on the other side, the organized agencies of reproduction invested with religion (the Church). If we transpose this division of labor to the intellectual world, we find it in the opposition between *auctor* and *lector*, between writers and professors invested by the educational institution with legitimate discourse and power over its reproduction.³⁴

The prophet is opposed to the professional priests by a series of structurally antagonistic features. In his temporality, he represents discontinuity as opposed to continuity, the extraordinary rather than ordinary, everyday, commonplace events. His authority is grounded in charisma rather than legality, in inspiration rather than training and certified skill; he derives his authority from the public, from the emotional community formed by his disciples rather than from any function or position in an ecclesiastic hierarchy. This type of authority involves the highly personalized relations characteristic of sects rather than the interchangeability and bureaucratic functionality of an organization like the Church. The message takes an emotional rather than a rational, educational form. It is a heretical message, at odds with the established order and with the orthodoxy of the priest’s message.

As Rémy Ponton has shown in his study of the Parnasse group,³⁵ the functioning of literary schools reflects most of the traits of prophetism. An analysis of avant-garde groups, such as the surrealists, would adduce the political dimension as well. In his article, Ponton also describes the routinization of charisma, when the new rules the Parnasse introduced in poetry are turned into recipes and achieve

official consecration with the entrance of the disciples in the Académie française.

Indeed, to perpetuate itself as a break-away message, the prophesy needs to build a community, to institutionalize and routinize itself, thus becoming an orthodoxy and ceasing, then, to appear as a prophesy. But by establishing the unwritten rule of the permanent revolution, the literary field, from the romantics on, shielded itself from the risk of experiencing the routinization that generally attends the social aging process. The principle that the newcomers challenge the literary orthodoxy and assert themselves against their elders – as opposed to other professions, for example, the academic field, where newcomers must pledge allegiance to their elders – was one way by which the literary field fought the potential routinization of the charismatic figure of the writer.

This principle of evolution through revolution was the first factor that prevented unification of the literary profession. Despite the existence of longstanding professional authorities such as the Académie française, founded in 1635, and the Société des gens de lettres founded by Balzac in 1838, no single institution was able to hold a monopolistic position in the literary field comparable to that of the Church in the religious field. Not for any lack of candidates: the Académie française was quite willing to play the role, but its power was challenged, in accordance with the above-mentioned principle. The coexistence of competing consecrating authorities fighting over the legitimate definition of literature was therefore the second factor that prevented the unification of the profession. A third factor was the considerable heterogeneity of writers' social background and working conditions, the main split being between those who made a living by writing and those who had a second occupation. It was this split that thwarted attempts at professionalization, which arose particularly in the 1920s.³⁶

Resistance to professional development seems to have been a way of maintaining charisma and refusing to have consecration monopolized by any single authority, which would have threatened literary activity with routinization. In return, political prophesying was a way of compensating for the lack of professional development by redefining the social function of the writer at a time when writers were losing control of their spheres of influence to new professional experts and the values of scientific accuracy and technical competence.

However, while prophetism was the most typical mode of political involvement of the writers as a group competing with these new experts, the existence of strong internal divisions within the literary field raises the question of the different forms of politicization at its various poles.

Four types of politicization in the literary field

To return to our original hypothesis, which has already been corroborated empirically, there is definitely a correspondence, “homology” in Bourdieu’s terms, between the position occupied in the field and political stances. But this can be taken further. If political positions are linked to the writer’s conception of his or her work, it is highly probable that there will be a connection between this conception and the form of politicization. In other words, we may postulate that the way of being a writer conditions the way one engages in the political sphere. This requires a presentation of the structure of the literary field.

The structure of the literary field

In *Distinction*,³⁷ Bourdieu has analyzed the structure of the social space as a chiasm. On the first axis, dominant and dominated classes are opposed with regard to the total volume of capital they possess. On the second axis, it is the structure of this capital that is determinant, that is, the proportion of economic and political resources as opposed to cultural resources. In this structure, intellectuals occupy a dominated position within the dominant class as they are endowed with cultural rather than economic or political resources.³⁸ Homology of position explains, according to Bourdieu, the intellectuals’ propensity to support the dominated groups of the dominated class (namely workers).

Hence, occupying a dominated position in the field of power, the literary field is also structured according to similar principles.³⁹ The first factor contrasts dominant writers and dominated writers, broadly speaking, on the basis of the total volume of their capital of renown. The second factor refers to the structure of this capital of renown, which is the type of recognition, symbolic or temporal, depending on its degree of independence with respect to the larger public’s expectations. The restricted circle, based on peer recognition, contrasts with

the large-scale production circuit regulated by the logic of the market economy and sales. But contrary to the social space, in this reversed world, symbolic capital prevails over temporal consecration. This principle expresses the relative autonomy of the literary field. The greater the proportional volume of specific capital, the more autonomous the agent or group of agents studied.

Conceptions of literature and of its relations with politics, as well as the discursive forms used to discuss these, vary with these two factors. Discourse thus tends to be increasingly euphemistic and depoliticized as one moves from the dominated pole to the dominant pole, morals and aesthetics being two forms of euphemistic discourse. If one looks at the political genres since the nineteenth century, this is what differentiates the lampoon from the essay, for example.⁴⁰ According to the second factor by which temporal recognition contrasts with symbolic recognition, literary judgment tends to neglect content and to concentrate on style and form as one moves from the pole of greater heteronomy to that of greater autonomy, with moralism being replaced by aestheticism.

By cross classifying these two factors we obtain four groups, positioned at the different poles of the literary field, each with its particular type of politicization. Accentuation of the characteristic traits of each of these groups produces a definition of four ideal types of writers: the “notabilities,” the “aesthetes,” the “journalists,” and the “avant-garde” (Figure 1).

The dominant group with respect to temporal renown contains writers – the “notabilities” – close to the socialites and to government circles where “good taste” and fashionable respectability prevail: they view both art and politics as necessarily subordinated to morality and the preservation of the social order. Against this moralistic conception of literature and politics, writers at the symbolically dominant pole – the “aesthetes” – take their stance. The latter call for a separation between these two domains, art and politics, so as to protect the independence of aesthetic judgment.

At the dominated pole, characterized, on the whole, by a propensity to politicize critical discourse, there is a difference between the polemicist logic specific to the journalistic pole, which tends to link literature to current events, social issues and short-term stakes (this is where we find the “polemicist-journalists”), and the anti-authority strategies of




Figure 1. Forms of politicization in the literary field.

the “avant-gardes,” who often tend to prize the subversive element in literature and to ascribe political portent to their protests, without sacrificing their independent aesthetic judgment.

Figures of committed writers

Thus, we have four ideal types of committed writers. These ideal-typical traits correspond to positions occupied in the literary field at a given time in a writer’s trajectory. Some individuals would change from one position to another in the course of the social aging process. They may have moved from the “avant-garde” to the “aesthete” position, for example, or from the “polemicist” to the “notability” in the case of an upwardly mobile trajectory in the field (it is less probable to evolve from the “avant-garde” to the “notability,” or from the journalistic pole to a symbolically dominant position). Others might possess properties connecting them with several groups. Far from challenging the model, these intermediate cases are proof of its dynamic character and heuristic value. Each group has typical forms of politicization.

The “notabilities”

This group includes the institutional writers, the prize-winners, and members of the Académie française, who attend official and fashion-

able gatherings and move in influential circles. In the institutions to which they belong, they encounter distinguished representatives of the field of power (from the army, the clergy, or the political field, for example, at the Académie française). It is in these institutions that they mobilize their colleagues for (conservative) political causes, as some members of the Académie française did during the Spanish war in support of nationalists led by Franco.⁴¹

The notabilities tend to view literature as a social order-maintaining instrument and to subordinate it to morality as well as to the national interest. They have combated every single modern art trend, just as they reject technical, scientific, and political modernism. They euphemize their execration of “politics,” identified with democracy and parliamentary government, by formulating it in terms of morality.

Endowed with institutional legitimacy, they sign their writings and stands with a reference to their status as “member of the Académie française.” The preferred media for their statements are the national press, lectures, and moralistic essays. They are particularly fond of drawing portraits of political leaders through which they can flaunt their proximity to the great figures of the day, including Mussolini, Hitler, and Pétain.⁴² Political action, when it is not direct exercise of power, often takes for them the form of patronage as a member of the honorific committee of a party, an association, a charitable action (which is the practical form corresponding to the moralistic stand).

The “aesthetes”

The “aesthetes” defend the autonomy of art against the attempts by the authorities to impose ethical and political constraints. They usually meet among peers in places specifically devoted to intellectual life (like the Pontigny decades), and more commonly in professional places such as publishing houses or in familiar private gatherings.

Their preferred medium is the literary review, the main instrument for preserving literary autonomy since it shelters dialogue among peers from the pressures of current events. This medium developed at the end of the nineteenth century, after the laws of 1881 ensuring freedom of press, as an expression of the conquest of intellectual autonomy. During the interwar period, the *Nouvelle Revue française*, founded by André Gide, was the locus of pure literature and independent intellectual debate. It did not ignore political issues but dealt with them on an intellectual plane: that is to say, from a distance, taking care to separate literature and politics.⁴³

When the “aesthetes” do go into politics, it is along the lines of the collective commitment of intellectuals originating in the Dreyfus Affair; firstly, by signing petitions in their own name, without any title (the sign of their personal charisma) and, secondly, by participating in specific groups of intellectuals (such as the Comité de Vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes – the watchdog committee of antifascist intellectuals) or in “reflective circles” on the fringes of political power. The best known of these writers, such as Gide, maintain their distance and preserve their autonomy by refusing to engage in anything beyond the simple function of patronage. The few who entered a political party, as Aragon in the Communist Party, occupied a more intellectual rather than a political position, some becoming a “conseiller du prince” rather than exercising real political functions.

Apart from petitions, the genre preferred by aesthetes to express their commitment, then, is the intellectual review, the essay, the testimonial (like André Gide’s *Voyage au Congo* (1927) which denounces the colonialist system), or occasionally a speech in a political-intellectual meeting. Politics also can be, for the aesthetes, a source of literary inspiration. But rather than describing real leaders, they prefer to portray idealized figures inspired from historical models or from literature (namely classical tragedy) in their fictional works (novels, like André Malraux and Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, or drama, like Henry de Montherlant, Drieu La Rochelle, or Jean-Paul Sartre) and to display their moral dilemmas.

The “avant-garde”

Avant-garde groups are composed of young pretenders who advance the subversive dimension of literature. From this standpoint, they are the ones most directly opposed to the notabilities for whom literature is a means of maintaining the social order. Often avant-gardes only exist in a collective form, as a tight knit small group—what the French call a “groupuscule” – modeled after the political avant-garde groups. This was true of the dadaists and the surrealists. These young people, who were often penniless and living at home or in cramped quarters, tended to meet in cafés where they could lead a bohemian social life.

As only people with a name can sign a petition, and most of the avant-garde are unknown, they proclaim their commitment the way the powerless express their protest: in manifestoes and vociferous artistic demonstrations, signed by the group as a whole. Their determination to transgress the prevailing ethical and aesthetic norms (the former

constituting a form of censorship of art) lead them to political radicalism. The surrealists, for instance, chose communism or Trotskyism. But although they view literature, and often poetry, as an instrument for social subversion, they nonetheless respect the exigencies of their own art, and thence the principle of autonomy.⁴⁴ It was this demand for the autonomy of art that led most surrealists to break with the Communist Party, which required that art be subservient to the cause of the Revolution. The Nouveau Roman group resolved this dilemma by separating literature and politics. For its leader, Alain Robbe-Grillet, the nature of the writer's commitment is not political but has to do with language.⁴⁵ But while they banished the ideological message from their fictional writings, the members of the group signed the "Déclaration sur le droit à l'insoumission dans la guerre d'Algérie" ("Declaration on the right to insubordination in the Algerian war"), a subversive anti-colonial manifesto also called "Manifeste des 121."⁴⁶ In the 1960s, the group *Tel Quel*, led by Philippe Sollers, tried again to associate literary heresy and political radicalism.⁴⁷

The "writer-journalists"

This category contains those writers-journalists and critics who work mostly in the small presses ("petite presse") or in the political journals. To keep their visibility in both the media and in the literary field, they tend to relate literature to current events and social issues. Scoop, denunciation, and social capital are the means of those who are deprived of symbolic capital. Hence their preferred genre is, apart from literary criticism, journalistic minor genres such as the investigation, the interview, the social satire, or the lampoon as a means of denouncing a public scandal.⁴⁸

Writers at this pole tend to gather around corporative claims and militant action in defense of the material conditions of their profession-through syndicalism in particular. This reflects both the professionalization of these writers, who earn a living from their writing, and the lack of recognition, that forces them to act as a group. They are the ones who spurred the development of intellectual syndicalism after World War I through their active role in the creation of the *Syndicat des gens de lettres* (the Men of Letters' Union), the Journalists' Union, and the Confederation of intellectual workers, that claimed a position somewhere between working-class trade unionism and the employers' organizations.⁴⁹ Some of them adopted extreme political positions on either the left or the right wing. This was especially the case for fascist intellectuals like Robert Brasillach and Lucien Rebatet, whose inclina-

tion to go from verbal violence to physical violence led them to support the extremist leagues and armed factions.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, we come to the question of the decline, since the 1970s, of the figure of the “committed writer” as typifying the “intellectual” in France. Three factors help explain this decline.

First, politicization in its prophetic form was a way of reasserting the social role of the writer while resisting the unification of the profession. Conversely, the development by the government of a cultural policy, starting with the creation in 1958 of a Ministry of Culture headed by André Malraux,⁵⁰ and the professionalization of the writers’ activity in the 1970s⁵¹ were instrumental in weakening writers’ prophetic commitment.⁵²

Second, professionalization went hand-in-hand with the presence of more women writers. Although the feminization of the intellectual professions took a highly politicized form in the 1970s with the feminist movement, that movement was headed by academics rather than by women writers. The movement itself was divided between “egalitarians” and “differentialists.” The former, best represented in the rising social sciences (history, sociology, and economics), focused on the struggle for equality of chances. Whereas the latter, led by psychoanalysts and humanities scholars (literature and linguistics), sought to subvert the symbolic order in changing the dominant representations through language and refused “phallographic” practices such as traditional politics.⁵³ Contrary to their precursor, Simone de Beauvoir, the new generation of women writers active in the feminist movement, like Hélène Cixous (also an academic scholar), chose the second option that ascribed them to “feminine-writing.”⁵⁴ Trying to reverse the stigma on a pure symbolic level, this feminine avant-garde, with its publisher, “Éditions des femmes,” was marginalized in the literary field. Although they succeeded in imposing new critical categories in the academic world, the debate in the intellectual field about whether writing is gendered contributed, in definitive, to reinforce social representations ascribing women authors to feminine values such as subjectivity or emotional life. As these representations were perfectly adapted, in the eyes of the publishers, to what they imagined as the large public’s expectations, the women authors could only be encour-

aged in this path. In the long run, therefore, the feminization of the literary world probably contributed to its (partial) depoliticization.

The third factor is the emergence of a new type of intellectual, the expert, recruited among specialists, academics, or professional researchers. As we have seen, this figure developed in the late nineteenth century, but took on unheard-of social proportions in the 1960s and 1970s with the massive increase in the student population and the expansion of the intellectual professions. With the development of the figure of the specialist, consulted for his or her expertise in a given field, the prophetic function was transferred from literature to the humanities and the social sciences, which came into their own at that time. In that sense, if Sartre, who was not only a writer but also a philosopher, embodied the figure of the “total intellectual,” in Bourdieu’s terms,⁵⁵ it may be said that Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are the real successors of Sartre in France. They are the ones who perpetuated the prophetic, critical function while propagating a new figure of the intellectual: what Foucault called the “specific intellectual” who acts in the name of his or her specialty, or what Bourdieu named the “collective intellectual” who breaks with the charismatic exceptionality of the writer to advance the peculiarly scientific model of collective work and competence. But speaking as individuals, they were both endowed with specific, symbolic capital and hence with personal charisma that legitimated their protest.

The model of the committed writer, although born in France, has spread to other countries, where it still subsists. The debate between Pierre Bourdieu and Günter Grass in 1999⁵⁶ illustrates the reversal that has come about in the German and French traditions. Whereas in France the writer is the embodiment par excellence of the intellectual, in Germany the professor takes that role. Now here, the two roles became reversed, and this was neither exceptional nor fortuitous. It was the outcome, on the one hand, of the spread of the French model of the “committed writer” to other cultures where the figure has remained alive, and on the other hand, of the process by which the values of scientific knowledge and technical competence have asserted themselves in opposition to the old literary culture since the nineteenth century, and that entailed the importing, at least in France, of the German model of research within the university.

Translated from French by Helen Arnold

Notes

1. See, for example, Pascal Ory et Jean-François Sirinelli, *Les Intellectuels en France, de l’Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1986) and, more recently, Michel Winock, *Le Siècle des intellectuels* (Paris: Seuil, 1997; paperback: coll. “Points,” 1999).
2. Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Minuit, 1979). English translation: *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984; paperback: NY: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). *L’Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Minuit, 1988); English translation: *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
3. See, namely, Christophe Charle, *Les Intellectuels en Europe au XIXe siècle. Essai d’histoire comparée* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), and Jerome Karabel, “Towards a theory of intellectuals and politics,” *Theory and Society* 25/2 (1996): 205–223.
4. On the Dreyfus affair, see Christophe Charle, *La Crise littéraire à l’époque du naturalisme. Roman. Théâtre. Politique* (Paris: PENS, 1979). On the German occupation of France, see Gisèle Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains (1940-1953)* (Paris: Fayard, 1999). On the split between right and left during the first half of the twentieth century: Gisèle Sapiro, “De l’usage des catégories de droite et de gauche dans le champ littéraire,” *Sociétés & Représentations* 11, “Artistes/politiques” (February 2001): 19–53. I developed part of the considerations I present in this article in the seminar I gave at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales from 1999 to 2001 on the topic “Sociology of intellectuals: writers and prophetism in the twentieth century.”
5. Pierre Bourdieu, “Champ intellectuel et projet créateur,” *Les Temps modernes* 246, “Problèmes du structuralisme” (1966): 865–906.
6. Pierre Bourdieu, “Une interprétation de la théorie de la religion selon Max Weber,” *Archives européennes de sociologie* XII/1 (1971): 3–21; “Genèse et structure du champ religieux,” *Revue française de Sociologie* vol. XII, (July–September 1971): 295–334.
7. Pierre Bourdieu, “Le champ scientifique,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 2–3 (June 1976): 88–104.
8. Pierre Bourdieu, “Le marché des biens symboliques,” *L’Année sociologique* 22 (1971): 49–126; “Disposition esthétique et compétence artistique,” *Les Temps modernes* 295 (1971): 1345–1378; “Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de classe,” *Scolies* 1 (1971): 7–26. “La production de la croyance,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 13 (February 1977): 3–45; “The field of cultural production, or: the economic world reversed,” *Poetics* 12/4-5 (1983): 311–356; “Le champ littéraire. Préalables critiques et principes de méthode,” *Lendemains* 36 (1984): 5–46; “L’institutionnalisation de l’anomie,” *Les Cahiers du Musée national d’art moderne*, 19-20 (June 1987): 6–19; “Le champ littéraire,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 89 (September 1991): 4–46; *Les Règles de l’art. Genèse et structure du champ littéraire* (Paris: Seuil, 1992); English translation: *The Rules of Art* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); *The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature*, R. Johnson editor (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993).
9. Bourdieu, *Les Règles de l’art*.
10. For a discussion of its relations with the religious powers, see Hervé Serry, “Littérature et religion catholique (1880–1914). Contribution à une socio-histoire de la croyance,” *Cahiers d’histoire* 87 (2002): 37–59; and *L’Invention de l’écrivain catholique. Le mouvement de “renaissance littéraire catholique” (1880–1933). Con-*

- tribution à une sociologie du "renouveau,"* Ph.D. Thesis (Paris X-Nanterre, 2000) 2 vol. *Naissance de l'intellectuel catholique* (Paris: La Découverte, forthcoming).
11. Albert Cassagne, *La Théorie de l'art pour l'art en France chez les derniers romantiques et les premiers réalistes* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 1997 [1906]).
 12. For a sociohistorical analysis of the intellectuals' political commitment during the Dreyfus Affair, see Christophe Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels" 1880–1900* (Paris: Minuit, 1990).
 13. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions. An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
 14. Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels."*
 15. Marc Martin, *Médias et journalistes de la République* (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1997), 61. On the professional development of journalists, see also Christian Delporte, *Les Journalistes en France (1880–1950). Naissance et construction d'une profession* (Paris: Seuil, 1998).
 16. Max Weber, *Le Savant et le politique* (Paris: Plon. "10/18", 1959).
 17. Pierre Favre, "Les sciences d'Etat entre déterminisme et libéralisme. Emile Boutmy (1835–1906) et la création de l'École libre des sciences politiques," *Revue française de sociologie*, XXII/3 (July–September 1981): 432–462.
 18. See Claude Digeon, *La Crise allemande de la pensée française (1870–1914)* (Paris: PUF, 1959); Fritz Ringer, *Fields of knowledge. French academic culture in comparative perspective 1890–1920* (Cambridge/NY/Paris: Cambridge UP/Éditions de la MSH, 1992); Christophe Charle, *La République des universitaires 1870–1940*, (Paris, Seuil, 1994).
 19. See Claire-Françoise Bompain-Evesque, *Un débat sur l'Université au temps de la Troisième République. La lutte contre la Nouvelle Sorbonne* (Paris: Aux amateurs du livre, 1988). Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 108–120. On the catholic reaction, see Hervé Serry, "Déclin social et revendication identitaire: la 'renaissance littéraire catholique' de la première moitié du XX^e siècle," *Sociétés contemporaines* 44 (2001): 91–110.
 20. See Viviane Isambert-Jamati, "Une réforme des lycées et collèges. Essai d'analyse sociologique de la réforme de 1902," *L'Année sociologique* 3e série (1971): 9–60.
 21. Cassagne, *La Théorie de l'art pour l'art en France chez les derniers romantiques et les premiers réalistes*.
 22. Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La Création des identités nationales. Europe XVII^e siècle-XX^e siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 1999).
 23. On the competition between literature and sociology, see Wolf Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science, the Rise of Sociology* (English translation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1985]).
 24. The psychological novelists, like Bourget, had, in fact, studied psychology, which was a new discipline, at the faculty and reconverted this scholarly capital in their literary works. See Rémy Ponton, "Naissance du roman psychologique: capital culturel, capital social et stratégie littéraire à la fin du 19^e siècle," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 4 (1975): 66–81.
 25. Paul Bénichou, *Le Sacre de l'écrivain 1750–1830. Essai sur l'avènement d'un pouvoir spirituel laïque dans la France moderne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996 [1973]).
 26. Thiesse, *La Création des identités nationales*.
 27. Anne-Marie Thiesse, *Écrire la France. Le mouvement régionaliste de langue française entre la Belle Époque et la Libération* (Paris: PUF, 1991); Hervé Serry, "La littérature pour faire et défaire les groupes." *Sociétés contemporaines* 44, "Littératures et identités" (2001): 5–14.

28. Antonio Gramsci, "Remarques et notes éparées en vue d'un groupe d'essais sur l'histoire des intellectuels et de la culture en Italie," *Cahiers de prison* 12 (trad. fr., Paris: Gallimard, 1978): 309–311, 345–346.
29. Bourdieu, "Genèse et structure du champ religieux," 331.
30. Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building. Selected Papers*, edited and introduction by S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 253–267; *Economie et société* (Paris: Plon. "Presses Pocket", 1995), vol. 2: 190–211.
31. Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building*, 254.
32. Susan Rubin Suleiman, "L'engagement sublime: Zola comme archétype d'un mythe culturel," *Les Cahiers naturalistes* 67 (1993): 11–24.
33. Pierre Bourdieu, "Une interprétation de la théorie de la religion selon Max Weber," *Archives européennes de sociologie* XII/1 (1971): 3–21.
34. Bourdieu, "Le marché des biens symboliques," 74.
35. Rémy Ponton, "Programme esthétique et accumulation de capital symbolique. L'exemple du Parnasse," *Revue française de sociologie* XIV (1973): 202–220.
36. Gisèle Sapiro, "Entre individualisme et corporatisme: les écrivains dans la première moitié du XX^e siècle," in Steven L. Kaplan and Philippe Minard, dir. *Corporations et corporatisme en France, XVIII^e–XXX^e siècles* (Paris: Belin, forthcoming).
37. Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction*.
38. Bourdieu developed this thesis long before *Distinction* was published. See Bourdieu, "Champ du pouvoir, champ intellectuel et habitus de classe," *Scolies* 1 (1971): 7–26.
39. See the figure representing the position of the cultural field in the field of power and in the social space, in Bourdieu, "Le champ littéraire," 11. On the basis of Bourdieu's theory of the literary field, I have conducted an empirical investigation of the literary field under the German Occupation which established the existence of these structuring principles; Gisèle Sapiro, "La raison littéraire. Le champ littéraire français sous l'Occupation (1940–1944)," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 111–112 (March 1996): 3–35; *La Guerre des écrivains*; "The structure of the French literary field under German Occupation (1940–1944): A Multiple Correspondence Analysis," *Poetics* 30/5–6 (2002): 387–402.
40. On the lampoon, see Marc Angenot, *La Parole pamphlétaire. Typologie des discours modernes* (Paris: Payot, 1982). On the essay, Philippe Olivera, "Catégories génériques et ordre des livres: les conditions d'émergence de l'essai pendant l'entre-deux-guerres," *Genèses* 47 (June 2002): 84–106.
41. Sapiro, *La Guerre des écrivains*, 270–273. On French intellectuals' political positions during the Spanish war, see David Wingeate Pike, *Les Français et la guerre d'Espagne (1936–1939)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1975), 237–244.
42. For example, Henry Bordeaux, *Images du Maréchal Pétain* (Paris: Sequana, 1941); René Benjamin, *Mussolini et son peuple* (Paris: Plon, 1937) and *Le Maréchal et son peuple* (Paris: Plon, 1941).
43. See Martyn Cornick, *The Nouvelle Revue française under Jean Paulhan, 1925–1940* (Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1995).
44. See Maurice Nadeau, *Histoire du surréalisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1945); and Norbert Bandier, *Sociologie du surréalisme 1924–1929* (Paris: La Dispute, 1999).
45. Alain Robbe-Grillet, *Pour un nouveau roman* (Paris: Minuit, 1961), 39.
46. See Anne Simonin, "La littérature saisie par l'Histoire. Nouveau Roman et guerre d'Algérie aux Éditions de Minuit," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 111–112 (March 1996): 69–71.
47. See Niilo Kauppi, *Tel Quel: la constitution sociale d'une avant-garde* (Helsinki: the

- Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 1990); "Investment strategies and symbolic domination: the group Tel Quel as an intellectual avant-garde," in Niilo Kauppi and Pekka Sulkunen, *Vanguards of Modernity. Society, intellectuals and the University* (Jyväskylä: Publications of the research unit for contemporary culture, 1992), 90–97.
48. Marc Angenot, *La Parole pamphlétaire*, 73 sq.
 49. See Sapiro, "Entre individualisme et corporatisme," and Delporte, *Les Journalistes en France*.
 50. See Philippe Urfalino, *L'Invention de la politique culturelle* (Paris: La Documentation française, 1996); Vincent Dubois, *La politique culturelle. Genèse d'une catégorie d'intervention publique* (Paris: Belin, 1999); and Herman Lebovics, *Mona Lisa's Escort. André Malraux and the Reinvention of French Culture* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999).
 51. Writers obtained peculiarly in 1975 a social protection. The project was elaborated by the Caisse nationale des lettres (National Fund of the Letters), which developed from the late 1950s on and was replaced, in 1973, by the Centre national des lettres (CNL, renamed Centre national du livre in 1992). This Fund allows aids to literary creation through scholarships and loans or subsidies to publishing projects.
 52. Rather than a depoliticization process, one can speak of a redefinition of the writers' main mode of politicization, from a prophetic to a more professionalized stance, as argued by Boris Gobille, *Crise politique et incertitude: régimes de problématisation et logiques de mobilisation des écrivains en mai 68*, Ph.D. dissertation (Paris: EHESS, March 2003). This reinforces my argument that the prophetic mode of politicization resulted from the lack of professional development.
 53. Marcelle Marini, "La place des femmes dans la production culturelle. L'exemple de la France," in Georges Duby, Michelle Perrot, *Histoire des femmes en Occident*, t. 5 (Paris: Plon, 1992).
 54. Delphine Naudier, "L'écriture-femme, une innovation esthétique emblématique," *Sociétés contemporaines* 44, "Littératures et identités" (2001): 57–74.
 55. Pierre Bourdieu, "Sartre," *London Review of Books*, vol. 2, 20 November – 3 December 1980, 11–12.
 56. The debate took place on the 20th of November 1999 and was diffused on the TV chain Arte on the 5th of December 1999. Their talks were typical: while Günter Grass spoke generally in the name of the humanistic tradition, Pierre Bourdieu took a more social and specific stance in his analysis of the increasing effects of neoliberalism.

CHAPTER 7

Media meta-capital: Extending the range of Bourdieu's field theory

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The question of media power in a broad sense – how are we to theorize the long-term impacts of the existence and actions of media institutions on social space?¹ – remains one of great difficulty. The media are *both* a production process with specific internal characteristics (possibly a field of such processes) *and* a source of taken-for-granted frameworks for understanding the reality they represent (an influence, potentially, on action in all fields). Accounts of media and media power that concentrate exclusively on either questions of “production” or questions of ideological “effects” are likely, therefore, to be unsatisfactory. A version of the former problem faces recent work on media within Pierre Bourdieu's tradition of field-based research, despite that work's other virtues. The solution lies in drawing more extensively than such research has done to date on Bourdieu's own theory of the

state, particularly the concept of the state's "meta-capital" over all fields, that offers a useful analogy to, although not a direct explanation for, the way media institutions affect an increasingly large range of other fields. This, however, represents a significant extension of the parameters of field theory as usually understood.

This argument requires some historical context. Media are one area where the dialogue between Anglo-American sociology and what can justifiably be called Bourdieu's "school of sociology"² has been limited, although, as Rodney Benson³ showed recently, media attracted considerable attention in the 1990s, not so much from Bourdieu himself as from his research associates, particularly Patrick Champagne.⁴ One reason, perhaps, for this limited dialogue is an underlying historical and theoretical tension between Marxist-influenced Anglo-American accounts of media power directed at the media's ideological impacts on the whole of society and Bourdieu's tradition of field-based research that is hostile precisely to general theorizing about social space.⁵ For that reason, there is no simple basis of exchange between recent Bourdieu-inspired work on media and other better-known theorizations of media and media power.

This is worth explaining in a little more detail in order to contextualize the extended version of Bourdieu's field theory proposed in this article. If the influential 1970s and 1980s British and American tradition of critical media sociology approached the media's contribution to social reality through ideology,⁶ arguing that the media reproduce and disseminate ideological contents originally generated elsewhere (above all, the state), the causal relationship between media-channeled ideology and people's beliefs proved elusive.⁷ In any case, this work told us little about the status of media institutions themselves in society generally or in specific sectors of social life.⁸ By contrast, postmodern social theory⁹ did address the impacts of media institutions on social structure, but only through suggestive pronouncements rather than empirically grounded detail, and so there is no basis of reconnection with Bourdieu's work here. Within a third perspective, Luhmann's systems model of "the reality of the mass media"¹⁰ offers (in its own terms at least) a rigorous account of how media work within social reality, but one that excludes ideological effects. The truth or falsity of specific media representations is irrelevant according to Luhmann,¹¹ who concentrates on the broad functional interrelations between media "system" and social "system," thereby obscuring precisely the contingencies underlying the media process that are most ideological:

the tendency for this person or thing, rather than that, to be heard or seen. So although, in its respect for the internal workings of media as a productive system, Luhmann's work has something in common with Bourdieu, the former's neglect of issues of conflict and power moves as far as possible from the political commitment of the latter, who in this respect is much closer to Anglo-U.S. ideology critiques.

Bourdieu's own work on media and that of researchers close to him could not insist more strongly on the wider social and political consequences of the media process. The result has been some of the boldest criticisms of "media culture" in any tradition, a further reason for the recent unpopularity of such work (mainly Bourdieu's *On Television and Journalism*) as has reached audiences in Britain and the United States, where sweeping criticisms of contemporary media have in some quarters become unfashionable. Take this remark from that book:

One thing leads to another, and, ultimately television, which claims to record reality, creates it instead. We are getting closer and closer to the point where the social world is primarily described – and in a sense prescribed – by television.¹²

The French version is more vivid:

*On va de plus en plus vers des univers où le monde social est décrit-prescrit par la télévision. La télévision devient l'arbitre de l'accès à l'existence sociale et politique.*¹³

The hybrid word "*décrit-prescrit*" captures, if polemically, the naturalizing effect of an institutional sector that generates the very categories through which the social world¹⁴ is perceived – a classic Durkheimian point. Similarly bold comments on the "symbolic power" of the media, particularly television, are found in the work of Champagne, as we will see below. The question, however, that this article focuses on is whether these bold statements are theoretically compatible with the field-theory of media, the latter being the only developed theory of media that Bourdieu and linked researchers have offered. As that theory stands, they are not.

Although we come later to the virtues of field-based media research, (next section), there is also something paradoxical about it, at least viewed from other media research traditions, in that it avoids *both* a general account of the impacts of media representations on social space *and* a detailed account of media audiences. Its explanatory

dynamics are located entirely in the internal workings of the journalistic field or in the specific connections between those internal workings and the operations of other fields that come into contact with it. The result is often to extend in interesting ways Anglo-U.S. work on the sociology of media production.¹⁵ The cost, however, is a tension between the avoidance of theoretical issues that arise outside the field model and the bolder judgements about media that its proponents, probably justifiably, want to make.

This tension is linked to a wider division in Bourdieu's work between his early, less field-focussed work on symbolic systems and symbolic power (see below) and his later work on fields. This is not so much a problem as a genuine theoretical crux, as we are back to the original difficulty for all theorizations of media with which this article began. Hence, resolving the tensions of field-based accounts of media, as this article tries to do by drawing on Bourdieu's theorization elsewhere of *the state's* specific social power, has dividends, not only for our appreciation of the continuity of Bourdieu's work, but also for rethinking some of the aporias of 1970s and 1980s Marxist work on media ideology. It is ironic, no doubt, to be arguing – a quarter of a century since the heyday of Althusserian theories of the media's role among the “ideological state apparatuses” – that the way forward for contemporary media analyses is via a linkage between Bourdieu's divergent theories of the media field and the state (Bourdieu himself having clearly turned his back on Althusserian models).¹⁶ The difference, however, between the argument developed here and earlier Anglo-US approaches to media/state is this: first, we will build on the achievements of Bourdieu's own sociology with its rejection of crude totalizing accounts of power from “the center” and, second, we will seek in doing so to draw on the Durkheim-inspired insights into symbolic power elsewhere in Bourdieu's work. As to the latter Durkheimian tradition, including Bourdieu's own attempt to fuse Marx and Durkheim, it has been ignored in Anglo-U.S. media sociology with only a few exceptions.¹⁷

It is necessary to clarify, first, how the term “media” will be used. By “media” here is meant the media that, until recently, have been assumed to be society's “central” media – television, radio and the general press. True, this cuts across a valid distinction between “central” media and media more specialized in their audience, but this is necessary if we are to begin to address the dimension of media most challenging for field theory: the broader social impact of *“les médias de*

grande diffusion,"¹⁸ both within and beyond specific fields.¹⁹ True, this leaves to one side arguments about whether new media (particularly the Internet and media digitalization) will undermine or simply refashion the social centrality currently attributed to television, radio and the press.²⁰ But this simplification is justified tactically for two reasons. First, it reflects the focus of media research in the Bourdieu tradition that has not to date analyzed new media. Second, there are good reasons to be sceptical about how fundamentally new media, especially the Internet, are changing patterns of media consumption, let alone people's orientation to media as sources of social legitimacy.²¹ The conclusion, however, returns to this and other broader issues raised by the analysis.

The incompleteness of the media field

There is little doubt that, as a sphere of cultural production, the media can *prima facie* be analyzed as a single field, or a collection of fields, (each) with a distinctive pattern of prestige and status and its own values. Indeed, according to Bourdieu, the media's intermediate position between the cultural and economic poles of the wider cultural field gives them a particular interest as a field. This section notes the positive contribution of field theory to media analysis, before identifying a key tension in its treatment of media power.

The media as field(s)?

In the course of the 1990s, Bourdieu's research associates produced a number of illuminating studies of the workings of the "journalistic field" (*champ journalistique*) or "media field" (*champ médiatique*), both terms being used, although the former is more common. The main argument running through this research was summarized by Bourdieu himself in his controversial lectures published in English under the title *On Television and Journalism*. The argument that is framed in relation to French media culture is essentially as follows:

1. The journalistic field has always occupied a pivotal role in the field of cultural production because of its specific role in circulating to a wider audience the knowledges of other, more specialized fields. As such, the journalistic field faces contradictory pressures from economic (heteronomous) and cultural (autonomous) forces.

2. In the 1980s and 1990s a combination of factors (including challenges to *Le Monde's* legitimacy as the main representative of "serious" journalism and the increasing legitimacy of television, as a mode of popular journalism) led to an increasing influence of television over press journalism and the increasing predominance of economic influences in the media field as a whole.
3. The increasing heteronomy of the media field has had profound effects on other fields of cultural production through the specific form that their relations to the media field have come to take: an increased influence of television news criteria within journalism has increased the susceptibility of those other fields to external (economic) pressures, reducing their autonomy as fields and increasing their reliance, specifically, on the media field.

No doubt we have learnt much from field-based treatments of the media. First, there have been detailed accounts of the changing workings of the journalistic field (2. above) showing specific ways that journalistic autonomy, not just in France but also in the United States, has been reduced.²² There remain, of course, numerous issues of detail, such as whether there is one such field or many, and if many, how they are interrelated.²³ However, they are of secondary importance, as for Bourdieu the exact boundaries of fields and sub-fields always remains a contingent question for detailed empirical inquiry rather than a theoretical issue. Much more important are the advances that field research has brought to our understanding of journalistic sources and story-telling practices, augmenting previous Anglo-U.S. work on the sociology of journalism carried out under very different economic and cultural conditions in the 1970s and early 1980s (see above).

The other way in which field research has contributed to our understanding of media is accounts of the changing interrelations between the media field and other fields of cultural production (3. above). These have been discussed in detail by Rodney Benson,²⁴ so they will not be repeated here; they include studies of media's influences on the intellectual field, the judiciary and the medical field. Together they build a rich, historically-nuanced picture of the increasing influence in many fields of a generalist, economically driven journalism. These accounts rely not on any general notion of ideology, but on specific analyses of how the changing internal dynamics of the journalistic field – for example, struggles for dominance between specialist medical press and general news journalists – mesh with the dynamics of those other

fields – for example, the emergence of new spokespersons and interest groups in and around the medical field (for the medical case Champagne and Marchetti’s work discussed, see further below). It is clear that much is gained by breaking down otherwise highly general claims about “media power” into specific, historically researchable questions about how external factors (the increasing economic pressures on media production) “are ‘translated’ by the internal logic of the news media field (and then, how this translated logic is translated into other related fields).”²⁵

There are, however, limitations to the field theory model developed in this work. As Benson argues, there is an ambiguity about what exactly is the source of the “external factors” *influencing the media field* and the balance within those external factors of economic (market) and political (state) forces; this ambiguity relates to an ambivalence about how to analyze the state itself.²⁶ This affects how one can read the direction of influence between the media field and other fields (such as the medical field), given that economic and political forces affect each in quite specific ways.

This article, however, will be concerned with a different issue, namely the implications of the type of influence that field research posits from the media field to *other fields*. How fields *interrelate* has always been a difficult question for a research program whose first concern is always with the internal workings of particular fields.²⁷ To understand field interrelations, field theory has relied on the notion that sets of fields change in tandem through “homologies” between their internal operations, but as Swartz points out “homology” just defers explanation to the question of what forces drive the actors in those fields. In Bourdieu’s earlier work, this was above all “habitus,”²⁸ but, given the bias of habitus towards influences from long-standing dispositions, it is much less clear what underlying mechanism field theory has at its disposal to explain the convergences of sets of fields in a fast-changing economic and cultural environment.²⁹

So far this problem is a general one. The next two sections specify more clearly what is at stake here, linking to broader questions of symbolic power that cannot be contained within the framework of field theory.

Specific problem cases for a field theory of media

I want first to show, more directly, that using field theory as an *exclusive* framework of explanation creates difficulties, or gaps, in Bourdieu's and his research associates' account of the media.

I now turn to Bourdieu's main explicit treatment of the media – the two television talks collected under the title *On Television and Journalism*.³⁰ This book has been criticized for some of its more sweeping generalizations about the way media represent the social world (their “trivialization” of it). I am not convinced by these criticisms, particularly given the background of empirical work on media fields that Bourdieu implicitly relied on. Instead, my interest is with the gap between Bourdieu's detailed discussion of how the media field(s) operate as fields of production and his reference to the overwhelming “symbolic power” of television. Implicitly the gap is filled by the convergences assumed between changes within the journalistic field (television's increasing dominance, with its greater susceptibility to economic influences translated through appeals to audience ratings) and changes in other fields (their increased openness to relations within the journalistic field). But how exactly does this convergence work?

There must be some causal mechanism that explains how what actors in particular, *non-media* fields do is changing. There is more than one type of explanation that could fill this gap in relation to any one non-media field: (1) specific factors (for example, an increasing dependence on markets or audiences reachable only through media) that make media coverage of increased importance to actors in that particular non-media field; (2) specific factors making media coverage more important to actors in a range of related non-media fields (for example, the pressures from the state to make various types of service politically “accountable,” as currently in the educational or health fields); or (3) general factors that have increased the perceived importance of media coverage across all fields. Only the first type of explanation remains within the framework of field theory. The second involves acknowledging changing pressures from other sources on a range of fields, and so moving beyond the intensified economic forces that Bourdieu sees as operating through the proxy of the media field. The third type of explanation raises questions about the simultaneous influences of media on all fields and possibly on the whole of social space – exactly the type of explanation that field research would normally rule out on

principle. Yet Bourdieu's account of television does not satisfactorily resolve the choice between these alternative explanatory paths.

A similar problem emerges in Patrick Champagne's work on media. Champagne³¹ in *Faire L'Opinion* analyzes the media's impacts on contemporary politics through an account of the complex interrelations of the journalistic and the political field. The journalistic field has a relationship with the political field so close that Champagne is tempted to refer to it as "a journalistic-political field" or "space."³² That relationship, argues Champagne, has transformed the definition of politics,³³ but not for the better. The political field has become increasingly insulated from external influences and conflicts (i.e. from those that politicians are meant to represent). By a "circular logic,"³⁴ both journalists and politicians "react" to a version of public opinion that they have largely constructed through the framing of questions for opinion polls, the reported reactions to those polls' results, and the influence of journalists' accounts of politics. The same circular logic constrains those outside the political hierarchy who might otherwise break through it; two decades after Baudrillard,³⁵ but with much greater sociological authority, Champagne³⁶ argues that demonstrations are often created for the media as a means of communicating through, and therefore on the terms of, the media.³⁷

There is much that is interesting here, but the question again is its theoretical completeness. First, there is something like a sleight of hand in the idea that the previously separate journalistic and political fields have merged. This enables Champagne to talk of the influence of journalists' definitions of "events" on politicians' definitions of events without addressing the crucial difficulty: how exactly have representations made by actors in *one* field come to have such influence on the actions and thoughts of others in *another* field? Elsewhere, Champagne attempts to harness the question of media influence on non-media actors back into field theory by claiming that people's differential ability to work well with the media somehow reflects, by a homology, the structures of capital in the fields to which those actors primarily belong:

Everything happens as if the journalistic event was a transposed form, in the relatively autonomous logic of the journalistic field, of the economic, institutional, cultural or symbolic capital that social groups [wanting to be represented in the media] have at their disposal [i.e. for application in their own fields].³⁸

It is unclear, however, how this homology works. Interestingly, Champagne introduces the notion of a new specific type of capital – “media capital” (*capital médiatique*)³⁹ – to capture people’s relative ability to influence journalistic events.⁴⁰ But there is only the briefest explanation of this new term,⁴¹ even though it implies an effect that field theory cannot easily encompass. Where, we might ask, is media capital acquired and exercised? In the media field or in the (political, medical, academic, etc) field where the agent in question primarily acts? Perhaps the point of the term “journalistic-political field” is that such questions don’t matter when analyzing the media’s interactions with politics. But suppose we repeated this move in explaining *all* non-media fields and their relation to media. The result would be either to fuse all fields influenced by media into a single “journalistic-cultural field” or to generate a whole parallel set of hybrid “journalistic-specialist” fields (medical, political, and so on), each with its own version of “media capital.” Either way, the strength of the field model – its *differentiation* of the specific dynamics of particular fields – would have been blunted.

The difficulty can be illustrated further by returning to Champagne and Marchetti’s analysis of the changing interrelations of media and medical fields around the AIDS crisis in late 1980s France.⁴² Our concern here is solely with the way the causal interrelation of these two fields is theorized.⁴³ What is striking in Champagne and Marchetti’s discussion is a dissonance between their detailed explication of the changing dynamics of, respectively, the subfield of medicine-focused journalists and the medical field, and their very bold statements about “the growing omnipresence and power accrued to the media and particularly television.”⁴⁴ Their analysis of the latter is concerned particularly with the ability of television to define and then generally impose a particular definition of the medical “scandal” that cut across older, more nuanced and scientifically accountable definitions of medical news:

[1] So the power of the press in the constitution of “scandals” is fundamental, not the power of the “press of scandals” [yellow press] ... but that of the main press [*la grande presse*] and especially the Parisian press. It is without doubt hardly an exaggeration to say that what is “scandalous” is what the journalistic field, acting together, considers as such and goes on to impose on everyone [*parvient surtout à imposer à tous*] ... [2] What is astonishing in the affair of the contaminated blood is that the qualification of facts as scandalous, far from being evident and immediate, has been the result of a singular battle that notably opposed, over many months, certain victims of the blood

contamination against the State, the judiciary and journalists, then opposed journalists to the medical and political sectors, and finally opposed journalists against each other.⁴⁵

Again note the disjuncture between the second process described (the various inter-field factors that contributed to the definition of *this particular case* of contaminated blood as a scandal) and the first process (the general power of journalists acting together (*dans son ensemble*) to define whatever is “scandalous” and impose that definition across the board. The first process cannot be reduced to the second, as the latter is general and the former is specific; why not argue, for instance, that the contaminated blood scandal was a wholly *exceptional* instance, resting on a very specific historical coincidence of battles in the journalistic and medical fields? If so, the first process needs its own explanation: how exactly is it that the main press can “impose” their definitions “on all” and who do we mean by “all?” Just some (but an ever increasing number of) specialist cultural fields? Or all fields? Or the whole of social space, including newspaper readers, some of whom may not belong to any field and certainly not the journalistic or medical fields?

It is striking that readers of these press debates are largely absent from Champagne and Marchetti’s account, apart from a passing reference:

So a vision of things is collectively constructed *that owes all its force* to the fact that it is close to what preexists in the popular consciousness, journalists never having more force on these occasions than when they speak to “[public] opinion” what it wants to hear.⁴⁶

Benson plausibly reads this as a hegemony-style argument,⁴⁷ but if so, like any hegemony-style argument, it must say something about the impacts of hegemonic representations on those who are assumed to believe them. This is precisely what *cannot* be done satisfactorily within the confines of a field-based account, because many or most of those over whom hegemony is assumed to be exercised are not members of the fields in question; they may be professionals who belong to other fields or people who belong to no field at all.

The point here is that field-based accounts of media are irrevocably pushed towards a type of explanation that spills out beyond the field model – that is, *if* they are to sustain the bold claims about the media’s broader “symbolic power” that gives this analysis much of its critical edge.

At this point we need to be clear about what exactly we mean by “symbolic power.” We must choose between a weak and a strong definition of symbolic power. John Thompson’s work⁴⁸ valuably insists on the symbolic as an important dimension of power alongside the political and the economic. Thompson defines “symbolic power” as the “capacity to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms.”⁴⁹ This definition helpfully captures in general terms the power of a number of social institutions over symbolic production: the media, the church, and educational institutions. But it is a weak concept of symbolic power, because it does not allow for the possibility that certain types of concentration of symbolic power (for example in media institutions) require a special analysis. In particular, Thompson⁵⁰ rules out a possibility, suggested by Bourdieu’s work, that certain forms of symbolic power are necessarily misrecognized. A *strong* concept of symbolic power, by contrast, suggests that some concentrations of symbolic power are so great that they dominate the whole social landscape; as a result, they seem so natural that they are misrecognized, and their underlying arbitrariness becomes difficult to see. In this way, symbolic power moves from being a merely local power (the power to construct this statement, or make this work of art) to being a general power, what Bourdieu once called a “power of constructing [social] reality.”⁵¹ It is the second, strong definition of symbolic power that Bourdieu presumably has in mind when he talks of the symbolic power of television. Such symbolic power legitimates key categories with both cognitive and social force⁵² and is defined “in the very structure of the field that belief is produced and reproduced in.”⁵³ This power, although it is relevant to the way certain types of capital are constituted as symbolic capital in the context of particular fields, is relevant also to the wider field of power, and indeed, to social space as a whole. How exactly the media’s symbolic power in this broad sense should be theorized consistently with field theory is, as we shall see, illuminated by Bourdieu’s late writings on the state.

The media as symbolic system

This problem can be reformulated as a question about the treatment of symbolic power in Bourdieu’s work more generally.

The analysis by Champagne and Marchetti of the media’s growing influence over the medical field turns, as we have seen, on the pervasive

influence of specific definitions of the “scandalous” produced in a medical context. But this notion of “scandal,” whatever the origins of its formulation in particular cases, has much wider usage; it is arguably central to our understanding of the media’s impacts on social space.⁵⁴ This opens a connection with a rather different type of argument (unconnected with field theory) found in Bourdieu’s writings: the construction of the socially resonant systems of categories that Bourdieu calls “symbolic systems.” In an early lecture on “symbolic power”⁵⁵ Bourdieu used the term “symbolic system” to describe both the university system and much earlier religious systems that each had authority to classify social space as a whole. Behind this lies Bourdieu’s original Durkheimian notion that religious institutions exercise a “monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the power to modify ... the practice and world-view of lay people.”⁵⁶ A version of this idea pervades Bourdieu’s whole sociology of education; it is present also in his interesting essays on “rites of institution” and “symbolic power,”⁵⁷ that were developed in part with reference to societies *without* highly complex differentiations of labor.⁵⁸ Crucially the concept of symbolic systems (having been developed before fields came to dominate Bourdieu’s research agenda) implies an explanatory framework that *cuts across* field theory. For a “symbolic system” is a structure of misrecognition that works precisely because of its pervasiveness across social space, on account of its totalizing force.

Is it possible that the gaps we found in field-theory-based accounts of the media can be addressed by using concepts (such as symbolic system) that are not tied to the explanatory framework of the field? This would, first, have the merit of linking recent work on media within the Bourdieu tradition more closely to other areas of Bourdieu’s work. Specifically, it would clarify the persistence in, for example, Champagne’s work of terms more natural in that earlier context, such as “consecration,”⁵⁹ that is the media’s ability to sanctify certain things as having primary importance.⁶⁰ Second, and more important, a connection to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic systems brings into view the impacts that media might have on all fields simultaneously by legitimating certain categories with not just cognitive but also social significance.⁶¹ This is the type of general media influence that, at the beginning of this article, I noted was difficult to integrate into production-focused analysis.

This suggestion is encouraged by consideration of Bourdieu’s later work on the French state. Bourdieu⁶² takes over and extends Weber’s⁶³

notion of the state, conceptualizing the state as a monopoly of legitimate physical *and symbolic* violence. In this context he is required to make an important distinction: between (a) the level that the state's own power (its symbolic power) is established at and (b) the field that agents (civil servants, politicians, and all those passing through the elite schools that under the French system control access to state positions) compete for the "monopoly over the advantages attached to [the state's] monopoly."⁶⁴ The former Bourdieu refers to as the "field of power" focused on the state.⁶⁵ What is the nature of the power the state exercises? Bourdieu has in mind not so much a power to act in the context of this or that specialist field, but preeminence over the definitions, for example, of legal and educational status.⁶⁶ The state's influence as a reference-point in social life works not in one field only, but across all fields.⁶⁷ The "field of power" of which the state is the central reference-point is not therefore, I suggest, a "field" in Bourdieu's normal sense. Rather, it is better understood as a general space where the state exercises influence (very much like a general symbolic power) over the *interrelations* between all specific fields (in the usual sense),⁶⁸ indeed, perhaps acts upon social space in general. We are close here to the issue Craig Calhoun⁶⁹ identifies, of how to understand the increasing "convertibility" of different types of capital across the whole range of fields. The state (certainly not only the French state, even if the forms of influence vary in different countries) adds a specific dimension to this issue because of its increasing influence over the educational field that everyone passes through (and indirectly therefore over the key entry-points into all or most specific fields of production). What is striking, however, is that Bourdieu never connected his or his fellow researchers' work on the media back to his theory of symbolic systems or the state,⁷⁰ notwithstanding the connections made elsewhere⁷¹ between media and politics.

Can Bourdieu's late work on the state help us grasp how the media exercise a similar influence on social space, including all specialist fields of production?

Meta-capital: From state to media

In the discussions that form *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Bourdieu was asked whether the state is a sort of "meta-field."⁷² His answer strikingly centers on the notion not so much of field, but of capital:

The concentration of ... different types of capital goes hand in hand with the rise and consolidation of the various fields [i.e. the specific fields that historically have contributed to the power of the state]. The result of this process is the emergence of a specific capital, properly statist capital, born of their cumulation that allows the state to wield a power over the different fields and over the various forms of capital that circulate in them. *This kind of meta-capital capable of exercising a power over other species of power, and particularly over their rate of exchange ... defines the specific power of the state.* It follows that the constitution of the state goes hand-in-hand with the constitution of the field of power understood as the space of play that holders of various forms of capital struggle in for power over the state – that is, over the state’s capital, over the different species of capital, and over their reproduction (via the school system in particular).⁷³

While the “field of power” “above” particular fields is a term of long-standing in Bourdieu’s work, what is significant here is the structured way in which Bourdieu sees the state’s own ability to influence what can count as capital in other specific fields. First, Bourdieu sees as a key influence on all fields a force *external* to them – the workings of the state. The state acts directly on the infrastructure of all fields: it is “the site of struggles, whose stake is *the setting of the rules that govern* the different social games (fields) and in particular, the rules of reproduction of those games.”⁷⁴ Put another way, the state influences the hierarchical relationship or “exchange rate”⁷⁵ between the fundamental types of capital at stake in each individual field (for example, economic versus cultural capital).⁷⁶ This power of the state is, crucially, not derived from the workings of any specific field, even if it is quite possible to think of the immediate space of competition between, say, civil servants as a “field” in its own right. As to the scope of this power, it presumably includes, although Bourdieu does not mention this specifically, influence over what counts as “symbolic capital” in each particular field. The concept of “symbolic capital” in Bourdieu generally means any type of capital (economic, cultural, and so on) that happens to be legitimated or prestigious *in a particular field*.⁷⁷ But the concept of meta-capital introduces the possibility that definitions of prestige within specific fields may be determined by influences outside those fields, specifically the state’s meta-capital.

By analogy, I want to propose that we understand media power also as a form of “meta-capital” through which media exercise power over other forms of power. This gives clearer theoretical shape to Bourdieu’s own most interesting insights about the media. When Bourdieu discusses the increasing pressure of television on, say, the academic field,⁷⁸ there is of course a direct economic dimension (a large tele-

vision audience means more books sold), but television exerts also, he suggests, an indirect pressure by distorting the symbolic capital properly at stake in the academic field, creating a new group of academics whose symbolic capital within the academic field rests partly on their appearances on television. There is no reason to suppose this type of shift occurs in just one field and not other fields; on the contrary, it is plausibly occurring widely across the whole field of specialist production fields, so that we need an overarching concept such as “*meta-capital*” to capture it.

Immediately, the question arises how these two types of meta-capital – the state’s and the media’s – interrelate: I return to this in the conclusion. For now, let us concentrate on how the media’s own meta-capital might work, and in particular how it might interact with the conditions obtaining in specific fields. Why assume that its influence is limited to specific fields of production? Just as the state’s influence on cultural capital and prestige through the school system (part of what Bourdieu refers to as the state’s meta-capital) is not confined to specific fields but radiates outward into social space generally, so the media’s meta-capital may affect social space through the general circulation of media representations. All actors in specific fields are likely also to be actors in general social space and general consumers of media messages. This suggests that the media’s meta-capital over specific fields might operate in two distinct ways: first, as Bourdieu explicitly suggests for the state, by influencing what counts as capital in each field; and second, through the media’s legitimation of influential representations of, and categories for understanding, the social world that, *because of their generality*, are available to be taken up in the specific conflicts in *any* particular field. The second type of influence would take us into the media’s agenda-setting role across many specific areas of life,⁷⁹ and the media’s role as the “frame” within which the generality of social “issues” get expressed and settled.⁸⁰ Should we indeed understand the media as affecting the habitus of individual agents in all fields – a more radical causal link between media and what goes on in particular fields?⁸¹ Clearly to pursue this would require an article in itself. Instead, let us concentrate on the first, more direct, way of understanding how the media’s meta-capital might work.

We might understand the media as altering what counts as symbolic capital in particular fields through its increasing monopoly over the sites of social prestige. Indeed, by altering in parallel what counts as

symbolic capital in a range of different fields, media may affect the “exchange rate” between the capital competed for in different fields (Bourdieu makes just this point in relation to the state’s meta-capital). This is quite consistent with Bourdieu’s point that capital is only *realized* by agents in specific forms in specific fields.⁸² The symbolic capital (among, say, chefs) that derives from doing a successful television cookery series is not necessarily convertible into symbolic capital in a very different field, such as the academic field; this is, because the former need involve few, if any, of the specific attributes valued *by media* in representatives of the latter. But this does not make the parallel structural transformation by media of the conditions operating in all fields any less significant, nor rule out the possibility that media-based symbolic capital developed in one field can under certain conditions be directly exchanged for symbolic capital in another field. In Britain recently a well-known television gardener has quickly become a successful popular novelist; clearly this depends on the pole of the field of cultural production (mass production or specialist) that you are closest to. Even so, the relationship between media as institutions and all other fields (from politics to the visual arts to sports) has been transformed, when being a player in the former has a significant chance of bringing with it influence over the terms on which people acquire symbolic capital on in the latter. When the media intensively cover an area of life for the first time (in the past decade, gardening or cooking), they alter the internal workings of that sub-field and increase the ambit of the media’s meta-capital across the social terrain. This is one important way that over time media institutions have come to benefit from a truly dominant concentration of symbolic power (“symbolic power” in the strong sense, of a power over the construction of social reality).

It is important to emphasize, however, that this analysis does not supersede the accounts of the journalistic field discussed in the first section, any more than Bourdieu’s concept of the state’s meta-capital rules out analyzing government bureaucracy in terms of a field of those who work for the state. The wider implication, however, of Bourdieu’s work on state power, which I am extending to media power, is that in contemporary, highly centralized societies certain institutions have a specific ability to influence all fields at once. This links Bourdieu’s field theory more explicitly with his other work on symbolic power and symbolic systems; for what is at stake at the level of meta-capital is precisely the type of *definitional* power across the whole of social space that the latter concepts capture.

There is much, of course, that could be said further to justify the idea that media have meta-capital of this sort; I have tried to develop elsewhere a linked argument based on detailed qualitative research.⁸³ Instead, before concluding, let me look briefly at how this theoretical idea might be empirically tested.

Ways forward for empirical research

There are a range of questions that could be asked about how the media's meta-capital is, or is not, progressively altering the operating conditions in any particular field of production:

1. Is media exposure a significant, or even a predominant, form of symbolic capital in that field? (Clearly, for every (sub-)field there are detailed questions about *what sort of* media exposure counts there, and these are answerable only in terms of the categorizations operating in that (sub-)field, but the importance of the general question remains; examples of (sub-)fields where this question is worth investigating have already been mentioned, such as gardening or cookery, and other examples will be discussed below).
2. If the answer to (1) is yes, to what extent is this changing that field's relationship *to other fields* where media exposure is also regarded as a significant component of symbolic capital, by allowing successful players in the former to exchange their success there for symbolic capital in the latter?
3. Against the background of (1) and (2), we can turn to the questions more regularly asked previously within field theory: what are the conditions of entry into the specialized media production field (and all its sub-fields), and how are those conditions changing as media-derived capital becomes increasingly significant across the whole range of fields?

These questions raise a further important issue (4): will the increasing influence of media over what counts as symbolic capital across all fields lead, in the longer-term, to the increasing *convertibility* of media-derived symbolic capital derived across social space as a whole? If so, is a new form of capital (that we might, following Champagne, call "media capital") beginning to emerge: that is, capital for use in any field based on prestige obtained through media exposure? In the long term, "media capital" might emerge in its own right as a new "fundamental species of capital" that works as a "trump card" in *all* fields⁸⁴ – just as

economic capital is, and for the same reason: because of its high degree of exchangeability or liquidity⁸⁵ – even if the means by which “media capital” can be accumulated or exchanged distinguish it sharply from economic capital. For now, however, this last point must remain speculative.

These questions intersect with existing work and debates on the media’s influence on particular fields. First, the idea that the political field is being transformed fundamentally by politicians’ need for media exposure has been familiar for some time;⁸⁶ Champagne’s suggestion of the fusion of the political and media fields (noted above) is also relevant here. Second, Bourdieu’s own strictures on television’s distortion of the proper values of the academic field⁸⁷ offer at least a provocation to research into how academics’ notions of symbolic capital are being changed through media, although detailed research needs to be done. A third interesting area is the visual arts, where (as Julian Stallabrass has argued)⁸⁸ media exposure has become increasingly the stuff of artistic success, as well as the subject of artistic reflection (Tracey Emin’s and Gavin Turk’s work, to name just two U.K. artists of international reputation). Particularly difficult, if potentially also the most far-reaching in its consequences, would be research on the economic field: to what extent is media exposure becoming not only a sign of prestige among business players, but an asset that can be directly converted into economic capital? In limited forms such as “stars” or “brands,” this has long been the case,⁸⁹ but there is a more general question about how far media exposure, as a token of anticipated economic success, makes something like “media capital” increasingly integral to business at all levels. Qualitatively rich studies of contemporary business and finance cultures and their interrelations with the media field would be welcome.

These questions, in effect, continue Bourdieu’s interest in “the production of belief,”⁹⁰ but apply it across all fields and their interrelations. We need to study the categories (in a Durkheimian sense) through which an increasingly pervasive “mediatization”⁹¹ of public and private life may be becoming normalized, even legitimated.

Conclusion

This article has developed in theoretical terms a proposal for supplementing existing field-based accounts of the media’s operations with

an analysis of the media's meta-capital over all fields and social space. The aim has been to open up possible answers to questions unresolved in purely field-based accounts of media. The aim has also been to show how, by a modest extension of the field-based model that draws on the rest of Bourdieu's conceptual framework, we can more satisfactorily deal with the difficulty of explaining media as both production process and symbolic system with which the article began.

There remain, however, some unsettled theoretical questions. *First*, what is the relationship between the media and the state, and their respective meta-capitals? Leaving aside the possibility that we should see the media as *part of* the state,⁹² which seems confusing at best, this difficult question can be only be taken forward through empirical explorations that (as Loic Wacquant has suggested for the state itself) need to be brought together on a global, comparative basis.⁹³ They will involve detailed analysis of how the state and media compete as reference-points for defining key terms in specific fields: one example might be the definitions in play in the regulation of crime, where the media's impacts on perceptions of the "crime problem" are attracting increasing attention from sociologists.⁹⁴ *Second*, what is the relationship between the media's and/or the state's meta-capital and that, potentially, of other central social institutions – the educational system, religious institutions, or corporate power? We might even want to conceive of Bourdieu's field of power entirely openly as a space where media, state and these other institutions *compete* for definitional power (meta-capital) over specific fields. Certainly there are interesting (again comparative) questions to be considered here, although it is more plausible, as Bourdieu's treatment of the state's meta-capital suggests, to see the state as the cumulative concentration of the definitional powers of earlier symbolic systems (such as the educational system) that have now been absorbed into the state. It is the historically established ability of the state to *range across* many different fields that justifies attributing to it *meta-capital*; only the media, I suggest, are plausible rivals to the state here in most contemporary societies, in which case the second question soon reduces to the first. *Third*, it is important in formulating such questions to bear in mind the global space of power where these processes are played out, particularly when the usefulness of the national framework for sociological questions has recently been challenged.⁹⁵ However, it remains to be seen, notwithstanding the growing importance of global media flows, whether the key social fields of contestation are operating on other than a national level. Clearly there are difficult questions here of integrating national

and transnational scales into field theory. *Finally*, as noted earlier, the long-term impacts of recent, less centralized means of media production and distribution (especially the Internet) on both the media field and the media's meta-capital will need to be considered. Once again, the answers will lie not in general theorization but in detailed analysis of how, in what ways, and to what extent the rules, categories, and capital on the basis of which agents in particular fields orientate themselves towards media institutions are changing.

The unanswerability of such questions here is not, however, a fault of the preceding analysis, but an example of the continued stimulation that Bourdieu's field model can provide to new forms of empirical research on the workings of media power.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. This is arguably the fundamental question of media "effects," as Lazarsfeld and Merton long ago argued, even if they regarded such questions as (within their research paradigm at least) unresearchable: see Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton, "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organised Social Action" in W. Schramm (ed) *Mass Communications* 2nd edition. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969 [1948]).
2. David Swartz, "In memoriam: Pierre Bourdieu 1930–2002," *Theory and Society* 31 (2002): 547–553, at 547.
3. Rodney Benson, "Field theory in comparative context: A new paradigm for media studies," *Theory and Society*, 28 (1999): 463–498.
4. Benson discusses *inter alia* the work of Patrick Champagne (*Faire L'Opinion*, Paris: Editions Minit, 1990) and the articles by various authors including Champagne in Bourdieu's journal *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* (volume 101–102, 1994). See now volume 131–132 (2000) in the same journal.
5. David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 128–129.
6. Stuart Hall "Encoding/Decoding" in S. Hall et al., editors, *Culture Media Language* (London: Hutchinson, 1980); David Morley, *The Nationwide Audience* (London: BFI, 1980); cf. Douglas Kellner, *Media Cultures* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

7. Cf Nick Couldry, *The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age* (London: Routledge, 2000), 8–10.
8. For an exception, see Stuart Hall, “The ‘Structured Communication’ of Events,” Stencilled Occasional Paper no. 5. (Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1973).
9. Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983); Paul Virilio *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotext(e):1986); compare Scott Lash, *Sociology of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1990); Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992).
10. Niklas Luhmann, *The Reality of the Mass Media* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
11. *Ibid.*, 7, 75.
12. Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism* (London: Pluto, 1998a), 22; cf. Patrick Champagne, “The View from the Media” in P. Bourdieu et al., *The Weight of the World* (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), 46–59.
13. Pierre Bourdieu, *Sur La Télévision* (Paris: Liber, 1996), 21.
14. In fact, Bourdieu avoids this term: the literal translation would be “social and political existence.”
15. Stuart Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1978); Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek and Janet Chan, *Representing Order: Crime, Law, and Justice in the News Media* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992); Todd Gitlin, *Inside Prime Time* 2nd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
16. Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 65–66.
17. See within Marxist-inspired work Philip Elliott, “Press Performance as Political Ritual” in H. Christian, editor, *The Sociology of Journalism and the Press* (Keele: University of Keele, 1982), 141–177, and Graham Murdock, “The Reenchantment of the World: Religion and the Transformation of Modernity” in S. Hoover and K. Lundy, editors, *Rethinking Media, Religion and Culture* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997), 85–101 (both UK) and outside the Marxist tradition Roger Silverstone, *The Message of Television* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981) and “Television Myth and Culture” in J. Carey editor, *Media Myths and Narratives* (Sage: Newbury Park, 1988) in the UK and the otherwise mainly US essays in Carey, *ibid.* More recently, see Couldry, *The Place of Media Power* and *Media Rituals: A Critical Approach* (London: Routledge, 2003).
18. Patrick Champagne and Dominique Marchetti, “L’information médicale sous contrainte,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 101–102 (March 1994), 45.
19. On the neglect by field-based research of the wider social space that falls outside particular fields, see Bernard Lahire, “Champ, Hors-champ, Contre-champ” in B. Lahire, editor, *Le Travail Sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu – Dettes et Critiques* (Paris: La Découverte/ Poche, 1999), 23–58.
20. W. Russell Neuman, *The Future of the Mass Audience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
21. Cf James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power without Responsibility*, 5th edition (London: Routledge, forthcoming), chapters 16–18; Couldry, *The Place of Media Power*, chapter 9.
22. Gilles Balbastre, “Une information précaire,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 131–132 (2000): 76–85; Patrick Champagne, “Le médiateur entre deux Monde,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 131–132 (2000): 8–29; Julien Duval, “Concessions et Conversions à l’Economie: Le journalisme économique en France depuis les années 80s,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 131–132 (2000): 56–75; Beatrice Joinet, “Le ‘Plateau’ et le ‘Terrain,’” *Actes de la Recherche en*

- Sciences Sociales*, 131–132 (2000), 86–91; Dominique Marchetti, “Les Révélations de ‘Journalisme de l’Investigation.’” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 131–132 (2000), 30–40; and for the US case, see Rodney Benson, “La logique du profit dans les médias américains,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 131–132 (2000): 107–115.
23. Jean Chalaby, *The Invention of Journalism* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Philippe Marlière, “The Rules of the Journalistic Field: Pierre Bourdieu’s Contribution to the Sociology of the Media,” *European Journal of Communication*, 13/2 (1998): 219–234.
 24. Benson, “Field theory in comparative context,” 471–477.
 25. *Ibid.*, 498 n83.
 26. *Ibid.*, 482–483.
 27. Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 128–129.
 28. *Ibid.*, 34.
 29. As Fabiani (“Les Règles du Champ” in B. Lahire editor, *Le Travail Sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu – Dettes et Critiques* [Paris: La Découverte/Poche, 1999], 75–91, at 87–91) points out, Bourdieu does have a range of mechanisms for explaining some such external influences (for example, the changing population of fields), but they are long-term historical factors and none of them would cover the type of direct influence I am discussing here.
 30. There are other places where Bourdieu treats media in the course of wider arguments: “The Production of Belief: contribution to an economy of symbolic goods” in R. Collins et al., editors, *Media Culture and Society: A Critical Reader* (London: Sage, 1986), 131–163, at 142–149, and many passages in *Distinction* (London: Routledge, 1984).
 31. Champagne, *Faire L’Opinion*.
 32. *Ibid.*, 261, 277.
 33. *Ibid.*, 264.
 34. *Ibid.*, 39.
 35. Jean Baudrillard, “Requiem for the Media” in *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (St Louis: Telos Press, 1981).
 36. Champagne, *Faire L’Opinion*, 204–222.
 37. *Ibid.*, 232.
 38. *Ibid.*, 239.
 39. *Ibid.*, 237, 243.
 40. *Ibid.*, 239.
 41. “Un capital de mobilisation et de sympathie parfois patiemment accumulé” (*ibid.*, 246).
 42. Champagne and Marchetti, “L’information médicale sous contrainte.”
 43. For other issues, see Benson, “Field Theory in Comparative Context,” 475–477.
 44. Champagne and Marchetti, “L’information médicale sous contrainte,” 45.
 45. *Ibid.*, 43 numbers added.
 46. *Ibid.*, 46, added emphasis.
 47. Benson, “Field theory in comparative context,” 494 n50.
 48. John Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
 49. *Ibid.*, 17.
 50. *Ibid.*, 269 n8.
 51. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 166.

52. Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 86–88.
53. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 88.
54. John Thompson, *Media Scandals* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
55. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ch. 7 [originally published 1977].
56. Pierre Bourdieu, “Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber’s Sociology of Religion” in S. Whimster and S. Lash editors, *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 119–136, at 126.
57. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*.
58. Cf Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
59. Champagne and Marchetti, “L’information médicale sous contrainte,” 64.
60. It is true that, as Champagne and Marchetti use this word, it is tied explicitly to the workings of the journalistic field, but surely a “scandal” cannot be a “scandal” unless it is recognized *as such* in wider society?
61. Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 87–88.
62. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) and *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
63. Max Weber *Economy and Society* Volume 3 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).
64. Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 58–59.
65. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 264; *Practical Reason*, 42.
66. Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 40–45; cf *Language and Symbolic Power*, 239–241.
67. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 229.
68. Cf Bourdieu’s own comment (in Loic Wacquant, “From Ruling Class to Field of Power: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu on *La Noblesse d’Etat*,” *Theory, Culture and Society*, 10/3 (1993), 19–44, at 21). He also refers to the field of power there as “a system of positions” (*ibid.*, 20) between holders of different types of capital.
69. Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory: Culture, History and the Challenge of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 139.
70. For such gaps in Bourdieu’s vast work, see generally Danilo Martucelli, *Sociologies de la Modernité* (Paris: Folio, 1999), 129–132.
71. Champagne, *Faire L’Opinion*.
72. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, *Introduction to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 111.
73. *Ibid.*, 114–115, added emphasis.
74. Bourdieu in Wacquant, “From Ruling Class to Field of Power,” 42, added emphasis.
75. Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 265.
76. Bourdieu (in Wacquant, “From Ruling Class to Field of Power,” 23).
77. For example, Bourdieu, “The Production of Belief,” 132–133; *Language and Symbolic Power*, 230; *In Other Words* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 134–135.
78. Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*.
79. M. McCombs and D. Shaw, “The Agenda-setting Function of the Mass Media,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (1972), 176–187.
80. Silverstone, “Television Myth and Culture”; Couldry, *The Place of Media Power*, Chapter 3.
81. On the implicit but sometimes undeveloped role of Bourdieu’s earlier concept of habitus in understanding the workings of particular fields of cultural production, and their interrelations, see Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 134.
82. Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 98.

83. Couldry, *The Place of Media Power*.
84. Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 98.
85. Scott Lash, "Pierre Bourdieu: Cultural Economy and Social Change" in C. Calhoun, E. Lipuma, and M. Postone editors, *Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), 193–211, at 201, discussing Bourdieu, *In Other Words*, 92–93.
86. John Street, *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy* (London: Palgrave, 2001), Chapter 9; Thomas Meyer, *Media Democracy: How The Media Colonise Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Margaret Scammell, *Designer Politics: How Elections are Won* (London: Palgrave, 1995).
87. Bourdieu, *On Television and Journalism*.
88. Stallabrass, *High Art Lite*, (London: Verso, 2000).
89. Chris Rojek, *Celebrity* (London: Reaktion Books, 2001).
90. Bourdieu, "The Production of Belief."
91. Rojek, *Celebrity*. Cf Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, 46 on the "mediatization" of culture.
92. Benson notes that sometimes this can be read into Bourdieu's uses of the term "state" ("Field Theory in Comparative Context," 482).
93. Loic Wacquant, "On The Tracks of Symbolic Power: Prefatory Notes to Bourdieu's 'State Nobility,'" *Theory, Culture and Society*, 10/3 (1993): 1–17.
94. Barry Glassner, *The Culture of Fear* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
95. John Urry, *Sociology Beyond Societies* (London: Routledge, 2000).

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ECONOMICS AS A CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DOMAIN

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CHAPTER 8

Flesh and the free market: (On taking Bourdieu to the options exchange)

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“Fifty oil Jan. doubles to go at an eighth.”

“Buy ‘em Buy ‘em Buy ‘em...”

“SOOOOOLD! ... Ten, ten, ten, ten and ten at a eighth” he screamed wildly, jabbing an ink stained finger at the piqued faces of the crowd, “and fifty more to go at a quarter.”

“WHAT? I was there I was there I was there,” came an angry scream from a now pale looking man as he faded behind a scramble of satisfied traders who had gotten in on the action and were now pushing forth to exchange their buy and sell tickets.

“You’re too slow pal, you better wake up,” said the seller, laughing as he mentally calculated his position. “Now I’m five bid at a quarter fifty up on the Jan. doubles,” this time directing his shouts toward a harried clerk bent over a flickering green screen at the front of the pit. The clerk said nothing in response but his fingers flew over a keyboard, typing out what everyone in the pit already knew, and computers hanging overhead immediately registered his perfect understanding as the latest transaction in the Union Oil options trading pit hit the screens and simultaneously lit up on terminals across the globe.

Everyday at the Pacific Exchange (PCX), the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the American Stock and Options Exchange, Chicago's Mercantile Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and on securities spot markets like these all over the planet, traders perform their daily aerobics of profit and loss. It only takes a few moments of seeing and feeling the energies course through one of these trading floors to get a sense of the extraordinary drama of life on the floor, where traders experience the information revolution of global connectivity at the lucrative center of the so-called *free market* system.¹

In this concentrated space of esoteric equations, interest rates, investment strategies and leverage, the floor traders' role is literally to *make the market* in financial securities – but as this case study shows, the market also makes them in the process. Securities spot markets are culturally saturated sites where institutional ideology moves at the level of habitualized action and the logic of identification to (re)produce the viability of trading as a way of life, in part by (re)producing a trading personality – an exemplary site where the body and society meld in the mental architecture of pleasurable consent to authority. The exchange, in other words, reveals a great deal about the practical logic of institutionalized work environments and their role in identity formation and social control.

This embodied performance of trading is the object of my investigations. In field research at the options exchange in San Francisco, I followed the traders through their dense and labyrinthine trading floor world of urban community, neo-conservative ideology and global technology. It was a path into their present and my own past of making sense and a living at the heart of the free market body politic, a place where what is produced seems the least tangible of products, but what financiers know as the greatest possible boon to any economy: asset liquidity and risk management. I spent two years working on the options floor in the 1980s, during which time I worked and lived through an endless series of trades, stopping just short of becoming a trader and making floor trading my own way of life. In the 1990s, I returned to the trading pits and found them largely unchanged; their intensity, camaraderie, masculinity, and technology still told of a world set apart, a distinct social space with a cultural density and specificity that marked it right for my purpose – to make sense of that world, which in earlier years I knew only practically, and make sense of the cultural turn that social theory took to the body and practice at the end of the twentieth century.²

With this purpose in mind, I took Pierre Bourdieu to the options exchange. In this article I report back on my observations of the floor and my interviews with traders, using concepts of *habitus*, *field*, and *practical action* for an analysis of the floor trading scene. I begin with comments on Bourdieu's theory of practice and its changing relation to the cognitive track in the cultural turn, then present my case study. After a short introduction to the physical setting, I examine the practical logic of trading using cognitive terms adapted from Bourdieu, and then listen in on the traders' talk and their writings, showing how their idealizing narratives of SuperTrader heroes present an opportunity to take a psychoanalytic look at the gendered performance of their shared workplace identity. In taking this approach, I argue that social theory should follow Bourdieu in his turn not just to the cognitive body, but further in to the body of (un)conscious attachment and pleasure.

Bourdieu and the body: On writing the agent of social action into practice theory

My theoretical interest in the trading scene grew as I encountered the theories of practice and embodiment that gained extraordinary currency across the disciplines of social history, anthropology, sociology, women's studies and cultural studies in the 1990s.³ Could the *action* or *practice* oriented approach explain the resiliency of dominant social orders? Could it explain the reproduction of social institutions without erasing people from the making of history? At the options exchange, could the interested, passionate investment of traders in their work be described in these terms? How exactly do traders, as individuals, answer the call of the exchange and channel the force of its cultural imperatives? And to what effect?

These are iterations of the venerable question of structure and agency, arguably the most powerful engine of sociological theory, having generated volumes concerned with the fate of modern individuals, ensconced as they are in the likes of bureaucracies, state-formations, compulsory race and gender structures, organizational and disciplinary fields, art worlds, media landscapes, etc. – a whole social world of imposing, objective and structuring forces, both symbolic and material. How do nominally free agents embedded in systems perform the relations that structure their lives and thus reproduce the *order* that the system requires to contain their freedom? It is not a metaphysical

question of freedom and determinism, but an empirical problem concerning the logic of resiliency of observable social formations. What happened to the revolutionary social movements of the twentieth century? What keeps hegemony so solid?

We can follow the logic of practice theory to the site of its answer: the unruly but governable body is there; the body subdued but still passionate; the body subjected to normative systems and rules that penetrate flesh, governing its desire and shaping its movement by channeling its pleasure; the prediscursive body, performing in action the subject's consent, prior to and irrespective of what might once have been called consciousness or rational action. Embodying culture as social control, this is the body that internalizes, naturalizes, and therein reproduces imposed ways of feeling, acting and knowing, and its implications for social theory are enormous – it changes the meaning of consent and thus our understanding of individuals' relations to their nations, citizenship, and justice, as well as the spectrum of social movements in which masses engage.

We need to write this body into our knowledge of discrete working environments and the cultural logics that operate there – places like the options exchange. How do they contribute to the cultural formation of embodied personality? Is character made under conditions like these an important domain of governance and domination?

Bourdieu was a leader in making practice theory work with a bodily engine of cognitive psychology, an ascending discipline in the years of his own rise to prominence. His work was eventually lauded both for leading the cognitive revolution in social theory and for avoiding overly cognitive descriptions of agency. This ambivalence in reception is hardly surprising, for throughout his work, especially the substantive analyses – i.e., of taste in *Distinction*, of the academic field in *Homo Academicus*, of art in *The Field of Cultural Production*, and of gender division in *Masculine Domination* – the continuous deployment of cognitivist language was progressively offset by important additions – such as *illusio* and *libido* – to the descriptions he offered of his central concepts, especially of *habitus*.

Just about anywhere in any of his texts, the reader can jump in and experience the rhetorical force of his cognitivist mode of description. In *Distinction*, for example, we read that “It is not a question of the truth or falsity of the insupportable image of the working class world

that the intellectual produces when, putting himself in the place of a worker without having the habitus of a worker, he apprehends the working-class condition through schemes of perception without having the habitus that is the product of the conditionings ‘normally’ imposed on those who are condemned to this condition.”⁴ This is a language of social conditioning and the fate of social reproduction against which charges of reduction have been continuously leveled; I return to this particular statement below, where I read it as a missed opportunity that suggests a methodological aversion to psychoanalysis, but first we should examine his general model of practice, examining the role of the cognitive body and keeping an ear open to just how pervasive the metaphors of cognitive science appear when his descriptions are allowed to speak for themselves.

Turning to the body, Bourdieu escaped reduction of the subject of social action to either side of the structure and agency rift – to an amalgamation of autonomous capacities (the centered and rational agent), on one side, or conversely to the mere effect of the objective conditions within which it is destined to struggle (the socialized cipher). Socially active agents, he wrote, however self-reflexive, never achieve the transparent self-presence and control assumed by the theories of rational action that still manage to prevail in much social scientific discourse.⁵ Such assumptions are often explicit, especially in economics and political science, whereas in sociological domains they tend to be more or less masked – more for example in the discourses of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology than in sub-disciplines leaning toward critical theory, which tend to displace agency onto history and the structures of the system, state, market, or culture, often using the terms ideology or class consciousness. In this latter direction, the concept of dynamic unconsciousness was crucial for explaining phenomena like resistance to change and manipulation of the masses.⁶

But in Bourdieu’s theory, the body itself is an ideological unconscious; with its deep-seated and socially trained cognitive structures, its inculcated classifications, perceptual schemata, and categorical dispositions – the socialized body decenters the subject. Anchoring the logic of social reproduction in this cognitive body, Bourdieu makes his place in the field of post-structuralism; these concepts mark out his specific position – they are, one could say, his particular cultural capital in the field of theory production.

The challenge is to decenter the subject without losing it entirely in structure. To make it work, he posited a relation between agents and their objective world that, at least in part, is governed by a non-discursively rational logic of bodily engagement – variously referred to as practice, practical action and practical reason. He constructed a complex social ontology, fusing the subject and object of conventional epistemologies in a dialectical relation; they exist, he explained, as a unity in totality and not as separate and distinct substances or processes. Subjectivism and objectivism are wed in *a dialectic of cognitive and social structures*; this relation itself is the object of analysis.⁷

The key to the argument is its dialectical style of explaining an *exchange* between the subject of action and its objective conditions of possibility for action – a psychological mediation of self and the social that binds the expressive dimension of subjective commitment to the external dimension of lived institutions that order, structure, and constitute the world of collective necessity. Bourdieu's concept of *practical action* expresses this counter-intuitive understanding of an active human agency of non-discursive rationality; the argument rests on the logic of socially produced knowledge that is embodied, not thought.

The objective moment of the dialectic is organized under the terms *field* and *social space*, referring to the areas of power-laden, patterned systems of objective forces, objects, positions and actions that constitute groups, institutions, and society. The subjective moment (actually, a “second order objectivity,” in his words) is organized under the term *habitus*. Because these are terms to which Bourdieu gave special meaning – terms that he made his own by filling them with contents that constitute his answer to these difficult questions – it matters how he chose to describe them to us.

The terms *field* and *social space* sublimate our familiar notions of collective interest and action, everything that individuals encounter as *the world*. Each of the various fields he discussed, such as the academic, political, scientific, literary, juridical, and religious fields, as well as the field of fields that constitute the social classes, are “patterned systems of objective forces,” like a magnetic field or an active battlefield; each is “a relational configuration endowed with a specific gravity which it imposes on all the objects and agents which enter in it”; each is a social space that conveys a unique set of values and abides by distinct regulating principles.⁸ They are fields of internal struggle over the

fields themselves – over the who, the what, and the how of legitimate valuation and distribution of relevant capitals.

Habitus is called a structuring structure that itself has been structured, a strategic system of classifications, schemata of perception, dispositions, and scripts – it acts as a reservoir of meanings and recipes for action assigned by, produced by and synchronized with the fields that provided them to habitus in the first place, and which in turn habitus tends to reproduce through its action. It is “the structuring mechanism which operates from within agents”; “the strategy generating principle enabling agents to cope with the unforeseen and ever-changing situations ... a system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks”; the “internalization of external structures”; the “somatization of the social relations”; it is externality at the heart of internality, the “social made body”; the group’s embodiment in an individual, and likewise “the biological individual ‘collectivized’ through socialization.” “In habitus, the past, present and future intersect and interpenetrate one another.” It can be understood as “virtual ‘sedimented situations’ lodged inside the body that wait to be reactivated” – the source of an agent’s strategies, the schemata that generate action and inform it with a ‘sense of the game’ necessary for performing the pre-logical, spontaneous logic of practical action.⁹ In Bourdieu’s dialectical model, habitus is a cultural unconscious that organizes perception and thus determines – we should probably say *overdetermines* – the actions that constitute fields.

This is a mechanics of social reproduction that Bourdieu continuously recreates at the level of the sentence: “More generally,” he wrote, by way of example,

every social order tends to perform a symbolic action oriented towards its own perpetuation by really endowing agents with the dispositions, and consequently the practices and properties, that the principles of di-*vision* assign to them. These principles, arising from the social reality, contribute to the very reality of the social order by realizing themselves in bodies, in the form of dispositions which, produced by the classifications, give the appearance of a collective foundation to classificatory judgments....¹⁰

The biological organism – the body – is the material site of exchange: “the whole social order imposes itself at the deepest level of the bodily

dispositions...” “Bodily hexis,” he wrote, “is political mythology realized, *em-bodied*, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, talking, and thereby feeling and thinking.”¹¹ And he pushed these terms even further: it is “a relation of knowledge or *cognitive construction*. Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one’s energy.”¹²

This language of energy and investiture in a meaningful life takes practice theory and the notion of habitus into the realm of affect and expression, identity and personality. Using these terms for describing the standing and speaking, feeling and thinking subject puts them in the business of representing the subject’s most complex symbolic function; personal identity, understood as that set of meanings that individuals attach to themselves by themselves and for themselves with a view towards the presentation of self towards others, must also be seen as a practical practice that flows from a habitus ensconced in a field. Thus does the dialectic of habitus and field appear to fuse elements of interest theory (a rationalist psychology), normative psychology, and affective psychology; but in carrying this out, Bourdieu subordinated these interests, norms and affects to a cognitive logic of operation that contains them in a bodily unconscious of inculcated classifications, conditioned dispositions, and habituated responses for constructing the world.

In contrast to rational action or rational choice theory, Bourdieu derived *interests* not from the merely rational, self-present and unitary possessive individual familiar to utilitarians and classical economists, who see preferences as endogenous, ahistorical, asocial and narrowly economically defined, but instead from the exigencies that historically achieved social structure press upon the thinking and acting thing. Thus, what may look like instrumental action is actually the habitual acting out of objective constraint, a kind of “choice of the necessary.”¹³ The subject *reveals* its interests in moving strategically through the field, just like preferences are revealed by prices in free markets, according to neoclassical economics, yet the subject acting with practical reason moves in this field without necessarily exercising reflexive awareness or conscious application of the rules governing that field. Economizing market behavior and strategic practice are therefore the same in that they reveal distribution struggles, but different in the fact that the various forms of capital are specific to the field, each of which offers unique opportunities for the subject to invest appropriate

interests, or to value different values. Each field is a game with specialized stakes.

Another term Bourdieu gave to these field-specific interests in the game was *illusio*. “Each field,” he wrote, “calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest, a specific *illusio*, as tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game and as practical mastery of its rules.”¹⁴ Earlier, in *Distinction*, he had written that the term “‘investment,’ for example, must be understood in the dual sense of economic investment – which it objectively always is, though misrecognized – and the sense of affective investment which it has in psychoanalysis, or more exactly, in the sense of *illusio*, belief, an involvement in the game which produces the game.”¹⁵ But he continued to subordinate this affective level of investment, the elaboration of which leads to psychoanalytic descriptions of a dynamic unconscious, to a cognitive logic of mental function and the environmental triggers of behavior. Listen, for example, to a description of habitus Bourdieu gave in the 1990s (the bold emphases are mine, throughout).

It is the double and obscure relation between habitus, i.e., the durable and transposable systems of **schemata of perception, appreciation, and action** that result from the institution of the social in the body (or in biological individuals), and fields, i.e., systems of objective relations which are the product of the institution of the social in things or mechanisms that have the quasi reality of physical objects; and, of course, of everything that is born of this relation, that is, social practices and representation, or fields as they present themselves in the form of realities perceived and appreciated.¹⁶

I think that, for logical reasons, there is a *relative irreversibility* to this process [of embodiment]: all the external **stimuli and conditioning** experiences are, at every moment, perceived through categories already constructed by prior experiences.¹⁷

As he explained, the stimuli and conditions of ongoing experience are perceived through categories already constructed; but these are categories he always represents as inscribed in the body by the stimuli and conditioning force of the fields. The prevailing idiom describing socialization is based in training and conditioning – metaphors inescapably linked to behaviorism. And so, even though he is careful to explain that “Habitus is not the fate that some people read into it,” and that “Being the product of history, it is an *open system of dispositions* that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures,” it is still the case that “We must think of it [habitus] as a **sort of spring that**

needs a trigger and, depending on the stimuli and the structure of the field, the very same habitus will generate different, even opposite outcomes.”¹⁸

Habitus changes, and it responds differently under the environmental stimulus of different or changing fields, but however this language is worked, it is still the language of conditioned disposition and environmentally triggered response. To the extent that this language prevails, the charge of psychological reductionism will always be leveled by some, while others will take it as a license for reduction.¹⁹

And indeed, Bourdieu was constantly fending off this charge – “Circular and mechanical models,” he said, “are precisely what the notion of habitus is designed to help us destroy.”²⁰ On the defensive, he continually refined his descriptions of habitus and field, pushing them closer and closer to psychoanalytic sensibility – without ever leaving entirely behind the strong cognitive bias of his earlier work.

In *Distinction* he wrote that, “Sociology is rarely more akin to social psychoanalysis than when it confronts an object like taste, one of the most vital stakes in the struggles fought in the field of the dominant class and the field of cultural production.”²¹ And later he described his whole project of *socio-analysis* in remarkably psychoanalytic terms.

At bottom, determinisms operate to their full only by the help of unconsciousness, with the complicity of the unconscious. For determinism to exert itself unchecked, dispositions must be abandoned to their free play. This means that agents become something like “subjects” only to the extent that they consciously master the relation they entertain with their dispositions.²²

But nevertheless, throughout *Distinction*, the language of inculcation and inscription of socially constituted dispositions prevails, indicating a bodily habitus built of schemata of perception and appreciation, divisions and classifications, categories and mechanisms – a cognitive unconscious. And it is the same for each of his substantive studies; the body begins to feel like a container of cognitive mechanisms that *spring* into action at the appearance of environmental triggers – some aspect of *the social/environmental field*. “Every social order systematically takes advantage of the disposition of the body and language,” wrote Bourdieu in *The Logic of Practice*, “to function as depositories of deferred thoughts that can be triggered off at a distance in space and time by the simple effect of re-placing the body in an overall posture which *recalls* the associated thoughts and feelings, in one of the

inductive states of the body which, as actors know, give rise to states of mind.”²³

The force of this argument benefits markedly from the supplemental power of its natural science rhetoric, which largely comes cloaked in the garb of its cognitivist metaphors; is this an unacknowledged – or should we say largely *disavowed* – debt to cognitive science and, through that channel, to the behaviorist impulse? While at times he was careful to distance himself overtly from these discourses, he could not leave behind the legacy that the social conventions of language and the history of cognitive science attach to the system metaphors he built.

In an essay celebrating the cognitive track in the cultural turn, Powell and DiMaggio explain that Bourdieu’s theory of practice and its central analytic construct of “habitus” have “been an important part of the cognitive turn in social theory.”²⁴ The cognitive turn, they say, designates a shift in emphasis from the social psychology of values, norms and attitudes, to classifications, routines, scripts and schemata; from commitment as the cognitive basis of the order of society to habit and unreflective practical activity; and from object-relations and the energetic metaphors of “drive,” “cathexis” and “internalization” to cognitivism and the metaphors of “interest,” “imitation,” “scripts,” and “schemas” of “the new institutionalism.” They credit this shift in social theory to the “cognitive revolution” in psychology, which marks “a dramatic transformation in the way in which social scientists have come to think about human motivation and behavior.”²⁵ But this statement indicates a consensus in psychological theory that in fact does not exist. Indeed, both the methods (*experimental, scientific*) and metaphors (mind as *information processor*, with classifications, scripts, and schemata as *programs* that get cued by environments) of cognitive psychology are hotly contested.²⁶

On their own account, Bourdieu’s theory is a particularly “balanced and multifaceted approach to action”; “habitus,” they say, “is an analytic construct, a system of ‘regulated improvisation’ or generative rules that represents the (cognitive, affective, and evaluative) internalization by actors of past experience on the basis of shared typifications of social categories, experienced phenomenally as ‘people like us.’” But then they credit Bourdieu for moving “beyond the Freudian imagery of ‘internalization’ to posit a generative grammar of the strategic behavior, rooted in but not fully determined by the past.”²⁷

And indeed, by the 1997 publication of Paul DiMaggio's "Culture and Cognition," any psychoanalytic technique had been dropped from the program.²⁸ Similarly, Zerubavel's 1997 *Social Mindscales: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology*, which might be a play on the title of Bourdieu's book with Wacquant, the dynamic unconscious seems entirely absent – even though it purports to be a *sociology of memory*; what we are given is a hardware-brain that is hardwired with universal cognitive mechanisms and running on the software of culturally specific cognitive traditions and scripts.²⁹ Dynamic consciousness, overdetermined by a dynamic unconscious, rife with affect and ambivalently driving its objects, is not to be found.

In taking stock of this cognitive track, we should not forget that the origins of cognitive science, and thus potentially certain of its effects in sociology, are found in its struggle to break from a more deterministic behaviorism – but without letting go of the latter's experimental orientation. This early cognitivism relied on computational metaphors and set artificial limits on the definition of mind – namely, that concepts are literal, not metaphorical, that they are distinct from mental imagery, and thus that mind can be studied using formal logic alone. It constituted itself by refusing *the philosophical* categories of consciousness and the symbolic power of imagery; but this itself was a philosophical position – the philosophy that cognitive science kept when it divorced behaviorism but remained in the house of positivism.³⁰ These proscriptions were constitutive of its signal attitude of natural science and thus contribute to its authority as a social phenomenon – at least in the eyes of its champions – as well as of its structuring difference from psychoanalysis. It is precisely this cultural supplement, I suspect, that accounts for the popularity of the cognitivist Bourdieu among American sociologists – workers in a field whose resistances to psychoanalysis are well known – over and against the Bourdieu that was leaning towards psychoanalysis; it is embraced because it gets the job done.³¹

But something is left behind in taking that direction. The subject's history of attachment and transformation in the global web of intersubjectivity is cut off from the particularly energetic dimensions of similarity and difference, condensation and displacement, metaphor and metonymy – the whole range of psychically charged *imaginary* transpositions through which the subject is transformed along lines of association at the nodal points of meaning-laden and generative social (structural) relations. A cognitivist vision of bodily knowledge being

trained by the social is useful, but it does not convey the mind's most complex symbolic functions – it remains oriented toward that level of experience that in fact we do share with the rat population. Our world indeed is a social maze; but that is not all it is.

What happens when *practice* and *cognitive science* are defined and integrated into social theory using equivalent or, by degrees, similar metaphors in describing their concepts? They have the same effect on the reader – they invariably produce the charge of reductionism; the agent of social action, it will be said, cannot be contained in such terms.

While others were refining the cognitive approach in the 1990s, Bourdieu was moving in the opposite direction. Jean-François Fourny points out that Bourdieu's early disavowals of the 1960s and 70s gave way to increasingly "massive importation of psychoanalytic concepts" in the 1980s.³² Especially with elaboration of the notions of *socio-analysis*, *illusio* and finally *libido*, we see Bourdieu's cognitive feeling for the logic of practice inclining toward psychoanalysis.

In the preface to *Practical Reason*, Bourdieu is confidently on the defensive and offering the book as a counter to charges of holism, utilitarianism, and reductionism – "The reference to these criticisms is, along with the need to recall the same principles on different occasions and to different publics, one of the reasons for the *repetitions* in this book, which I have chosen to maintain for the sake of clarity."³³ And then, in a chapter tellingly titled "Is a Disinterested Act Possible?": "Having defended my usage of the notion of interest," he wrote, "I will now attempt to show how it can be replaced by more rigorous notions such as *illusio*, *investment*, or even *libido*."³⁴ Libido, we know, is a word Freud took from the Latin, in which it meant desire, lust, will and the drive to pleasurable satisfaction, especially the sexual. Feeling out this relation of interest to libido, Bourdieu wrote that, "We could thus also use the word *investment* in the double sense of psychoanalysis and of the economy."³⁵ And that, he continued, would mean that, "One of the tasks of sociology is to determine how the social world constitutes the biological libido, an undifferentiated impulse, as a specific social libido."³⁶

There are in effect as many kinds of libido as there are fields; the work of socialization of the libido is precisely what transforms impulses into specific interests, socially constituted interests which only exist in relation to a social

space in which certain things are important and others don't matter and for socialized agents who are constituted in such a way as to make distinctions corresponding to the objective differences in that space.³⁷

Practical reason, it turns out, and thus the whole logic of practice at which Bourdieu's theory is aimed, is charged with the energy made familiar by Freud. With the 1997 publication of *Pascalian Mediations*, this opening toward psychoanalytic descriptions of habitus and field drew near to completion.

The initial form of *illusio* is investment in the domestic space, the site of a complex process of socialization of the sexual and sexualization of the social. And sociology and psychology should combine their efforts (but this would require them to overcome their mutual suspicion) to analyse the genesis of investment in a field of social relations, thus constituted as an object of interest and preoccupation, in which the child is increasingly implicated and which constitutes the paradigm and also the principle of investment in the social game. How does the transition, described by Freud, occur, leading from a narcissistic organization of the libido, in which the child takes himself (or his own body) as an object of desire, to another state in which he orients himself towards another person, thus entering the world of "object relations", in the form of the original social microcosm and the protagonists of the drama that is played out there?³⁸

The work of socialization of drives is based on a permanent transaction in which the child makes renunciations and sacrifices in exchange for testimonies of recognition, consideration and admiration ("How well behaved he is!"), sometimes expressly solicited ("Look at me, Daddy!"). This exchange, involving the whole person of the two partners, especially the child of course, but also the parents, is highly charged with affectivity. The child incorporates the social in the form of affects, socially coloured and qualified, and paternal injunctions, prescriptions or condemnations no doubt tend to exert an "Oedipus effect" (to use Popper's phrase...)³⁹

Here we see the exchange – Bourdieu says *permanent transaction* – between objective social structure and subjective motivation breach the divide between the limits set by cognitivism and a dynamic logic of unconscious mental imagery – "Look at me Daddy!"; the child must be referring to the whole image of itself which it knows it produces for the other to see, and it has already felt the power of this exchange in the form of its own witnessing of the world it encounters. Desire is reconciled with habitus and field; the concepts of psychical energy, investment in the object, and the transformation of the drives by encounter with the social are written over the cognitive inculcation of social divisions as categories and schemata of perception and taste. Psychical development imbricates social conditioning.

Yet Bourdieu pulls up short of entering the *imaginary*, or rather disputes that he is already there: “We are very far from the language of the ‘imaginary’ which is sometimes used nowadays, somewhat recklessly...”⁴⁰ Submission to the social is trained into the body, so that “While making things explicit can help, only a thoroughgoing process of countertraining, involving repeated exercises, can, like an athlete’s training, durably transform habitus.” Social theory, he seems to be telling us again, needs cognitive therapy, not psychoanalysis.

And so having taken the habitus as far as libidinal absorption in objective social structure, Bourdieu never goes back to that moment in *Distinction* where he missed an opportunity to adopt a *logic of identification*, which might take him over the line into reckless imagination. Here is the quote again, as promised: “It is not a question of the truth or falsity of the insupportable image of the working class world that the intellectual produces when, putting himself in the place of a worker without having the habitus of a worker, he apprehends the working-class condition through schemes of perception without having the habitus that is the product of the conditions ‘normally’ imposed on those who are condemned to this condition.”⁴¹ In this crucial discussion, it is precisely by excluding the possibility that an intellectual could build a bridge – the Latin and Greek origins, *metaphor* means to bear across, carry over, to transfer – of language across the gulf separating himself or herself from the worker, by “putting himself in the place of the worker,” i.e., by *identifying himself with that worker*, that gives the description of habitus here its force as an explanation; but this is precisely not what happens on what I contend are the most consequential occasions. Intellectuals do *identify* themselves with workers – as do all peoples across nearly every other form of social divide. What did he mean by “the insupportable image”? At one level, this charge is a canard; no image can replace the thing itself – the fact is that humans identify across social divisions with imperfect visions and models, they do it consciously and unconsciously (for psychoanalysis, the unconscious is active in all consciousness), and they change themselves and the other in the process.

The image of the other transforms the self, or rather the ego, which Freud and later Lacan, among others, describe as an imaginary projection of an embodied subject; it is built of identifications of itself with the world. The result is a world-structured imaginary – a bodily ego – that becomes that through which the world will then be imagined. *Seeing* the worker work, strike, fight, and die, or *hearing the story*

of that travail, the intellectual lives vicariously through this other, making the other a part of him or herself in a moment of identification that transforms the ego in its imaginary structure. In that sense, at least, the intellectual is no different from anybody else.

Such transpositions are precisely what the cognitive mode sacrifices in the name of its science. By shunning the logic of dynamic (un)consciousness and mental images, it moves toward the order of reproduction of the same and, by degrees, away from the order of differences – and to that extent it falsely limits the creative function of the subject and the force of the object by staying away from the subject's more complex symbolic functions. To the degree that Bourdieu contains habitus and field within a cognitive language, he produces the conditions of the charges made against him; and to the extent that he answers those charges by opening his description, he moves in the direction of psychoanalysis.

Even in *Masculine Domination*, whose stunning first chapter (“A Magnified Image”) blends cognitive methods with desirous investment in describing the endurance of masculine social orders, Bourdieu never broached the psychoanalytic logic of identification to interpret the force of the image and its effect on the subject. The *image* he names is the whole social world, that which “constructs the body as a sexually defined reality and as the depository of sexually defining principles of vision and division.”⁴² This is Bourdieu's most powerful move – making the whole world a symbolic system (a field of fields) that structures the subject's habitus (what others might call its social or morphological imaginary).

His example, useful once again, is the Kabyle social system, the meaningful oppositions of which he says constitute “an embodied social programme of perception [that] is applied to all the things of the world and firstly to the *body* itself, in its biological reality.”⁴³ The total objective social symbolic system of order is a field of effectual power manifest visually, and every other way, to the subject – by appearing, it structures the subject that constitutes that appearance; in Bourdieu's words, “Because the social principle of vision constructs the anatomical difference and because this socially constructed difference becomes the basis and apparently natural justification of the social vision which finds it, there is a relationship of circular causality which confines thought within the self-evidence of relations of domination inscribed both in objectivity, in the form of objective divisions, and in subjectivity,

in the form of cognitive schemes which, being organized in accordance with these divisions, organize the perception of these objective divisions.”⁴⁴ Therefore we conclude: the objective, built, material environment that contains the subject from birth until death – the whole social world – is a symbolic order whose work on the subject of social action is like that of language on the subject of speech; enabling and constraining and constitutive of desire, it is the gift and the law all wrapped into one.

But even so, though Bourdieu explicitly intends the description of habitus and field to transcend the reductive psychologies, his repetitive use of the language of first wave cognitive science invariably drags the reader back. A choice is presented; which direction should we take – Bourdieu’s cognitive track or his lean toward psychoanalysis? Or can we take both?

The following descriptions of the options exchange grew out of my attempt to answer that question. Cognitive terms were useful in addressing the level of action associated with inculcated classification, conditioning, learning and habit, but a psychoanalytic approach proved better suited for my encounter with the self-understandings and doubt, idealization and mental discipline – or the pleasure, for example, that will lead the floor trader to act in the interest of common ideals that are not unrelated to the narrative environment that encinctures him there, binding his flesh to the free market center.

The options trading floor at the Pacific Stock Exchange

At mid-day, sunlight falls on the steps of the exchange and also on “the wall” across the street from the Mills building, which houses the options floor. To the delight of weary traders and the many clerks who manage their affairs on the dim, windowless trading floor, this sun and its welcome respite can appear year round. Waist high and stretching for a full block along Sansome street between Bush and Sutter, just outside the Bush street entry to the floor, “the wall” is a singular meeting place, reflecting the true diversity of metropolitan San Francisco’s financial district. Scores of mongrel bike messengers congregate here, sitting on the wall smoking and waiting for the next mission, their belt-clip dispatch radios smear the air with a surreal din of emergency. Bankers, clerks, retailers, advertisers, traders, street merchants, hipsters, garbage pickers, and people of every color and kind stop to rest on the

sun lit wall, drinking coffee or swallowing hotdogs from the itinerant food carts that bless these busy corners with invaluable one minute meals. The brilliant variety of the street scene here lies in high contrast to the homogeneity of the trading floors. Although the spot markets might claim the name of “peoples’ capitalism,” because anyone with money can buy a seat and learn to trade, the fact is that traders nationwide are over ninety percent white and male.

The rules, conditions, and wider social context of the floor trading game help explain its gender homogeneity. From the moment the bell rings at 6:30 a.m., signaling the start of another trading day, until it rings again at 1:10 p.m., marking the daily close of trading, apparent pandemonium prevails in the electric buzz and flicking video glow of the trading floor. Trading on the market floor is said to reward the loudest, most aggressive, most ruthless and generally the most confident and egotistical of competitors, with the pits themselves often described as warlike arenas where physical size and strength, pure mass and the ability to endure hours of yelling and standing in one spot factor heavily in success. Women “have to be doubly tough,” one trader told me, “and willing to put up with anything.” In line with gender stereotypes, traders and writers within finance culture often ascribe these traits and capacities only to men; their rhetoric more than reflects the floor scene reality, it helps to fend women off and preserve for the men a lion’s share of the floor trading space.

An introductory guide to the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE), now called simply the Pacific Exchange (PCX), distributed in 1995, includes a section titled “The Pioneers Who Charted The Pacific.” Its “most important dates” include its founding in 1882, “the first woman member of any US exchange joins the PSE” in 1969, and the “first woman specialist operates at the PSE” in 1976. Thus, for almost one hundred years the Pacific Stock Exchange was an exclusive boy’s club. It used to be that “a lot of times you’d see women on the floor,” my trader informant continued, “but they wouldn’t make it past clerk, or something, now they’re getting the chance to trade, and they’re doing quite well.” But then he estimated that they still made up merely five percent of the total PSE membership. Almost two decades after women entered the field, although there were 324 traders on the options floor, only ten of them were women (under three percent). Another trader described how difficult it could be for women:

It's a male dominated industry, and it's a very very aggressive industry in that you're standing next to people screaming and yelling all day long and, it just moves, things, or tendencies move toward the masses, in the fact that you know when there's a bunch of guys they're standing around talking guy things, and they have guys' you know, insights into everything and that's what ends up happening, the reason it's more than if they were sitting there with 15 men conference calling is you, you have to stand there and jibber-jabber all day, because there's a lot of down time, and that's when, that's when, you know, you can be, you can be, I don't know what the term is in the industry, but it can be unfortunate for women.⁴⁵

Although most of the traders I spoke with were well aware that their world is strongly gendered, they seemed less aware of the whiteness of their ranks. When describing themselves and their work, traders were often moved to note and explain the gender gap in floor demography, "it really is a man's world down there," but the color division rarely creeps into any book or discussion. Race tended not to be an explicit category of self-expression. One white male trader remarked several times about the racially diverse experience of his childhood years on the east coast – "it was a pretty small mostly black town" – but he never compared that world to his present one. Neither did the PSE trumpet a budding multi-culturalism, as it did a new gender consciousness, although the pamphlets it issued were careful to include diversity in their pictorial representations of the trading floors. One book mentioned that the first black trader on Chicago's Mercantile Exchange appeared in 1972, but there was no explanation of the overwhelming racial homogeneity that continues today.

Trading as work occupies an ambiguous professional status, and thus fails to map easily onto any class analysis based on education. Traders, though predominantly white and male, come from a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds. Rags to riches stories abound. The stock market has been a gilded path for many uneducated boy wonders whom market legends then valorize for their "self-made" and "entirely independent" "rise to the top." These "heroic traders" are the poster children of the markets, strong material for those who truly believe the market is a last frontier where the sovereign individual can still prove to himself and the world his hard earned mettle, legitimizing what might otherwise be cast as a privileged, greedy and self-centered profession. The traders' talk is filled with these symbols, strategies and value laden stories; as one veteran trader explained, successful traders are "a very aggressive entrepreneur type, equal to any other kind of business that's, that's starting up where you can

make an awful lot of money, you know, drilling for oil, wildcatting, or going after gold.”⁴⁶

The practical logic of trading

Options floor trading is a sub-field of the securities industry; market-makers trading on their own accounts and floor brokers executing orders for both themselves and their public and private investors compete in competitive struggle for profits. On the floor, the possession of a trading badge marks its bearer as equally positioned for the competition.

The immediate experience of trading appears to be suited for an interpretation using the notion of practical reason. The logic of each individual trade is a highly schematized and totally standardized set of actions. The schematized trade is repeated infinitely in the trading pits, and it is by dint of this repetition that the objective logic of the discrete individual trade becomes a first principle of daily life on the floor.

Trading quickly and decisively is viewed as the only way to succeed under the intense conditions of the pits. Accordingly, the deeper the objective logic of the trade is ingrained, the easier it can be performed without having to stop and think; if a trader does not have to resort to the conscious application of the rules of trading, in other words, if the trade can be executed by rote and not by reflexive awareness, the more competitive the trader becomes. Intense competition between traders in the pits selects for this acquired nature; this is part of what becoming a trader means – a naturalization of the logic of the trade, a practical mastery of the formal scheme of trading. The efficient trader has absorbed the logic of the pits and thus appears to *know* them *intuitively*, displaying for observers an obvious “feel for the trading game.”

Learning this game is made more complex by the information revolution. Each pit becomes the focal point of the global financial market’s collective interest in the particular stocks and options being traded, and traders take this seriously; they stand at the supercharged nodes of a global info-network, keeping up to the minute on breaking news that might in any way affect market conditions. A massive flow of information thus gets channeled through their positions during their performance of the trading routine; newspapers are everywhere, stock ticker tapes line the walls and electronic news wires continuously spell out

headlines and stories overhead. *SuperTrader* Vic Sperandeo described the role of information:

For those of you who do not know about tape reading, it was the infant that grew into modern technical analysis. As technical analysis does today, tape reading relied on pattern recognition. The biggest difference was that the pattern recognition was as much or more subconscious than conscious. Like being “on” in sports, if you stopped to ask yourself what you were doing right, you could lose your concentration. All kinds of factors came into play, too many for your mind to be explicitly aware of. You watched a group of 10 to 40 stocks, constantly memorizing prices, previous high and low points, and volume levels. Simultaneously you were subconsciously aware of the speed and rhythm of the tape movement, the sound of the ticker, the frequency of new prints on a specific stock, the rate of change of prices of the market averages and on any given stock, and repeating price and volume patterns. The subconscious conclusions drawn from all this contributed to what was often called an “intuitive feel” for the market . . . I believe that tape reading required a special kind of aptitude that just isn’t practical or necessary any more, except maybe on the floor of the exchanges.⁴⁷

Awareness and psychical engagement with this information stream is critical; but the trade itself is negotiated in the pit in face to face verbal agreement between individuals, after which they exchange small, hand written buy and sell tickets that are matched together, stapled, time-stamped and handed to a computer clerk who enters the transaction into the system, which quickly prints it overhead – this is where failed mastery of the objective logic is most devastating.

The implosion of global information in the face to face locale helps make inhabiting the trading crowd an intense bodily practice. The pits are alive with a physical and psychological intersubjectivity. Bodies are held in rigid attention to electronically displayed economic indicators, pressing against each other in collective anticipation. An amplified excitement is palpable as the turbulent crowds sense the next tick of a stock. The smells of sweat and breath and ink and coffee texture these interludes. Total mental and physical focus is part of the specially developed perceptivity that traders learn to train on the stream of information flooding into the scene, the physical space of the floor, and the other bodies in the crowd. Waiting. Watching for a sign of recognition by the other, a bit of news, some action. Who will be the next to trade? How will the market move? Traders talk about developing a feel for the psycho-physical game of waiting for action, a quasi-perceptual sense acquired only after many hours, days, months, and even years of inhabiting the crowds. One trader put it to me like this:

I don't really know where you can replicate something like that, and the competitive edge that it keeps you in, I mean, you are constantly under siege, and it's intense, a battle, it's like a sport. I mean other than being an athlete, I can't imagine something that would give me this much adrenaline ... I don't really think I could describe what it's like, but it's basically like being completely under pressure, just the total pressure cooker, at times when you're in a position and it has risk and you're managing it, and you're trading for size, you're basically in there for a quarter of, you know, a playoff game, and things, you know, the highs and lows of what you can imagine in a complete playoff game, everyday. I mean things are going great. Things are going terrible. And you have to continue, regardless of that you have to continue the battle, and, I mean, it's insane. And it's like that almost everyday. Because even when nothing is happening, that in itself is something.... And you have to constantly reevaluate, reevaluate, it's like sailing, you know, you're just constantly tinkering at the helm of this little ship. You know, you're just constantly adjusting to the changing climates.⁴⁸

This trader is describing a non-reflexive practical sense of the immanent future that is inscribed in the unfolding present of the field – of the market. Some call it an *instinct* – the knowledge of a future that is immanent in the present condition that the trader is feeling while immersed in the game.

This intensity has an effect on traders, who tell the same story in a hundred different versions – of witnessing a trader whose total awareness of the market has grown to omniscient proportions, such that s/he becomes intuitively in synch with the market, one step ahead of the others. I asked one trader, “what does it take to succeed?” “A really strong ego,” he said,

A real desire to distinguish themselves, or to put themselves above, and in this case the measuring stick is money. That's what keeps them going I think, they really just want to just distinguish themselves as being better, like or smarter, or like, there's some sort of like mystery to like, if you know what the right thing to do is, if your judgement is so good that you can do that, it makes you seem like some sort of mystical, like “Oh, he's tied in, he's like this Buddhist,” or whatever, he's totally one with the stock market, this guy's in synch, so it's kind of like a mental thing.⁴⁹

All traders have their own moments of synchronicity, of trading as if by “second nature.” Others speak of traders who “lose their sense of the game” at the wrong moment, letting some outside element engage their mind, breaking its hold on the game, often with disastrous consequences. *Second nature* and *trading instinct* are terms that convey the depth of traders' psychical engagement with the institution they occupy, and

which in this way comes to occupy them. I understand the *instinct* to be precisely the development of a natural attitude inside the self-contained universe of the trading floor. Like the home of one's childhood, and the *texture* of a developing child's gendered relations with sibling and parental objects that acquire and carry the impression of their experienced locatedness within the dwelling, the traders' inhabitation and practical mastery of the trading floor achieves the bio-physical-psycho-social state of a natural identity. A special language has developed that facilitates the game. A veteran trader told me how it shaped his experience.

Those are the rules. And so, they chop everything up. Instead of saying a sixteenth, they'll say "a teeny." Because that's quick, that's fast. Instead of saying Sun Micro Systems, they'll say "Sun," or they'll chop everything up. They give everything nicknames and shorten everything up very quickly. Instead of saying "the fifty-fives," they'll say the "doubles." They can say it fast, it can be distinguished, you know, because everything is in a verbal communication, and in that verbal communication they've created ... their own language, as such, that is foreign until your down on the floor and can understand it ... And that all has to be done very fast. So that language has to be trimmed down.... "I'll do a hun," you know, [meaning] "I'll do a hundred." ... They don't say "the bid is 2 and a quarter and the offer is 2 and a half in Micron." They'll say, "Jan doubles quarter at a half." You leave the whole numbers out and everybody knows what that means. And it's the same thing in doing spreads, or you want to buy something and sell another thing, you have to use a different kind of language to communicate that, that everybody can hear and not mistake, because you can't take each person aside and say, well, this is what I want to do. You know, you don't have a conversation with anybody, you have a conversation with everyone, and in that quick short language ... so, they kind of have to have that mentality, they have to think very quickly on their feet, they can't sit down and say, "well, let me figure this out," because boom it's gone.⁵⁰

The trader who fails to assimilate this language to the degree that it becomes second nature will not survive in the pits; a simple linguistic mistake instantaneous in the making can cost a trader a lot of money, if not everything.

Traders tend to apply this esoteric language to fields of experience outside the trading floor, a phenomenon that attests to its prominent place in the pre-reflexive practical sense they develop through trading. I began calling this code language "the spread lingo" in my field notes, as I watched traders go fluidly from financial analysis to culinary analysis to analysis of the people on the streets, and then back to financial analysis again, without breaking the flow of conversation,

using the spread terminology necessary for trading in the pits. For example, several male traders and I were walking down a San Francisco street when they dropped into the spread lingo upon seeing a beautifully crafted house:

“Fantastic paint job. I’m at 20 G’s on that detail.”

“Buy’em. You’re crazy doing that at less than fifty.”

(Just then a middle-aged, elegantly dressed white woman steps out of a Mercedes onto the curb.)

“I got size to go cheap here, fellas. At a teeny.”

“I’m sell’en, I’m sell’en too.” (several give this response)

“I’ll tak’em, I’ll tak’em, I’ll tak’em all.”

“Sold! Sold! Sold!” comes the chorus.

“Sweet deal” says the one who approves.

But what did it all mean? The first trader said he was “at 20 Gs” on the paint job. He had “made a market,” saying he thought it would cost \$20,000 to have it done, but he translated it into a public offer and a challenge to the others, by calling it out like an offer in a trading crowd. The response of the second trader was to say that the offer was thirty thousand dollars under value (too cheap). Before the *deal* could be further negotiated, a new *trade* ruptured the dialogue as the woman stepped out of her car. Trader number three shouts “I’ve got size to go cheap here, fellas,” and everyone instantly knew what he meant. If the woman were an options contract, she would be “out of the money,” and the trader would sell her “at a teeny,” that is, really cheap (a sixteenth of a dollar, the lowest value a contract can have), as many times as anyone else was willing to take the other side (“I’ve got size to go,” meaning “a lot for sale”). Several traders agreed with the low “offering,” by saying “I’m sell’en, too,” but one responded with “I’ll tak’em,” meaning he would buy whatever the others had for sale. In other words, he liked the woman and so took the other side of the trade. The deal was consummated, so to speak, when the trader who made the initial offering to the crowd of his peers cried out “Sold!” signaling the verbal contract had been completed.

You can never tell when the conversation will drop into the spread lingo like this, as the traders express their values and opinions throughout daily life in the terms of their trading language. The necessity of mastering the idiom, and the requirement of living it to the bone in order to make it pay off in the pits, drives the naturalization process. The end result is an inscribed proclivity to turn any value judgement into a price spread – to make a market of every object under consideration. In many situations this is played off as kind of a joke, but the practice is a very significant marker of the degree to which the requirements of the workplace diffuse throughout the mental life. The spread terminology migrates down through conscious application toward the unconscious body; these terms and their schematized logic, born of the objective necessity of navigating the complex terrain of the exchange as economic institution, are actively sedimented, driven down through infinite repetition into habitual dispositions – they enter or become habitus. And although the practice is easily brought to awareness, this does not negate the fact that it very often emerges like a reflex, like a facial tick, that is, like a habit. The lexical logic of trading is really a flexible and transposable frame through which any sphere of life can be projected. The example reported has the advantage of expressing the traders' spread terminology, their fixation on money values, and the hetero-masculine flavor of the whole trading scene. Languages, like the "spread terminology" of the traders, are an elemental compound in workplace identification.

The complex objective logic of the ideologically driven and rule governed institutional game, the objective logic of each buy-sell transaction, the masculine sporting metaphors and attitudes toward the game, the high volume info-channel, the intense psycho-physical immersion in the pits, the shared idiom of trading, the (un)conscious spread lingo, and the requirement of mastering the whole saturated scene together complicate the life of each trader. They carry out a disciplinary and normalizing function that aids in producing a collective identity. They are the rules, classifications, codes, schemata, spaces, contours, and languages that constitute trading as a discrete field of experience – an order of objective necessity; they are conditions of possibility for *becoming* a trader. And, in the end, they are really what becoming a trader means – the trader must be experiencing the market in these bodily terms, the cognitive terms of the options free market.

Habitus, field, and practical action work well at this level, but there are dimensions of floor trading experience that have not been addressed,

and to which the cognitive dimension of these concepts appears quite less well suited. We encounter the deficiency when we turn to the texts and conversation of traders, engaging their content and moving beyond the routinized logic of trading experience, to which we have been not exactly confined, but directed by cognitive feelings for the trading habitus.

SuperTrader talk, text, and the logic of identification

The traders' talk and their texts are filled with examples of the spread terminology, the trading instinct, and the bodily intensity of pit trading, and also reflect their sharp numerary faculty, their propensity in calculating odds aimed at making quick, heavily weighted decisions, their proclivity to gamble, and their inclination to use sporting and martial metaphors to describing their experience. Books and narratives by so-called – and often self-proclaimed – SuperTraders and Market Wizards traverse this terrain; most combine a mini biographical preface that serves as a gloss on becoming a great trader with elaborate strategies for success in the market. As we discover below, their narrative style has much to reveal about the traders' self-knowledge; the idealized and literary figure of the SuperTrader we find in this discourse invites interpretation beyond the limits of cognitivism.⁵¹

The trading world I lived in and studied is saturated with image-laden stories, for example, those describing what I came to call *the first principle of trading*. Floor trader Brian Gelber conveyed this widely shared understanding in response to an interviewer's question, "Can almost anyone be successful [trading] if he or she works hard enough?" "Working hard has nothing to do with it," he replied in the pages of *Market Wizards*, "you have to know yourself and put that knowledge to work in the market"⁵²:

This is my view of a year in the life of a trader: Four out of twelve months you are hot. You are so excited that you can't sleep at night. You can't wait to get to work the next day; you're just rolling. Two months out of the year, you are cold. You are so cold you are miserable. You can't sleep at night. You can't figure out where the next trade is going to come from. The other six months out of the year you make and lose, make and lose. You can't sleep, because you are trying to figure out how you are going to make money.... The net result is that you never sleep, because you are constantly thinking too much about trading. It is an all consuming thing. That is why you need to know yourself – to moderate your emotions....⁵³

Gelber links “knowing yourself” to “moderating the emotions.” The self is the ego, in this perspective; it is vulnerable to the damaging influence of pride and other emotions. Traders always return to its role and condition. The first principle of trading is to *know yourself*, and that means having the discipline to moderate your emotions and control the ego so that neither interfere with the rational decisions of buying and selling, i.e., your trading system. Market Wizard Tom Baldwin took the idea even further: “actually, the best traders have no ego. To be a great trader, you have to have a big enough ego only in the sense that you have confidence in yourself. You cannot let ego get in the way of a trade that is a loser; you have to swallow your pride and get out.”⁵⁴

In this way, we see how *the first principle*, of knowing yourself, leads to what I call *the Rule #1 of trading*: cut your losses and let your profits run. Edwin Lefevre’s 1923 *Reminiscences of a Stock Operator*, a biography of the great trader Jesse Livermore, gives the classic statement of this SuperTrader ideal.⁵⁵ Lefevre’s book is referred to in numerous texts that deal with the culture and strategies of trading, and traders call it essential for grasping the mental challenge of trading. Gelber, who trains floor traders, writes that, “The first book we have our traders read is Edwin Lefevre’s account of Jesse Livermore.... I have read it at least a dozen times.”⁵⁶ Livermore describes the difficulty of carrying out the *Rule #1*:

I sometimes think that speculation must be an unnatural sort of business, because I find that the average speculator has arrayed against him his own nature. The weaknesses that all men are prone to are fatal to success in speculation – usually those very weaknesses that make him likable to his fellows or that he himself particularly guards against in those other ventures of his where they are not so nearly a danger as when he is trading in stocks or commodities.... The speculator’s chief enemies are always boring from within. It is inseparable from human nature to hope and to fear. In speculation when the market goes against you you hope that every day will be the last day – and you lose more than you should had you not listened to your hope – to the same ally that is so potent a success bringer to empire builders and pioneers, big and little. And when the market goes your way you become fearful that the next day will take away your profit, and you get out – too soon. Fear keeps you from making as much money as you ought to. The successful trader has to fight those two deep-seated instincts. He has to reverse what you might call his natural impulses. Instead of hope he must fear; instead of fearing he must hope. He must fear that his loss may develop into a much bigger loss, and hope that his profit may become a bigger profit. It is absolutely wrong to gamble in stocks the way the average man gambles.⁵⁷

But the simply stated *Rule #1* is difficult to follow in the speed and the intensity of the pits, where the life-blood of money is always at stake. The final shout that seals the trade is said to be born on the gut level of personal strength and internal conviction; failure to discipline emotion and ego can destroy the rational plan and smash the trader's identity. It should be no surprise, then, that care of the self turns out to be *the* prescription for trading success in the narrated dramas of the Super-Trading texts.

A twenty-five-year trading veteran told me the following story; listening carefully, we can hear *the first principle* and *the Rule #1* – as they inhabit an offhand remark that evokes the full speed of the floor trading scene:

So, an old commodity trader told me that a long time ago [pause] he trades beans – and he says [pause] he would buy 'em and if they started to go [up, hand gesture] he'd buy some more, and if they started to go [up] he'd buy some more. And oop, it would look like things were stumbling out, oop, he'd sell them out, if he made a mistake, he would eliminate that mistake instantly, but he wouldn't let it affect his decision for [pause] that was it, that was done, you let your profits run and cut your losses. That's it, you trade them off, and you don't choke, you don't choke up, there's no emotion to it – each trade is a separate trade and you just constantly do that; go with the flow; recognize the flow at the time; and don't think that you know what's going on – you go ready to be very egotistical, and very strong and very physically and mentally strong at the same time. You can't allow yourself to be taken, to be taken by yourself; you don't have the ego that you know what's going on, because as soon as you know what's going on, the market will slam you the other way. You know, you have to have a Chinese philosophy to bend in the wind – or you'll break. And you have to make a decision that you are [pause] that you believe that the market is going up, and when it doesn't you can say you were wrong, and accept that error, and do it again, and do it again, and do it again. That's the entrepreneur, I think. An entrepreneur, or you go out digging for gold – that rock doesn't have the gold, OK fine, well I think it's over here, well it's not, OK; I'm gonna go and dig, in in in and if you keep it up, generally you know it will work – but you can't give up, you gotta keep going keep going keep going keep going.

The words of this veteran show how the first principle and the Rule #1 serve as vehicles for the basic values that elevate SuperTraders to the status of idealized trading culture icons: a masculine ethos of possessive, utilitarian individualism. “That's the entrepreneur,” he says, “the gold digger,” the self-knowing, autonomous spirit who does not give up, but just keeps pushing until all obstacles have been overcome, success has been had, and the wealth has been made. This trading

discourse constitutes the self as an ungendered, conscious, rationally calculating and yet emotional self.

Numerous books and articles by traders add vivid imagery as they explain and valorize this ethos. For example, in his “Forward” to *The SuperTraders*, Alan Greenburg gave this vision of becoming a trader.

Perhaps the greatest testimony to this country’s aspiring to be the land of opportunity – a land of ambitions, dreams, successes, and failure – is personified in the glory of Wall Street. And for decades the very soul of Wall Street has been the securities trader. Whether screaming on the floor of the stock exchange or sitting on one of the thousands of trading desks from San Francisco to Chicago to New York, this personification of risk, aspirations, and riches exists in countless transactions every trading day. And at the heart of this process lies the trader, engaging in securities combat, trying to squeeze out an additional eighth or a quarter for his clients on every transaction.⁵⁸

Greenburg focuses the mythology of the entire securities industry onto the personalities of the traders; they are concrete, particular displays of the mythic American Dream. But this soul of this market is at war with itself; the heroic conquerors and survivors become SuperTraders, but the struggle is hard:

The tangible and intangible qualities that make the difference between mediocre, good and great traders over the decades have remained constant. Anyone can be analytical; anyone can memorize the symbols of the stocks he trades. That is irrelevant. A great trader must have the backbone to stay the course, to take calculated risk but not be afraid to take losses. If nothing else, the great trader is a fundamentally disciplined individual. Traders must follow the advice of Davey Crockett, who said, “Be sure you’re right, and go ahead....” In this book ... important issues have been all addressed to provide the reader with an insight into a way of life that is quite different from nearly all others.⁵⁹

Trading, for Greenburg, is more than just a job, it is a way of life – and his words say a lot about how that life is imagined. Great traders are rugged individualists with the backbone to stay the course, they are unafraid, and most tellingly, they are disciplined individuals. Greenburg employs a mythic image of the old west to idealize the autonomous and maverick character of the SuperTrader. Quoting Davey Crockett, he dreams of the trader in wild-west vistas, a seminal theater of masculine imagination. In similar fancy, George Angell introduced his *Winning in the Futures Market*:

Today's futures markets are a financial frontier. They are as challenging, unbridled and dangerous as the old west. Yet they offer a world of opportunity to the individual with the wit, discipline and courage to set out and conquer this indisputably difficult financial terrain.⁶⁰

The market is the frontier for heroic trading men, land of the free and well-disciplined conqueror, where worlds of opportunity lie waiting for capture. Listen to this promise ring true in the very first lines of Alexander Elder's *Trading for a Living*.

You can be free. You can live and work anywhere in the world. You can be independent from routine and not answer to anybody.... This is the life of the successful trader.⁶¹

These are mythic dream images from which identities can be made. At every turn, on the cusp of every defining event in the explosive moments of trading and the struggle of learning to trade, these narratives and strategies stand ready on the tips of so many tongues that crowd the trading floor and enliven trading literature. They help traders make sense of a complex and fast paced world that might otherwise elude them, if not punish them brutally. Versions of these stories, with their heroic men of emotional steel, their metaphors of frontier survival, and their celebrations of atomistic freedom and entrepreneurial transcendence greet every new trader that arrives on the scene; they are always already there, a cultural supply of sense-making stories that give the new trader an ideal to embrace. In this way, the traders' talk enables their practical, cognitive mastery of the objective logic of trading – the discourse of trading facilitates its practice.

This trading discourse is an organizationally bound and institutionalized system of symbols, patterns, and concepts for perceiving, understanding, judging and acting – a source of information, coping mechanisms, and practical solutions, a reservoir of cultural material from which the embattled trader has little option but to draw from and drink. It is a spoken, written and practical repository of history, a repertoire of ideas and action in which the following elements quickly stand out: the celebration of aggressive competition, the atomistic vision of oneself against the world, the self-conscious and valued alienation from the mainstream of finance culture, the western American mythos that narrates the exchange as a final frontier, the fantasy of achieving personal autonomy through economic accumulation in this wide open field, the psychological rules for emotional discipline that

underlie success, and finally – most importantly for my argument – the condensation of all of these characteristics in the idealized figure of the SuperTrader.

The SuperTrader is a fantasy figure that moves through this discursive space, often unnamed but sometimes explicitly, guiding the traders in their self-understanding, in motivating themselves and thus in reproducing their floor trading culture; it is a common reference point against which to judge their success or their failure, and to grow toward and mature – a mirror for the collective experience of trading: an ego-ideal for the trading identity.⁶²

In psychoanalytic theory, the ego-ideal is an agency within the subject – the positive pole of a dual Oedipal precipitate set up in the ego that begins a lifelong process of personality-building identifications; the other, negative pole is the super-ego. The ego-ideal's relation to the ego can be illustrated simply with the statement – “You ought to be like this.” It works on the ego through a logic of inferiority, in which the ego submits to the authority of the ideal out of admiration. The super-ego's relation, on the other hand, can be similarly illustrated with the statement – “You must not do certain things.” While the ego-ideal operates on the ego according to the model of love, the super-ego works through interdiction and prohibition, driving the subject toward submission through fear of punishment and guilt. Although “super-ego” is accepted shorthand indicating both dimensions, for the present discussion I retain the distinction.⁶³

Identification is the process by which the ego-ideal and super-ego are built into the subject in what should be viewed as a lifelong procedure of embodying world-knowledge. It is the first of two elementary forms of human emotional ties described by Freud, the second being object-relation. The child's first special interest in an other, commonly the mother or father, is the active desire in identification and the precursor of all future identifications. The child wants to *be* like the model he has chosen; Freud says the child “takes his father as his ideal.”⁶⁴ According to Freud, “We can only see that identification endeavors to mold a person's own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model.”⁶⁵ The second form of emotional tie is object-cathexis. Here the child wants to *have* or possess the object of its desire. Libidinal cathexis is the common energy and motive force animating these bonds. During identification the desire to be the object behaves, says Freud, “like a derivative of the first, *oral* phase of the organization of

the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such.”⁶⁶ This statement has the benefit of reminding us that attitudes and impulses towards others and objects are commonly contradictory; ambivalence is not the exception but the rule in comprehending relations.

The originary form of emotional tie, identification, is returned to under conditions of regression and symptom formation, particularly in the context of collective experience of need or stress, where emotional, physical, and situational similarities are present and recognized, consciously or unconsciously. Subjects experiencing such common conditions tend to substitute a common, idealized object or figure for their ego-ideal and super-ego, or rather add to their ever changing composite ideal by identifying themselves with characteristics drawn from that commonly idealized figure: for the infant that means the idealizing construction of parental objects and a continuum of their subsequent parental substitutes (teachers, role models, etc.), whom they encounter along the lines of association that constitute daily life among people and institutions; for the traders this long line of substitutes ultimately encounters the elevated, culture-laden figure of the SuperTrader.

Their cultural universe is presided over by these towering figures, whom traders perceive to embody, in real life, the ideal psychology of trading. SuperTraders' bank accounts are said to reflect how they matured and grew into the perfect trading personality, embodying in the process every virtue of the field. As traders project a generalized psychology of utilitarian individualism and a mythical frontier heroism into the *image* of this imaginary figure, the SuperTrader. It comes to embody the specific demands of the field. It becomes a super-saturated cultural sign that appears to new traders as an objective condition, one that, by so appearing, helps ordinate the total posture of trading by providing an object through which traders can identify with each other in their egos. Everywhere presented as a cultural symbol, it guides their engagement with the universe of trading and mediates their internalization of its objective necessity, specifically shaping the actual dialectical exchange between subjective (*habitus*) and objective (field) into a psycho-social conflict of self-overcoming. Consider, for example, how the *first principle's* imperative is to know yourself, and then put that knowledge to work in the market with emotional discipline. In this way, collective imagination constitutes the field around the figure of the SuperTrader, facilitating the internalization of the social logic of

that field by providing an image of the practical terms of the free market exchange that will be embodied in the personal identity of the traders who perform it. Therefore, while it may be true that traders make markets, it is because the market has made them traders.

The trading practice, we conclude, and thus, by extension, the market in which it performs have dynamic unconscious dimensions that cannot be captured by the cognitive mode of interpretation alone. The identificatory logic of trading, seen here operating at least in part through the cultural phenomenon of the SuperTrader as a commonly invested ego-ideal, cannot be subordinated to a cognitive logic of repetition, inculcation, routinized learning, schematized habit, environmental trigger and conditioned response; it must instead be explored in the affective, cathective, imaginary terms of a psychoanalysis tuned to the image that the SuperTrader presents to the up-and-coming trader.

The gendered performance of trading

The gendered performance of trading further illustrates the need for psychoanalytic interpretation. The aggressive practical logic of the pit competition as well as the trading discourse that valorizes and legitimizes it mark the exchange as a quintessential theatre of masculine performativity, a “natural” context for the performance of male excellence, while women are imagined in this very same context to be naturally unequipped for such activity. Thus, what the practice of trading reproduces behaviorally, the cultural sphere of trader talk reproduces discursively, a reciprocally reinforcing dialectical circuit. The gendered discourse of trading helps channel women out of the profession while reinforcing the male traders’ essentialized views of themselves, therein simultaneously enabling and even mandating the performance of gender inequality on the floor-trading scene. This can help explain why, although membership has been open to anyone for three decades, it remains the case that less than five percent of floor traders are women, as compared to just over twenty-eight percent representation in the broader occupational category of securities and financial services sales.⁶⁷

Feminist scholars have noted the gendered quality of bodily dispositions and practices in a number of practical fields, examining the deployment and consequences of the use of sexual metaphors in various discourses, for instance those of law, the sciences, and the

women's self defense movement.⁶⁸ The use of heterosexual imagery and systemic metaphors in the trader talk carries out similar functions. The stories that continuously circulate through trader culture come inscribed with masculine notions of the individual grounded in utilitarian, individualist psychology; traders use this cultural material to make sense of their world, thus helping to constitute the trading ethos as male in flavor and further consolidating the trading floor as a theater of masculine performance.

Such gender performativity is energized by the ego's structural lack.⁶⁹ Given the ego's primary function as a systemic defense mechanism, it necessarily and continually strives towards what is always already impossible: namely, to complete itself, to fill itself in, to defend itself against its own original and always threatening structural dis-unity. Psychoanalysts, psychologists, and sociologists of the most diverse opinions at least agree on this – that the formation and operation of ego is a continuous project of consolidation. From Freud's original elucidation of the psychical apparatus, which charted the ego's slow emergence from the undifferentiated primary energies of the infant, to the "socialization of ontological security" in Giddens's *stratification model of the self*, which implies that wholeness and trust must be secured and maintained, to Jacques Lacan's explanation that "the essential function of the ego is very nearly [a] systematic refusal to acknowledge reality," which implies that the ego itself is symptomatic and that the experience of wholeness is always necessarily a construction (or illusion), it is agreed that the ego is energetically, structurally driven to consolidate the experience of reality.⁷⁰

We have seen the ego's performance in the case of the traders. Under the guidance of cultural codes that carry the meanings and strategies internal to the trading scene, the ego is both threatened by and drawn towards the figure that promises it relief and success: a group ego-ideal, manifest in the culture-laden symbolic figure of the heroic male SuperTrader. By way of its meaning and value-laden psycho-social bodily context, and under the guiding compulsion of the SuperTrader as common ideal, the trading floor scene provides for and even demands the energetic performance and finally the embodiment of masculine cultural norms.

Gender performativity on the trading floor must therefore be seen as part of the expressive dimension of practice, a symptom of the relation between individual action or practice and the field as a cultural system.

As the subject's own desire develops and matures toward the common ideal, it moves and motivates the subject in consonance with the logic of the system; traders' successful management of trading as a way of life marks the embodiment, literally, of this ideal in the flesh and blood form of a trading personality and identity, an ideal in circulation within the symbolic order of trading.

Therefore, we see how an energetic, dynamic unconscious mediates and transforms traders' experience of the objective social through imaginative processes of narration and identification that constitute objectivity – namely, the objectivity of the exchange that each new as yet uninitiated trader encounters upon acquiring a badge and entering the pits. The SuperTrader that they meet – an imaginary figure in narrative and in text, in story after story – helps defend the ego from disintegration by shaping its perception of reality and providing the ideal future state toward which it strives; it is an imaginative projection of the traders themselves – an imaginary social fact of their existence within the organized culture that constitutes the field, in all of its objective necessity. In this way, we see that it drives the performance of its own idealized imperatives and ensures its embodiment in the next wave of initiates by creating the trading world they are forced to encounter. *Habitus*, we conclude, should not be viewed as merely a set of inscribed cognitive operations capable of generating habitual practice, but more fully as the meaning- and value-laden imaginary order of the embodied ethos of trading.

Although a complete psychoanalytic interpretation of the trading experience would certainly require more than this provisional engagement with the SuperTrader, enough has been said to suggest the value of investing practice theory with a psychoanalytic drive, a talking cure, it might be said, for the social field worker.

On the unconscious body in theory

People embody those ways of knowing and thinking about their world with which they find it already saturated when they arrive on the scene. In and through daily life, their bodies live the experience of these working meanings. As the perceptual apparatus is circumscribed in their structured and structuring, alluring and imposing, institutionally grounded and organizationally distributed forces of affect and effect, their rules are transformed into *doxa* – “a state of immediate adher-

ence that is established in practice between a *habitus* and the field to which it is attuned,” in the words of Bourdieu.⁷¹ Their power of law is aestheticized in the process – it permeates the body, becoming an agency of natural perception.

How we conceive of this psychosocial exchange between the world and subject that performs it is *the crucial question* that practice theory poses. We have seen how Bourdieu led a turn to the cognitive body, and discovered the ability of his *logic of practice* to interpret an unconscious level of habitual behavior; it was a boon for critical theory. But the language and legacy of cognitive science put a brake on the system; by containing the unconscious with metaphors of training and conditioning, schema and response, and by excluding the language of imaginary relations, cognitive sociology risks describing a world that feels automatic and closed.

In his later publications, Bourdieu opened his concepts of habitus and field to psychoanalytic descriptions; the *interest* that agents *invest* in their fields can be written as *libido*, an original capacity of *desirous attention* to the world that is called into and shaped by social-symbolic orders – the fields – bringing them energy and giving them power to operate as if with a life of their own. These bodily energies move along imagined – read *imaginary* – paths, where similarity and difference are projected and valorized, idealized and introjected, demonized and resisted – both consciously and unconsciously – through intertextual life-worlds of mirrored and mirroring identificatory bonds, the forces of which form fields of meaning-effect and so must be read as a literary system of psycho-social exchange. Yes, the world is a social maze, but it is also a hall of mirrors.

I have tried to show this dimension of traders’ embodied subjectivity in the performance of doxic experience at the options exchange. Doxa – psychoanalytically conceived as an internalized and naturalized experiential fabric woven through the personality of institutionally inscribed subjects – exists as a source of authority over every new subject that enters its field; I learned this myself when I arrived in the pits and started working in the market that came to work in me. The ethnographer’s job is to dig up the silt-like deposits of doxa that harden in personalities where people get embedded in places such as this. The logic of identificatory practice, modeled by psychoanalysis, is a tool for this job – it sees individual personalities as transformed in their imaginary structure by images thrown up by the social world in these

settings, images that are carried in spoken words and written texts as they circulate through places like the floor trading pits.

From this perspective, the embodied ethos of trading appears as a dynamically shared (un)conscious community of those who inhabit the exchange, enclosed in its image, living the experience of trading as their “way of life”; and the consolidation of this unconscious community proceeds, at least in part, by way of the trader’s collective identification through the image of the SuperTrader as ego-ideal. As each new trader arrives on the scene, this figure is always already there, presiding over the field and displaying its compulsory and opportunity-laden ways of perceiving, knowing, valuing and acting; its authority is doxa. As they learn to trade from their peers and their texts, the SuperTrader rises, offering its character as a partial substitute, a helpful addition to the subject’s imaginary – that is, to its ego, its ongoing embodiment of the social imaginary. Identification with the image completes the transaction, changing the subject engaged in the system that supplied the image and ensures its return. As we can see, options are not all that is exchanged on the trading floor.

Analyzing the deeply buried and forgotten bodily dispositions of this more dynamic and literary habitus entails a sociology of doxic experience that encounters the narrative and image-laden order of distinct social worlds; it requires a cultural analysis of organizations and institutions that can move at this imaginary level. Organizations learn and then forget the enabling and constraining structures – categories of thought, feeling, and action – that call up and drive practice, just like individuals forget certain experiences that, bound up and driven by psychical energies, are fated to return engraved in the symptom; for example, the trader’s unconscious expression of pleasurable commitment to a masculine cultural order is demonstrated in the gender performativity immanent to the doxic, identificatory logic of trading. The case of the traders thus shows how systemic reproduction and the maintenance of social order is performed, and how reflexive knowledge and symbolization of these processes are certainly one condition of directing their transformation.

When the individual’s ego conforms in some way with the ideal the subject has set up in itself, the result, according to Freud, is pleasure: “There is always a feeling of triumph,” he wrote, “when something in the ego coincides with the ego-ideal. And the sense of guilt (as well as the sense of inferiority) can also be understood as an expression of

tension between the ego and the ego-ideal.”⁷² A basic economy of pleasure is thus seen operating in the agencies of the unconscious that are active in the processes of imaginative idealization, identification and introjection that guide the internalization of the field (objective culture system). It feels good to succeed – to feel the formation of specific organizational, workplace, or professional doxa; and it hurts when the fit is not right.

This amounts to a built-in motivational agency within the pleasure economy of the embodied and embodying psyche; its channels of attention are the paths that shared meanings follow on their way to embodied personality and workplace identity. Embodiment, in these terms, is the pleasurable and ultimately erotic constitution of a social imaginary. Traders trade with a passion that, using these terms, social theory can understand.

Sociology will benefit to the extent that it achieves this dynamic feel for the subject of social action. In the pleasurable consent to authority, a psychoanalytically informed practice theory will discover the key to interpreting the bodily unconscious of psychical work that binds the subjective dimension of personal commitment to the objective order of living institutions.

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Notes

1. A Google worldwide directory search lists 116 stock exchanges, 34 commodities exchanges, and five options exchanges, although undoubtedly there are more. Many stock exchanges trade options and commodities as well. The number of trading floors and of traders is therefore quite small relative to other professional fields, but the central role of the markets in organizing contemporary economies should multiply our interest in their specific logic.
2. From 1983 through 1985, I worked as a floor clerk and then broker’s assistant on the options trading floor at what was then called the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE) and

is now called the Pacific Exchange (PCX). I returned in 1994 for field research, during which time I conducted interviews and observations on the trading floor, immersed myself in the traders' own literary microcosm, and reflected at length on my continual relations with traders since the mid-1980s. Having lived and worked on the scene, I had the knowledge and contacts needed to secure privileged access to the trading floor. During a year of advance work and three months of intensive field work, in which I received a daily visitor's pass several times a week, I was able to hang around on the trading floor, talk to traders about trading, watch them trade for hours, hit the street for lunch and cocktails after work, make new contacts, and arrange in-depth, tape-recorded interviews. I had countless conversations on the trading floor, in the bars of San Francisco's financial district, and at the homes of traders in the city. In our long and diverse conversations, traders talked freely with me, another white man who had been there before. In addition, four in-depth interviews were recorded, each lasting between one-and-one-half and two-and-one-half hours. Three of the interviewees were white male traders with current floor trading memberships, presently trading for a living on the options floor. The fourth interviewee was a white woman who had quit the industry after only two years, having decided not to take the exam required to advance from being a trader's assistant to a licensed floor trader.

3. For an early and influential review of practice theory in anthropology, and beyond, see Sheri Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sheri B. Ortner, editors, *Culture/Power/History: A Reader In Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Also important in the emergent field, Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and Michele de Certeau's *The Practice Of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). But Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical statement in *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) is perhaps most important, and his *Introduction to Reflexive Sociology* (with Loïc J. D. Wacquant, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) is a quick route into the central questions of practice theory. Secondary sources are too numerous to list but several deserve special mention; Craig Calhoun's "Habit, Field and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity," in Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone, editors, *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), as well as the rest of the volume; David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977); Jeffery Alexander, in "The reality of reduction; the failed synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu," *Fin de Siècle social theory; relativism, reduction and the problem of reason*, Jeffrey Alexander, editor (London: Verso, 1995).
4. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), originally published 1979, 373–374.
5. See Roger Friedland and Bob Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions," in W. Powell and P. DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 232–235. Friedland and Alford describe the advance of rational action assumptions within the social sciences. "The most radical retreat from [the category of] society [in social theory]," they argue, "has been toward the instrumental, rational individual, whose choices in myriad exchanges are seen as the primary cause of social arrangements. Public-choice theory, agency theory, rational-actor models, and the new institutional economics all reflect this premise." Rational

action theory, rational choice theory, interest theory, and game theory are among the numerous names given to this methodological and ultimately philosophical approach to the “human” component of the “human sciences.” See also Sheri Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,” 394–395. Ortner identified “interest theory” as the dominant theory of motivation in the practice anthropology of the 1980s, describing how it posits “an essentially individualistic, and somewhat aggressive, actor, self-interested, rational, pragmatic, and perhaps with a maximizing orientation as well. What actors do, it is assumed, is rationally go after what they want, and what they want is materially and politically useful for them within the context of their cultural and historical situations.”

6. Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Eric Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, and ultimately Jürgen Habermas rely in their writing predominantly on Freudian concepts in descriptions of the subject. Marcuse was especially keen on describing the condition of industrial society in terms of its influence on unconscious process; his historicization of the Freudian *reality principle* in the concept of an historically prevailing *performance principle*, and its expression in the rise of *One Dimensional Man*, anticipated volumes of emerging social theory and influenced a generation of youth counter-culture. See *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press 1955) throughout, but especially 35; *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); and the less well-known *Five Lectures* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), especially “Freedom and Freud’s Instinct Theory” and “Progress and Freud’s Theory of Instincts.” In addition to these lectures by Marcuse, Theodore Adorno’s two-part “Sociology and Psychology” (Part I, *The New Left Review* 46 (1968): 67–80, and Part II, *The New Left Review* 47 (1968): 79–97) shows the force and direction of the critical Freudian approach to the question of dialectical exchange that Bourdieu is describing. In “Psychoanalysis and Social Theory,” the last chapter of *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. Shapiro (Beacon Press: Boston, 1968, 1971), 274–275, Jürgen Habermas restated the basis of the psychoanalytic direction in critical social theory: “Freud conceived of sociology as applied psychology. . . . Furthermore the superego, constructed on the basis of substitutive identifications with the expectations of primary reference persons, ensures that there is no immediate confrontation between an ego governed by wishes and the reality of external nature. The reality that the ego comes up against and which makes the instinctual impulses leading to conflict appear as a source of danger is the system of self-preservation, that is, society, whose institutional demands upon the emergent individual are represented by the parents.” Joel Whitebook’s *Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1996) should be required reading for students of this direction in critical theory; see especially his comments on Marcuse’s *performance principle*, pages 24–41.
7. In *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 1-69, Loïc J. D. Wacquant described Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus variously as a “generative structuralism,” a “genetic structuralism,” a “social praexiology,” and a “historicist rationalism.” Each of these terms is intended to express the necessity of thinking beyond the orthodox binaries inscribed in various subjectivist and objectivist sociologies (i.e., mind/body, phenomenology/structuralism, agency/structure, freedom/determinism).
8. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, but also see descriptions of the various *fields* in Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press,

- 1993), throughout, but especially 55–61 and 162–175; “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” *Hastings Law Journal* 38 (July 1987): 805–853; *Homo Academicus* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, 1988), especially his comments on psychoanalysis in chapter one, 22–23; for Bourdieu’s earlier descriptions, see “Systems of Education and Systems of Thought” and “Intellectual Field and Creative Project,” *Knowledge And Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education*, Michael F. D. Young, editor (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), and *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 1977).
9. Quotations in this paragraph are from throughout Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*.
 10. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic Of Practice*, 146.
 11. *The Logic of Practice*, 69–70. On this point, see also Sheri Ortner’s “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,” 392: “In two recent works in anthropology that explicitly attempt to elaborate a practice-based model (Bourdieu 1978 [1972]; and Sahlins 1981),” she wrote, “The authors nominally take a French structuralist view of the system (patterns of relations between categories, and of relations between relations). In fact, however, both Bourdieu’s *habitus* and Sahlins’ ‘cosmological dramas’ behave in many ways like the American concept of culture, combining elements of ethos, affect, and value with more strictly cognitive schemes of classification.”
 12. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 127.
 13. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 372–396. See also Craig Calhoun, “Habitus, Field and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity,” 73–74. Calhoun argues that Bourdieu understands the interested, economizing agent to be a historical construction, a product of history. Bourdieu’s adoption of “the language of economizing strategies,” Calhoun points out, “is careful to show that the economizing was not that of individuals understood discretely, but inhered in the habitus as a social creation.” Thus, economism or calculation for Bourdieu is part of the social situation of agency; it is “built into the practical play of the game,” and thus gets inscribed in the bodies of agents as the durable dispositions of habitus. Strategizing behavior is decentered in this perspective onto the practical, non-discursive action of the socially situated and cognitively motivated agent, making the economizer a practical maximizer as opposed to a rational, conscious, decision-making maximizer.
 14. Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 117.
 15. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 86.
 16. Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 126–127.
 17. Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 133, 135. Bourdieu continues, “From that follows an inevitable priority of originary experiences and consequently a *relative* closure of the system of dispositions that constitute habitus. (Aging, for instance, may be conceived as the closure of these structures: the mental and bodily schemata of a person who ages become more and more rigid, less and less responsive to external solicitations),” 133–134.
 18. Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 133, 135.
 19. In “Aspects of Structural and Processual Theories of Knowledge,” *Critical Per-*

spectives, 96–97, Aaron Cicourel notes that although in Bourdieu’s earlier work with Passeron “the notion of structure dominates the conceptual issues at all times, there does not appear to be any clear sense of how process affects structure and vice versa. The recipient of process, therefore, is like an empty black box. This earlier theoretical view remains within the confines of the classical structural tradition, despite the fact that Bourdieu and Passeron are being critical of the classical French structuralist point of view. More recent work, like *Outline* and *Distinction*, avoids the rather mechanistic notion of ‘inculcation’ and instead seems to prefer terms like ‘incorporation’ or ‘embodiment.’” But is it in fact the case that the mechanistic notions and descriptions are left behind? Or is it rather that description is added to description? The later in Bourdieu’s work that we look, the closer and closer he is moving toward energetic, dynamic, and psychoanalytic descriptions of habitus, but cognitive inculcation remains omnipresent. Cicourel also points out that such “Structural and processual theories of knowledge tend to under-represent the cognitive and semantic basis for their claims to the meanings that both acknowledge as essential for their respective perspectives.... The task of identifying, much less describing, the experiences of participating in surveys or experimentally with those being studied is seldom an explicit part of the structural, processual, and cognitive-linguistic approaches to theories of knowledge,” 99.

20. Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 135.
21. *Distinction*, 11.
22. Pierre Bourdieu, in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 136–137.
23. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 69.
24. Powell and DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism In Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 25.
25. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism In Organizational Analysis*, 15.
26. For less enthusiastic accounts of cognitive and experimental psychology, see Albert H. Hastorf and Alice M. Isen, *Cognitive Social Psychology* (New York: Elsevier/North-Holland, 1982); John Bowers, “All Hail the Great Abstraction: Star Wars and the Politics of Cognitive Psychology,” *Deconstructing Social Psychology*, Ian Parker and John Shotter, editors (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); Michael Billig, “Rhetoric of Social Psychology,” *Deconstructing Social Psychology*; John Shotter, “Social Individuality Versus Possessive Individualism: The Sounds of Silence,” *Deconstructing Social Psychology*; and Paul Kline, *Psychology Exposed or The Emperor’s New Clothes* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).
27. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism In Organizational Analysis*, 26.
28. Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and Cognition,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 23 (1997): 263–287.
29. Eviatar Zerubavel, *Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), throughout, but especially 1–22.
30. On the emergence of cognitive science, see John Brockman, “Philosophy in the Flesh: A Talk with George Lakoff,” *Qué es un Cuerpo? A Parte Rei* 14 (April 2001): 1–13.
31. Cognitivism has grown into an immense professional field in recent decades, effecting great debates and differentiations within the discipline; but something has remained constant – its core axis of experimental practice, information

- processing metaphors, commitment to reductionism, environmental cues for the activation of schemata (DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition"), and aversion to psychoanalysis. On directions in cognitive science that take better account, in my view, of images and see minds working through metaphor, see, for example, Michael Kimmel, "Penetrating into the *Heart of Darkness*: an image-schematic plot-gene and its relation to the Victorian self-schema," *VIEWZ* 10/1 (June 2001): 7–33; also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
32. Jean-Francois Fourny, "Bourdieu's Uneasy Psychoanalysis," *Substance* 93 (2000): 103–112.
 33. Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, 1998), ix, n. 1.
 34. *Practical Reason*, 76.
 35. *Ibid.*, 78.
 36. *Ibid.*, 78.
 37. *Ibid.*, 78–79.
 38. Pierre Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, 2000), 166.
 39. *Ibid.*, 167. Bourdieu's reference to Popper's "Oedipus effect" is instructive. He cites K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (second edition, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 13. In *Conjectures and Refutations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 33–39, Popper explained his twist on Freud's Oedipus that Bourdieu adapted: "Years ago I introduced the term '*Oedipus effect*' to describe the influence of a theory or expectation or *prediction upon the event which it predicts* or describes: it will be remembered that the causal chain leading to Oedipus' parricide was started by the oracle's prediction of this event. This is a characteristic and recurrent theme of such myths, but one which seems to have failed to attract the interest of the analysts, perhaps not accidentally. (The problem of confirmatory dreams suggested by the analyst is discussed by Freud, for example in *Gesammelte Schriften*, III, 1925, where he says on page 315: 'If anybody asserts that most of the dreams which can be utilized in an analysis ... owe their origin to [the analyst's] suggestion, then no objection can be made from the point of view of analytic theory. Yet there is nothing in this fact,' he surprisingly adds, 'which would detract from the reliability of our results.')."'
 40. Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, 2001).
 41. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 373–374.
 42. *Masculine Domination* (Stanford University Press, 2001), 11.
 43. *Ibid.*, 11.
 44. *Ibid.*, 11–12.
 45. Personal interview.
 46. Personal interview.
 47. Victor Sperandio, *Trader Vic – Methods of a Wall Street Master* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1991), 6–7.
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52. Jack Schwager, *Market Wizards*, 356.
 53. *Ibid.*, 356.
 54. *Ibid.*, *Market Wizards*, 384.
 55. Edwin Lefevre, *Reminiscences of a Stock Operator* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923).
 56. Jack Schwager, *Market Wizards*, 347.
 57. Edwin Lefevre, *Reminiscences of a Stock Operator*, 130–131.
 58. Alan Rubinfeld, *The SuperTraders*, xi.
 59. *Ibid.*, xi, my emphasis.
 60. George Angell, *Winning In The Futures Markets* (Chicago: Probus, 1990), 1.
 61. Alexander Elder, *Trading For A Living*, 1.
 62. The concept of ego-ideal first appeared in Freud's "On Narcissism: An Introduction," *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 14, James Strachey, editor (London: Hogarth Press, 1975); see also *The Ego and the Id*, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 19, James Strachey, editor (London Hogarth: Press, 1975) and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1922 [1959]). Joel Whitebook's *Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* includes an excellent discussion of the concept as developed by later psychoanalysts, including Heinz Kohut and Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel.
 63. See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973). This is a crucial resource for crafting working concepts in psychoanalytic theory.
 64. Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 37.
 65. *Ibid.*, 38.
 66. *Ibid.*, 37.
 67. U.S. Bureau of Labor, *Employment and Earnings*, 1993.
 68. On law, see Rosalyn Diprose, *the bodies of women: ethics, embodiment and sexual difference* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); on the sciences, see Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on gender and science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and on the women's self-defense movement, see Martha McCaughey, *Real Knockouts: The Physical Feminism of Women's Self-Defense* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
 69. See, for instance, Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits Of "Sex"* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995).
 70. See Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); *The Consequences Of Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, structure and contradiction in social analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press); and Jacques Lacan,

“Some Reflections on the Ego,” *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 34 (1953, 11–17): 13.

71. Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 68–69. More fully: “Practical belief is not a ‘state of mind,’ still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (‘beliefs’), but rather a state of the body. Doxa is a state of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a *habitus* and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking for granted of the world that flows from practical sense. Enacted belief, instilled by the childhood learning that treats the body as a kind of living memory pad, an automaton that ‘leads the mind unconsciously along with it,’ and as a repository of the most precious values ... is the product of quasi-bodily dispositions, operational schemes....”
72. Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 63.

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CHAPTER 9

On the wealth of nations: Bourdieuconomics and social capital

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The question of why some countries are richer than others has puzzled social scientists for centuries. Already in the eighteenth century, Adam Smith¹ discussed this issue in his book *The Wealth of Nations*. Smith and other social scientists have focused on the role of material capitals such as physical and financial capital. Drawing heavily on classical *social* economic thinkers, such as Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Marcel Mauss, and Karl Polanyi, Pierre Bourdieu,² in his article “The Forms of Capital,”³ contributed to breaking this line of thought by answering the two questions: what is capital and what forms of capital exist. The result was an original reformulation of Marx’ concept of capital, where the term “capital” is expanded to include both non-material as well as material phenomena. Thus, our contribution is to highlight the role of non-material capitals when explaining differences in the wealth of nations.

In our view, such an expanded concept of capital has relevance to interdisciplinary social science research, which operates with a myriad of more or less exotic forms of capital, ranging from the religious, intellectual, and moral, to the natural and digital.⁴ Therefore, our goal is to enhance an operationalization of Bourdieu's expanded concept of capital as a general framework for an interdisciplinary research program that seeks to dissolve a largely artificial distinction between economics and social science. In line with Bourdieu's⁵ own original vision of "a general science of the economy of practices," his expanded concept of capital can help us to unify and to explain the existing "plethora of capitals"⁶ within a unified theoretical framework.

Anthropologist Alan Smart has characterized the Bourdieusian attempt to mediate between economy and culture in the following way:

One of the most influential efforts to reintegrate social and economic analysis has been Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical project to develop a "general science of the economy of practices." Such a science would recognize market exchange and capitalist production, or the economic in a narrower sense, as only a particular type of economic practice and would explore the conversions that occur between the economic and the noneconomic.... The central set of concepts in this ambitious program is an extended use of the term capital. What is conventionally considered to be capital is in Bourdieu's approach only one form – economic capital – while respect, obligations, and knowledge are seen as symbolic, social, and cultural capital. The study of the economy of practices would examine the distinctive logics and features of each form of capital, and the processes of conversion between the different forms.⁷

Similarly to Marx,⁸ who spoke about "heaped up labor" (*aufgehäuften Arbeit*) or "stored up labor" (*aufgespeicherte Arbeit*), Bourdieu⁹ has defined capital broadly as "accumulated, human labor," which can potentially produce different forms of profits. This work can be viewed as accumulated history,¹⁰ transferred through time in either objectified – i.e., material – form, or in embodied form, i.e., as part of a person:

Capital is accumulated labour (in its materialised form or its "incorporated," embodied form), which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labour.¹¹

However, in contrast to Marxian capital analysis, which is exclusively macro-economic, historical, and one-dimensional (that is, being like all classical economic theories obsessed with visible substances), the Bourdieusian analysis is micro-sociological and investigates relations. Furthermore, it operates with a variety of material and non-material

forms of interchangeable capital, i.e., forms of power¹² within specific fields (economic, political, juridical, artistic, religious, scientific). These forms of capital, the number of which – like the number of fields – seems to be unlimited, ranging from financial, cultural, technological, juridical, organizational, commercial, and symbolic to social capital.¹³

Following Bourdieu, capital is inscribed in both objective and subjective structures and hereby becomes a guarantor for the regularity and stability of the social world.¹⁴ Indeed, at a given time, the various forms of capital can be said to be the very “immanent structures” of the social world, understood as “the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which governs its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.”¹⁵

It costs time and energy for actors to build up and subsequently profit from a capital. The capital must, of course, also contain value and therefore be the object of interest. Capital therefore implies investment strategies, both at the individual level as well as the group level.¹⁶ It constitutes “the games of society,”¹⁷ not only the purely economic game but also the more non-material, i.e., *all* the games.

Such an expanded concept of capital is far from the traditional economic definition of the word as a resource that facilitates production and that is simultaneously not consumed in the production process, i.e., as a factor of production.¹⁸ In this sense, capital can in no way be separated from production, regardless of whether we are referring to physical capital (buildings, machinery, etc.), financial capital, or human capital (education and re-qualification).

Within the social sciences, however, there has been a strong tradition for viewing exchange in a society as a totality, giving terms such as “interest” and “value” a high degree of ambiguity. Hence, social scientists from Mauss, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel to Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss, Eric Wolf, and Benedict Anderson have each in their own ways sought to explain and account for a general connection between culture and economy. Most path-breaking seems Durkheim,¹⁹ who, considering economic ideas and practices as collective representations in the form of the popular opinions dominating a society, strongly questioned what he termed the theory of economic materialism – a theory held by economists who could only conceive of external, objective realities, and which made the economic life the “underlying

structure” (*substructure*) of social life. Also, this critique is reflected in Mauss’s idea of a total, social fact (*fait social total*).

It is precisely this scientific tradition that has led to a critique of undersocialization within classical economy theory, which is accused of reducing human actions to simple profit maximization without cultural implications. In recent years, such a critique has been formulated by the economist Yoram Ben-Porath,²⁰ who spoke of the “F-connection” (family, friends, and firms) and subsequently by the sociologist Mark Granovetter,²¹ who has emphasized the embeddedness of economic transactions in changing, cultural contexts – an expansion of economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi’s²² original definition of the concept of “embeddedness.”

However, a much more serious and specific critique of *doxa* in the form of a highly irrational and unrealistic belief in natural given “markets” and “rational” economic practices, i.e., of the economistic economists’ *homo oeconomicus*, has been formulated by Bourdieu in an attempt to reach a more realistic definition of economic reasoning, “une définition réaliste de la raison économique”²³ and, lately, by Frédéric Lebaron,²⁴ who systematically questions the collective economic beliefs, termed *La croyance économique*, invented and reproduced by traditional economic thought.

As is demonstrated later in this article, Bourdieu’s expanded concept of capital can in fact be viewed precisely as an attempt to construct a consistent, general theoretical framework, which can bring together economic and social science theories in order to avoid reductionistic economics or, put otherwise, to enhance a more *anthropological* economics. This is made possible by a theoretical break with both economism and culturalism. Before focusing, in a sociological perspective, on the role of informal institutions and the Bourdieusian theoretical framework that allows us to do so, we point in the next section to the political economy approach and its focus on the role of formal institutions.

Wealth of nations

Per capita incomes in the richest countries are more than twenty times as high as in the poorest. How can this be explained? Here, political economy writers like North,²⁵ North and Weingast,²⁶ and Olson²⁷

argue that the traditional production factors such as technology, land (natural resources), physical capital, and human capital cannot account for these differences. Consequently, *if* these traditional factors are insufficient, we are forced to move in the direction of alternative analyses of more non-material, invisible, and relation-based forms of capital, including human organization. Thus, characteristically for this literature, North²⁸ writes that, “The inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.” In the following, we restate standard arguments from the political economy literature *against* the four traditional production factors of technology, land (natural resources), physical capital, and human capital, pointing to the role of formal institutions as the missing element in explanations for the dramatic income-level differences across countries.

First, *technology* could mean differences in access to the world’s stock of productive knowledge. Is technological knowledge generally accessible at little or no cost to all countries? Yes, if un-patentable laws of nature and advances in basic science exist, this technological knowledge is a non-excludable public good available to everyone without charge. No, if patentable (or embodied in machines) knowledge exists, as non-purchasers can then be excluded. Are the gains from using modern productive knowledge in a poor country mainly captured by the innovating firms that hold patentable technology? Olson here uses the case of South Korea from 1973–1979. Here, a survey showed that the foreign owners of productive knowledge obtained less than a fiftieth of the gains from Korea’s rapid economic growth. This supports the long-familiar assumption that productive knowledge is available to poor countries at very low costs. Therefore, differences in income cannot be explained by access to the available stock of productive knowledge.²⁹

Second, what about *land and natural resources*? No, says Olson. If you look at density of population, many of the most densely settled countries have high per capita incomes, and many poor countries are sparsely populated. For example, Argentina fell from having one of the highest per capita incomes to third world status with only 11 persons per square kilometer.³⁰ Similar cases are Zaire, Brazil, and Kenya, with (respectively) 13, 16, and 25 persons per square kilometer. In contrast, more densely populated countries seem to be richer, e.g. Belgium, Japan, and Holland have, respectively, 322, 325, and 357

persons per square kilometer. Even more strikingly, Singapore has 4,185 and Hong Kong has over 5,000 persons per square kilometer. Both these densely populated countries have per capita incomes more than ten times as high as the poorest countries, and continue to absorb migrants. In fact, if all countries are taken into account, there is a positive relationship: the greater the number of people per square kilometer, the higher per capita income.³¹

Olson continues in arguing that most economic activity can now be separated from deposits of raw materials and arable land due to transportation technology. Most modern manufacturing and service exports are therefore no longer closely tied to natural resources. For example, Silicon Valley as computer center, Frankfurt, London, and Zurich as banking centers, Western Europe and Asia as manufacturing centers.³²

Third, what about investments in *physical capital*? Here, firms should invest in developing countries where the wage is low. Olson refers to evidence showing that if, for example, an Indian worker and an American worker supplied the same quantity and quality of labor, the marginal product of capital in India should be *58 times* as great as in the United States! Such gigantic differences in return should generate huge migrations of capital from the high-income to the low-income countries. Capital should be struggling at least as hard to get into the Third World as labor is struggling to migrate into the high-wage countries.

Why not? Why is most of the world's stock of capital "crowded" into North America, Western Europe, and Japan? Olson argues that this is due to shortcomings of the economic policies and institutions of poor countries. The political risks make foreign investors and foreign firms feel unwelcome, and provoke the flight of locally owned capital. Lending to these countries is exceedingly risky because they do not enforce and guarantee property rights.³³

Fourth, what about *human capital* per capita? Can the differences in per capita income be explained by differences in the quality of marketable human capital? Clearly, culture, skills, or education in a society must influence the level of its per capita income. Thus, Olson³⁴ lists a number of authors arguing that several cultural preconditions may motivate humans to save up money and work hard, for example, the "Protestant ethic" and Max Weber's combination of the ancient Greek

heritage and Calvinism.³⁵ However, Olson³⁶ continues, the argument that culture is important for economic development, though plausible, is also vague: “culture” has not been defined precisely or in a way that permits comparison with other variables in an aggregate production function. We add the cultural dimension when introducing the approach of Bourdieu and the notion of social capital in the next section.

Concerning the skills and education linked to human capital, one can turn to natural experiments. As it happens, migration from poor to rich countries provides researchers with a marvellous (and so far strangely neglected) natural experiment, e.g., the Latin American who swims the Rio Grande. New immigrants carry some marketable human capital, but the institutions are now those of the host country. For example, an engineer fleeing from East to West Germany would obtain a better salary. Also Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea pay better wages than China and North Korea. Such great differences in economic performance in areas of very similar cultural characteristics could surely not be explained by differences in marketable human capital.³⁷ Olson³⁸ refers to evidence showing that new immigrants from countries where per capita incomes are only one tenth as large as those in the United States have a wage more than half as large as their American counterparts. Likewise, Scandinavian countries were relatively poor in the nineteenth century and much migration to the United States took place during this period. Since then, Scandinavian countries have been characterized by very open economies and free-trade policy.

Overall, Olson³⁹ concludes that rich countries have vastly larger leads over poor countries in per capita incomes than can possibly be explained by differences in the marketable human capital of their populations. Because differences in the four classical aggregate factors of production do not explain much of the great variation in per capita incomes, we are left with the possibility of institutions. Great differences in the wealth of nations are mainly due to differences in the quality of their formal institutions and economic policies!

Bourdieu

“Bourdieuconomics”

Do Olson and similar political economists provide satisfactory answers to the basic question of why some countries are rich whereas others are poor? Both yes and no. On the one hand, we agree that institutions are crucial to economic growth. On the other hand, we find the political economy theory claiming the formal institutional set-up as the most important production factor insufficient. Therefore, we need to take the risk of considering an *even less* material, measurable, and visible factor, and thus (re-)claim still another piece of a formerly pure culture area – a kind of exotic and rather obscure scientific reserve, where things due to the black box “culture” cannot be measured properly, i.e., in accordance with the laws of traditional economics, which is probably why it has been left behind to various tribes of social scientists.

In short, in the following we argue that the *cultural* dimension of institutions should be added. In other words, we stress not only the importance of formal institutions in the form of written-down contracts *but also* informal institutions in the form of the social capital belonging to a population or a group. People’s rational economic performance (if such exists) within various types of institutional set-ups does not fully explain the gulf between rich and poor countries. Another important production factor – informal institutions localized as social capital – should be added to the traditional production factors mentioned by Olson (land, technological knowledge, physical capital, human capital, and formal institutions).

This implies a socio-economic approach in the study of the relationship between economic growth and institutional set-ups, in order to reintegrate the economic and cultural sphere, formal and informal human exchange, in the analysis. To do so, we find it useful to supplement Olson’s institutional sclerosis thesis with Bourdieu’s idea of material and non-material forms of capital. Such new socio-economics – which might be termed “Bourdieuconomics,” in respectful remembrance of the great French sociologist – implies the usage of a capital theory that, methodologically, operates with visible, material forms of capital (i.e., substance) and invisible, non-material forms of capital (i.e., inherited in relations) *at the same level*.

Investigating a broader range of material and non-material forms of capital makes it possible – within such a neo-capital framework – to connect a micro-oriented, sociological analysis of power relations (where different forms of capital are unevenly distributed among actors, who possess different habituses and different positions within specific fields) with a macro-oriented, political economy analysis that explicitly measures social capital as a new production factor, primarily in the form of generalized trust that reduces transaction costs and thus increases economic growth.

A Bourdieueconomics should not be seen merely as a supplement to traditional economic or social scientific analyses. Rather, it forms a basis for all human sciences, because it directs focus to structural forces (evidenced by anthropological field work), which contribute to form the strategies of the actors in their attempts to gain capital. These forces consist of the influence from fields, i.e., the influence of historical products such as the influence of the economic field on economic practices, as well as the influence of the habitus, which also is a historical product and as such never more than conditioned spontaneity.⁴⁰ As Bourdieu has told us again and again, this fact is continuously being overlooked within human science – either by people entrapped by interactionism, like sociologist Mark Granovetter, or by rational action theory, like economic sociologist James Coleman and more conventional, “unrealistic” economists such as Gary Becker or the economists within “new institutional economics.”⁴¹ In short, a Bourdieueconomics certainly acknowledges that actors on the one hand have strong interests and consciously seek to plan and execute strategies to fulfil these. However, on the other hand, as products of individual and collective history, these strategies should be defined as relatively reasonable (*raisonnables*) rather than rational in the absolute meaning of the word.⁴²

Furthermore, in the outline of a Bourdieueconomics presented in this article, we choose to stress the particular importance of one non-material form of capital – social capital – when explaining differences in economic growth and institutional set-ups. Thus, social capital can be localized as institutionalized but informal human exchange (“unwritten rules of the game”). Social capital “lubricates” civic society. The outcome is a voluntary provision of collective goods, such as common norms, predictability in human exchanges, and trust. In this way, social capital reduces transaction costs and enhances economic growth.⁴³ Therefore, we need to investigate further this new, important

production factor, which until recently has been the “missing link” in political and economic debates, as we demonstrate elsewhere.⁴⁴

Forms of capital

A general science of the economy of practices

Early on, Bourdieu imagined a broad interdisciplinary-based human science whose goal was to reintroduce capital “in all its forms and not only in the one form which is recognised by economic theory.”⁴⁵ It thus becomes possible to outline the practice of the social world as directed not only towards the acquisition of economic capital but of all forms of capital.

These various material and non-material forms of capital shall here be understood broadly as the resources within a society. The acquisition of these resources gives access to power and ultimately to material wealth. In this way, Bourdieu directs his focus toward the *economy* in practice, i.e., toward the economic calculation that lies behind not only obvious, i.e., economic practices but also the more hidden and symbolic practices. This clearly entails a break with culturalism – or semi-ologism, as Bourdieu also terms it – which has tended to oversocialize practice, ignoring “the brutal fact of universal reducibility to economics.”⁴⁶ The project is described like this:

A general science of the economy of practices, capable of reappropriating the totality of the practices which, although objectively economic, are not and cannot be socially recognised as economic ... must endeavour to grasp capital and profit in all their forms and to establish the laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing) change into one another.⁴⁷

Bourdieu’s reformulation of Marx’s concept of capital thus consists of two original observations.⁴⁸ First, many different forms of capital exist, from material (physical, economic) to non-material (cultural, symbolic, social). Second, with varying degrees of difficulty, it is possible to convert one form of capital into another.

This entails a second conceptual break, namely with the economism of Marx and the classical economists, a monopolizing of an economic sphere that derives from ethnocentrism, and which is made possible by artificially isolating an economical economy from a cultural econo-

my.⁴⁹ Clearly drawing on his anthropological fieldwork studies of economic practices and strategies in Algeria⁵⁰ and Béarn,⁵¹ Bourdieu's alternative, as already mentioned, is to depart from such a substantialism and materialism by localizing the economic forces behind *all* human actions, without necessarily seeing these as derived from naked self-interest, as the economists would have it.⁵² In other words, the analysis must not simply describe actions that can be capitalized in what Marx terms "callous cash payment,"⁵³ but also actions marked by an apparent disinterestedness, behind which people seek to camouflage the economic drives that lie behind their efforts to acquire a capital. It is a case of "a work of denial."⁵⁴ In this connection, Bourdieu distinguishes between "archaic" economies, whose function is to limit and hide the callous brutality of economic interests, and a capitalist economy, which allows room for "the clear, economic (i.e., economical) concepts of the undisguised self-interest economy."⁵⁵ An exception, however, is the world of art, which in the West has attained a special status as a disinterested field, but whose economic interestedness Bourdieu has sought to elucidate in *Distinction*.⁵⁶

As noted above, for Bourdieu, all forms of capital can potentially be converted into economic capital. At the same time, he notes the paradox that although an economic calculation lies behind every action, not every action can be reduced to economic calculation.⁵⁷ In this way, Bourdieu seeks to mediate between economism and semiologism:

[On] the one hand [there is] economism, which, on the grounds that every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital, ignores what makes the specific efficacy of the other types of capital, and on the other hand [there is] semiologism (nowadays represented by structuralism, symbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology), which reduces social exchanges to phenomena of communication and ignores the brutal fact of universal reducibility to economics.⁵⁸

The point here is that for the actors it is a value in itself to participate and invest time, energy and money in "the economic game," which hereby – precisely as a culturally embedded game with written and unwritten rules – obtains a legitimacy in itself.⁵⁹ In summary, for Bourdieu as well, the term "interest" retains its ambiguity, such that he cannot be accused of being a rational choicer. "Economic" is married to "social," thus it is only possible to speak about a socio-economics. In a concluding remark about the shortcomings of traditional economics, Bourdieu formulates it in this way:

Economism knows no other interest than that which capitalism has produced, through a sort of concrete application of abstraction, by establishing a universe of relations between man and man based, as Marx says, on “callous cash payment.” Thus, it can find no place in its analyses, still less in its calculations, for the strictly symbolic interest which is occasionally recognized (when too obviously entering into conflict with “interest” in the narrow sense, as in certain forms of nationalism or regionalism) only to be reduced to the irrationality of feeling or passion.⁶⁰

Economic, cultural, symbolic, and social capital

As concerns the concrete analysis of the economy of practices in all its forms, Bourdieu proposes that we operate with four forms of capital: economic, cultural, symbolic and social.

Beyond economic capital, into which the other capitals can be capitalized, cultural capital should be understood here as cultural products that are embedded in the human mind and body, as well as in objects. Cultural capital thus appears in three states (*états*). In its objectified state (*état objectifié*), cultural capital consists of humanly created objects such as pictures, books, instruments, machines, etc. In its institutionalized state (*état institutionnalisé*), cultural capital consists of educational qualifications such as academic degrees. Finally, in its embodied state (*état incorporé*), cultural capital consists of permanent dispositions in the individual person, i.e., a *habitus*.⁶¹

Symbolic capital, in contrast, is a more hidden or camouflaged form of capital, which is defined as “economic or political capital that is disavowed, mis-re-cognised and thereby recognised, hence legitimate, a ‘credit’ which, under certain conditions, and always in the long run, guarantees ‘economic’ profits.”⁶² In this connection, Loïc Wacquant speaks about the “hidden processes whereby different species of capital are converted so that economically-based relations of dependency and domination may be dissimulated and bolstered by the mask of moral ties, of charisma, or of meritocratic symbolism.”⁶³

Although Bourdieu did not invent the concept of *social capital*, his definition succeeds in unifying the classical group theories (Marx, Durkheim, Weber) with the reciprocity theories (Mauss, Simmel). For a more detailed review, see Portes and Sensenbrenner.⁶⁴ In his new formulation, network relations within a group are viewed as a potential, but nevertheless concrete and useful, resource from which the individual group member can profit – socially as well as economically. In this way, social capital becomes:⁶⁵

the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.... The network of relationships is the product of investment strategies ... aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term.⁶⁶

Within the last few decades, the concept of social capital has become a central mediator between economics and the social sciences, as will be demonstrated in the following discussion.

Social capital

Social capital as derived from socialization

Whereas Bourdieu has primarily made his analysis at the micro and meso-levels, linking his concept of capital to that of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, American sociologist James Coleman⁶⁷ focuses on social capital as reciprocal obligations and expectations between people, i.e., reciprocity, as well as on the norms and sanctions that ensure these relations. Coleman has sought to demonstrate this at both macro- and micro-levels.

At the macro-level, one can thus say that the ability to cooperate derives precisely from shared values and ultimately out of mutual trust in a society. It is because these shared values and trust facilitate cooperation that social capital can be counted upon as a factor of production on an equal footing with other capitals. In this sense, Coleman argues that social capital is a collective good, i.e., a product that benefits persons other than the individual producer himself, including those whom the producer does not know.⁶⁸ Coleman has documented this via micro-sociological investigations, where he has focused especially on socialization processes. In a comparison of Catholic and non-Catholic schools in the United States, Coleman has statistically demonstrated that pupils in the Catholic schools have a lower dropout rate than pupils in non-Catholic schools.⁶⁹ Why? Because the pupils in Catholic schools possess a larger stock of social capital in the form of networks of family, friends, and neighbors. But this is not all: their family, friends, and neighbors also know each other, just as they regularly meet and in this way ensure common

norms and social control. Coleman summarizes this in the term “closure.”⁷⁰

At a more general level, however, this discovery also entails that social capital is a fragile collective good. If one imagines that a key person in the production of social capital moves out of the area (e.g., a parent of one of the pupils), persons other than the one leaving will experience the loss of closure-based networks. In other words, it is a case of an almost structurally conditioned underinvestment in social capital, inasmuch as “the actor or actors who generate social capital ordinarily capture only a small part of its benefits.”⁷¹

Social capital as substance

Some of the most recent and most ambitious attempts to develop the concept of social capital further have been carried out by American political scientist Robert D. Putnam.⁷² In contrast to Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam has carried out his social capital studies largely on a quantitative and statistically oriented database in an effort to describe social tendencies at the macro-level. Along this line, Putnam has focused, like Coleman, upon trust and collective goods. Thus, he has defined social capital as a production factor consisting of “networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate co-ordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”⁷³

Unlike Bourdieu and Coleman, however, Putnam has avoided incorporating classic sociological problems such as social classification and socialization. As a result, Putnam’s definition of social capital tends to be substantivist – amounts and numbers – compared to Coleman’s and especially Bourdieu’s, where social capital tends to be defined relationally, as an exchange that – embedded in dynamic and complex social processes – produces individual and social identities. Where Putnam sees social capital primarily as quantifiable relations, Bourdieu and Coleman are interested in these relations’ emotional, cultural, and social quality. Here we observe a classic opposition between inner, classificatory categories and the empirically quantifiable effect that derives from the classification.

Putnam’s basic idea of the quantity and substance of the relations is prominent in his two major works, *Making Democracy Work*⁷⁴ and *Bowling Alone*.⁷⁵ In both books, the primary objective is to measure

the presence of social capital in a society in terms of an increase in civic involvement, whereas the absence of social capital is indicated by a decline in the civic population's social activities.

Making Democracy Work is a comparative study of social capital in Northern and Southern Italy. Here Putnam measures social capital as traditions of civic engagement (in the form of voter participation, newspaper reading, and the number of civic associations), which lead to an effective society in an economic sense. Putnam concludes that the two regions have evolved in diametrically opposed directions. In Northern Italy, associational life flourishes. The North functions well and democratically because of the mutual trust among the citizens. This difference explains why Northern Italy's economic performance is so much higher than that of Southern Italy. "Trust lubricates social life," Putnam points out⁷⁶ but only in "civic regions" such as Northern Italy. In "uncivic regions" such as Southern Italy, there is not much trust to work with. The South is afflicted by criminality and corruption, and people are unwilling to trust each other. Thus, Putnam localizes the sources of a successful democratization process in a group's political history in the form of a historical legacy of democratic relations of cooperation:

These communities did not become civic simply because they were rich. The historical record strongly suggests precisely the opposite: They have become rich because they were civic. The social capital embodied in norms and networks of civic engagement seems to be a precondition for economic development, as well as for effective government.

In a subsequent article, Helliwell and Putnam insist that:

there are major continuing differences among the Italian regions in how well government works. . . . These differences date from the time when hired guns came into the South with authoritarian structures in hand, while the northern communities became linked instead by tower societies and other means of co-operative action involving more horizontal and open structures of government and society.⁷⁷

The existence of social capital in a society thus attains decisive socio-economic importance. Social capital is an important factor of production. An example of loss of social capital can be seen in the decline of associational life in the United States from 1969 until the present.⁷⁸ Here Putnam attempts to document that it is primarily television as a negative factor that has eroded the great reserve of social capital created in connection with the civil rights movements of the 1960s.

The time that could have been used for social activities is now used in front of the television. Leisure time has become “privatized.”⁷⁹

Putnam’s macro-historical approach has been strongly criticized by American sociologist Alejandro Portes.⁸⁰ Portes⁸¹ accuses Putnam of oversimplifying the historical data by his unilateral focus on the positive effects that derive from a reserve of social capital at the macro-level. Portes further argues that Putnam’s oversimplification is based on a general under-appreciation of the fact that social capital among a population is not only unequally distributed but also varies in quality. Thus, a population may contain both socially beneficial and socially destructive forms of network-based cooperation, either positive or negative social capital.⁸²

In this way, and interesting for this context, Portes in a very precise way hints at crucial differences among anthropologist and sociologist Bourdieu, who analyzes social capital as strategies within hierarchically structured fields (relation perspective), economic sociologist Coleman who, in a more equilibrium oriented perspective, sees social capital as both qualitative relations and a measurable macro level production factor (relation *and* substance perspective), and Putnam, who in a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* way applies an – as a reviewer remarked – “armature” of statistics to measure stocks of social capital (substance perspective). The evident gains Putnam obtains at the macro-level are here partly outweighed by the deductive and somewhat *a posteriori* character of the analysis, in contrast to anthropologists and sociologists like Portes who, inductively and in a process perspective, insist on studying how and why real, specific persons create and destroy social capital *in situ*.⁸³

Positive and negative social capital

Positive social capital derived from social control is typically found in the form of what Portes⁸⁴ calls “rule enforcement,” “bounded solidarity,” and “enforceable trust.” In this connection, Putnam,⁸⁵ who at the general level emphasizes voluntary, civic cooperation, speaks here of “bridging social capital.” As an empirical example, Portes cites the Vietnamese community in New Orleans, where everyone keeps an eye on each other under a “Vietnamese microscope.” If a child is truant from school or joins a street gang or if an unmarried young girl becomes pregnant, great shame is brought upon the entire family.

Therefore, one is always on guard, prepared to intervene before the damage is done.⁸⁶ Such a form of social capital is useful for parents, teachers, and police authorities, in that it helps to maintain effective discipline. Members of these kinds of networks are forced to acquiesce if they are not to risk being marginalized by society.

Beyond creating more obedience and reducing crime in a local community, social capital can also operate as a positive force in the individual families. This phenomenon has been observed by Coleman. Parents and kinsmen who made up a solid support group for the children advanced these children's future possibilities. Another example are the Asiatic immigrant mothers in the United States, who not only remain home with their children but also procure school textbooks in order to help their children with their homework.⁸⁷

Finally, Portes speaks of the general benefits that derive from network-based cooperation. What Bourdieu called the "profit" derived from belonging to a group reveals itself, in that those within the group enjoy certain privileges they have not necessarily earned. Members of the intellectual circle in Cologne endeavour to keep other, peripheral persons out in the cold.⁸⁸ The same phenomenon occurs among immigrant enclaves monopolizing certain business sectors, such as Chinatown in New York, Little Havana in Miami, and Koreatown in Los Angeles.

It is thus a case of networks, no matter whether these are constituted by the "strong ties" of kinship relations or the "weak ties" of friends, connections, and the like.⁸⁹ The importance of the latter has convincingly been demonstrated by Granovetter,⁹⁰ who shows that it is those in a social circle beyond family and close friends who constitute the most important resources in obtaining a job. The point here is that, in a complex society, it is extremely important to know people with other backgrounds and different experiences from one's own, i.e., a group of people who demand less engagement than family and close friends. Where this is not the case, a group can risk becoming isolated, as in certain black urban neighborhoods, where industry and white middle-class families "have left the remaining population bereft of social capital, a situation leading to its extremely high levels of unemployment and welfare dependency."⁹¹

This leads us to what Portes calls "negative social capital," and what Putnam⁹² terms "bonding social capital." The monitoring that takes

place in certain local communities, and that results in a binding and forced solidarity, has a positive function of social control. However, it may also have a negative effect on the individual insofar as it limits freedom of action. In this connection, Boissevain reports on a village community on Malta, where neighbors know everything about everyone, and where the demand for participation in joint activities ultimately leads to a demand for conformity. The curtailed freedom of action that follows from this can help in explaining “why the young and the more independent-minded have always left.”⁹³

The networks can also assume a direct exclusionist and negative character. Beyond monopolization, this may also lead to a group more or less consciously isolating itself from its surroundings. An example is the group of Puerto Rican drug dealers in New York, who do everything to keep each other within the drug milieu, such that it becomes treason to mix with the whites in an attempt at social upward mobility.⁹⁴

Operationalization and economic growth

Concerning operationalization of the social capital concept and actual research, the preliminary results from a survey undertaken by Paldam and Svendsen⁹⁵ suggest that it is indeed possible to measure social capital when using a mix of different trust measures. They have produced a questionnaire for catching the trust aspects of social capital by focusing on three theoretical approaches to measure social capital, namely: (1) membership in voluntary organizations, (2) general trust, and (3) trust in formal institutions. Concerning membership in voluntary organizations, Putnam⁹⁶ first suggested that this indirect measure could be used for social capital because face-to-face interaction within the voluntary organizations would create trust that eventually would spread in society and generate social capital there. Putnam’s main result, when studying the density of organizational membership in Italy, was that on average a person in North Italy was a member of far more organizations than a person in the South. This difference should then explain the striking difference in economic wealth between the North and the South.⁹⁷ The second and third trust measures directly address general trust among citizens and trust in formal organizations. Concerning general trust among citizens, people were asked whether they trust other people in general. Finally, trust in formal institutions was identified as an average of citizens’ trust in four types of formal institutions, namely (1) the legal system, (2) police, (3)

administration, and (4) government. Our preliminary results demonstrate that when combining these three trust measures, the level of social capital differs highly among Western and Eastern European countries. For example, this combined trust measure indicates that the level of trust is about three times higher in Denmark and other Western European countries than the level of trust in former Eastern European countries such as Russia.⁹⁸

Earlier surveys suggest that the traditional production factors listed above account for two-thirds of economic growth in OECD countries from 1960-1990.⁹⁹ In other words, the residual one-third cannot be accounted for. The missing one-third in explaining economic growth could arguably be due to a “missing link” in terms of an institutional factor such as the presence of social capital. Future research should therefore try to relate the level of social capital carried by an individual to economic growth. Our own preliminary findings suggest that social capital is indeed instrumental to economic growth and social development and that social capital really turns out to be a new production factor in practice. However, more research in more countries over time is needed to test this and other preliminary propositions thoroughly. Thus, we are undertaking surveys in about twenty countries this year to enable us to carry out valid cross-country analyses.

Conclusions

Examining why some countries are rich and others poor has been a core issue in research for centuries. In the second section above, we suggested, along the lines of political economy theory and Mancur Olson’s approach, that traditional production factors cannot explain the observed differences in wealth of nations. Rather, differences in the quality of formal institutions were arguably crucial to economic wealth. However, this type of political economy theory accentuating the role of formal institutions could not stand on its own. Also, the non-visible and non-material dimension of institutions had to be added.

Therefore, the third section introduced a socio-economic approach in the study of the relationship between economic growth and institutional set-ups. This was to reintegrate the economic and cultural sphere, formal and informal human exchange, in the analysis. Here, we found it useful to supplement Olson’s formal institutional thesis

with Bourdieu's idea of material and non-material forms of capital. Such a new socio-economics – which might be termed “Bourdieuconomics” – involves the usage of a capital theory that, methodologically, operates with economic and cultural forms of capital *at the same level*. Here, we stressed the particular importance of a non-material form of capital, namely social capital, when explaining differences in economic growth and institutional set-ups. Thus, social capital could be localized as institutionalized but informal human exchanges (“un-written rules of the game”).

In other words, we stress the importance of formal institutions in the form of written contracts *as well as* informal institutions in the form of the social capital belonging to a population or a group. People's rational economic performance within various types of institutional set-ups does not fully explain the gulf between rich and poor countries. In summary, we suggest that another important production factor – informal institutions localized as social capital – should be added to the traditional production factors listed by Olson (land, technological knowledge, physical capital, human capital, and formal institutions). The presence of social capital presumably “lubricates” civic society and the outcome is a voluntary provision of collective goods, such as common norms, predictability in human exchanges and trust. In this way, social capital reduces transaction costs in society, thereby enhancing economic growth and consequently the creation of differences in the wealth of nations. Future research should therefore be directed towards analyses of a new and formerly disregarded production factor, *social capital*, within a new field of socio-economics, namely “Bourdieuconomics.”

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CULTURE AND POLITICS

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**Haunted by the specter of communism:
Collective identity and resource mobilization
in the demise of the Workers Alliance of America**

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The study of social movements was long divided between resource mobilization and political process theories that focused on “how” movements emerge and “new social movement” theories that focused on “why” movements emerge. Resource mobilization and political process theories emphasized the importance of resources and political opportunities for movement emergence, but presumed “an already-existing collective actor able to recognize the opening of political opportunities and to mobilize ... resources for political purposes.” In contrast, new social movement theorists employed the notion of collective identity to account for precisely what strategic models of collective action presupposed but were unable to explain: the formation of collective actors.¹

Although researchers initially viewed these theoretical perspectives as competing paradigms, more recent research on social movements

views them as complementary.² This article builds on this scholarship and seeks to provide a deeper synthesis of the two approaches. Social movement theorists have already introduced the concept of framing to integrate culture and interpretation into resource mobilization and political process theories. However, the concept of framing is frequently used in ways that reproduce the exclusively strategic logic of these approaches rather than complementing it: framing theory focuses on the construction and deployment of frames by already existing collective actors, thereby neglecting the important question of how naming and categorizing serve to constitute collective actors in the first place.³ Moreover, research on framing reflects an “ideational bias,” focusing primarily on “ideas and their formal expression” rather than political ritual and other dramaturgical actions.⁴ Finally, the most important problem with existing efforts at theoretical synthesis has been identified by Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper: “In relying on collective identity to fill the gaps in structuralist, rational-actor, and state-centered models, that is, to explain the processes those models miss, scholars have sometimes neglected the role collective identity plays in the processes those models foreground. They have turned identity into a kind of residual category, describing what happens outside structures, outside the state, outside rational action.”⁵

In this article, I aim to further the task of synthesizing strategic and identity-oriented models of collective action by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of classification struggles. At stake in classification struggles is “the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups.” Because classificatory schemes are “the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization,” practical representations help to “bring into existence the thing named” and “*contribute to producing* what they apparently describe or designate.”⁶ Bourdieu’s work is especially useful for synthesizing strategic and identity-oriented models of collective action because one of his key concerns was to reveal the unity of the material and symbolic dimensions of practice. As one recent commentator puts it, Bourdieu’s “theory of practices extends the idea of interest to culture,” while “his theory of symbolic power extends culture to the realm of interest.”⁷

Following Bourdieu, I seek to extend culture to the realm of interest by highlighting the role collective identity plays in one of the key processes that strategic models of collective action foreground: the mobi-

lization of resources. According to resource mobilization and political process theories, movements can acquire resources in two ways: either by relying on the funding and sponsorship of elite allies or by appropriating an “indigenous” organizational base. In this chapter, I show how struggles over collective identity affect both alliances and the capacity of movements to hang on to indigenous organizational resources. In short, rather than seeing movement emergence as a two-step process of identity formation and resource mobilization, I argue that “how” social movements emerge (resource mobilization) involves and partly depends upon “why” they emerge (identity-formation).⁸

This article extends culture to the realm of interest in another way as well. The “new social movements” that demanded recognition for new identities in the 1970s and 1980s were said to differ from older movements in terms of issues, goals, tactics, and constituencies.⁹ Above all, these new social movements were defined “by contrast to the labor movement, which was the paradigmatic ‘old’ social movement.”¹⁰ In contrast to the new social movements, the collective identity of the labor movement was assumed to be relatively unproblematic. In this article, rather than examining a “new” social movement to provide empirical evidence for my claims about the role of collective identity in resource mobilization, I examine a quintessentially “old” movement, the Workers Alliance of America. I argue that the presumed differences between the identity-oriented “new social movements” and the strategic, class-based “old social movements” are not so stark as the collective identity approach would have it.¹¹ But I do not merely challenge the “newness” of what is taken to be the major distinguishing characteristic of the new social movements (i.e., their emphasis on collective identity formation as an important end in its own right). I also challenge the notion that labor movements are fundamentally different in nature from and even antithetical to the identity-oriented new social movements. In this way, too, I seek to extend culture to the realm of interest.

Conversely (again following Bourdieu’s lead), I also seek to extend the idea of interest to culture. New social movement theorists have argued that if political struggle presupposes collective identity, then collective identity must be formed prior to political struggle and according to a different logic. Alessandro Pizzorno, for example, suggests that “expressive conduct” prevails within “new groups seeking identity and recognition,” while the instrumental “logic of exchange and negotiation is unknown or abolished.” In his view, identity must be constructed

before social conflict can ensue.¹² I aim to challenge this dichotomous view. Rather than seeing collective identity as formed prior to political struggle and according to a different logic, I argue that collective identity is constructed in and through struggles over classificatory schemes. New social movement theorists recognize that these struggles emerge *between* movements and authorities as the former demand recognition for new identities from the latter.¹³ However, this dynamic between movements and authorities is often complicated by the emergence of struggles *within* movements over collective identity. Despite a few notable exceptions,¹⁴ new social movements theorists tend to neglect these internal struggles, because they often see identity-formation as taking place according to a different, non-strategic logic. In summary, I not only extend culture to the realm of interest by highlighting the role collective identity plays in resource mobilization and in the “old” labor movement, but I also extend the idea of interest to culture by emphasizing how classificatory schemes are both weapons and stakes in political struggles. In this way, I seek to contribute to a deeper synthesis of strategic and identity-oriented models of collective action.

I provide empirical evidence for these theoretical claims with a study of the demise of the Workers Alliance of America, a powerful, nationwide movement of the unemployed formed in the United States in 1935 and dissolved in 1941.¹⁵ I begin by examining and criticizing existing explanations for the demise of the Workers Alliance, which attribute it to economic recovery and a consequent decline in mass unemployment, co-optation by the reformist Roosevelt administration, state repression to protect capitalist class interests, or repression by “dispossessed” social groups seeking to vent their resentment of modernization. I argue that contrary to these prevailing views, the demobilization of the Workers Alliance cannot be fully explained as the result of a strategic struggle among already constituted collective actors pursuing predefined interests, nor as the consequence of displaced anger and frustration by groups whose status and power were threatened by modernization. Next, combining Bourdieu’s insights with those of Erving Goffman and Howard Becker, I provide an alternative explanation for the demise of the Workers Alliance. In my account, classification struggles are a key causal mechanism that shaped the movement’s collective identity in ways that hindered its capacity to mobilize resources, thereby contributing crucially to the movement’s demobilization.¹⁶ I focus on two important classification struggles.

First, opponents of the Workers Alliance invoked new categorical identities that cut across the old categories that initially provided a basis for the political mobilization of the unemployed. What were those older categories? The Workers Alliance defined and mobilized WPA workers as government employees rather than paupers. Much as the workers studied by Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski tried to upgrade their job titles to obtain “the corresponding material and symbolic profits,” the Workers Alliance demanded recognition of WPA workers as employees for similar reasons.¹⁷ In addition, the Workers Alliance relied on the Popular Front discourse of the 1930s to forge a collective identity that bridged differences between Communists and non-Communists, bringing both together in a broad-based movement. Group unity was thus provided in part by the external threat of fascism. Opponents of the Workers Alliance sought to disorganize the Workers Alliance by activating and institutionalizing a crosscutting principle of division between Americanism and communism. This symbolic re-ordering of the social world, which was facilitated by the 1939 non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, hindered the movement’s mobilization of resources by legitimating government repression, weakening commitment to the movement, and discouraging participation in the Workers Alliance. As Polletta and Jasper note, “if identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation, they also help explain people’s exodus from a movement. One of the chief causes of a movement’s decline is that collective identity stops lining up with the movement. We stop believing that the movement ‘represents’ us (the term suggests an expressive dimension as well as a strategic one).”¹⁸

Second, a related classification struggle also contributed crucially to the demise of the Workers Alliance. The capacity of the Workers Alliance to mobilize resources was hindered not only by a classification struggle between the movement and its opponents, but also by a classification struggle within the movement. As movement opponents struggled to impose a new vision and division of the social world, the Alliance resorted to what Goffman calls “in-group purification” to avoid de-legitimation and repression. In-group purification allows one part of a group to “take up in regard to those who are more evidently stigmatized” than themselves “the attitudes the normals take” toward the group as a whole. Stigmatized persons thus try “not only to ‘normify’ their own conduct but also to clean up the conduct of others in the group.” Although in-group purification may facilitate resource mobilization if it allows a movement to acquire new allies or hang on

to old ones, in-group purification was self-destructive in this case.¹⁹ Internal struggles to purify the Workers Alliance of “un-American” elements led to splits, purges, and defections, but the movement was unable to compensate for resources that were thereby dispersed or diverted to internal conflicts. In short, the classification struggle within the Workers Alliance compounded the demobilizing effects of the classification struggle between the movement and its opponents.

Existing explanations for the demise of the Workers Alliance

During the Great Depression, the unemployed were initially organized in the United States by the Socialist Party, A. J. Muste’s Conference on Progressive Labor Action, and the American Communist Party. By 1935, the Socialist-led groups and the Musteite Unemployed Leagues merged to form a single, nationwide social movement organization, the Workers Alliance of America. A year later, the Communist-led Unemployed Councils were also included, although non-Communist leaders retained a majority on the Alliance’s national executive board. “What had been three major organizations and a number of minor ones became a single entity able to bring increased pressure on behalf of the jobless.”²⁰ While the Workers Alliance was broadly inclusive and committed to upgrading and expanding all forms of relief, by 1939 roughly three-quarters of its members were employees of the Works Progress Administration, the massive public-works effort initiated by the Roosevelt administration in 1935.²¹

The Workers Alliance has been described as “perhaps the most formidable organization of the able-bodied unemployed in American history.” When the Workers Alliance sent 2,000 delegates on a job march to Washington in July 1937, “the action prompted one congressman, Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia, to warn that the WAA would soon be a powerful political organization unless the federal government shifted relief back to the states and the municipalities. If this did not happen, said Woodrum, no congressman would be able to win reelection without acceding to WAA demands.” A year later, an alarmed *New York Times* editorial warned that the Workers Alliance was becoming “an enormous pressure group compared with which the American Legion and the farm lobbies may pale into insignificance.”²² Yet by the time the United States entered the Second World War in 1941, the movement had collapsed. Why?

Table 1. Workers Alliance protest event data by year, 1935–1941²³

Year	Number of protest events initiated wholly or partly by the WAA	Total combined arrests and injuries from protests reported during the year
1935	1	0
1936	18	54
1937	32	53
1938	32	29
1939	21	3
1940	10	29
1941	1	0

Table 2. Unemployment by year, 1929–1941²⁴

Year	Unemployed (in thousands of persons 14 years old and over)	Percent of civilian labor force
1929	1,550	3.2
1930	4,340	8.7
1931	8,020	15.9
1932	12,060	23.6
1933	12,830	24.9
1934	11,340	21.7
1935	10,610	20.1
1936	9,030	16.9
1937	7,700	14.3
1938	10,390	19.0
1939	9,480	17.2
1940	8,120	14.6
1941	5,560	9.9

The economic recovery thesis

The collapse of the Workers Alliance is often attributed to a decline in mass unemployment as the United States became embroiled in the Second World War.²⁵ However, to specify economic recovery as the only or even the primary cause of the movement's demise is unconvincing for two reasons. First, the Workers Alliance was already in decline by 1939, as shown in Table 1. At this time, there were still well over nine million Americans out of work, more than seventeen percent of the civilian labor force (see Table 2). "WPA is in the United States to stay for at least twenty years," WPA Commissioner F. C. Harrington publicly declared in February 1940. "Only a far-reaching change in the

economic system will change this [unemployment] problem. Until we readjust our economic system and distribute more equitably our work opportunities, we'll still have the problem of unemployment." Even as late as 1941, when the movement dissolved, unemployment stood at five and a half million, nearly ten percent of the civilian labor force. While these figures are below the peak of mass unemployment in 1933 (almost thirteen million), they indicate that it remained a serious problem.²⁶

There is a second reason why a decline in mass unemployment cannot fully explain the demise of the Workers Alliance. Even if mass unemployment had ceased to be a serious problem, as proponents of the economic recovery thesis suggest, both the Workers Alliance and the WPA could have been re-oriented to solve new problems. To be sure, following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, some Americans did attack the WPA on the grounds that rearmament in the United States and sales of arms and other supplies to Europe would solve the unemployment problem and eliminate or reduce the need for a works program. Conservatives like Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina also advocated cuts in WPA and relief funding in order to meet increased needs for national defense. And Roosevelt himself, increasingly preoccupied by the war in Europe, was forced to abandon much of his domestic reform agenda in order to win Congressional support for his collective security policies. However, some congressmen "clearly envisaged an *increase* in projects undertaken by the WPA to *further* the national defense," and some leaders of the unemployed movement sought cooperation with national defense agencies to promote the training of the unemployed. In line with these efforts to reorient the WPA and the unemployed movement toward defense needs, attempts were made in 1940 to eliminate earlier prohibitions on the use of WPA funds for "the manufacture, purchase, or construction of any naval vessel, any armament, munitions, or implement of war, for military or naval forces." By October 1941, "one out of every three WPA workers ... was engaged in defense work." In summary, even when the original purpose of an organization becomes obsolete, it can always adapt to its changing environment by adopting new aims, looking for new causes to espouse, and discovering new problems to which it can devote its energies and resources.²⁷

The co-optation thesis

If the economic recovery thesis fails to explain fully the collapse of the Workers Alliance, what else might explain it? A number of scholars have argued that the demise of the Workers Alliance can be attributed to co-optation of the movement by the Roosevelt administration. According to Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, for example, the formation of the Workers Alliance marked a shift from loosely structured, disruptive, and confrontational protests at the local level to organization-building and ineffective lobbying at the national level. They argue that protest by the unemployed declined at the local level “largely as a result of the Roosevelt Administration’s more liberal relief machinery, which diverted local groups from disruptive tactics and absorbed local leaders in bureaucratic roles.”²⁸ There is certainly some truth to the co-optation thesis, but it fails to explain both *why* the Workers Alliance was co-opted and the *timing* of co-optation. I argue that co-optation was symptomatic or derivative of a deeper underlying cause: the rise of an increasingly powerful coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress in the late 1930s.²⁹ Following the electoral victories of the New Deal in 1932 and 1936, the Workers Alliance could afford to take an oppositional stance toward the Roosevelt administration. That the movement did take such a stance is evidenced by the increasing disruptiveness of the movement’s protests between 1935 and 1937 (as revealed by the number of arrests and injuries shown in Table 1), its harsh attacks on the New Deal, and its support for the formation of a third political party.³⁰ However, following the “Roosevelt Recession,” the House Un-American Activities Committee investigations, and the 1938 congressional election, New Dealers were on the defensive. Under these conditions, the Workers Alliance became increasingly alarmed that even the limited gains of the New Deal were being jeopardized by reactionary forces. While the demands of the movement continued to exceed what Roosevelt’s New Deal offered, movement leaders were determined to defend what little they already had. Thus, by 1938, the Workers Alliance saw itself as part of a progressive coalition in support of the New Deal, striving to protect important political gains against the attacks of reactionary forces. In short, prior to the emergence of a powerful conservative bloc in Congress, the Workers Alliance was engaged in a dyadic conflict with the Roosevelt administration. It was the emergence of a third party (the conservative bloc) that altered the way the movement interacted with the administration.³¹

The class repression thesis

A third account of the demise of the Workers Alliance stresses the importance of political factors generally and the role of the conservative congressional bloc that emerged in the late 1930s in particular, but minimizes the causal significance of class struggle and collective identity. According to this class repression thesis (probably held by some members of the Workers Alliance itself), the struggle between the Workers Alliance and its conservative opponents was primarily driven by clashes of real material interests. Thus, congressional conservatives repressed the Workers Alliance in order to protect capitalist class interests (potentially threatened by radical anti-capitalist politics) or the internal distribution of political power (potentially threatened by a Communist-led movement committed to the revolutionary transformation of the U.S. state).³² Moreover, according to this view, in-group purification within the Workers Alliance was not a struggle over the movement's collective identity, but only an opportunistic attempt to avoid real material sanctions and punishments. Although this model acknowledges that the struggle between the Workers Alliance and its political opponents involved framing work, it insists that this framing work was merely in the strategic service of material stakes and interests. Symbolic attacks on the Workers Alliance are thus seen as a means to purportedly non-cultural ends (profits, power, etc.).

Like the co-optation thesis, this account contains some truth, but it is not fully convincing. What I dispute is not the important role of repression in the demise of the Workers Alliance, but an account of how repression works that neglects the important role of collective identity. Of course, material interests do partly determine "the play of ideas within which different groups figure out the world and their role and *allegiances* in it." However, as Stuart Hall has pointed out, "social collectivities have more than one set of interests." Actors may have gender and race interests in addition to class interests; they may also have symbolic interests in addition to material interests. Because "interests can be and frequently are contradictory, even mutually exclusive," they may be articulated according to "alternative inferential logics," leading to quite different lines of political action. This is especially true during periods of social upheaval and transformation like the New Deal, when the old political order dissolved and actors struggled to construct a new one. As Sheryl Tynes points out, "in the turbulent environment of the 1930s, it was not easy for a wide variety of organizations to gain an understanding of, or agree upon, what their

true interests were, and whether, in the Depression, those interests had changed.” Under these circumstances, as theories of corporate liberalism have demonstrated, class interests could lead capitalists to support as well as oppose social reforms and to co-opt rather than repress radicals. In either case, symbolic work was necessary to “provide a concrete definition of interests to guide strategic choices.” Thus, rather than being “given as an objective feature of a structure of positions in a social system,” the interests and identities of actors are “constructed, *constituted*, in and through the ideological process.”³³

Moreover, although symbolic work may be more effective when it is backed by political and police violence, the converse is also true; political and police power rests at least partly on symbolic work. Emile Durkheim’s discussion of the forced division of labor, Max Weber’s notion of legitimacy, and Antonio Gramsci’s concept of consent all make clear that political and police violence typically requires some form of justification. Even Karl Marx recognized that in order to rule, a social class must “represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society.” Bourdieu – perhaps even more than Weber, Durkheim, Marx, and Gramsci – has also shown the importance of symbolic work in developing and maintaining power relations. Symbolic work is especially important during periods like the New Deal when an older historical bloc has disintegrated and actors – in this case, New Dealers and their opponents on the left and right – are struggling to construct a new one. At such times, conservatives and other political actors must “enter into struggle and win space *in civil society itself*” using “the trenches and fortifications of civil society as the means of forging a considerable ideological and intellectual *authority* outside the realm of the state proper and, indeed, *before* – as a necessary condition to – taking formal power *in the state*.” Just as symbolic work is necessary to constitute the identities and interests of groups, it is also needed for brokerage purposes, to construct alliances between different groups and social forces, and to transform coercion into the “authority of a leading bloc.” Thus, while material sanctions and punishments may have been necessary to induce splits between Communists and non-Communists within the Workers Alliance, it is unlikely that they would have been sufficient. Indeed, if it was only or primarily material sanctions that led to in-group purification, why did in-group purification begin (as I show below) in 1938, *before* Congress enacted the legal provisions that penalized Communists?³⁴

The psychological expressivism thesis

The psychological expressivism thesis also emphasizes the repression of the Workers Alliance at the hands of a conservative congressional bloc, but sees this anti-Communist drive as the effort of “dispossessed” social groups to vent their resentment of modernization. According to this thesis, some groups rapidly lost or gained status and power or came to occupy discrepant statuses as a result of the modernization of the United States in the twentieth century. These dispossessed groups then focused their resentment on Communists, who served as a scapegoat for modernization and “the strains associated with their uncertain or changing social status.” From this perspective, anti-Communism was “not a vehicle of conflict but a vehicle of catharsis – a purging of emotions through expression.” Where proponents of the class repression thesis view anti-Communism as a rational strategy to protect material class interests, proponents of the psychological expressivism thesis see it as an irrational displacement of aggression and frustration “against targets with little power to resist.” According to this model, “what the right wing [was] fighting, in the shadow of Communism, [was] essentially ‘modernity.’”³⁵

This thesis suffers from several related defects. First, because the modernization of American society arguably began well before the New Deal and continued afterwards, the psychological expressivism thesis cannot account for the precise timing of the anti-Communist drive against the Workers Alliance. In addition, as Joseph Gusfield has pointed out, this model of anti-Communist crusades tends to confuse “status and expressive elements.” Status movements are characterized as irrational “political action for the sake of expression” rather than rational political action to influence or control “the distribution of valued objects.” However, “the enhancement or defense of a position in the status order is as much an interest as the protection or expansion of income or economic power.” Thus, far from being oriented only to psychological release, status movements may be understood as rational political action to influence the allocation and distribution of honor or prestige. Moreover, these symbolic or status interests are also bound up with important material interests, for “[material] resources bring prestige and prestige often leads to material advantages.” In short, the psychological expressivism thesis misses the important symbolic and material interests at stake in status conflicts and elides the strategic dimension of such struggles. Yet it is only by taking into account the (ideologically constructed) interests of conservatives and the process of

political interpretation through which the Workers Alliance was identified as a potential threat to those interests that one can account for the timing of the anti-Communist drive of the late 1930s.³⁶

Mobilizing the specter of communism

Having specified the limitations of existing explanations for the demise of the Workers Alliance, I now provide an alternative explanation for the movement's demobilization that better integrates strategic and identity-oriented models of collective action. In this section of the article and the next, I show how a classification struggle between the Workers Alliance and its opponents shaped the movement's collective identity in ways that crippled its capacity to mobilize resources. The Workers Alliance initially encouraged the political mobilization of the unemployed by forging a collective identity that avoided the stigma of pauperism. As Piven and Cloward have shown, political authorities have traditionally deterred the poor from demanding relief by setting relief recipients apart as a "clearly demarcated and degraded . . . class of pariahs." The Workers Alliance resisted such ritual profanation by demanding that political authorities recognize WPA workers as government employees rather than paupers. Indeed, as noted above, the Workers Alliance had largely become "a trade union for WPA workers" by the late 1930s.³⁷

Congressional conservatives resisted these demands for recognition of WPA workers as employees with only mixed success, but in the late 1930s they hit upon a more effective strategy for opposing the movement. Just as twentieth-century middle-class professionals draw on a variety of criteria – economic, moral, and cultural – to draw boundaries between themselves and others,³⁸ so also people can draw boundaries between the deserving and the undeserving poor on the basis of different criteria. In this case, Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress (with help from their allies outside of Congress) disorganized the Workers Alliance by activating and institutionalizing a boundary between Americanism and communism that cut across and over-rode the category of "employee" that initially provided a basis for political mobilization of the unemployed.³⁹ This symbolic re-ordering of the social world better enabled conservatives to de-legitimize the Workers Alliance, not with the taint of pauperism, but with the taint of "un-Americanism." In other words, rather than positioning Workers Alliance members as paupers in opposition to the citizen-earner, congressional

conservatives now positioned them as an internal enemy in opposition to the citizen-soldier.⁴⁰ This alternative mode of ritual profanation would increasingly resonate with the American public as the international situation grew more ominous in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

The boundary between Americanism and communism also cut across and over-rode another categorical identity that the Workers Alliance used to mobilize the unemployed: the Popular Front against fascism that was embraced by the American Communist Party from 1935 to 1939. To be sure, for the Communist Party's leadership and inner circle, the Popular Front was a tactical move rather than a principled rejection of the party's earlier opposition to liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the Popular Front against fascism did reflect a new vision of the social world and its divisions wherein former enemies now became – at least temporarily and for a limited set of aims – allies. This symbolic work was partly successful in disarticulating old political formations and, by brokering new alliances, reworking their elements into new formations. As Irving Howe and Lewis Coser point out, “the Popular Front strategy, particularly through its appeal to the emotions of anti-fascist fraternity, was extremely successful in this country. It was the first approach the CP had found that enabled it to gain a measure of acceptance, respectability, and power within ordinary American life.” Although the American Communist Party never gained a mass membership, more Americans came to see the party as a legitimate political partner during the Popular Front phase than in any other period in American history.⁴¹

The Popular Front, however, provided a fragile collective identity. By activating and institutionalizing a boundary between Americanism and communism, conservatives undermined and re-ordered this Popular Front vision of the social world that (in contrast) had aligned communism and Americanism against fascism. Conservative efforts to shatter the collective identity provided by the Popular Front, although achieving some success before 1939, were greatly facilitated and reinforced by the non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939. The pact – and the American Communist Party's resulting about-face when it came to support for the New Deal and vigilance against the threat of fascism – disillusioned and alienated many former allies, sympathizers, and “fellow travelers.” The pact also facilitated conservative efforts to equate communism and fascism as two sides of the same coin, equally threatening to Americanism. “The Nazi-Soviet Pact,” wrote Workers Alli-

ance organizer Eli Jaffe, “gave new impetus to the anti-communist feeling latent in many Americans, notably the policy-makers in Washington.... It became increasingly clear to me that [the] Nazi-Soviet Pact was providing a green light to anti-communist witch hunters.”⁴²

Two important congressional committees spearheaded these efforts to disorganize the Workers Alliance by invoking crosscutting categorical identities. The first was the 1938 House Special Committee on Un-American Activities, popularly known as the Dies Committee after its chairman, Texas Democrat Martin Dies.⁴³ The second was the 1939 House Subcommittee on the Works Progress Administration, composed of members of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, and popularly known as the Woodrum Committee after its leader, conservative Virginia Democrat Clifton Woodrum.⁴⁴ Through highly ritualized congressional investigations, both committees sought to activate new principles of social division that would weaken commitment to and discourage participation in the Workers Alliance. In addition to activating the boundary between Americanism and communism, this symbolic re-ordering of the social world involved three other elements: (1) identifying the Workers Alliance with communism; (2) identifying the Workers Alliance with foreign enemies (the Soviet Union), in part by emphasizing the presence of aliens and the foreign-born among movement participants; and (3) exposing ties between the Workers Alliance and the WPA to discredit the latter as well.⁴⁵

The charges of Communist subversion made against the Workers Alliance in committee hearings involved “a combination of fact and fiction.” As contemporary critics pointed out, accusations were often supported with flimsy or circumstantial evidence that would not have held up in a court of law, and congressional committee members and witnesses were rarely impartial. Yet conservative charges of Communist subversion were not completely unfounded. Communists were active in the Workers Alliance; they worked to increase their influence within the movement, tried to use the Alliance and the WPA to further their political aims, and the Communist Party did indeed oppose the American system of government. Thus, congressional conservatives did not simply conjure up or manufacture a Communist menace out of whole cloth. Neither did they create the anti-Communist sentiment that they encouraged and skillfully exploited. Representations of communism as politically impure or taboo were certainly not new, which meant that conservatives had plenty of historical precedents upon which to draw for this kind of framing work. There were also historical

precedents for viewing foreign-born workers as social carriers of “un-American” radicalism, notably the Red Scare of 1919 to 1920. Moreover, representations of aliens and foreigners as a potential fifth column tapped into an enduring republican tradition in American political culture that linked social provision to civic virtue, and into ascriptive forms of Americanism that linked fitness for self-government to racial qualifications.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, moral entrepreneurship was required to mobilize existing anti-Communist sentiment. As Howard Becker points out, “rules do not flow automatically from values,” and “the existence of a rule does not automatically guarantee that it will be enforced.” The degree to which others respond to a deviant act – including acts of political deviance – depends largely on the activities of the moral entrepreneurs who create rules, publicly bring infractions to the attention of others, and enforce rules. In these ways, moral entrepreneurs can mobilize new or alternative criteria of legitimacy, as conservatives did when they shifted public debate about the Workers Alliance and the WPA from pauperism to communism. Of course, like all moral entrepreneurs, congressional conservatives were not merely disinterested guardians of society’s values; they were motivated by particular interests that prompted them to take the initiative as well as by a fervent belief in the righteousness of their cause. And since congressional conservatives could not accomplish their aims without help, they did what moral entrepreneurs usually do: They “enlist[ed] the support of other interested organizations and develop[ed], through the use of the press and other communications media, a favorable public attitude” toward the rules they wanted to create and enforce.⁴⁷

This active moral entrepreneurship is especially evident in regard to the Dies Committee. Although it received little attention at first, publicity began to grow in July 1938, especially after the committee announced that the WPA Federal Theater and Writers’ Project would be investigated. By the time formal hearings opened in Washington in August 1938, committee chairman Martin Dies had “become front-page news,” and “from that time on his name was destined to become a familiar one to millions of newspaper readers throughout the United States.” By December 1938, public opinion polls “showed that three out of five voters were familiar with the work of the [Dies] Committee and that three out of four of those who knew of it believed that it should be continued.... Of all the voters polled, 74 per cent were in favor of continuing the investigation.” By March 1939, two out of every

three voters reported having heard of the Dies Committee, and a subsequent poll conducted in December 1939 revealed that public support for the committee remained strong and essentially unchanged. Following the release of the Dies Committee's second report in January 1940, a poll revealed that "70 per cent of the people interviewed thought it more important to investigate Communism than Nazism, a definite change from the attitude expressed in the Poll a year before."⁴⁸

As Patricia Sexton points out, "Dies's assault on the labor-left" not only "overshadowed in scope and influence even the McCarthy hearings in the post-World War II years," but also helped to change "the country's political balance." In October 1938, Dies boasted that his committee had "destroyed the legislative influence of the Workers' Alliance" in Congress. The Dies Committee probably influenced the outcome of the 1938 congressional election as well, which proved to be disastrous for the Workers Alliance: "With the increase of Republican strength in Congress after the November elections, conservative Democrats held the balance of power between liberals and conservative Republicans, and they used it to prevent completion of the structure of the Second New Deal." The changing balance of power in Congress ensured that the committee's work would continue. After receiving the Dies Committee's first report, Congress voted overwhelmingly in February 1939 to continue the committee and appropriated \$100,000 for that purpose. Congress again voted overwhelmingly to continue the Dies Committee after the release of its second report in January 1940. Even Roosevelt was prompted to praise the committee in May 1940 as "one of his sources of information on fifth columnists."⁴⁹

Institutionalizing the specter of communism

Congressional conservatives sought not only to activate the boundary between Americanism and communism as a new criterion of political legitimacy, but also to inscribe this criterion in institutions. In other words, they sought to transform a symbolic boundary into a social boundary.⁵⁰ This institutionalization reflected conservatives' vision and division of the social world, but it also reinforced that vision and division; by altering the patterns of social relations in which Workers Alliance members were embedded, conservatives facilitated changes in the movement's collective identity.⁵¹ Institutionalization provided what Boltanski calls "'objective' evidence of the existence" of those social divisions and social groupings that conservatives sought to

create: “The objectification of a group in a legally defined collective person, and then the collective person in an institutional ‘apparatus,’ helps to make the group a social being that is more solid and durable than the aggregate of the agents who give it their allegiance and maintain it” – and, one might add, more solid and durable than alternative groupings. Thus, institutionalization not only influenced the strategies through which actors pursued their interests; it shaped the identities and goals of actors as well.⁵²

Congress began to institutionalize the boundary between Americanism and communism in 1939, when it passed legislation that explicitly excluded Communists from participation in the federal works program.⁵³ These anti-Communist provisions were intended to weaken the Workers Alliance. One member of the Woodrum Committee, quoted in *The New York Times* on condition of anonymity, declared in April 1939:

Unless there is assurance given us that the Workers Alliance will no longer be welcomed at the WPA as the representative of the workers, then I shall propose an amendment to the law forbidding payment of relief funds to those who are members of the alliance. I take the position that since the testimony of the alliance officials shows clearly that it leans toward communism, which has as its aim the overthrow of our form of government, then the funds of this government should not continue to go into the hands of those who are themselves Communists, or who by their membership in this organization give force to its aims. Of course, the proposal to deny relief money to members of this organization is a drastic one. I do not feel that the workers ought not to organize. But I am convinced that, if in organizing they place themselves under the banner of an organization whose executive committee is honeycombed with Communists, they cannot in good conscience protest against the action of members of Congress in upholding their oaths to support the Constitution and to wage a relentless fight against enemies, both within and without this country. Many of us have known for a long time that the alliance was furthering – whether consciously or otherwise – the aims of the Communist party by preying upon those in want, organizing them and gradually spreading the Communist cloak over a large segment of those who must ask the government for subsistence. I, for one, do not propose to let money appropriated for relief go into the coffers of an organization such as the alliance.⁵⁴

In June 1939, *The New York Times* reported that “committee members said privately they had labored hours to find words that would bar employment to Workers’ Alliance members, but were unable to do so unless they wrote in provisions that would be harmful to persons who had no connection with the organization.” Instead, conservatives sought to exclude Workers Alliance members by proxy. The anti-

Communist provisions, *The New York Times* reported, were “a result of testimony in the current investigation of WPA” and were “aimed directly at the Workers Alliance and its alleged parent, the Communist party.” These measures were further supplemented by broader and more far-reaching legislation to repress the political influence of the Communist Party, including the 1939 Hatch Act and the 1940 Smith Act.⁵⁵

As noted above, fears of Communist subversion were related to suspicion of foreigners and aliens, who were often viewed as social carriers of communism. Congress began to restrict the eligibility of aliens for federal unemployment relief even before the investigations of the Dies and Woodrum Committees. The investigations created pressure for further restrictions while legitimating existing restrictions as anti-Communist measures. The 1936, 1937, 1938, and 1939 Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts were significant not only for their restrictions on aid to aliens, but also for the preference they increasingly gave to veterans. While the unemployed had struggled since the inception of the WPA to define themselves as worthy citizen-earners – “to work and be treated as workers,” in the words of Workers Alliance president David Lasser – it was the icon of the citizen-soldier that Congress increasingly held up as deserving. This icon could only be defined in opposition to a foreign and subversive threat against which the nation had to be defended. Hence, the preference given to veterans also implied the exclusion of aliens (foreigners) and Communists (perceived as dangerous proponents of an alien philosophy and tools of a hostile foreign power).⁵⁶

While some formulations of collective identity may limit the actions that authorities can take and discourage a regime from attacking movements, authorities can also redefine the collective identity of movements in ways that facilitate repression.⁵⁷ In this case, anti-Communist measures clearly provided the basis for political repression of the Workers Alliance. In November 1939, the official Workers Alliance newspaper *Work* complained that anti-Communist legislative provisions were being used to intimidate members of the movement: “Despite the fact that Workers Alliance members had voluntarily taken an oath of allegiance to the Government, some anti-labor [WPA] foremen and supervisors told Alliance members that they could not sign these September 30th slips [testifying to their allegiance] because they belonged to the Alliance.” While Alliance members were reportedly “not fooled by this low trick” and signed anyway, “non-

members signified their fear of joining the Workers Alliance because they were 'afraid of losing their [WPA] jobs.'” In a letter to Roosevelt dated January 10, 1940, Workers Alliance president David Lasser wrote: “Discrimination, intimidation, terrorization of [WPA] workers for exercising their legal rights to organize is widespread and growing.... As you may know, the present Relief Act prohibits employment of anyone who advocates or belongs to an organization which advocates overthrow of the government by force or violence. Now, we have absolutely nothing to do with any people who fall under this classification.... But this section of the law is being used in a widespread campaign against the Workers Alliance. WPA workers on the projects are told that this section refers to the Workers Alliance and that *they cannot belong to the Workers Alliance and work on the WPA program.*” In June 1940, national WPA Commissioner Frances Harrington announced plans to purge the WPA rolls of Communists by July 1. In New York City, local WPA administrator Brehon Somervell declared that the purge would be conducted with the assistance of the Board of Elections, the FBI, the police, the WPA's own Bureau of Investigation, and the reports and testimony gathered by the Dies Committee.⁵⁸

By de-legitimizing the Workers Alliance and calling into question the worthiness of movement participants, these legislative measures also paved the way for retrenchment of the federal works program for the unemployed. In the late 1930s, Congressional conservatives succeeded in restricting eligibility and curtailing funding for the WPA. A key strategy was to limit WPA employment and make it more precarious. The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1939 instituted a new eighteen-month rule that required those on WPA rolls who had been employed for eighteen months or more to relinquish their WPA standing and to remain off the rolls for sixty days, after which time they could be reconsidered for WPA employment if re-certified as eligible. The eighteen-month rule was devastating for WPA workers: “When the new policy went into effect, its harshness immediately became apparent. Dismissals numbered about 171,000 in July, 1939. In August [1939], that catapulted to more than half a million – 611,733, or nearly a third of the number employed during the month.” The American Association of Social Workers reported early in 1940 that the general effect of the eighteen-month rule was “to augment insecurity.... [P]rivate jobs did not become more numerous.” According to a WPA survey, eighty-seven percent of the WPA workers laid off under the eighteen-month clause in July and August 1939 had yet to find jobs in private industry in November 1939. Moreover, only half of those who

had found private employment were earning as much or more than their former WPA wages. Florence Kerr, the assistant WPA commissioner in charge of white-collar and women's projects, declared that the eighteen-month clause led to "hunger, eviction, sickness and despair" among the unemployed. Despite such hardship, "efforts of the [Roosevelt] administration and others to mitigate the rigor of the eighteen-month clause did not deter Congress in 1940 from re-enacting essentially the same provision."⁵⁹

While conservatives justified the eighteen-month rule as a way of spreading around WPA employment to as many as possible, the provision was also an indirect attack on the Workers Alliance. According to Herbert Benjamin, a Communist Party member and the Alliance's secretary-treasurer, "Mr. Woodrum and his colleagues . . . stated on the floor [of the House of Representatives] and they evidently actually believe that by partially wrecking the WPA, for example by requiring that all workers shall be compelled to take at least a 60-day furlough if they have worked 18 months or more on the program, they will effectively undermine the Workers Alliance." This view is confirmed by Edwin Amenta, who notes: "[T]he institution of an eighteen-month time limit on WPA employment was devised partly to hinder the organizing tasks of the Workers' Alliance, which had enough on its hands with the inherent difficulties of mobilizing unemployed workers." Re-certification requirements were a powerful disincentive to participation in protests or other forms of political action. In addition, the turnover generated by the eighteen-month rule undermined the group solidarity necessary for collective action. The tightening of eligibility requirements created divisions among relief recipients between the "ins" who continued to have an immediate stake in the WPA and the "outs" who no longer did.⁶⁰

The eighteen-month rule was also intended to deprive the Workers Alliance of a key recruitment incentive. Charges that the Workers Alliance influenced access to relief and WPA employment prompted Congressman Clifton Woodrum to praise the eighteen-month rule for "breaking up WPA racketeering." Other Congressmen reportedly shared Woodrum's concerns. According to *The New York Times*, the "members [of Congress] most interested in this phase of the measure said the provision was written in an attempt to destroy the alleged influence of the [Workers] alliance, which, it is asserted, has held out as an inducement to membership the claim that it can guarantee WPA employment to its members." "The testimony before the [Woodrum]

committee was abundant,” *The New York Times* reported in 1939, “that the Alliance holds out to prospective members its alleged influence in obtaining WPA jobs for them, and in maintaining such jobs. There is also much testimony to support the criticism that the Alliance – particularly in New York and other urban centers – has been able to do just what it said it could do to obtain and maintain jobs on the WPA for those who joined.” Accordingly, “the motive of the committee [in introducing the eighteen-month rule] was to deprive the Alliance of any right to its claim that it could guarantee employment, and maintain employment for its members.”⁶¹

The eighteen-month rule was also intended to de-fund the Workers Alliance. In 1939, Herbert Benjamin testified to the Woodrum Committee that roughly half of the movement’s monthly income came from membership dues, initiation fees, and charter fees. “Initiations and dues are the life blood of our organization,” Benjamin’s successor, Frank Ingram, wrote a year later. In June 1939, *The New York Times* reported: “Critics of the organization have taken few pains to conceal the fact that they hope to destroy the Workers’ Alliance by means of provisions in the currently considered [1940] relief bill which will force the members to quit paying dues, and thereby administer a financial blow that the organization cannot hope to weather.... [T]he [House Appropriations] committee set out on a course designed to wreck the Alliance, by denying its members the government-furnished cash to continue to pay dues.” This aim was confirmed by the Workers Alliance, which denounced the eighteen-month rule as “an effort on the part of House reactionaries to cramp the style of the Workers Alliance ... through a provision for mandatory ‘furloughs’ for WTA workers who have been on the rolls for a certain specified length of time. The reason put forth by Tories for this plan is allegedly to prevent the unemployed from ‘making a career out of relief.’ Actually ... it is hoped by these Congressional Tories that members of the Workers Alliance will be [the] ones laid off.”⁶²

Evidence suggests that the eighteen-month rule did indeed effectively de-fund the Workers Alliance. In July 1939, the Workers Alliance announced a new organizing drive to add 100,000 new members, increase dues payments by fifty percent, and add 25,000 new subscribers to its official newspaper, *Work*. In a statement issued to rank-and-file members, Alliance leaders Lasser and Benjamin described it as “one of the most important drives in the history of our movement.” A month later, the Workers Alliance proudly reported that the organiz-

ing drive had “yielded an 18 percent increase in new members” despite the “bitter Woodrum ‘WPA Investigation’” and the “continued attack from all sections of reaction.” However, the Alliance conceded that “general dues payments throughout the organization have not kept pace with recruiting” and that “many of our organizations have not even made the most modest beginnings in launching the drive.” Moreover, Benjamin noted, some of the states that had “a relatively high standing in their membership drive” had fallen behind in the drive to improve dues payments. Robin D. G. Kelley concludes that the eighteen-month rule “practically put an end to the Workers Alliance” in Alabama. The Alabama Workers Alliance “lost its organizational base within a few weeks” after the rule was implemented, and membership quickly dwindled from a peak of four thousand in 1938 to less than one thousand members.⁶³

In-group purification

I now turn from the classification struggle between the Workers Alliance and its conservative opponents to the classification struggle that emerged within the Workers Alliance. The effort of movement opponents to redefine the collective identity of the Workers Alliance in de-legitimizing ways precipitated internal conflicts over the movement’s collective identity. At stake in these internal struggles was not only how the movement would define itself, but also who within the movement would have the power to do so.⁶⁴ Initially, the movement resisted conservative efforts to oppose communism to Americanism, insisting instead upon the Popular Front vision of the social world that aligned them both against fascism. Unable to prevent congressional conservatives from mobilizing Americanism as a new criterion of legitimacy and political deviance and finding itself positioned on the wrong side of the American/un-American boundary, the Workers Alliance struggled by means of political ritual to effect a communion with symbols of Americanism.⁶⁵ Workers Alliance leaders thus sought to resist the ritual profanation of the movement, but within a framework and upon the basis of principles of division that were similar to those established by congressional conservatives. In addition, the Workers Alliance sought to invert charges of un-Americanism and redirect them at opponents, thereby turning republican concerns about civic virtue and charges of un-Americanism against conservatives, though again operating within a framework and upon the basis of principles of division similar to those conservatives had instituted.

Finally, in an attempt to preserve its legitimacy, hold on to allies, and protect itself from external repression and internal subversion, the Workers Alliance resorted to in-group purification.

In Weberian terms, one might say that in-group purification transforms a church, which that “lets grace shine over the righteous and the unrighteous alike,” into a sect, which demands stricter internal certification of a member’s moral qualities.⁶⁶ At its most extreme, in-group purification leads to purges in an effort to avoid social pollution. One part of a group thus seeks to deflect violence (physical or symbolic) away from the group as a whole and channel it toward that part of the group that has been rejected as impure.⁶⁷ In the case of the Workers Alliance, internal struggles to purify the movement of un-American elements led to internal conflict, weakening the movement’s capacity to mobilize organizational resources. In this way, the classification struggle within the Workers Alliance compounded the demobilizing effects of the classification struggle between the Workers Alliance and its opponents.

As the investigations of the Dies and Woodrum committees received growing public attention, increasing concerns within the Workers Alliance about its internal purity – in the eyes of members themselves as well as in the eyes of constituents and bystander publics – made differences between Communist and non-Communist members increasingly unbridgeable. Of course, these conflicts did not emerge *ex nihilo*. Rather, the efforts of movement opponents to re-order the social world symbolically exacerbated existing tensions and provided additional incentives to non-Communists to break with their Communist colleagues. Some of the earliest splits occurred in New York City, where the movement was especially strong. In September 1938, *The New York Times* reported that “Henry V. Rourke, who was associated with [the non-Communist Workers Alliance president] David Lasser in the founding of the Workers Alliance and who has been a paid member of its organizing staff ever since, announced yesterday that his local...had voted to withdraw from the alliance in protest against ‘Communist domination’ of the organization’s affairs.” Members of Rourke’s local vowed to form a new organization of home relief and work relief recipients, one presumably free of Communist domination. By early October 1938, delegates from eleven locals previously affiliated with the Workers Alliance and from four independent groups of WPA workers formed a new city-wide organization under Rourke’s leadership called the Unemployed and Project Workers Union.⁶⁸

Following the secession of Rourke's local, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) established the Federal Project Workers, headed by a former Workers Alliance member, "to unite the unorganized WPA employes [*sic*] and the many groups and branches that have recently split off from the Workers Alliance." A statement issued by leaders of Federal Project Workers also seized upon alleged Communist influence within the Workers Alliance to justify their activities: "In the face of widespread accusations that the Workers Alliance is under the domination of Communist leaders and has confused functions of a trade union with political activities, the need has been emphasized for a labor organization that will concentrate on the matters of wages and working conditions on WPA projects." Soon after the formation of the Federal Project Workers, another local of the Workers Alliance seceded and a third rival organization called the WPA Employees Association of America was formed. In a letter to Roosevelt, leaders of the WPA Employees Association declared that many WPA workers remained unorganized because "the organization now purporting to speak for them bears the taints of communism."⁶⁹

These defections were not confined to New York, but spread to Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Ohio, Maryland, New Jersey, and Wisconsin by the end of 1938. "In Gadsden, Alabama, the Communist issue prompted the formation of the Gadsden United WPA Workers that denounced the [Workers] alliance as a Communist front. In Jefferson County [Alabama], anti-Communism and racial conservatism on the part of white members split the [Workers] alliance in half." These were not unrelated issues. The movement's conservative opponents appealed to ascriptive forms of Americanism (and deep-rooted fears of African Americans as an internal domestic enemy) when they warned that Communists sought to establish "an independent black republic" in the United States "under the domination of the Communist commissars." In this context, the Alliance's vigorous multiracial organizing efforts in the South in 1938 appeared to confirm charges of Communist domination. "Because racial equality and Communism were seen as two sides of the same coin, many whites left the [Workers] alliance [in Alabama] on the pretext that its racial practices alone proved it was a Communist front." Thus, when racial divisions were aligned with the division between Americanism and communism, in-group purification took the form of racial purification.⁷⁰

At the Fourth National Workers Alliance Convention in late September 1938, movement leaders downplayed in-group purification and

insisted that the movement remained strong and unified. Yet the secession of dissident groups within the Alliance did alarm the leadership and delegates enough to take defensive actions. First, the convention voted 311 to 8 to exclude two delegates from New York City who accused the Alliance of following Communist party policies. "Claiming to speak for fourteen New York locals with a combined membership of more than 2,000, they told reporters that it was 'extremely doubtful' if their locals would remain in the alliance." Alliance leaders downplayed the loss, estimating that the expelled delegates represented only nine locals and three hundred members. Second, the convention voted to deny a seat to Brendan Sexton, a member of the executive board, for accusing the Alliance of being undemocratic in a letter to a popular magazine. Third, in order to prevent further factionalism, Lasser and Benjamin proposed the following amendment to the constitution of the Alliance: "Any member or officer shall be subject to discipline who proposes any action designed to bring about the secession from the Workers Alliance of any local or other subdivision; or who forms or joins in forming or associates himself in action with any organized group not legally recognized as an official body of the alliance which attempts to dictate or control the policies of the Workers Alliance; or who acts as an agent in the alliance of any group hostile to the alliance; or who joins or causes to be issued or joins in issuing any unauthorized public statement attacking the alliance or any of its officers or any subdivision; or who attempts or associates with others in attempting interference with or obstruction of lawful decisions of the Workers Alliance or its subdivisions." Fourth, evidently concerned that locals around the country were being weakened by internal splits and defections, the national executive board of the Workers Alliance sought to combine shrinking locals into larger county and inter-county organizations, "where their united strength would be many times greater." The national executive board also urged "a sustained campaign to go over the entire membership and bring back into activity and good standing those who have dropped out."⁷¹

Lasser's presidential remarks at the 1938 convention revealed his own growing ambivalence about the Communists in the Workers Alliance. On the one hand, he vigorously stressed the need for solidarity. Singling out the Dies Committee, Lasser denounced "the Tories in politics and the press" who sought "to slander and misrepresent us, *hoping to thus raise confusion and dissension in our ranks.*" "This convention," he declared, "must warn our enemies, within and without, that we intend to preserve the unity of our movement." On the

other hand, Lasser's stern warning to the Communists revealed his own growing conviction – well before the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact brought an end to the Popular Front – that they were impure and untrustworthy: “Under our constitution any person or persons who are members of any group not an official body of the Alliance, which aims to control or dominate the policies of our organization, will be subject to disciplinary charges leading to suspension or expulsion.” Also revealing is the distinction Lasser made between two groups of enemies, external and internal. His fears of the Communists as an organizational fifth column seeking to control the Alliance paralleled conservative denunciations of the Workers Alliance as a national fifth column seeking to control the WPA. Lasser's comments thus suggest that he and other non-Communist members of the Workers Alliance were beginning to adopt a new vision of the social world and its divisions similar to that held by conservatives and to adopt a stance toward Communist members similar to the stance that conservatives took toward the Alliance as a whole.⁷²

Despite the measures adopted by the Workers Alliance in 1938 to contain internal conflicts and prevent the hemorrhaging of members and leaders, matters continued to worsen the following year. In August 1939, the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany widened rifts within the Workers Alliance between its Communist and non-Communist members. Prior to the pact, the Workers Alliance had been strongly anti-fascist, prompting the movement to endorse the principle of collective security at its 1938 national convention in Cleveland. Solidarity between Communist and non-Communist members of the Workers Alliance, tenuous though it was, had been based in part on this shared hostility toward fascism. On a cultural level, fascism served as a symbol to which these groups could come together in opposition, despite their political differences. On a psychological level, strong negative emotional ties to fascism served as the basis for identification (in Freud's sense) between Communist and non-Communist movement participants. However, the non-aggression pact eliminated this cultural and emotional basis for the movement's internal cohesion. Some movement leaders (including Lasser) proposed that the Workers Alliance condemn the Soviet Union, side with the Allies, and support American rearmament “as steps toward fighting Fascism,” while others – particularly the Communists – continued to oppose both rearming and support for the Allies. By 1940, the Workers Alliance had taken a strongly antiwar position and insisted on maintaining strict American neutrality in the face of Nazi aggres-

sion in Europe. These antiwar and isolationist sentiments alienated those members of the movement like Lasser who felt that the Workers Alliance should support the Allies against fascism. In addition, Communist support for the pact seemed to confirm conservative charges that Communists were subservient to the Soviet Union. The non-aggression pact thus heightened suspicion, distrust, and conflict between Communists and non-Communists within the Workers Alliance. Many non-Communist members who opposed the Alliance's antiwar and isolationist stance expressed their dissent through exit rather than voice.⁷³

In 1940, in-group purification of the Workers Alliance spread to the movement's top leadership. In January 1940, Herbert Benjamin resigned as the movement's general secretary-treasurer. According to Franklin Folsom, this was part of an effort by Workers Alliance president David Lasser to purge the movement of Communists. Folsom reports that Lasser and American Communist Party leader Earl Browder asked Benjamin, "the most obvious target of the red-baiters," to resign. "Anyone who aids in giving our movement a character it does not deserve . . .," Lasser wrote, "is aiding those like the Dies Committee who are trying to smear us from the outside. We take steps to expose and remove such people from our ranks." In short, Benjamin's resignation was an attempt to deflect ritual profanation and political repression from the Alliance as a whole by expelling the most important and highest-ranking Communist in the organization. While dramatic, this gesture ultimately failed to protect the Workers Alliance. Despite Benjamin's resignation, "attacks by reactionaries" remained "intense."⁷⁴

Unable to deflect external attacks by removing Benjamin and increasingly convinced that the Workers Alliance no longer represented him and like-minded members, Lasser himself resigned as president of the Workers Alliance in June 1940 and began issuing his own strong attacks on Communists in the movement. According to Lasser, five of the six non-Communist members of the national executive board also resigned with him. The gesture confirmed that these former supporters of the Popular Front had embraced a new vision and re-division of the social world that realigned Americanism in opposition to both communism and fascism. "Along with many former Alliance leaders and dissatisfied locals throughout the country," Lasser wrote about his fellow defectors, "they are joining with me in support of a new national unemployment movement which will be 100 percent American and

free of isms.” The Communists, Lasser told *The New York Times*, had “driven out many thousands of sincere militant unemployed who did not wish to be ‘under the thumb of any political group to which they did not subscribe.’” While these defections were partly an attempt to evade de-legitimation and political repression, they also indicated that the collective identity of some movement leaders no longer lined up with the movement.⁷⁵

Why did the Workers Alliance fail to resist de-legitimation? Why did so many of the movement’s members and leaders embrace a new vision of the social world and its divisions, wherein communism and Americanism were antagonistic rather than (as in the Popular Front vision) aligned against fascism? Why did tensions between Communists and non-Communists within the Workers Alliance combust so effortlessly into full-blown splits and purges? To begin with, although conservative charges were frequently exaggerated, they had some basis in reality that made them credible. Conservatives tapped into existing fears and anxieties that were generated by domestic political turmoil, including the sit-down strike wave of 1936 to 1937, as well as an increasingly ominous international situation. The 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact greatly strengthened the plausibility of conservative efforts to equate fascism and communism as two faces of the same subversive threat to Americanism, and the outbreak of the war in Europe and the subsequent fall of the French republic in June 1940 further intensified concerns about national security and fears of subversive activity.

The anti-Communist drive of the late 1930s was also successful because congressional conservatives were part of a strong public that could make binding and authoritative decisions as well as deliberate, and they used their growing influence within Congress to institutionalize new principles of social division and new criteria of legitimacy. These new criteria were thus inscribed in law and enforced by the repressive machinery of the state; symbolic power was thereby reinforced with political and police violence. In contrast, the Workers Alliance was a weak public without decision-making powers; at best, it could only hope to shape opinion. Here, too, it was thwarted, for widespread and favorable press coverage allowed congressional conservatives to shape and mold public opinion more effectively than the Workers Alliance. “At all times newspaper coverage ... favored the [Dies] Committee and by means of it favorable public opinion had been built up.” “We may justly claim,” the Dies Committee announced in its January 1941 report to Congress, “to have been the decisive force

in shaping the present attitudes of the American people towards the activities of the ‘fifth columns’ that aim at our destruction. Our work has been a type of public education whose importance cannot be exaggerated.” In contrast, the Workers Alliance had much greater difficulty disseminating its representations and definitions of the social world. In April 1938, for example, the circulation of its official newspaper *Work* only reached seven thousand.⁷⁶

Finally, conservative representations of Communists as a subversive menace were compatible with the pre-existing political inclinations of diverse groups, including some groups within the Workers Alliance itself. Anti-communism signified different things to different people: racial segregation and white supremacy, patriotic nationalism, opposition to Stalinist dictatorship, or a general hostility to organized labor and the political left. Anti-communism was effective at realigning social forces into a new political formation in part because diverse groups could rally around the same symbol while attributing different meanings to it.⁷⁷ Although in-group purification failed for all of these reasons to protect the Workers Alliance from being stigmatized as un-American, it had important unintended consequences that contributed to the movement’s demise.

Effects on resource mobilization

Both of these classification struggles – the struggle *between* the movement and its opponents and the struggle *within* the movement – involved material as well as symbolic stakes. By propagating and institutionalizing a particular vision of the social world and its divisions, conservatives influenced the distribution of resources and power in significant ways, affecting both the Alliance’s access to legal protections against punitive reprisals and its capacity to mobilize organizational resources. To be sure, because the Workers Alliance relied heavily on dues from and newspaper sales to members who were unemployed or on relief, the movement was always short of resources from the very beginning.⁷⁸ However, the classification struggle between the movement and its opponents compounded this resource mobilization problem directly by discouraging participation in the movement and indirectly by legitimating political repression.

The classification struggle within the movement compounded its resource mobilization problems still further. First, in-group purification

led to the loss of experienced and committed leaders like Henry Rourke, Herbert Benjamin, and David Lasser, who either left voluntarily or were purged from the organization. Some Alliance organizers and leaders left to join other organizations like the Congress of Industrial Organizations.⁷⁹ Although Communists themselves placed more emphasis on labor organizing after 1935 or 1936, they were still clearly active in the Workers Alliance, and attempts to purge the movement of Communists probably cost it some of its most talented organizers: "By early 1937 the [Communist] Party had made organizing the unemployed through the WAA one of its main priorities . . . and the Party provided the skill and resources needed by the alliance."⁸⁰

Second, the internal splits, purges, and defections experienced by the Workers Alliance led to a loss of rank-and-file members. According to leaders of the Workers Alliance, the movement continued to grow through most of 1938. However, by the end of that year, the growth in membership seems to have reversed. In March 1938, there were 11,316 dues-paying members of the Workers Alliance of Greater New York; in December 1938, the total had dropped to 8,916 despite the enrollment of new members during the year. Nor was this trend confined to New York. According to *The New York Post*, the Alliance's national membership peaked by the beginning of 1939 at 600,000 (half of it paid up), but declined thereafter. Folsom suggests that it was the movement's "internal factional squabbles" that "caused many WAA members to lose interest and drift away." Movement leaders themselves expressed similar views. In the keynote report of the 1939 convention of the Workers Alliance of Greater New York, executive secretary Sam Wiseman wrote: "The conduct of most of our local meetings is disorganized and in many cases taken up with petty squabbles, resulting in the driving out of hundreds of members before they even get a chance to know what our organization really is."⁸¹

Third, the loss of rank-and-file members meant a decline in dues payments and newspaper sales. By December 1938, movement leaders were concerned enough to launch a new campaign to consolidate and streamline the Workers Alliance, similar to an earlier 1937 campaign. The campaign was intended at least in part to make resource mobilization more effective; measures were proposed to ensure more regular payment of membership dues and newspaper subscriptions. Nevertheless, by September 1939, the Workers Alliance announced that *Work*, its official newspaper, had been operating at a deficit for several months and that without immediate financial help from members, it

would be forced to suspend publication. No issues of *Work* were published during the month of September 1940, and when it resumed publication in October 1940, it was published less frequently than before.⁸²

Finally, as the Workers Alliance struggled to find alternative sources of income in the face of dwindling dues payments and newspaper sales, the emergence of rival organizations increased competition for scarce resources. By December 1940, the Workers Alliance and Lasser's new American Security Union were both pleading for grants from the Robert Marshall Foundation. In a letter to George Marshall dated December 12, 1940, Workers Alliance president Richard McKibben (Lasser's successor) wrote that the Alliance was unable to support its work on membership dues and was "able to keep going only through the generosity of such public-minded, progressive men and women as the late Robert Marshall." McKibben added: "In the present period ... the Alliance's dues income from its unemployed membership has naturally reached a low level. This makes it more imperative than ever before that we have the financial support of the Robert Marshall Foundation." While McKibben conceded that "there has been a decrease in the dues paying membership of the Workers Alliance in the last period," he insisted that this was not because of Lasser's resignation, but rather "because of the increasing impoverishment of the unemployed and a considered campaign of vilification, intimidation, and coercion by government officials."⁸³ McKibben seems not to have considered the possibility that the movement's internal difficulties were compounding the effects of external repression.

Conclusion

The demobilization of the Workers Alliance from the late 1930s to 1941 is unmistakable: According to Herbert Benjamin's testimony before the Woodrum Committee in April 1939, the Workers Alliance included a total of 1,521 locals distributed in forty-five states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. When the national executive board of the Workers Alliance decided to dissolve the organization in November 1941, it had dwindled to two hundred branches in twenty-five states.⁸⁴ This article has argued that classification struggles were a key causal mechanism that shaped the movement's collective identity in ways that hindered its capacity to mobilize resources, thereby contributing crucially to the movement's demobilization. I traced demobilization to two important classification struggles.

First, conservative opponents of the Workers Alliance appealed to new categorical identities that cut across the old categories that initially provided a basis for the political mobilization of the unemployed. The Workers Alliance defined and mobilized WPA workers as government employees rather than paupers and relied on the Popular Front discourse of the 1930s to forge a collective identity that bridged the gaps between Communists and non-Communists. Opponents of the Workers Alliance successfully activated and institutionalized a cross-cutting principle of division between Americanism and communism. This symbolic re-ordering of the social world, which was reinforced by the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, hampered the movement's mobilization of resources by legitimating government repression and discouraging participation in the Workers Alliance.

The capacity of the Workers Alliance to mobilize resources was undermined not only by the classification struggle between the movement and its opponents, but also by a second, related classification struggle within the movement. As movement opponents struggled to impose a new vision and division of the social world, the Alliance resorted to in-group purification to avoid internal subversion, de-legitimation, and repression. However, internal struggles to purify the Workers Alliance of "un-American" elements dispersed and diverted resources, and the movement failed to compensate for those losses by acquiring new allies or hanging on to old ones. In this way, the classification struggle within the Workers Alliance compounded the demobilizing effects of the classification struggle between the movement and its opponents.

These classification struggles help to explain the demobilization of the Workers Alliance itself, but what about the various rival organizations that split off from it? Although some Alliance leaders hoped to reinvigorate the unemployed movement by forming rival organizations free of Communist participation, these hopes remained unfulfilled. To begin with, the specter of communism often continued to haunt the defectors. Congress effectively blacklisted Lasser, for example, as a result of his previous association with the Workers Alliance. Moreover, even when these new unemployed organizations were able to escape the specter of communism, they were crippled by many of the same WPA reforms that had been directed against the Alliance, particularly the devastating eighteen-month rule. In addition, these rival organizations were weakened by competition (not only from the Workers Alliance but from the CIO as well) over resources that were rapidly dwindling as a result of WPA retrenchment. Factional struggles, turf

disputes, and increased competition for resources diverted these fledgling social movement organizations from social protest. Finally, America's entry into the Second World War in December 1941 (after the collapse of the Workers Alliance) eliminated the membership base of these spin-off organizations as a result of military mobilization, raised the costs of disruptive protests that might have interfered with the war effort (after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, even the Communists strove to avoid such interference), led to a loss of any remaining elite allies in the Roosevelt administration, and strengthened the political influence of business.⁸⁵

Long-term political impacts of classification struggles

What were the long-term political impacts of the classification struggles that took place in the late 1930s and early 1940s? How did these struggles reconfigure American politics, or at least contribute to new configurations? To begin with, although anti-communism was not the only basis for the working coalition that emerged between Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress, it did help to disarticulate old party rivalries and forge a new cross-party conservative bloc that hindered and impeded completion of the New Deal. Moreover, although the anti-Communist friend-enemy grouping forged in the late 1930s was briefly disarticulated during the Second World War as the United States and the Soviet Union became allies, it nevertheless set an important historical precedent for the Cold War vision of the social world and its divisions. Finally, even as anti-communism organized some groups, it disorganized others. The division between Americanism and communism cut across earlier (admittedly fragile) political groupings (the Popular Front) and precluded the formation of similar ones. Why? Because the outcomes – including the failures – of earlier classification struggles shaped the subsequent choices of social movement activists. The CIO's postwar expulsion of its Communist-led unions, in particular, was probably influenced by union activists' memories and knowledge of previous struggles within the Workers Alliance.

Implications for sociological work on the New Deal

Most sociological studies of the New Deal aim to show how struggles between already constituted groups (usually labor and business) influ-

enced policy. In this study, I have attempted to redirect the focus to explain how groups were organized, disorganized, and reorganized. In other words, I have tried to show how the New Deal was shaped not only by struggles among classes, but also by what Adam Przeworski calls struggles about class. To understand the latter fully, I have argued, it is necessary to move beyond (even while building upon) the neo-Marxist theoretical framework that dominates much of the sociological literature on the New Deal. At the same time, this study engages historical institutional models of the New Deal as well. In line with this approach, I emphasized the ways in which institutions shaped the perceptions of interests and the behavior of individuals and groups. However, while most of the existing institutionalist work on the New Deal focuses on national governmental capacity, the U.S. party system, and other enduring structures that constrained New Deal reforms, this study focused upon those institutions created by the New Dealers themselves, particularly the WPA. My findings are consistent with Piven and Cloward's claim that the WPA discouraged protest by the unemployed. However, while they argue that the WPA discouraged protest by "once more enmeshing people in the work role," I trace demobilization (in part) back to the anti-Communist reforms of the WPA instituted in the late 1930s.⁸⁶

Theoretical contributions

I have tried to use this particular case to provide a better synthesis of identity-oriented and strategic models of collective action. To do so, I have drawn heavily on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of classification struggles as well as insights from Erving Goffman and Howard Becker. On the one hand, I extended culture to the realm of interest by highlighting the role collective identity plays in one of the key processes that strategic models of collective action foreground: the mobilization of resources. Although it is well established that the sponsorship of elite allies and the appropriation of an "indigenous" organizational base are important for resource mobilization, it is less widely recognized how classification struggles and collective identity shape both. Moreover, I extended culture to the realm of interest in another way as well: by challenging the notion that labor movements like the Workers Alliance are fundamentally different from or antithetical to the identity-oriented new social movements. On the other hand, I also extended the idea of interest to culture. Rather than viewing collective identity as something formed prior to political struggle and according to a different logic, I

showed that the collective identity of the Workers Alliance was constructed in and through struggles over classificatory schemes. These included struggles *between* the movement and its opponents as well as struggles *within* the movement. To summarize, rather than seeing movement decline as a two-step process of identity formation followed by stalled resource mobilization, I have tried to show that resource mobilization involves and partly depends upon identity-formation.

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Notes

1. The quotation is from Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 286. For resource mobilization and political process theories, see John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82/6 (May 1977): 1212–1241; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); and Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). For new social movement theories, see Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," *Social Research* 52/ 4 (Winter 1985): 663–716; Alberto Melucci, "The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach," *Social Science Information* 19/2 (1980): 199–226; idem, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research* 52/4 (Winter 1985): 789–816; idem, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*, ed. John Keane and Paul Mier (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); idem, "The Process of Collective Identity," in *Social Movements and Culture*, ed. Hank Johnston and Bert Klantnermans (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Alessandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict," chapter 11 in *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968*, ed.

- Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, Vol. 2 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978); idem, "On the Rationality of Democratic Choice," *Telos* 63 (Spring 1985): 41–69; Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ed. Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Alain Touraine, "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements," *Social Research* 52/4 (Winter 1985): 749–787.
2. See Bert Klandermans, "Introduction: Social Movement Organizations and the Study of Social Movements," *International Social Movement Research* 2 (1989): 1–17; Morris and Mueller, editors, *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*; Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, editors, *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Johnston and Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture*; Jon Shefner, "Moving in the Wrong Direction in Social Movement Theory," *Theory and Society* 24/4 (1995): 595–612; Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, editors, *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). This shift is part of a broader "cultural turn" in social movement theory.
 3. On framing, see William A. Gamson, "Goffman's Legacy to Political Sociology," *Theory and Society* 14/5 (September 1985): 605–622; William A. Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest," in Johnston and Klandermans, editors, *Social Movements and Culture*; David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 464–481; Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–639. Scott A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, "Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Construction of Movement Identities," in Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield, editors, *New Social Movements*, provide a valuable discussion of the relation between framing and collective identity, but they, too, take the existence of "SMO [social movement organization] actors" as a given. I do not mean to suggest that framing theory has been useless or should be discarded. Rather, my point is that we need to modify and expand how the concept of framing is used in social movement theory.
 4. Doug McAdam, "The Framing Function of Movement Tactics," chapter 15 in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.
 5. Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," 285.
 6. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 220–221, 223 (emphasis in the original). Idem, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984 [1979]), 477–479. See also Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski, "The Educational System and the Economy: Titles and Jobs," chapter 8 in *French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal since 1968*, ed. Charles Lemert (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); and Luc Boltanski, "How a Social Group

- Objectified Itself: 'Cadres' in France, 1936–45," *Social Science Information* 23/3 (1984): 469–491.
7. David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 89.
 8. On resource acquisition, see McAdam, *Political Process*, 20–59; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 44, 47–48. By arguing that collective identity shapes resource mobilization, I do not mean to deny that resource mobilization also shapes collective identity. Although I emphasize the former here, I acknowledge that causality runs in both directions.
 9. Claus Offe, "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics," *Social Research* 52/4 (Winter 1985): 817–868.
 10. Craig Calhoun, "'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century," in *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, ed. Mark Traugott (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 173.
 11. Cf. William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*; and Calhoun, "New Social Movements."
 12. Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity," 293. Cf. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity."
 13. Melucci, "The Process of Collective Identity," 48–49. Cf. Marc W. Steinberg, "The Roar of the Crowd: Repertoires of Discourse and Collective Action among the Spitalfields Silk Weavers in Nineteenth-Century London," in Traugott, editor, *Repertoires and Cycles*; and idem, "Toward a More Dialogic Analysis of Social Movement Culture," in Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett, editors, *Social Movements*.
 14. E.g. Belinda Robnett, "External Political Change, Collective Identities, and Participation in Social Movement Organizations," in Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett, editors, *Social Movements*.
 15. Due to space constraints, this article only addresses the reasons for the decline and demise of the Workers Alliance. A separate work on the rise of the movement is in progress.
 16. By causal mechanisms, I mean "a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations." Following McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, this article eschews "general models ... that purport to summarize whole categories of contention and moves toward the analysis of smaller-scale causal mechanisms that recur in different combinations with different aggregate consequences in varying historical settings" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 24). I do not deny that other causal mechanisms besides classification struggles contributed to the demobilization of the Workers Alliance, nor do I wish to minimize the impact of those mechanisms, but I do argue that those mechanisms alone (i.e., without reference to classification struggles) cannot explain the demobilization of the Workers Alliance. On causal mechanisms as an alternative to both general covering laws and historicist accounts that eschew generalization altogether, see Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, third edition (Glencoe: Free Press, 1968); Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing About Mechanisms in Social Science," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 21 (1991): 367–388; Charles Tilly, "Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology," *Comparative Social Research* 16 (1997): 47–57; and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*.

17. Bourdieu and Boltanski, "The Educational System and the Economy."
18. Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," 292.
19. Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 107–108. Like all causal mechanisms, in-group purification produces "different aggregate outcomes depending on the initial conditions, combinations, and sequences" in which it occurs and concatenates with other mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, 37). On the potential benefits of factionalism, see Mildred A. Schwartz, "Factions and the Continuity of Political Challengers," and Jo Reger, "More than One Feminism: Organizational Structure and the Construction of Collective Identity," both in Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett, editors, *Social Movements*.
20. Franklin Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor: The Story of Collective Action of the Unemployed, 1808–1942* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1991), 417.
21. Harvey Klehr, *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 297–298. For an overview of the political mobilization of the unemployed in the 1930s, see Helen Seymour, "The Organized Unemployed," (Ph.D. dissertation, Division of the Social Sciences, University of Chicago, 1937); Bernard Karsh and Phillips L. Garman, "The Impact of the Political Left," chapter 2 in *Labor and the New Deal*, ed. Milton Derber and Edwin Young (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961); Roy Rosenzweig, "Radicals and the Jobless: The Musteites and the Unemployed Leagues, 1932–1936," *Labor History* 16/1 (Winter 1975): 52–77; idem, "'Socialism in Our Time': The Socialist Party and the Unemployed, 1929–1936," *Labor History* 20/4 (Fall 1979): 485–509; idem, "Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression, 1929–1933," chapter 8 in *Workers' Struggles, Past and Present: A "Radical America" Reader*, ed. James Green (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage, 1977); Harold R. Kerbo and Richard A. Shaffer, "Unemployment and Protest in the United States, 1890–1940: A Methodological Critique and Research Note," *Social Forces* 64/4 (June 1986): 1046–1056; Harold R. Kerbo and Richard A. Shaffer, "Lower Class Insurgency and the Political Process: The Response of the U.S. Unemployed, 1890–1940," *Social Problems* 39/2 (May 1992): 139–154; Steve Valocchi, "The Unemployed Workers Movement of the 1930s: A Reexamination of the Piven and Cloward Thesis," *Social Problems* 37/2 (May 1990): 191–205; and Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*. On the WPA, see Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*; David L. Porter, *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal* (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1980); Michael B. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and Edwin Amenta, *Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). "The WPA ... by 1939 had become the most comprehensive, ambitious, and controversial government program," and it "was regarded as the cornerstone of domestic relief" (Porter, *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal*, 61, 70). It "absorbed both the greatest amount of public spending and public attention" and was "Roosevelt's top priority in social policy" (Amenta, *Bold Relief*, 81, 83, 144).
22. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, updated edition (New York: Vintage, 1993 [1971]), 106. Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 421. *The New York Times*, August 12, 1938, p. 16. *Work*, August 27, 1938, p. 5 (Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives of the Tamiment Institute Library, New York University Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, Microfilm R1568).

23. The author gathered all protest event data from *The New York Times Index* and *The New York Times*. Because of the way the data were originally reported, it was necessary to count as a single event coordinated protests occurring at the same time but in different locations within the same city (e.g., at different relief offices or WPA projects).
24. All unemployment data are from United States Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), 135.
25. E.g., Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 431; Karsh and Garman, "The Impact of the Political Left," 94.
26. Harrington is quoted in *Work*, February 15, 1940, 3. It was only in 1942 that the unemployment rate dropped below five percent. WPA employment also remained high; the average number of persons employed on WPA projects per month did not fall below one million until March 1942. See United States Federal Works Agency, *Final Report on the WPA Program, 1935–43* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 28.
27. Quotations are from Donald S. Howard, *The WPA and Federal Relief Policy* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1943), 132–133 (emphasis added). Also see *Work*, November 23, 1939, 1; Basil Rauch, *The History of the New Deal, 1933–1938* (New York: Creative Age Press, 1944), 314–315, 326; and Franklin D. Roosevelt, President's Personal File, File #6794 (American Security Union), Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
28. Quotation is from Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*, 76. Cf. Rosenzweig, "Socialism in Our Time," 503; idem, "Organizing the Unemployed," 177; and James J. Lorence, *Organizing the Unemployed: Community and Union Activists in the Industrial Heartland* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 82, 115, 272.
29. See James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); and Porter, *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal*.
30. See the following issues of *The Workers Alliance: The Official Newspaper of the Workers Alliance of America* (Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives of the Tamiment Institute Library, New York University Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, Microfilm R1569): August 15, 1935, 1; October 2, 1935, 2; "Second October Issue" [1935], 1; "November Issue" [1935], 1; "Second April Issue" [1936], 2; "First June Issue" [1936], 1; and "First July Issue" [1936], 1.
31. See the following issues of *Work*: September 24, 1938, 7; October 8, 1938, 4; October 22, 1938, 12; July 29, 1939, 6, 12; and August 12, 1939, 6. On the way in which dyadic interaction is altered by the addition of a third party, see Georg Simmel, "The Triad," in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, trans. and ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950).
32. While the Workers Alliance pushed for an expansion of the WPA, business largely opposed New Deal experiments with work relief (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Politics of Upheaval* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960], 264; Nancy Ellen Rose, *Put to Work: Relief Programs in the Great Depression* [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994], 53; Edwin Amenta, Ellen Benoit, Chris Bonastia, Nancy K. Cauthen, and Drew T. Halfmann, "The Works Progress Administration and the Origins of Welfare Reform: Work and Relief in New Deal Social Policy" [unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, New York University, 1996], 50, note 12). Their concerns were threefold: First, employers feared that work relief would cause labor shortages and create pressure for private-sector wage increases (Rose, *Put to Work*,

- 53). Second, they believed that too much was being spent on relief and they favored cutbacks in order to balance the federal budget (Rose, *Put to Work*, 54, 77; Schlesinger, *Politics of Upheaval*, 264). Third, they feared that production-for-use projects would lead to government competition with the private sector and crowd out production for profit (Rose, *Put to Work*, 76–80).
33. Quotations are from Stuart Hall, “The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists,” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 45–46 (emphasis in the original); Sheryl R. Tynes, *Turning Points in Social Security: From “Cruel Hoax” to “Sacred Entitlement”* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 60; and David Plotke, “The Political Mobilization of Business,” chapter 8 in *The Politics of Interests*, ed. Mark Petracca (Boulder: Westview, 1992), 176. On the multiple interests of social collectivities, also see Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 280; Pierre Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups,” *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32 (1987): 1–18; idem, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); and idem, *Language and Symbolic Power*. On the discursive definition of interests, see idem, “What Makes a Social Class?”; Mustafa Emirbayer, “Beyond Structuralism and Voluntarism: The Politics and Discourse of Progressive School Reform, 1890–1930,” *Theory and Society* 21/5 (1992): 621–664; Mustafa Emirbayer, “The Shaping of a Virtuous Citizenry: Educational Reform in Massachusetts, 1830–1860,” *Studies in American Political Development* 6 (Fall 1992): 391–419; Plotke, “The Political Mobilization of Business”; David Plotke, *Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47–97; and Weber, *From Max Weber*, 184–185. Proponents of the collective identity approach to social movements have also stressed the discursive definition of interests. Rather than seeing interpretation as driven by prior strategic calculations, it makes more sense to understand political action as always simultaneously involving interpretation and strategy (Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Action and Its Environments* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 311–316). On corporate liberalism, see James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); G. William Domhoff, “How the Power Elite Shape Social Legislation,” chapter 6 in *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America* (New York: Vintage, 1971); and Ronald Radosh, “The Myth of the New Deal,” in *A New History of Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the Corporate State*, ed. Ronald Radosh and Murray Rothbard (New York: Dutton, 1972).
34. See Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Free Press, 1984 [1893]); Weber, *From Max Weber*; Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971); Robert C. Tucker, editor, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, second edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 174. Quotations on constructing a leading bloc are from Hall, “The Toad in the Garden,” 47, 53 (emphasis in the original). Also see Stuart Hall, “The Great Moving Right Show,” in *The Politics of Thatcherism*, ed. Stuart Hall and Martin Jaques (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983); Emirbayer, “Beyond Structuralism and Voluntarism”; idem, “The Shaping of a Virtuous Citizenry”; and Plotke, *Building a Democratic Political Order*.

35. For the psychological expressivism thesis, see Daniel Bell, editor, *The Radical Right* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), and Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1977*, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). For critical reviews of this perspective, see Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), and Jerome L. Himmelstein, *To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), chapter 3. Quotations are from Himmelstein, *To the Right*, 73; Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade*, 179, 19; and Bell, *The Radical Right*, 12.
36. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade*, 19, 175, 18. Of course, in the case of the Workers Alliance, it was mainly the status of organized WPA workers (their worthiness to receive social assistance) rather than the movement's anti-Communist opponents that was at stake.
37. Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements*, 41–44. Lorence, *Organizing the Unemployed*. Klehr, *Heyday of American Communism*, 297–298. I borrow the concept of ritual profanation from Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), 85–90 (cf. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, chapter 5).
38. Michèle Lamont, *Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
39. There is debate among political sociologists about whether the imposition of stigmatizing categorical identities discourages political mobilization or provides a basis for it. Piven and Cloward, e.g., argue that turning welfare recipients into “a clearly demarcated . . . class of pariahs deters political mobilization for public relief” (*Poor People's Movements*, 42–43). In contrast, Anthony Marx, e.g., argues that legal discrimination creates a stigmatized categorical identity that provides a “potential base for resistance,” establishing the “who” that then challenges exclusion and discrimination (“Race-Making and the Nation-State,” *World Politics* 48/2 [January 1996]: 180–208). What I am suggesting here is that both views may be correct under different conditions. In other words, whether categorical identities that are created through exclusion and/or discrimination also become the basis for political mobilization depends in part on whether those categorical identities are aligned with other social divisions or weakened by crosscutting social divisions. Political mobilization, I argue, is more common under the former condition than the latter condition.
40. I borrow the notion of citizen-earner from Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). On the gendered character of the citizen-earner, see Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 19/2 (1994): 309–336. These two forms of ritual profanation, which represent what might be called the civic death of relief recipients bear a striking resemblance to Orlando Patterson's two ways of representing the social death of slaves (*Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982], 39, 41).
41. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History, 1919–1957* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 325, 362–363, 385. Karsh and Garman, “Impact of the Political Left,” 103–104. Klehr, *Heyday of American Communism*.
42. Howe and Coser, *American Communist Party*, 391–392. Klehr, *Heyday of American Communism*, 400–409. Eli Jaffe, *Oklahoma Odyssey: A Memoir* (Robert F.

- Wagner Labor Archives of the Tamiment Institute Library, New York University Elmer Holmes Bobst Library), 91.
43. United States House of Representatives, *Hearings Before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, 75th Congress, Third Session, on H. Res. 282*, vol. 1 and 2 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1938). August Raymond Ogden, *The Dies Committee: A Study of the Special House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities, 1938–1944* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1945).
 44. United States House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 76th Congress, First Session, Acting Under House Resolution 130* (1939–40), in Record Group 233: House of Representatives, 76th Congress, Appropriations Committee: Subcommittee on the Works Progress Administration, Hearings: Acting Under House Resolution 130, 9E2, Row 31, Compartments 11-14, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC. Arthur W. Macmahon, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden, *The Administration of Federal Work Relief* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941), 289–290.
 45. The investigations and hearings conducted by these two committees may be seen as ritualized in at least three ways. First, this activity was partly ceremonial in Goffman's sense, i.e., a conventionalized means of communicating one's evaluation or assessment of another's status (Goffman, *Interaction Ritual*, 48–56). Unlike the micro-level ceremonial profanations described by Goffman (*Interaction Ritual*, 85–90), however, the individuals involved here typically represented, spoke, and acted on behalf of large groups of people (or at least attempted to do so). Second, these congressional investigations, and the red scare of the late 1930s more broadly, appear to have involved the kind of “generalization” that Jeffrey C. Alexander sees in political rituals like Watergate, through which “social solidarities are reworked” and classificatory systems (and the relation of actors to them) are shifted and transformed (“Three Models of Culture and Society Relations: Toward an Analysis of Watergate,” chapter 5 in *Action and Its Environments*; idem, “Culture and Political Crisis: ‘Watergate’ and Durkheimian Sociology,” chapter 6 in *Structure and Meaning* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1989]). Third, committee hearings helped to bring about a convergence of ethos and world-view in the manner described by Clifford Geertz. For participants, he suggests, ritual involves not only the presentation of a world-view, but “in addition enactments, materializations, realizations of it – not only models of what they believe, but also models for the believing of it. In these plastic dramas men attain their faith as they portray it.” The dispositions that rituals induce, Geertz adds, “have their most important impact . . . outside the boundaries of the ritual itself as they reflect back to color the individual's conception of the established world of bare fact” (*The Interpretation of Cultures* [New York: Basic Books, 1973], 113–114, 119 [emphasis in the original]).
 46. Klehr, *Heyday of American Communism*, 249. On the aims and activities of the Communist Party, see Howe and Coser, *American Communist Party*, and Klehr, *Heyday of American Communism*. On republicanism and ascriptive Americanism, see Suzanne Mettler, *Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” *American Political Science Review* 87/3 (September 1993): 549–566; idem, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

47. Howard S. Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), 132, 121, 139. Social movement theorists have usefully extended and elaborated Becker's point about the importance of the mass media for moral entrepreneurship. See, e.g., William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach," *American Journal of Sociology* 95/1 (1989): 1–37; William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes, and Theodore Sasson, "Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality," *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992): 373–393; Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest"; William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," chapter 12 in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*; and Bert Klandermans and Sjoerd Goslinga, "Media Discourse, Movement Publicity, and the Generation of Collective Action Frames," chapter 14 in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.
48. Ogden, *Dies Committee*, 48, 101–102, 114, 173, 179.
49. Patricia Cayo Sexton, *The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 145. Ogden, *Dies Committee*, 104, 107, 113, 152, 177–188, 208. Rauch, *History of the New Deal*, 284. The coalition between conservative factions of the Republican and Democratic parties had to be actively brokered and constructed (Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism*). Just as the Workers Alliance relied on the Popular Front discourse of the 1930s to forge a collective identity that bridged differences between Communists and non-Communists, so anti-Communist discourse forged a collective identity that bridged party differences between conservatives and provided a basis for their alliance. The forging of this conservative coalition after the 1938 election signaled the end of the New Deal (Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism*; Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* [New York: Knopf, 1995]). Even Amenta, who argues that the 1939 Congress was "far from dominated by conservatives," concedes that "the pro-spenders lost their majority" (*Bold Relief*, 137).
50. "Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space.... Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities" (Michèle Lamont and Virag Molnar, "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences," *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 [2002]: 168).
51. Cf. Roger V. Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
52. Boltanski, "How a Social Group Objectified Itself," 485–486. Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
53. *The New York Times*, June 23, 1940, 1. Macmahon et al., *Administration of Federal Work Relief*, 336. Howard, *WPA and Federal Relief Policy*, 119, 138–139, 303–324. Lewis Meriam, *Relief and Social Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1946), 369–370. Sexton, *War on Labor*, 148. Rose, *Put to Work*, 112–114, 137–138 (notes 56 and 57).
54. *The New York Times*, April 20, 1939, 1.
55. *The New York Times*, June 18, 1939, IV, 6. *The New York Times*, June 13, 1939, 1.

- Macmahon et al., *Administration of Federal Work Relief*, 287. Porter, *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal*, 109. Sexton, *War on Labor*, 148–149. Jaffe, *Oklahoma Odyssey*. Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 141.
56. Lasser is quoted in *The New York Times*, August 25, 1936, 11. On restrictions on aid to aliens and preferences for veterans, see John D. Millet, *The Works Progress Administration in New York City* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1938), 65; Howard, *WPA and Federal Relief Policy*, 523; Meriam, *Relief and Social Security*, 381–382; and Rose, *Put to Work*, 112–114, 137–138 (notes 56 and 57). New Dealers opposed special programs and benefits for veterans, preferring instead to meet the needs of veterans through “programs directed at the entire population.” As late as 1942, Roosevelt’s National Resources Planning Board envisioned comprehensive expansion of New Deal programs rather than special legislation for veterans following the war. However, the Second World War brought “what the New Deal reformers had hoped to avoid: a special welfare state for a substantial sector of the population [veterans] deemed especially deserving” (Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, “Redefining the New Deal: World War II and the Development of Social Provision in the United States,” chapter 2 in *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States*, ed. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988], 85, 93–94).
 57. See Steven Pfaff, “Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East Germany in 1989,” *Social Forces* 75/1 (1996): 91–118; and Stephen Adair, “Overcoming a Collective Action Frame in the Remaking of an Antinuclear Opposition,” *Sociological Forum* 11/2 (June 1996): 347–375.
 58. See *Work*, November 9, 1939, 4; *Work*, February 15, 1940, 1; *Work*, June 20, 1940, 1; and *Work*, November 9, 1939, 4. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President, Official File, File 2366 (Workers Alliance of America, 1935–1942), Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (emphasis in the original). *The New York Times*, June 23, 1940, 1.
 59. Rose, *Put to Work*, 111–114. *The New York Times*, June 13, 1939, 1. Howard, *WPA and Federal Relief Policy*, 522–523. *Work*, February 15, 1940, 1. *Work*, September 28, 1939, 1.
 60. Amenta, *Bold Relief*, 141, 222. *Work*, July 1, 1939, 7. On the use of tighter eligibility requirements to divide “ins” from “outs,” see Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 22–23.
 61. *Work*, July 29, 1939, 7. *The New York Times*, June 13, 1939, 1. *The New York Times*, June 18, 1939, IV, 6.
 62. U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 37–39, 82. *The New York Times*, April 18, 1939, 3. *Work*, June 20, 1940, 3. *The New York Times*, June 18, 1939, IV, 6. *Work*, June 17, 1939, 2. Similar defunding measures were considered at the state level. In California, where the Workers Alliance was particularly strong, the state legislature in 1939 considered prohibiting recipients of public assistance from paying dues to any unemployed organization. Assemblyman Hugh Burns, who introduced the proposed legislation, admitted openly that it was aimed at the Workers Alliance (*Work*, June 3, 1939, 3; *Work*, June 17, 1939, 3).
 63. *Work*, July 1, 1939, 1. *Work*, August 12, 1939, 1, 8. *Work*, July 29, 1939, 8. Robin D. G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 157.
 64. Group formation requires political representation (delegation of authority to act

on behalf of another or of another's interests) as well as social representation (symbolic or discursive depiction). Through the delegation of symbolic power, mandated representatives and spokespersons receive "from the group the power to make the group" (Bourdieu, quoted in Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 187; cf. Boltanski, "How a Social Group Objectified Itself").

65. In 1939, for example, movement leaders sought to demonstrate the organization's commitment to Americanism by requiring Alliance officers and members to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the U.S. government, in conscious imitation of the requirements of the 1940 emergency relief bill (*The New York Times*, June 29, 1939, 12; *Work*, July 1, 1939, 2; *Work*, July 15, 1939, 11; *Work*, November 9, 1939, 4). "The idea," said Willis Morgan, head of the New York Workers Alliance, "is to answer those who charge we are subversive and against the Government." At the same time, Morgan added that he did not believe the oath would exclude Communists from membership in the Alliance (*The New York Times*, June 29, 1939, 12). The Alliance's national executive board recommended that the oath be "administered by city officials or ministers" at "special Fourth of July membership meetings." In addition, the board recommended that "addresses on Americanism ... should also form part of the meetings." Workers Alliance leaders declared that the movement was "adopting this oath voluntarily, rededicating itself to true Americanism and leaving no doubt as to where it stands on upholding the Constitution and form of government of the United States" (*Work*, July 1, 1939, 2). The patriotic character of the movement was similarly emphasized at the second annual convention of the New York Workers Alliance in January 1940, where the first session was opened by delegates singing "The Star Spangled Banner" (*The New York Times*, January 13, 1940, 6).
66. Weber, *From Max Weber*, 302–322. Cf. Christopher K. Ansell, *Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
67. Cf. René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, translator Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
68. On constituents and bystander publics, see McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements." *The New York Times*, September 4, 1938, 1. *The New York Times*, October 2, 1938, 45. *The New York Times*, October 3, 1938, 16. On Rourke's defection, see also the report dated July 7, 1938, on "The Workers Alliance and Its Dominance by the Communist Party," in the Harry L. Hopkins Collection, Container 100, File: Workers Alliance, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. On Rourke, see also U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 111.
69. *The New York Times*, September 19, 1938, 1. *The New York Times*, September 20, 1938, 2.
70. *The New York Times*, September 23, 1938, 18. *Work*, November 19, 1938, 9. Karsh and Garman, "Impact of the Political Left," 94. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe*, 156–157. U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 1096. For a detailed account of splits within the New Jersey Workers Alliance, and the decision of some locals to form a rival organization (the Workers Relief and WPA Union), see George Breitman's letter to the Robert Marshall Foundation, dated November 6, 1940, in the Gardner Jackson Collection, Container 85, File: Workers Alliance of America, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. On ascriptive Americanism, see Smith, "Beyond Tocqueville," and idem, *Civic Ideals*. The Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 did in

- fact call for the establishment of a separate “Negro republic” in those Southern counties that contained a majority of African Americans, but the American Communist Party no longer “pushed this theory” after 1934 (Howe and Coser, *American Communist Party*, 206–208). On the American Communist Party’s efforts to promote racial equality and mobilize African Americans in the 1930s, see Howe and Coser, *American Communist Party*, 204–216ff. For an account that is more sympathetic to the Communist Party, see Michael Goldfield, *The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: New Press, 1997), chapter 6.
71. *The New York Times*, September 25, 1938, 1. David Lasser, *Work and Security: A Program for America* (Washington, DC: Workers Alliance of America, 1938), 15. *The New York Times*, September 25, 1938, 1. *The New York Times*, September 26, 1938, 9. *Work*, September 28, 1939, 11. For an account of events at the 1938 convention from the perspective of the Workers Alliance, see *Work*, October 8, 1938, 4. The Alliance referred to the excluded delegates as “splitting disrupters” who had “aided and abetted a small group of dissidents in New York who sought to break up of the Alliance [*sic*].”
 72. Lasser, *Work and Security*, 8–10, 14 (emphasis in the original).
 73. On the use of symbols to bridge political differences, see Rebecca E. Klatch, *Women of the New Right* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). As Melucci (“The Process of Collective Identity”) has emphasized, collective identity involves emotional investments as well as cognitive definitions. In line with this view, Sigmund Freud suggests that group members identify themselves with one another because they have made similar emotional investments in the group leader. He adds that an idea or abstraction may take the place of the leader, and that “the leader or the leading idea might also, so to speak, be negative; hatred against a particular person or institution might operate in just the same unifying way, and might call up the same kind of emotional ties as positive attachment” (*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, trans. and ed. James Strachey [New York: W.W. Norton, 1959 [1922], 40–41). Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 427–428. *Work*, June 20, 1940, 2. *Work*, August 1, 1940, 1. *The New York Times*, June 12, 1940, 18. On exit and voice, see Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
 74. *The New York Times*, January 31, 1940, 6. *Work*, February 15, 1940, 1, 3–4. Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 428–429.
 75. *The New York Times*, June 20, 1940, 16. Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 429–430. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President’s Personal File, File 7649 (Lasser, David), Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
 76. On the distinction between strong and weak publics, see Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” chapter 5 in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). Ogden, *Dies Committee*, 101–102, 230. *Work*, April 23, 1938, 4.
 77. Cf. Klatch, *Women of the New Right*.
 78. According to Benjamin’s testimony before the Woodrum Committee in 1939, “dues, initiation fees and charter fees” accounted for approximately half of the national organization’s monthly income of \$4,000. “Income from the sale of other organizational supplies such as literature and our newspaper” accounted for an additional forty-five percent of that total (U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 37–39, 82). On the Alliance’s

- difficulties mobilizing resources in the early years of the movement, see *The Workers Alliance*, October 2, 1935, 2; *The Workers Alliance*, “First June Issue” [1936], 4; and *The Workers Alliance*, “First September Issue” [1936], 4.
79. Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 428–429. The CIO was also subjected to red baiting by the Dies Committee in the late 1930s. However, in contrast to the Workers Alliance, the CIO received countervailing legitimization and support from the National Labor Relations Board, “which partially countered the adverse circumstances of 1938–39” (Steve Babson, *The Unfinished Struggle: Turning Points in American Labor, 1877-Present* [New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999], 109). In this respect, the CIO was as dependent on the federal government as the Workers Alliance. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which required “each union official of a national or international . . . to file an affidavit assuring the government that he was not affiliated with communism or the Communist party; failing to comply would cause the union to lose the protection and privileges” of the National Labor Relations Act (Joseph G. Rayback, *A History of American Labor*, expanded and updated edition [New York: Free Press, 1966], 399; Babson, *Unfinished Struggle*, 130). In this respect, the Taft-Hartley Act was comparable to the legislation that excluded Communists from participation in the WPA. Moreover, international politics – the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in the case of the Workers Alliance, and the Marshall Plan in the case of the CIO – exacerbated internal conflict between Communists and non-Communists in both cases (Babson, *Unfinished Struggle*, 133). Like the Workers Alliance, the CIO ultimately responded with in-group purification, expelling eleven affiliates between 1949 and 1950 on grounds of Communist domination. These parallels raise an obvious question: Why was in-group purification a more successful response to anti-communism for the CIO than for the Workers Alliance? Non-Communists in the Workers Alliance were unable to dislodge the Communists and instead left the organization, while non-Communists in the CIO were able to expel them and take control. As a result, in-group purification was more successful for the CIO: “As the Korean War reached its critical stage, the CIO could claim a purity equal to that of the AFL and was able, thereby, to escape public indictment during the years when the anti-communist hysteria in the nation reached its height” (Rayback, *History of American Labor*, 408). Nevertheless, in-group purification was not without serious costs for the CIO, including the loss of nearly a million members (Robert H. Zieger, *The CIO, 1935–1955* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995], 253). CIO raids on the expelled Communist unions diverted time and money from organizing the unorganized, and competition played into employers’ hands, particularly in the electrical industry, where union membership declined, wages fell, and working conditions deteriorated (Harvey A. Levenstein, *Communism, Anticommunism, and the CIO* [Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981], 312; Zieger, *The CIO*, 285–286; Babson, *Unfinished Struggle*, 136). The CIO was able to partly compensate for these costs by raising per capita dues (Levenstein, *Communism, Anticommunism, and the CIO*, 299–300; Zieger, *The CIO*, 290), a course of action that WPA reforms made far more difficult for the Workers Alliance. Even so, with membership rolls stagnating, the CIO was forced into a merger with the AFL in 1955 (Levenstein, *Communism, Anticommunism, and the CIO*, 330). A similar attempt by the Workers Alliance to affiliate with the CIO in the late 1930s was less successful.
80. James J. Lorence, *Gerald J. Boileau and the Progressive Farmer-Labor Alliance: Politics of the New Deal* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994), 171.
81. On the growth of the Workers Alliance through most of 1938, see, e.g., *Work*, June

- 4, 1938, 7; *Work*, September 24, 1938, 9–10; and *Work*, October 8, 1938, 4. On membership decline, see *The New York Times*, February 12, 1939, 9; and *The New York Post*, August 7, 1940, in Franklin D. Roosevelt, President's Personal File, File 7649 (Lasser, David). Folsom, *Impatient Armies of the Poor*, 428–429.
82. *Work*, December 3, 1938, 7. *Work*, September 14, 1939, 3. *Work*, September 28, 1939, 3.
83. Gardner Jackson Collection, Container 85, File: Workers Alliance of America, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
84. U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 37–39, 82. *The New York Times*, November 20, 1941, 29.
85. Howard, *WPA and Federal Relief Policy*, 119–120. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President's Personal File, File 7649 (Lasser, David). Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 145. Margaret Weir, *Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 51.
86. Jeff Manza, "Political Sociological Models of the U.S. New Deal," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 297–322. Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, 97.

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Bourdieu's political sociology and the politics of European integration¹

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Some traditional approaches to the politics of European integration

For five decades, Western Europe has been in political and economic turmoil. Closer cooperation between Western European countries started with France's and Germany's determination to prevent the advent of a third world war. The leaders of these countries decided to pool steel production by creating the European Coal and Steel Community. Later, with a few other countries they created a common atomic agency. Economic integration soon took the lead, spilling over to other domains. The Euro, shared by twelve European Union member-states, crowned this economic push, and is creating pressures to develop closer cooperation in other areas, such as military issues, foreign policy, and social policy.

Political scientists have provided standard social scientific approaches to this macro level transformation process. They have emphasized institutional and policy matters. To simplify a great deal, two models have dominated scholarly discussion. The state centric model emphasizes the role of nation-states in their attempts to augment their power. According to some proponents of this inter-governmentalist and neo-

realist model,² the process of European integration has, in many ways, strengthened rather than weakened European nation-states. Nation-states are still the key players in European politics. A second model, propagated by neofunctionalists, is called the multi-governance model. According to this model, nation-states are losing ground in the face of growing transnationalization and regionalization of decision-making. The European Union has already become the main decision maker in Europe.³

Sociological and anthropological micro-level approaches have lately supplemented and, to a certain extent, challenged these policy-oriented, high politics approaches to European integration.⁴ These anthropological and sociological approaches look at integration processes from bottom up, to use Simon Bulmer's terms, at the level of everyday political life, often using interviews and participant observation as research techniques. French anthropologist Marc Abélès has studied the European Parliament and the European Commission from the inside, analyzing the internal dividing lines and tensions of these institutions. In his works, Abélès strives to present European political institutions as they reveal themselves to an outside observer. In his book *La vie quotidienne au Parlement européen* (Everyday life in the European Parliament), he maps the contradictions of transnational political representation.⁵ The Member of the European Parliament has to represent both the national interests of France and those of the transnational institution he serves.⁶ American political sociologist George Ross has studied the cabinet of the former head of the European Commission Jacques Delors.⁷ In this study, Ross scrutinizes the strategies of Delors's cabinet in the Commission, and the numerous practical questions that arise when national politicians and civil servants end up serving common, European interests in the European Commission.

Since the 1990s, social constructivism has presented a social scientific alternative for the study of European integration. By introducing Anthony Giddens's social theory into international relations theory and European studies,⁸ social constructivism opens new paths to scholarly work that emphasize socialization and the social construction of reality, following in the spirit of Berger and Luckmann.⁹ In contrast to previous approaches, social constructivist studies emphasize the symbolic aspects of European integration, discourses and more generally the power of words to construct (to simplify again a great deal) two distinctive political ontologies relative to Europe, that

of a Europe of nation-states and that of a Europe of transnational processes.

According to some social constructivist scholars,¹⁰ the purpose of the constructivist research program is to study relatively neglected areas of the integration process, polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, and the role of ideas and the uses of language. Social constructivism focuses on what the authors call social ontologies, which include such diverse phenomena as intersubjective meanings, cultures of national security, and symbolic politics. By emphasizing social interaction, social constructivists are able to examine in a new way the structure of the international system, and the dialectics between states and the international order. According to some, social constructivism is situated between rationalism, represented by such approaches as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, and reflectivism, which includes postmodernism and post-structuralism.

Although presenting an alternative approach, social constructivism also has its weaknesses. A major one is the absence of a theory of agency.¹¹ This has to do with a neglect of political action as situated action, that is, action in specific institutional settings. Social constructivist scholars concentrate on the interaction between agents and structures, emphasizing the role of structures. A second weakness of social constructivism is that, despite its stated aims to study the social fabric of European and world politics, it is only weakly sociological. Its protagonists are eager to examine the discursive processes informing European integration, identity, norms of behavior, and so on, leaving largely untouched the social characteristics of the individuals and groups who, through their activities, construct this symbolic and material entity. Bourdieu's political theory presents another version of social constructivism, a structural constructivist account of politics that believes in the construction of reality by agents who, constrained by structures that are material and symbolic, struggle to accumulate social resources.

Political field and political capital¹²

Bourdieu develops his political sociology using three by now well-known concepts, field, capital, and habitus. Following Max Weber's analysis of spheres of life,¹³ Bourdieu analyzes politics like any other area of social activity, such as the economy, religion, or education.¹⁴

Bourdieu's concept of field refers to a relative autonomous sector of social activity. By capital, Bourdieu means social resource. Each field has its specific capital. Political capital is what agents accumulate, and fight for, in the political field. It involves specific social skills, the capacity to mobilize individuals around a common goal, to formulate collective policies, or to win seats for one's party, for instance.¹⁵ Each field has its dominant habitus, a culture or an internalized set of principles of actions and of evaluation. Reality is, of course, more complicated than this.

In his political theory, Bourdieu conceptualizes politics topologically. The political field constitutes a space that is structured such that the value of each element of it is formed through the network of relationships that this element entertains with the other elements in the field. In Bourdieu's structuralist theory, then, the relative value of an element is determined by this set of relationships and not by any external factors. Any unit, a political party, an international organization, a confederation of nation-states, can be analyzed as a field.

The political field is subject to some general, structural principles that are common to all fields. The most important of these *modus operandi* is the field's organization around two opposite poles: the protagonists of change and the apostles of law and order, the progressives and the conservatives, the heterodox and the orthodox, or the challengers and the incumbents.¹⁶ In the political field, this binary logic not only structures political parties and ideologies; it permeates the political field as a whole, from political parties and other political organizations between the progressive and conservative wings, all the way down to the habitus of an individual who might have evolved from a radical youth into a conservative party official.

In his theory, the political field has the same structural characteristics as any other field. Political capital is symbolic capital in the field of politics, a type of capital that the agents involved in this field compete for. Agents at the autonomous pole of the political field possess the most legitimate type of political capital, whereas agents at the heteronomous pole of the political field accumulate alternative types of political capital. The dominant have a lot of capital, the dominated relatively little. Through a process of sociomimesis, agents' political stances and political strategies follow their positions in the political field.

Political agents attempt to monopolize the legitimate means of manipulating the social world.¹⁷ They compete with journalists and social scientists in the struggle for the “monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence,”¹⁸ a phrase Bourdieu borrowed from Weber’s discussion of the priesthood having the monopoly over the legitimate manipulation of the means of salvation and the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence.¹⁹

The influence of Weber’s discussion of the priesthood is also evident in Bourdieu’s analysis of the relationship between political professionals and amateurs. As the political field gains in autonomy, the profanes become increasingly dispossessed of the properly political means of production. For instance, professional politicians that have gone through elite French schools like the *Instituts d’études politiques* (IEP) or the *Ecole nationale d’administration* (ENA) gradually replace amateur political activists or citizen-legislators.²⁰ This way the criteria that regulate entry into the political field also change. Bourdieu does not theorize the levels of autonomy, but as the field becomes more autonomous its internal mechanisms play a more central role in political activity.²¹ Struggles are sedimented and institutionalized, eventually forming part of the objectified and materialized social unconscious. In this historical process, each political organization develops its own esoteric culture that is alien to outsiders. Following Bourdieu’s analytical method, to understand the specific meaning of a political stance, one must situate it in a relational network composed, on the one hand, of the other stances formulated at the time and, on the other hand, of the structure of the demand.

As political capital becomes objectified into posts in the party apparatus, relative independence from electoral sanction develops. For individuals in normal times, the temptation to integrate into the political apparatus grows as the material and symbolic spoils accumulated by the party are redistributed to the followers.²² Conversely, in exceptional or revolutionary times, staying in the political apparatus can be risky.

Bourdieu differentiates between two types of political capital, that acquired by the individual and that acquired by delegation. Individual political capital is the result either of slow accumulation, as in the case of French “notables,” or of action in a situation of institutional void and crisis,²³ in which case the concept is close to Weber’s charismatic legitimacy. Personal political capital disappears with the physical

disappearance of the person holding this power. He or she is recognized and known for characteristics that are considered his or her own. Political capital is acquired by delegation through investiture by an institution, for instance, a political party or other political enterprise. A person receives from the institution a limited and provisional transfer of collective capital composed of recognition and fidelity.²⁴ Through this process, the capital is partly transformed from collective to personal. Political capital becomes institutionalized in the form of posts and positions. Those in the service of political enterprises are their delegates.

Political capital by delegation thus refers to a situation where the power of a politician depends on the power of his or her party and of his or her position in the party. The leader of the party becomes, through investiture, a banker²⁵ and the party a bank specializing in political capital. The banker controls access to this collective capital, which is bureaucratized and certified by the party's bureaucracy. Citing Antonio Gramsci, Bourdieu writes that political agents such as trade union representatives are "bankers of men in a monopoly situation."²⁶

Bourdieu's theory is Durkheimian in its holistic analysis of the political field, and Weberian in its attempt to think of political processes using economic terms as models and to concentrate on symbolic capital. Following Durkheim, Bourdieu sees the political in functionalist terms as forming a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. The logic of the whole conditions the role of the parts, and the whole takes on a life of its own that is independent of the parts. The logic of the political field determines the stances taken.²⁷ Bourdieu also sees political activity in terms of rituals, institutions, and symbolic action. A central ritual in his theory of political representation is that of investiture, whereby an individual is chosen to represent and constitute a group.

Like Weber, for whom the modern state is an "enterprise" or a "business" (*Betrieb*),²⁸ for Bourdieu the offer and demand of political goods and the monopolization of capital are the main political processes. As a result, sociology and political science paradoxically become subfields of economics (types of *minor economics*), mimicking economic terms and thought schemes. Political action becomes an inferior, because less rational, form of economic action. Politics is seen as a war between groups fighting for domination. By law, public officials are supposed to further public interest, although often they use their legitimacy to further their particular ends. Political power is supposed to be public

power, and the state the guarantor of public order. Bourdieu questioned these suppositions. At the same time, phenomena usually seen as forming part of political culture, such as the public sphere²⁹ and the rule of law, had little place in Bourdieu's theory. Incorporating them would require drawing qualitative differences and distinguishing politics from other human activities in non-formal terms.

Since the 1960s Bourdieu began studying the state, and specifically the French state. The sociogenesis of the state is "the culmination of a process of concentration of different kinds of capital, capital derived from physical force or instruments of coercion (the army, the police), economic capital, cultural, or better still informational capital, symbolic capital; a concentration which, as such, translates into possession of a sort of metacapital giving the bearer power over all the other kinds of capital and those who possess them" (my translation).³⁰

Through a process of privatization of public power prior to the existence of the state, certain social groups succeed in monopolizing various kinds of public authority. The new authority that emerges becomes responsible for calling the shots and deciding about the relative value of social resources and their exchange rates. The state participates in a decisive manner in the production and reproduction of the instruments of construction of social reality. In Bourdieu's formulation, the state is a kind of grand social organizer that "constantly exercises a formative action of durable dispositions," of *dauerhabitus* to use Weber's term.³¹ It imposes fundamental principles of classification on everybody – sex, age, competence, and so on.³² Its influence is everywhere. In the family, it controls the rites of institution; in the schooling system, it creates divisions between the chosen and the rejected, durable, often definitive symbolic divisions that are universally recognized and that often have determining effects on the future of individuals. The individual's submission to the state order is the result of the harmony between cognitive structures and the objective structures of the world to which they apply.

Competition and symbolic violence among various groups – *homo homini lupus* – are endless, instituted by society in a Rousseauan manner but lacking the positive basis Rousseau's theory of primitive man has. There is no end to the struggle, no light at the end of the tunnel. In fact, and paradoxically, it seems that in Bourdieu's theory politics is by definition stateless, understood as genuine shared public authority. Bourdieu never studied the European Union as a socio-

logical object, but in its current, neoliberal form, he condemned it.³³ Through his political activism, he sought to create a social Europe. In Bourdieu's framework, the European Union is taking some of the functions of the nation-state, but a European civil society and an effective European democracy have not yet developed. The European Union is in its current form undemocratic, a polity without a civil society.³⁴

Structural constructivism and European integration

Several scholars working in the area of the political sociology of Europe have been inspired by Bourdieu's work, and have adapted some of Bourdieu's analytical tools (such as field and capital) to the study of European integration. They analyze European integration through specific objects, for instance new social groups such as Members of the European Parliament or civil servants, connecting political strategies to structural location and to social characteristics such as gender and education, and analyzing broader processes such as the construction of a transnational political field. They approach these objects anthropologically by interviews and participant observation, linking meaning-structures to broader macro-sociological transformations. In this sense, more than most sociological institutionalists, they explore agency. In contrast to Bourdieu, they also study specifically political processes such as elections as a means of distributing political power and the public sphere as participating in the setting of rules directing the political game, in some cases comparing to one another the structures of different national political fields. Concerning the European Parliament, what is interesting is that it is a totally new type of political institution. Likewise, the European parliamentarian is a new type of politician who can be contrasted with the traditional elected politician and the nominated international politicians such as those working in international organizations.

While the European Union does not possess the traditional attributes of the state, such as the monopoly of legitimate violence, or of a federation, such as a constitution and taxing and spending powers, it presents nonetheless certain features of a field that increasingly dominates the more established social political units that partly compose it (states, regions). Certain groups in the European bureaucracy present themselves as holders or caretakers of a type of European, collective symbolic capital that undermines state sovereignty. Struggles over the

definition of the European Union and the content of this European political capital are taking place between agents at all levels, starting from the transnational level where the E.U. bureaucracy, various powerful transnational interest groups (for instance industrial groups) and the smaller member-states oppose the larger member-states attempts to keep the European Union as a confederation of nation-states. The political and economic resources available to the groups occupying central positions in the Eurosphere (to use Dusan Sidjanski's term³⁵) enable them increasingly to determine the rules of the transnational political game through, for instance, institutional configurations (e.g., by reinforcing the position of the European Commission) and the imposition of new principles of social classification (e.g., through directives) (70 percent of new legislation stems from the European level). This concentration of resources also transforms the political cultures of the national and regional political subfields, as the case of the European Parliament demonstrates.³⁶

French political sociologist Michel Mangenot has studied the constitution on the European level of a transnational network of powerful political agents that use domestic political resources at the transnational level. These have a common trait: they are all former students of the French elite school *Ecole nationale d'administration* (ENA). They form an unofficial network in the European bureaucracy, exchanging among themselves services and information. This system of social services and information is parallel to the official, European bureaucracy. Mangenot shows how the Europeanization of the ENA – a key institution in the reproduction of French elites³⁷ – found resistance in many circles that considered Paris as still being the sole political center of France. An invisible coup d'état has taken place in terms of the education of French elites, as part of the training now takes place in Strasbourg, seat of the Council of Europe and, with Brussels and Luxembourg, of the European parliament. Certain educational assets, specifically studies at the IEP and the ENA, have provided individuals with the means to make it to top bureaucratic positions in the European Commission.³⁸ For some, European institutions have become extensions of French institutions.

Another French political sociologist, Willy Beauvallet applied Bourdieu's concept of field to the study of a specific political unit, the European Parliament, scrutinizing the social characteristics and capital structures of the European parliamentarians.³⁹ He analyzes the political uses these parliamentarians make of their position in the

French political field. The French contingent to the European Parliament can be examined in terms of length of service, education, political experience, and so on. Beauvallet classifies these European deputies into four groups depending on two variables, the level of investment in the European Parliament and the length of their careers. Novices can be divided into those who invest and try to carve themselves careers in the European Parliament and those who consider the Parliament as being a stepping stone for a more traditional political career. Career-minded European parliamentarians had invested considerably into work in the European Parliament, whereas more experienced politicians were there mainly to crown their careers.

In my research, I have explored transnational political processes in Europe by studying the dislocating effects of European integration on the Finnish and French national political fields and elections to the European Parliament.⁴⁰ In both member-states, European integration has changed the structural features of the domestic political fields by introducing new institutions and practices. In Finland, the elections to the European Parliament enabled individuals who would not normally succeed politically to gain an electoral position. The 1996 elections were characterized by a total lack of interest from top politicians such as the prime minister, Paavo Lipponen, and the finance minister, Sauli Niinistö. This testified to a larger indifference on the part of the political establishment. What was important was what happened at the executive level, at that of the Council of ministers of the European Union. This indifference toward the European electoral institution, which is due to the structural marginality of the European Parliament in Finnish politics, partly enabled individuals endowed with cultural capital – TV celebrities and former sports stars – to win seats.

In France, the picture is not totally different. There also the European Parliament is a marginal political institution.⁴¹ It attracts a variety of individuals, from those with no political capital to politicians dominated in terms of their capital structures. For those with no political capital, European elections provide an opportunity to transform other assets such as cultural capital into political capital. For women politicians and regional politicians, dominated in domestic political structures, European elections serve as an entrance point to national politics. Women politicians have been successful in these elections, as have regional politicians unknown to the national audience. The success of women politicians can be explained partly by the strategies of politicians like François Mitterrand and partly by the strong pres-

ence of women in some parties, such as the Socialist party. But many of the women initially elected to the European Parliament, where they could be out of the way and do as little damage as possible from the point of view of the dominant political groups, eventually found their way to other sectors of the French political field, even to become ministers. For regional politicians the European Parliament presented an alternative avenue to access top national positions to the Senate and the lower chamber. In both Finland and France, the European Parliament has enabled certain groups to challenge traditional careers and the dominant political culture that goes with it.

European political integration is also social and cultural integration. Spending time in Brussels changes the political habitus of politicians. For Finnish and French politicians work in Brussels does not present an alternative to national political careers, they do not all become federalists after having worked in the European Union. Rather, transnational political careers modify opportunity structures and become additional possibilities to more traditional prospects at national, regional and local levels. Some invest more than others in the European Parliament, but this investment is at the same time an investment at national, regional, and local levels. These do not exclude one another, because politicians use their assets to further their careers on all levels.

Conclusions

In contrast to state- or Commission-centric approaches, structural constructivist political sociology has the advantage of presenting a holistic approach to political processes, enabling an analysis of the formation of a transnational European political space, composed of both a transnational level and more established national and regional units. As a variation of the multi-governance model, it grasps the European Union, member states, and civil societies as forming a single structure – a field – that constrains and enables political action.⁴² The European Union is also a new system of political domination, in which certain groups, members of the Eurosphere, endeavor to transform private authority into public authority and their special interests into European interests in contrast to national or regional interests, classified as narrow minded and archaic. Following political theorists who examines elites such as Michels, Mosca, and Pareto, Bourdieu's critical approach is sensitive to the political power struggles that attempt to define the common good. Scholars inspired by his work and endeavor-

ing to develop his structural constructivist approach have analyzed the political strategies forged by agents in relation to the formation of a transnational political field and to specific social characteristics such as class, gender, education, and political experience.

At a high level of abstraction, politics can be analyzed in all forms of social interaction. The study of politics is equated with that of social domination. At a lower level of abstraction, politics can be analyzed as a specific field of human activity. Scholars need to develop structural constructivism to take into account the specificities of fields and not just their general properties. The study of political fields has to be historically informed. Different kinds of political fields have to be separated from one another. At this lower level of abstraction different types of political fields could correspond to different types of political systems (for instance, the E.U. vs. nation-states, the Westphalian state vs. the postmodern state). For Bourdieu, the mechanisms of power delegation operate the same way in the totalitarian Soviet Union as in democratic France⁴³ and in the religious and political domains. In the manner of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, he overemphasizes in his analysis of political delegation the profane's total submission to the delegate. But the public sphere (the media, NGOs and pressure groups) presents a counter force to the political establishment that regularly denounces politicians for their wheeling and dealing. In this respect, Bourdieu's political action, contradicts his political theory, as he himself was very active in various intellectual movements at the end of his life.

A developed structural constructivist account of European regional integration has to address the temporal and multi-level character of the European Union (the internal dynamics of integration). For instance, the structural dislocations created by various temporalities – such as national election cycles – prevent structural homologies between different spaces from being realized. In the case of a transnational polity like the European Union, its multilevel character requires that the multi-positionalities of agents be taken into account. For instance, in certain specific situations national ministers, as representatives not only of their member-states but also of the European Union, can use the information they have to further and even to impose policies at lower levels. Now that European institutional structures are being hotly debated and the European Union is expanding to Eastern Europe, critical approaches such as the one provided by structural constructivism are needed more than ever.

Notes

1. For the term "structural constructivist", see Bourdieu, "Social space and symbolic power," *Sociological Theory* 4 (1989): 14. French sociologist Pierre Ansart also used the term in his survey of French sociology, *Les sociologies contemporaines* (Paris: Seuil, 1990). For an analysis of structural constructivism in the French intellectual field, see Niilo Kauppi, *French Intellectual Nobility: Institutional and Symbolic Transformations in the Post-Sartrian Era* (Albany, SUNY-Press, 1995), 35–68.
2. See, for instance, Andrew Moravcsik, "Why the European Community strengthens the state: A liberal intergovernmentalist approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31 (1983): 473–524; *The Choice for Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
3. New institutionalisms of rationalist, historical, and sociological persuasions have provided a third way to the neofunctionalist/multilevel governance and inter-governmentalist approaches. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734–749; William Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, editors, *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political science and the three new institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44 (1996): 936–957; Junko Kato, "Institutions and rationality in politics – three varieties of neo-institutionalists," *British Journal of Political Science* 26/4 (1996): 553–582. For a recent presentation of these approaches, see Gerald Schneider and Mark Aspinwall, editors, *The rules of integration. Institutional approaches to the study of Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
4. See, for instance, the special issue on the political sociology of Europe, Virginie Guiraudon, editor, *Cultures & Conflicts* 38–39 (2000).
5. Marc Abélès, *La vie quotidienne au Parlement européen* (Paris: Hachette, 1992).
6. Richard S. Katz, "Role orientation in parliaments," in Richard S. Katz and Bernhard Wessels, editors, *The European parliament, the national parliaments, and European integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
7. George Ross, *Jacques Delors and European integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
8. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46 (1992): 391–425; *Social theory of international politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966). The symbolic usage by political scientists of sociological literature is a larger problem that is tied to interdisciplinary communication.
10. Thomas Christiansen, K. E. Jørgensen, Antje Wiener, editors, a special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (1999) on social constructivism and sociological institutionalism.
11. Jeffrey Checkel, "Social construction and integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (1999): 545–560.
12. For discussions of Bourdieu's political sociology and political theory, cf. Jean-Yves Caro, "La sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu. Éléments pour une théorie du champ politique," *Revue française de science politique* 30/1 (1980): 1171–1197; Frédéric Bon and Yves Schemeil, "La rationalisation de l'inconduite. Comprendre le statut du politique chez Pierre Bourdieu," *Revue française de science politique* 30/1 (1980):

- 1203; Philippe Fritsch, "Introduction," in Pierre Bourdieu, *Propos sur le champ politique* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2001), 7–31; Lahouari Addi, "Violence symbolique et statut du politique dans l'oeuvre de Pierre Bourdieu," *Revue française de science politique* 51/6 (2000): 950–954; NiiloKauppi, "Elements for a structural constructivist theory of politics and of European integration," Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies Working Paper, 104 (2003); and David Swartz (forthcoming), "Pierre Bourdieu's political sociology and governance perspectives," in Henrik Bang, editor, *Governance traditions of political science, sociology and political theory*.
13. See *Zwischenbetrachtung*, Max Weber, *Gesammelte aufsätze zur religionssoziologie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972), 542; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors, *From Max Weber. Essays in sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 323–362.
 14. "Une interprétation de la théorie de la religion selon Max Weber," *Archives européennes de sociologie* XII (1971): 3–21; "Genèse et structure du champ religieux," *Revue française de sociologie* XII (1971): 295–334.
 15. For an interesting discussion of skills, see Neil Fligstein, "Social skills and the theory of fields," *Sociological Theory* 19/2 (2001): 105–125.
 16. William Gamson, *The strategy of social protest* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1975).
 17. Bourdieu, "Champ politique, champ des sciences sociales, champ journalistique," *Cahiers de GRS* 15 (Lyon), 13.
 18. Bourdieu, "Champ politique, champ des sciences sociales, champ journalistique," 19.
 19. Weber, *Economy and society* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972); *Staatssoziologie. Soziologie der rationalen Staatsanalt und der modernen politischen Parteien und Parlamente* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966), 27–28.
 20. Pierre Bourdieu, *The state nobility. Elite schools in the field of power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Pippa Norris, "Recruitment into the European parliament," in Katz and Wessels, editors, *The European parliament, the national parliaments, and European integration*.
 21. Weber, *Economy and society*, 608.
 22. Cf. Weber, *Staatssoziologie*, 63–64; Bourdieu, "La représentation politique. Eléments pour une théorie du champ politique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 36/37 (1981): 19–21.
 23. Bourdieu, "La représentation politique," 18.
 24. *Ibid.*, 19.
 25. Bourdieu, *Propos sur le champ politique* (Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2000), 65.
 26. Bourdieu, *Language and symbolic power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from political writings 1921–1926* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), 17.
 27. Bourdieu, *Language and symbolic power*, 184.
 28. Weber, *Economy and society*.
 29. Jürgen Habermas, *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society* (Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1989).
 30. Bourdieu, *Raisons pratiques* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 109.
 31. Weber, *Gesammelte aufsätze zur religionssoziologie*, 541.
 32. Bourdieu, *Méditations pascaliennes* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 209.
 33. *Acts of resistance: Against the new myths of our time* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
 34. Bourdieu, *Acts of resistance*. Habermas's assessment is similar. Jürgen Habermas, *The postnational constellation: Political essays* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001).

For analysis of Bourdieu's intellectual politics, see the special issue of *Substance* 93/23 (2000), Jean-François Fourny, editor.

35. Dusan Sidjanski, "Eurosphères. Dirigeants et groupes européens," in François d'Arcy and Luc Rouban, editors, *De la Vème république à l'Europe. Hommage à Jean-Louis Quermone* (Paris: PUF, 1996).
36. However, this does not automatically make politicians more European or federalist.
37. See Bourdieu, *The state nobility*.
38. Michel Mangenot, "Une école européenne d'administration? L'improbable conversion de l'ENA à l'Europe," *Politix* 43 (1998): 7–32.
39. Willy Beauvallet, "Institutionnalisation et professionnalisation de l'Europe politique. Le cas des eurodéputés français," *Politique étrangère* (Winter, 2003).
40. Niilo Kauppi, "European Union institutions and French political careers," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 19/1 (1996): 1–24; "Power or subjection? French women politicians in the European parliament," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 6/3 (1999): 331–342; "La construction de l'Europe: le cas des élections européennes en Finlande 1999," *Cultures & Conflits* 38–39 (2000): 101–118.
41. This is also true in terms of the social characteristics of Europarliamentarians, see Emil J. Kirchner, *The European parliament: Performances and prospects* (Aldershot: Gower, 1984).
42. For a similar approach in some respects, see Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical functionalism: Stagnation as a booster of European integration," *International Organization* 45/2 (1995): 262.
43. Bourdieu, *Propos sur le champ politique*, 101.

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CHAPTER 12

From critical sociology to public intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu & politics

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From social science to politics¹

On December 12, 1995 Pierre Bourdieu, France's leading public intellectual in recent years until his untimely death in 2002, took up a megaphone and addressed striking railroad employees at the Lyon train station rally culminating the largest street demonstrations in Paris since May 1968. He proclaimed solidarity of French intellectuals with the striking workers. There he delivered his famous "Against the Destruction of a Civilization"² speech in which he spoke not to the particular grievances of the strikers but argued that they represented something more fundamental and far reaching: the defense of a type of social security that had been protected, albeit imperfectly, by the traditional welfare state. Bourdieu would reiterate this theme across a wide range of public protests and social unrest over the next seven years. He became a strong advocate for the protection of pensions, job security, open access to higher education, and other provisions of the welfare state that were achievements of social struggles earlier in the 20th century. He argued against social security budget cuts and scaling back welfare provision in the name of free markets and international competition. He began to sign public petitions, participate in demonstrations, editorialize in newspapers, grant more interviews, appear on television, and work overtly with political protest groups. He became the primary public intellectual of major scientific status at the head of the anti-globalization movement that emerged in France and other Western European countries in the nineties.

Bourdieu (along with Jean-Claude Passeron) had achieved some fame already in the mid-sixties with the publication of *The Inheritors: French Students and their Relation to Culture* followed by *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* in 1970.³ Yet

this did not lead him to assume an active public intellectual role so typical of many French intellectuals. In fact, his later years of public political activism seem to contrast with the earlier years of following a professional career as a social scientific researcher. Indeed Bourdieu's relative silence during the May 1968 student uprising was conspicuous for virtually all other leading French sociologists at the time took public positions regarding the student movement.⁴ Bourdieu clearly became a kind of public intellectual that he had not been before. A change had occurred in both form and frequency of highly visible political engagements.

Furthermore, this new political activism seemed at odds with earlier views Bourdieu had expressed regarding the role that a social scientific intellectual should pursue. Indeed, he had voiced early in his career sharp criticism of certain forms of political activism by intellectuals. After all was it not Bourdieu who had been highly critical in his earlier writings of the "total intellectual" role played by Jean-Paul Sartre? Had not Bourdieu been quite dismissive of much of Sartre's political activism in his later years as irresponsible, opportunistic and ineffective.⁵ Was it not Bourdieu who had been sharply critical of sociologists who in his view played to the demands of the mass media?⁶ Had not Bourdieu stressed in his early writings the importance of building up sociology as a science rather than using it as a form of political activism?⁷ The political activism of his later years also seemed to mark a change in view of the political responsibilities of the social scientist. Reluctant in his early years to play a highly visible political role, Bourdieu came to express more forthrightly the view that the social scientist has an important public political function to fulfill. Thus, a striking paradox emerged between Bourdieu's sharp criticism of media intellectuals in the past and his own sudden high media visibility in his later years. Bourdieu both sharply criticized and paradoxically enhanced that kind of intellectual practice.

To be sure, Bourdieu had on a few occasions made highly visible political statements. He had joined Michel Foucault in protesting the Russian clamp down on Solidarity in Poland in 1981. He had supported the French comedian Coluche's right to enter the 1981 electoral race against the Socialist Mitterrand for the presidency. On a couple of occasions during the 1984–1990 period he played the role of expert by preparing reports on educational reform for the French Socialist leadership in government. But in comparison to the

public political activism of Foucault, and particularly Sartre, and the customary appearance on French television of many other leading French intellectuals, Bourdieu had been strikingly absent from the front stage of the Parisian French intellectual politics prior to the nineties.

Criticism of Bourdieu's activism

The December 1995 strikes in France created an intense national debate over social security and the legitimacy of the strikes. By taking a highly public position in support of the strikes and by helping to organize a petition of intellectuals in support of the strikers, Bourdieu placed himself right at the center of the national debate. By the late nineties, particularly beginning in 1998, Bourdieu himself came under sharp attack in the French media for his political stances opposing government policies. Indeed the subsequent debate sometimes reduced to whether one was against or for Bourdieu!⁸ One can find in the popular press numerous personal attacks as well as highly polemical denunciations of both his sociological research and political activism.⁹

Three broad types of criticisms appeared. First, did these recent political activities in the nineties, particularly since December 1995, represent a new career strategy by Bourdieu? Had Pierre Bourdieu, professor of sociology at the Collège de France, suddenly “discovered” politics as some seemed to believe? Were there in fact two Bourdieus: the political activist of his later years and the professional sociologist of his earlier period?

Second, had he finally realized his life-long dream of becoming another Sartre or Foucault? Was his recent public political visibility motivated by a drive for personal grandeur, intellectual notoriety, and power? Did he in fact desire to become just the kind of “total intellectual” or “media intellectual” he himself sharply criticized in his earlier work?

Third, some critics suggested that the high visibility political activism of his later years simply bore out an underlying ideological agenda that had characterized Bourdieu's work from the very beginning and compromised its scientific integrity. They questioned the very scientific status of his work. This criticism came largely from disgruntled former

disciples who broke with Bourdieu in the eighties.¹⁰ Was his sociology merely a form of political opportunism as this group of critics charge?

Toward a Field Explanatory Framework

I think the answers to these critical questions are a good deal more complex than the questions themselves seem to suggest. None of them individually suggests a satisfactory answer. Indeed, they seem to be searching for a very non-sociological explanation of Bourdieu's later years. They focus on Bourdieu the individual abstracted from the social context in which he lived and worked. The explanatory framework I sketch out below is rather different. It stresses context, or in Bourdieu's terminology, "fields" of cultural and political life as well as personal choice. The chapter argues that changes in Bourdieu's position within the French intellectual field and changes within the intellectual field itself in relation to the economic and political fields set the stage for Bourdieu's strategic choices in political involvement. Bourdieu's experience of those changes led him to shift emphasis in the way he understood the relationship between sociology and politics. What I offer is a cultural/political field explanation rather than a personal/psychological one, an explanation where personal intellectual strategy is framed and modified in changing institutional settings.¹¹ This chapter identifies several institutional conditions that seemed decisive for Bourdieu to be able to play the kind of public intellectual role he did in his later years.

1. The early years: Building legitimation for critical social scientific research

For Sociology as a Scientific Craft

Prior to the eighties and nineties Bourdieu rarely made public political declarations in the tradition of Parisian intellectuals. His efforts during the sixties and seventies focused on developing a critical social scientific research orientation as distinct from the academic sociology taught in the universities and the media-oriented pop sociology that flourished in French intellectual circles. Sociology at that time (fifties and sixties) was a dominated discipline.¹² There existed few programs in sociology and little specialized training. It was either taught as strictly academic theory akin to social philosophy or practiced as applied empirical research with little connection to theory.¹³ Teaching

and research in sociology hardly represented an attractive career option for promising graduates of the Ecole Normale Supérieure in the fifties and early sixties. What was needed, according to Bourdieu,¹⁴ was to build up the scientific legitimation of sociology rather than join in the widespread leftist political activism in France against capitalism and imperialism at that time.

In this early period Bourdieu seemed to believe that he could distinguish between internal intellectual field struggles and external political struggles and focus on the internal struggles in an effort to build up the scientific status of sociology in France.¹⁵ Enhancing intellectual autonomy from outside forces would be an enduring theme throughout his career and much of his later political activism seems rooted in this basic concern. He wanted to transform sociology into a rigorous research enterprise that would be critical though not prophetic, theoretical though empirically researchable, and scientific though not positivist.¹⁶ To that end he devoted his energies to creating a research center (Centre de sociologie de l'éducation et de la culture), to founding and directing a sociological journal (*Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*), and to forming a network of researchers who would institutionalize and legitimize his vision for sociological inquiry.

Bourdieu's later years brought change not only in his activities but also in his view of the relationship between science and politics. In his early writings, he argues that there should be a clear separation between sociology as a science and politics as distinct arenas of struggle. The first task of sociological analysis is to break with received views of the social world, including political views, and to develop its own scientific analysis of the social world.¹⁷ If sociology were to become a legitimate science, then it needed to develop an autonomous set of intellectual practices distinct from external constraints. The sociologist was not to take marching orders from political parties or interest groups. Bourdieu, though on the political left in France, was sharply critical of the "fellow traveler" posture adopted by Sartre vis-à-vis the French Communist Party. Sociology was to establish its own intellectual agenda.

Sociologists were not philosophers or moralists who were called to offer prophetic insights on all the important issues of the day. Sociology was a scientific craft that constructed a distinct type of knowledge that

was empirical though not positivist and critical though not intellectualist. The sociologist was called to exercise this craft not embrace a prophetic leadership role for society.

Politics Nevertheless

Yet, even Bourdieu's earliest work has a political dimension.¹⁸ While drawing a sharp distinction between politics and the scientific work of sociology, Bourdieu insisted on the political relevance of sociology. He reasoned as follows. Sociology is to be the study of power. Since effective exercise of power requires legitimation, the practice of sociological research has the effect of unmasking and debunking hidden, taken-for-granted power relations shaping social life. Bourdieu argues that by unmasking taken-for-granted power relations "genuine scientific research embodies a threat for the social order."¹⁹ Scientific research exposes the hidden interests of the established powers.²⁰ Once power relations are exposed, new possibilities for individual and collective arrangements become possible.

This view of science suggests a key role that sociologists can play in modern societies: "The sociologist unveils and therefore intervenes in the force relations between groups and classes and he can even contribute to the modification of those relations."²¹ That a critical social science can potentially modify relations between social classes amounts to a strong claim for the power of sociological knowledge in modern stratified societies and for the vocation of the social scientist as intellectual. Indeed, a normative vision for the political effects of social scientific research characterizes Bourdieu's sociological project.²² And a sociology of intellectuals informs Bourdieu's reflexive practice of the sociological craft.

Choice of research topic for Bourdieu always had political significance. "Acts of social scientific research," as suggested by the title of Bourdieu's journal, are to be "acts of conquest" against the taken-for-granted understandings of social hierarchies and therefore are fundamentally "political acts." In this respect, he follows Max Weber who argues that choice of research topic is informed by ethical and political considerations.²³ For Bourdieu, choice of research topics is guided by moral and political considerations: inequality, suffering, and domination. His early Algerian work on peasant attitudes toward time spoke critically of French colonialism and efforts to modernize traditional communities.²⁴ His two earliest "political"

texts, “Révolution dans la révolution” and “Les sous-prolétaires algériens,”²⁵ spoke directly to the colonial situation and French military involvement in Algeria. There he documents some of the destructive effects of colonialism and struggle for independence and raises the important political sociology issue of conditions that create political consciousness and action. *The Inheritors*²⁶ contributed to the growing critical consciousness of class inequalities in French higher education during the May 1968 student movement. *Reproduction*²⁷ informed a generation of labor leaders and activists as well as students, teachers, and sociologists of the subtle inequalities in education. Early work on public opinion emphasizes a sharp division between political professionals and lay persons over who actually produces political opinion.²⁸ This early work inaugurates a political sociology theme that will be developed later: the social closure of French political life to only those with the requisite cultural capital and social competence to participate.²⁹ Later work would likewise focus on important public concerns. *The State Nobility*³⁰ would document the increasing social elitism of French higher education and *The Weight of the World*³¹ would focus on social exclusion and suffering precipitated by the retracting welfare state.

Yet, the focus of Bourdieu’s early work was one of doing good science, albeit with a political dimension. He rarely signed political tracts, appeared on radio or television, joined in street demonstrations, editorialized in French newspapers – all activities that characterized many leading French intellectuals. Yet these forms of political expression Bourdieu himself would eventually employ to some degree. Clearly something changed for Bourdieu in the nineties and we turn to a brief exploration of key factors contributing to that change.

Field changes

Field mobility

An important factor was a change in institutional context where Bourdieu worked. He shifted positions within the French intellectual field from one of a young scholar in a relatively low-status social science to one of increasing institutional centrality and intellectual stature. Bourdieu made his career in research not in university teaching and career advancement up the traditional academic ladder in France.³² He accumulated intellectual prestige from his extensive

critical social scientific investigations and publications not teaching or institutional leadership. He did virtually no applied work for industry or government. He invested entirely in the culturally intensive sector of the field of cultural production, that is, the restricted cultural markets where cultural production is done largely for peers and enjoys a high degree of autonomy from external economic, political, and cultural forces.

These efforts were institutionally successful. He shifted from a position in a fairly low status intellectual enterprise (sociology) in France in the late fifties and early sixties to a central and leading position at one of the most prestigious intellectual institutions in France, the Collège de France in 1981.³³ Bourdieu's professional career was aided by the rising fortunes of his discipline. The social sciences in France also improved in stature in France during the sixties and seventies, expanding considerably in funding and recruitment of researchers, teachers, and particularly students.³⁴

One could hardly imagine Bourdieu playing the leading public intellectual role in the nineties without having first made this institutional shift in the French intellectual field. Entry into the Collège represented a very important step in securing the scientific legitimation of his work, which was the focus of his efforts early in his career. The Collège provided him institutional resources and considerable symbolic capital. Bourdieu's popularity increased especially among researchers and specialists. The Collège secured for him a prestigious institutional position from which he could speak beyond the community of intellectual peers.

Access to the Collège was made possible by his tremendous publication output, such as *Distinction* (1979), *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1972), and *The Logic of Practice* (1980), all now considered classics in 20th century sociology.³⁵ His journal *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, started in 1975, came to be viewed as a highly innovative and respected social scientific publication. Later works, such as *The State Nobility* (1989) also brought considerable media attention. His central position in the French scientific community was further solidified in 1993 with the French National Center for Scientific Research (Centre national de recherche scientifique) Gold Metal award by which the French scientific community gave special recognition to sociology as a science and to Bourdieu as its most recognized spokesperson.³⁶

Changes within the intellectual field

While Bourdieu's progressive shift to a central position within the French intellectual field is an obvious factor in his preparation for a public intellectual role, no less significant were changes within the French intellectual field. A shift in the French intellectual field occurred with the death of Foucault in 1984. Sartre had made intellectual political activism a virtual rite of necessity for French left intellectuals after World War II. Foucault emerged after Sartre continuing the tradition, if in altered form, of the French intellectual field being organized around a few superstars. But after Foucault's death an empty space was created in the French intellectual field. Yet, it was not certain that someone would emerge to take Foucault's place and continue the practice in its traditional form. The distinctly French tradition of the public intellectual, epitomized by Sartre and Foucault, had come under attack both in conception and institutional conditions. Many argued, or hoped, that this leading intellectual tradition was rapidly coming to an end.³⁷ Had not increased intellectual specialization and the displacement of the humanities by science in relative importance in French education undercut the traditional cultural base for the public intellectual in France? Had not Foucault followed a "specific intellectual" model of limited, specialized involvements in selected public issues, such as prison reform, rather than imitating the "total intellectual" model of speaking on all the issues of the day as idealized by Sartre?

But an empty space in an intellectual field does not guarantee a seat. Following Foucault's death there was speculation in the French media who if anyone might rise to take his place. Bourdieu did not immediately assume the leading position; indeed, it was by no means clear that Bourdieu would emerge as the leading one. Following Foucault's death there was a period of flux in which several intellectuals competed for public attention. Other potential candidates like Jacques Derrida already had considerable media visibility but none with the stature of Sartre or Foucault. Other conditions would have to be met for Bourdieu to emerge as a leading public intellectual.

Increasing Media Orientation of French Intellectual Life

Bourdieu not only changed position within the French intellectual field; the field itself changed in a way that led Bourdieu to devote more attention to struggles external to the research community.

Expanding cultural markets weakened the institutional base of the critical intellectual tradition. French higher education expanded considerably in the post-World War II period creating many more highly educated French men and women than could look forward to teaching positions as had traditionally been the case. Many highly educated individuals who might have sought careers in secondary and university teaching no longer saw those as attractive labor markets. Rapidly expanding opportunities in the mass media, management, advertising, etc. became alternative options. Moreover, the expansion of student enrollments without commensurate expansion of facilities and support services plus extensive politicization of the university milieu after May 1968 led many to see the universities as undesirable places for careers.

All of this contributed to the growth of cultural markets beyond the traditional purview of university elites. This growth in possibilities for both cultural consumption and production beyond the walls of the university changed the structure of power and control of cultural life in France. Prior to the sixties the university professor could enter into public debate under controlled conditions where he could exercise some control over the mode of transmission and reception of his views. The rapid expansion and diversification of cultural markets changed all of that. Symbolized by the events of May 1968, the traditional monopolizing power for the academic intellectual was lost.³⁸ French cultural and political life became more mass media oriented: the number of potential competitors in the public arena increased considerably, television came to play a greater role, and journalists increasingly shaped the form and content of intellectual debate in France. Numerous highly educated French men and women broke down the traditional boundaries between the university, government administration, and private and public enterprise by taking on multiple roles of teacher, consultant, journalist, etc.³⁹ A growing number of academics began orienting their writing toward high visibility media outlets. In Bourdieu's view, intellectual work became increasingly corrupted by being oriented toward the media rather than scholarly peer review groups.⁴⁰ Whereas the traditional critical intellectual had been rooted in the elite academic culture of *Ecole Nationale Supérieure*, the new participants in public debate were increasingly graduates of *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* and *Institut des Sciences Politiques* (Paris) who shared cultural orientations more favorable to markets and rational management. There also emerged a

number of policy oriented think tanks, such as the Foundation Saint Simon, that cultivated close contact between corporate executives, senior government officials, journalists, and policy consultants. Gone was the largely uncontested critical discourse of the political left intellectual and the institutional order that had fostered it.

The role of the mass media, particularly television, became vastly more important in French political life over the last thirty years. Bourdieu saw increasing interrelations between politics and the media, between the journalistic field and the political field. His research colleague Patrick Champagne documented that increasingly tight nexus leading him to refer to the “journalistic-political field.”⁴¹ Champagne’s work shows that this media/political arena became increasingly insulated from external influences and conflicts as it grew more and more homogeneous sociologically and unified ideologically. By a kind of “circular logic,” politicians and journalists feed off of each other: both react to public issues they themselves have constructed, often through opinion polling.

Bourdieu himself analyzed this evolution in some of his work as have others, such as Régis Debray, whose denunciation of the media orientation of many French intellectuals follows in many respects Bourdieu’s views.⁴² In this newly developing intellectual market the implicit critical dimension of the scholarly social scientific text becomes eclipsed by other contenders more able to attract attention in the new arena of public debate.

Economic and political changes

Globalization becomes a national issue

Changes in the broader political and economic arenas also helped set the stage for Bourdieu’s increasing public activism. A change in political and economic conditions created a new context in which Bourdieu developed his sharp criticism of neoliberalism and globalization. The attack against welfare state provision by Margaret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the United States spread to Western Europe. To Bourdieu’s considerable disgust even the Socialists in France began to advocate market-oriented reforms that would reduce the size and responsibilities of the welfare state. The year 1983 could be described as an about face in French political economic

policy. The Mitterrand government shifted abruptly away from the traditional *dirigist* tradition of economic policy characteristic of the Fifth Republic. It began dismantling with considerable rapidity some of the centralized power of the French state. The 1982 nationalizations gave way to the 1983 policy of privatization. Even firms remaining under government control were held to standards of profitable performance. Significant private sector policy initiatives increased. Restructuring of French industry created massive lay offs that were to be absorbed largely through early retirements with benefits.

Though traditionally critical of centralized and bureaucratized state power, Bourdieu came to view the new era of globalization and fiscal constraints on state spending as even more threatening to the well-being of communities. It was not just that Bourdieu stepped in to fill a gap in French intellectual space left by the death of Foucault in 1984. The issue of globalization had become a major issue in France of the nineties. No other single issue had so galvanized France since May 1968. By the early nineties the French became obsessed with globalization. There were prominent factory closings. Bookstores were filled with book titles on the subject. TV programs and news regularly featured the issue. José Bové and the direct political action of the peasant movement and protests received high media visibility. Bourdieu attended Bové's trial in July 2000 and offered his support. Globalization became in France not just a matter of intellectual debate but also the source of considerable social agitation. Thus, Bourdieu did not just fill a gap in the intellectual arena in the nineties. He entered the arena on a hotly debated issue. Globalization became a unifying national issue making it easier for intellectuals to find an issue on which they could speak and expect to be heard. Without a unifying national issue like globalization, Bourdieu's political engagements in his later years might well have been quite different.

The 1995 strikes

Late 1995 was a period of intense labor agitation in France. A broad range of labor unrest, particularly in the public sector, and demonstrations in the universities generated the most significant political crisis in France since May 1968.⁴³ The strikes were precipitated by the Juppé plan, named after the Prime Minister Alain Juppé who attempted a reform of the French social security system and a modification of the retirement benefits for employees of the Parisian transportation system (RATP) and French railroad employees (SNCF).

Salaries of public service employees were frozen and other measures limited or decreased the traditional benefits granted to public service employees. Massive railway employee strikes broke out and soon spread throughout the public sector bringing France to a standstill. The political crisis gave new life to the more radical political and labor union elements that rapidly gathered new support. Bourdieu supported the strikes.

Earlier in November of that year, a public petition with a list of signatures of prominent French intellectuals around the review *Esprit* and the Foundation Saint Simon – including the sociologist Alain Touraine – came out in support of the leadership of the socialist-oriented labor union Confédération Fédérale des Travailleurs (CFDT) who supported the Juppé plan. Bourdieu was furious that his long-standing antagonist *Esprit* had come out against the strikes.⁴⁴ He mobilized and published a second list of signatures appearing in early December supporting the strikes. These events marked the beginning of a series of highly visible, media catching public appearances by Bourdieu that continued in a variety of forms until his death in January 2002. To many observers in the French media this period marked the beginning of a very “political” Bourdieu.⁴⁵

The 1995 massive political mobilization in France in response to the erosion of public policies upholding traditional welfare state functions is very important for understanding the visibility that Bourdieu achieved in his later years as a public intellectual. Bourdieu could intervene politically with a considerable amount of symbolic capital not available to him in earlier years. He was mobilized by a social movement that made it possible for him to intervene politically in ways not possible in earlier years.⁴⁶ And intervene he did. He began to sign petitions, participate in demonstrations, editorialize in newspapers, appear on television, and work overtly with political protest groups.⁴⁷ He became France’s leading public intellectual.

Conjuncture of research and political issues

Another contributing factor to the rise of Bourdieu as a leading public intellectual was the conjuncture that occurred between the kinds of burning public issues that emerged during the nineties and Bourdieu’s own research. Bourdieu’s attack on neoliberalism not only took the form of polemical essays and public declarations. It was also based on

sociological research.

His support for the strikes in 1995, and the kinds of issues they represented, was anticipated already in his 1993 publication of *The Weight of the World*. There he documented the social suffering of those left unprotected by the vicissitudes of markets and by explicit public policy by state planners who had increasingly become practitioners of neo-liberal ideology. *Weight of the World* documents extensive testimony of the social effects of reduced welfare state protection. It amounted to a stinging indictment of Socialist government policies focused on so called fiscal responsibility rather than maintaining and fortifying traditional state welfare and safety net functions that corresponded to the long-standing demands of the left parties.

In 2000 Bourdieu published *Les structures sociales de l'économie*⁴⁸ (earlier portions of this book had already appeared in *Actes*) in which he deconstructs neo-liberal economic discourse by showing that the housing market for individual dwellings is in fact shaped by politics. The book offers a polemical attack against neo-classical economics by arguing that economic phenomena are always embedded in broad social and political phenomenon. The individual decision to purchase a dwelling is not simply individual but brings into play a whole range of social and political conditions that make it possible or impossible. Thus housing provision is not simply a product of invisible market forces as technocratic and neoliberal discourse would have it, but results from political decision making and political interests that Bourdieu wishes to highlight. Against the determinism of market necessity, Bourdieu attempts to create a broad debate on the idea that markets are socially constructed and, albeit constraining, are always open to some political alternative.⁴⁹ This research makes it possible for him to intervene politically as an expert having researched the social effects of neoliberal policy in France.

Personal experience, reflection, and choice

Changes in his institutional position and social/political context only partially explain Bourdieu's rapid ascendancy to the public intellectual position that seemed to many to be in line with that previously held by Sartre and Foucault. Personal experience, reflection and choice in both research and in relationship to the Mitterrand presidency shaped a change in view and strategy of relations between sociology and

politics, a change in the form of strategic action Bourdieu believed a critical sociologist should take.

Personal experience from Weight of the World research

The experience of researching social suffering and exclusion in preparation for *The Weight of the World* (1993) sharpened Bourdieu's awareness of the disenfranchised and marginalized individuals and groups who experienced directly the dislocation, precariousness, and constraints imposed by reduced state social services. This research experience gave him a new appreciation of their plight and motivated him to give voice to these social groups he found without effective representation in the national debate over economic and political policies. The tremendous success of the book, both in terms of sales (it sold over 100,000 copies) and public debate and media attention it provoked, brought to Bourdieu a new level of public visibility as a public intellectual. Theater groups staged performances based on the book's ethnographic exploration of social suffering. This success opened for Bourdieu the possibility of a new and effective political role based on his scientific authority. It suggested the possibility of new more direct forms of political engagement that had not been possible before and he seized that opportunity.

Disillusionment with the political left in power during eighties & nineties

Bourdieu had always been on the political left and hence in the political opposition during the center-right governments of the Fifth Republic up until the election of Mitterrand in 1981. The arrival of the socialist-communist coalition to power in 1981 opened up the possibility of a more effective rapport of communication between left intellectuals and the new left government; it created the possibility of implementing the ideal of more rational and scientific based public policy less governed by private economic and political interests. During the Mitterrand years Bourdieu did contribute two different reports on education. In 1985 he published the Collège de France report "Propositions pour un enseignement de l'avenir" in response to the request by Mitterrand that the Collège reflect on the fundamental principles of education for the future.⁵⁰ With François Gros, he presided over a commission set up by the socialist minister of education, Lionel Jospin, on the contents of education and published its report "Principes pour une réflexion sur les contenus d'enseignement" in 1989.⁵¹ Thus, on a few occasions

during the eighties Bourdieu functioned as an expert advising political authority under a socialist government. But one could hardly characterize him as assuming a major advisory role to the left government. Bourdieu himself was far too critical of power and too fearful of falling into a kind of intellectual servitude role to political leadership to join in any official way the Mitterrand government.⁵² Indeed, he proved to be a sharp critic of the various left governments formed under Mitterrand and later in “cohabitation” with the center-right leadership of Jacques Chirac under the Mitterrand presidency. He became disillusioned with the left government, increasingly came to the conclusion that it no better than the right was able to hear the voice of reason and science. The political class of the left socialist government was as socially and ideologically closed as was that of the previous center-right regimes.⁵³ He became increasingly disillusioned with the French socialists and this personal disillusionment helps explain and prepare the public intellectual role he would play in the nineties.

A shift in view and strategy

Personal experience of having researched the social effects of neoliberal economic policies in France and growing disillusionment with the left government under Mitterrand led him to modify his view of the political effects of critical social scientific research. The ideal that a sociology of power would unmask and debunk power relations and therefore lead to their transformation came to appear overly optimistic.⁵⁴ This ideal guided his work on the French elite system of the grandes écoles culminating in the 1989 publication of *The State Nobility*. That research exposed as never before the power relations buttressing the elite system of the grandes écoles. The book received considerable media attention but no significant response from French socialist political leadership. No significant reform of the grandes écoles was undertaken in response to their increasingly class-based character, in recruitment, curriculum and pedagogy that Bourdieu critically documented. Something more needed to be done.⁵⁵ While Bourdieu never backed away from the debunking ideal of critical social science as an act of resistance, we begin to see him seek out more direct forms of political intervention and work increasingly towards developing collective expressions of intellectual criticism of existing power arrangements.

We observe a shift in intellectual strategy from one of trying to speak to a left government as an expert to one of developing a “collective

intellectual” strategy (see later pages) that would reaffirm and defend the autonomy of intellectual work from political powers and speak forcefully and critically of abuse of political power in whatever form.

While critical of the “total intellectual” role played by Sartre, Bourdieu nonetheless valued the critical intellectual tradition dating back to Emile Zola.⁵⁶ Part of his willingness to assume this kind of public intellectual role was in response to the apparent decline of the critical intellectual tradition in France. The image of the leading public intellectual in France thrived during the Cold War period. Situated on the political left, most French intellectuals carved out a distinct identity as critics of colonialism and capitalist imperialism. Algeria and Vietnam were rallying issues for the left. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marking the end of the Cold War, a growing number of French intellectuals came to argue that the time for the role of the “critical intellectual” was over and that it was now time to defend and better manage markets and democracy. A growing number of intellectuals began cultivating more cooperative relationships with political and economic leadership and the mass media in the roles of advisor, expert, political analyst, TV commentator, etc.

This shift in orientation for many intellectuals was made easier by the loss of political legitimacy of the left parties. Scandals, failed initiatives and economic crisis plagued various governments under the Mitterrand presidency. Socialist leadership during the Mitterrand presidency had adopted a number of macro-economic policies of accommodation to international financial markets. Socialists therefore became less able to rally support around their traditional role of ideological resistance toward capitalist trends. This kind of economic realism Bourdieu would sharply contest as spineless abdication to the forces of globalization.

Bourdieu devoted more and more time and attention in later years to giving organizational expression to intellectuals. This shift in strategy reaffirms an old theme in his career; namely, the need to protect the autonomy of the intellectual field from outside economic, political, and religious forces. This theme becomes more important in his later years because he believes that autonomy to be threatened by a new and growing media oriented intelligentsia.

Unlike in the early years when Bourdieu was willing to distinguish between internal and external struggles and focus on the former, his concern and activities in his later years suggests he no longer believes this to be possible. Bourdieu's analysis of the changing relationship of the intellectual field to outside political and economic constraints led him to conclude that an intellectual/political strategy focused entirely on internal issues was no longer viable. The distinction between internal and external struggles became less convincing.⁵⁷ The autonomy of intellectual life became more and more threatened by the mass media and by the much more diverse cultural markets. Bourdieu as a consequence came to the conclusion that to defend the former he must also challenge the latter. Thus, despite a change in type and frequency of public activism, there was continuity in the kind of concern expressed. The same concern for intellectual autonomy remains but it is as if his intellectual concern must now be fought out in the larger public arena, not just within peer networks. Moreover, this shift in view and particularly strategy is facilitated by Bourdieu's change to a central position in the French intellectual field.

As a consequence we observe a shift in intellectual strategy. We see evidence of this shift in strategy in his publications appearing in the early nineties. He starts publishing small paperbacks that are accessible to a broad audience in terms of price and writing style and that are collections of interviews, short speeches and essays devoted largely to criticism of neoliberal globalization as a central theme.⁵⁸ This strategy effectively reaches a wide readership beyond the university and provokes a sharp debate in the French media.

He also comes to support occasionally high profile forms of protest against established powers. Believing that the arena of public discourse had become narrowly framed by the logic of neo-classical economic assumptions, Bourdieu tried to find ways to break through that iron cage of economic determinism. He also looked to the work of artists, such as Karl Kraus and Hans Haacke, as privileged sources of creative intervention to expose the enclosed world of political leadership and discourse.⁵⁹ He attended the trial of José Bové.

One can also observe the shift in strategy as he devotes more and more energy to developing the idea of and organizational means for the "collective intellectual." The idea was not entirely new; one can find expressions of it in the late eighties and early nineties.⁶⁰ The 1992

postscript “For the Corporatism of the Universal” to *The Rules of Art* appears as a kind of manifesto that outlines an activist strategy that he would more and more employ throughout the nineties. It defines an activist role for the “scientific intellectual” that he sees going back to the example set by Emile Zola during the Dreyfus affair. Bourdieu calls for the collective organization of intellectuals, a call that “takes a normative position based on the conviction that it is possible to use knowledge of the logic of the functioning of the fields of cultural production to draw up a realistic programme for the collective action of intellectuals.”⁶¹ Here the work of social science is presented in strikingly instrumentalist terms as a tool for the political efficacy of intellectuals.

Why does Bourdieu make this direct appeal? Because he thinks the intellectual field in general is threatened increasingly in two ways. First, it is threatened by the interpenetration of art and money. Marketing criteria and sales have come to replace genuine intellectual criteria in publishing. Even the *avant garde* chases after commercial success rather than maintaining its traditional disregard of commercial criteria.⁶² Hence his return to the familiar theme of working to enhance and preserve intellectual autonomy. What differs this time is the focus that no longer centers exclusively on the internal world of intellectuals. The internal and external worlds have become fused because of the second reason Bourdieu sees to explain the need for developing collective action by intellectuals. This changes the institutional focus of his intellectual politics.

The second reason is the degree of closure of the arena of public debate. The arena of public debate within the field of power is increasingly monopolized by technocrats and journalists pushing out artists, writers, and scientists. As a consequence, public policy discussion and formulation have come to be framed by neoliberal economic assumptions. Bourdieu’s response in “For the Corporatism of the Universal” is to call for an organized corporatist response among intellectuals to defend their interests within the intellectual field and to reintroduce the values of reason and science within public debate. The arena of public debate is treated like a cultural field where critical and scientific intellectuals should try to recapture some of the terrain lost to the technocratic and administrative elites.⁶³

Bourdieu tries to implement this “realpolitik” of the collective intellectual in several practical ways. He creates in 1989 his own European review of books, *Liber*, in an effort to develop a European intellectual tradition modeled on the *Encyclopedists of the Enlightenment*. *Liber* was to disseminate to a large readership a broad range of literary, artistic, and scientific *avant garde* works not readily available because of language barriers, slowness of translations, national traditions, etc.⁶⁴ It appears first as a supplement to four major European newspapers but then, because of financial constraints, becomes a supplement to *Actes* and continues until 1998.

In 1992 he issues a call, “Appel à la communauté des universitaires et des chercheurs,” to the university and research communities that leads to the creation of the Association de réflexion sur les enseignements supérieurs et la recherche (ARESER). The association publishes in 1997 *Quelques diagnostics and remèdes urgents pour une université en péril*.⁶⁵ The book brings together a number of documents, papers, and recommendations that call for increased financial and human resources to meet the needs of an increasingly heterogeneous public and a reorganization of work that would enhance more local control. The association also sponsors a number of meetings on educational policy. In conjunction with this group Bourdieu will publish in the nineties some opinion pieces in the national press showing his ongoing concern for educational reform.

He creates in June 1993 the Comité international de soutien aux intellectuels algériens (CISIA) to offer support to Algerian intellectuals threaten by the civil war in that country. That same year he participates in the International Parliament of Writers in Strasbourg and initiates a petition to organize a “critical opposition to power,” to offer “solidarity with writers under threat,” and to set up “a place of reflection for new forms of activism.”⁶⁶ The strategy of organizing international conferences of intellectuals becomes a favorite one of Bourdieu and he participates in several until just before his death. In 1995 he organizes *Raisons d’agir* (Reasons to act), a group of progressive social scientists who share similar critical views of neo-liberal public policies as a way of counter acting those conservative think tanks, such as the Foundation Saint-Simon, that celebrate market mechanisms. In the same year he launches a publishing venture that eventually assumes the same name. It represents an attempt to regain control over the conditions of intellectual production from growing commercial interests in the

French publishing world. It is designed to bring sociological analyses of contemporary civic issues to a broader public. The first publication in 1996 was his best-seller and controversial *On Television*.⁶⁷ A broad and sharply critical debate breaks out in the French press over Bourdieu's criticism of TV journalism. In the April 8, 1998 issue of *Le Monde* he publishes his famous "Pour une gauche de gauche" in which he criticizes "la troika neo-liberal Blair-Jospin-Schroder" and the socialist government under Lionel Jospin for betraying the ideals of the left.⁶⁸ The op-ed piece elicits considerable debate in the French press and an avalanche of written correspondence.⁶⁹

Bourdieu's criticism of media journalism

The foregoing discussion helps explain Bourdieu's attack on media journalism that generated much of the criticism of his political activism in the late nineties. His sharply focused criticism of neo-liberal bias in media journalism in his little "red book," *On Television*, was a major publishing coup and provoked sharp debate over the role of the mass media in France. It sold over 140,000 copies and was for several months at the top of the best seller list in France. The book placed Bourdieu at the center of a national debate over the role of the mass media in France, particularly television journalism. Sharply critical of the celebrity-making machine of the media, the book had the paradoxical effect of making Bourdieu himself all the more a celebrity. Bourdieu was not against journalism per se even though some of his sharpest criticism suggested as much. Indeed, he attributed to journalism the important function of keeping the claims and actions of political leadership under public scrutiny and thereby holding political leaders accountable for their actions or inactions. Rather, it was his defense of the autonomy of the intellectual field and criticism of the closure of public discourse that motivated his attack. He believed that the intellectual field was rapidly being undermined by the invasion of a media-oriented intelligentsia where intellectual prestige was determined more and more by media visibility than by traditional peer group review in professional publications. At the same time the terms of public discourse were becoming narrowly framed by neoliberal economic terminology and assumptions. While a long-time critic of media-oriented intellectuals who he dismissed as superficial, without enduring intellectual qualities, and who contributed to a kind of "cultural fast food" consumption, Bourdieu became increasingly convinced that the marketing orientation of cultural and political life had

so advanced that it had become virtually impossible for alternative viewpoints to gain a fair public hearing. He viewed the arena of public debate as increasingly monopolized by technocrats and journalists pushing out artists, writers, and scientists. The voices of grassroots activists, immigrants, the unemployed and labor activists were too easily dismissed as “irrational” and “unrealistic” in the climate of globalization and austerity that were justified in the neo-liberal language of financial necessities. The language of “flexibility” and “fiscal responsibility” were presented as the rational and necessary steps to take when in fact they were but euphemized ways of justifying unemployment, reduced retirement and medical benefits, etc. He denounced as the “neo-liberal scourge” the euphemized language of financial rigor and efficiency as harboring the market interests of dominant groups. And the voices of those most directly affected by those policies were seldom listened to and generally dismissed as representing vested corporatist, sectorial interests rather than genuine needs of the common good. Against this Bourdieu proclaimed an emphatic “no” and much his political activism of his later years can be seen as a series of protests against the rigid framing of public discourse.

Conclusion

Bourdieu came to believe in the urgency of assuming a public role as a critical intellectual and social scientist to speak forcefully against the neo-liberal discourse that he believed had come to exercise a powerful censoring effect on public debate. The form and frequency of his political activism changed significantly from that of his early years. He found himself increasingly in the paradoxical position of assuming a high profile public intellectual role for which he himself had expressed strong reservations. Indeed, a Pierre Carles documentary movie on Bourdieu’s political work, *Sociology as a Martial Art*, was a surprise commercial success in 2000–2001 bringing Bourdieu unprecedented visibility. He had become a public intellectual celebrity. Yet, as one scene in the Carles movie suggests, some of the celebrity visibility seemed to be more of an embarrassment than a relished experience for Bourdieu. More importantly, he believed that his more direct political involvements did not compromise his rigorous and objective practice of sociology as a science. In his words, the challenge was to “think politics without thinking politically.”⁷⁰

It is difficult to offer a precise measure of the impact Bourdieu had as a public intellectual during the 1995 crisis and subsequently. In the short term, some indicators suggest that the impact was substantial. Clearly, how Bourdieu's name, signature, and perceived support were used by activists during the strikes, and subsequently, would be a fascinating if difficult study to carry out. Bourdieu brought considerable "symbolic capital" to the movement.⁷¹ By signing the petition supporting the strikes he brought to the movement the prestige of the Collège de France, of his scientific reputation, of his moral force from having previously spoken forcefully to the issue of social exclusion and suffering with the 1993 publication of *The Weight of the World*, and of the relative rarity of his name appearing on public petitions. The petition would be sometimes referred to simply as the "Bourdieu" list. But as Michel Offerlé⁷² notes, there is considerable antidotal evidence of activists using the "support of Bourdieu" to rally support in meetings.

It of course is too soon to assess what if any enduring effects the anti-globalization movement in France and Bourdieu's prominent position within it will have on French public policy. For a short time at least it represented a formidable force providing some check to further erosion of welfare safety net functions by the French state. But his efforts appear to have been more "acts of resistance" than successful reorientations of public policies in France. The shift to increasing reliance on market mechanisms for the delivery of public goods and services in France continues though perhaps at a different rate and in a different way than had they if Bourdieu and the social movement of the 1990s never existed.⁷³

It is striking that Bourdieu, who was often accused by critics for being a deterministic reproduction thinker, saw in neo-liberal globalization a powerful threat to traditional welfare arrangements but not one whose success was a foregone conclusion. Consistent with his constructionist view of social life, even those seemingly powerful economic forces grew out of collective struggles where actors had some choice in the matter. Bourdieu's own political activism in his later years demonstrated that fundamental faith he had in resistance to domination. The reproduction of forces of domination could be strategically resisted in certain times and places.

Whether Bourdieu's efforts, and those of the social movement he helped lead, end up being only a blip on the ascending curve toward increasing market determination of the distribution of public goods and services or a more significant alteration in that pattern remains of course to be seen. It would be premature to draw a conclusion though the fascination with markets and the taken-for-granted view of their determining constraints seems hardly to have run their course. If several years from now the 1995 social movement appears to have been nothing more than a short-lived political event, then there would be no harsher critic than Bourdieu himself who, reflecting on the significance of May 1968 in France, credited the 1968 crisis with having little significant effect on the most fundamental structures of domination in modern France.⁷⁴

Far from sheer personal ambition to become another Sartre or Foucault, Bourdieu's rise to the role of leading French and European public intellectual grew out of a conjuncture of institutional influences and changes that set the stage for personal choice. This chapter identified several such key factors. Bourdieu's choice to meet strikers on December 5, 1995, his publication in 1996 of a blitzing critique of TV journalism, his choice to show solidarity with José Bové and the anti-globalization movement, for example, were made possible by a series of changes in the French intellectual field and Bourdieu's own position within it. Bourdieu's movement to a central location in the French intellectual field, the changing character of the field itself, the growing influence of the mass media in French political and cultural life, the failures of the French Socialists in power, a cultural legacy of leading critical intellectuals in France, a unifying national issue of globalization, and the political conjuncture in 1995 all intersected in ways that opened a path for Bourdieu to choose new and more frequent forms of political action. His responses to that combination of factors at different moments reveal both a striking continuity in desire to preserve the autonomy of intellectual life and a change in view and strategy on how best to do that.

Contrary to the widespread media view that Bourdieu had suddenly become "political" during his later years in the anti-globalization movement, Bourdieu expressed ongoing interest in politics throughout his career. Indeed, Bourdieu confronted at least three burning national crises in his lifetime, but in only one did he come to play a leading public intellectual role: the Algerian war, the university crisis of May

1968, and the crisis of the welfare state in the nineties. He offered a political response to all three but the forms of those responses differed. He responded as a professional sociologist through his research and writing identifying key political issues that shaped each of those crises. But only in the case of the latter did he also come to play a public intellectual role. We have explored in this chapter how his move to a key institutional location in the French intellectual field endowed him with a symbolic capital to lead a social movement in a way that he could not have done in Algeria or during May 68. At different times, with different resources, and from different locations within the French intellectual field Bourdieu addressed national political issues throughout his career.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of "From Critical Sociology to Public Intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu and Politics." *Theory and Society* 32/5–6 (2003): 791–823. An earlier version was delivered as a lecture at the City University of New York Graduate Center, May 9, 2003. I wish to thank Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and David Lavin for making that possible. I also want to thank Karen Lucas for offering useful editorial advice in preparing this version. Three works have been particularly helpful in shaping this analysis of Bourdieu's political life: Pierre Bourdieu, *Interventions, 1961–2002. Science sociale et action politique* (Marseille: Agone, 2002), Pierre Mounier, *Pierre Bourdieu, une introduction* (Paris: Pocket/La Découverte, 2001), and Louis Pinto, *Pierre Bourdieu et la théorie du monde social* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998). Conversations with David Karen, Niilo Kauppi, Frédéric Lebaron, Gérard Mauger, Michel Offerlé, Franck Poupeau, Elliot Weininger and Vera Zolberg were also very helpful.
2. Pierre Bourdieu, "Against the Destruction of a Civilization," *Acts of Resistance. Against the Tyranny of the Market*, ed. Pierre Bourdieu (New York: The New Press, 1995), 24–28.
3. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *The Inheritors: French Students and their Relation to Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979 [1964]) and Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (London: Sage, 1977 [1970]).
4. Some of his sociological work, however, had been a contributing factor to French student leader political awareness in May 1968. *The Inheritors* informed their political analysis of the French university situation and contributed to a more politicized view among many French university students of university conditions. In addition, Bourdieu and several colleagues at the Center for European Sociology drafted in 1968 a statement regarding the strike. See Pierre Bourdieu, "Appel à l'organisation d'états généraux de l'enseignement et de la recherche," *Interventions, 1961–2001. Science sociale et action politique* (Marseille: Agone, 1968), 63–68. But he did not participate in the May 68 demonstrations as did Foucault. He did not publish analyses of the May 1968 events in the immediate aftermath as did Raymond Boudon and Alain

- Touraine nor did he editorialize in the French press on the significance of the events as many French intellectuals did. His analyses would come later in Pierre Bourdieu, Luc Boltanski, and Pascal Maldidier, "La Défense du Corps," *Social Science Information* 10/4 (1971) and in Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) but only as elements of analyses focused on the French university teaching profession.
5. A key difference between the political activism of Bourdieu and that of Sartre is that Bourdieu entered the political arena with an intellectual practice directly related to the issues he spoke to politically whereas Sartre as philosopher and literary figure did not. Bourdieu's defense of the welfare state against privatization stemmed in part from what he learned while researching the negative social and economic effects on those most directly affected by downsizing the welfare safety net. See Pierre Bourdieu et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999 [1993]) and Pierre Bourdieu, *Les structures sociales de l'économie* (Paris: Édition du Seuil, 2000).
 6. Pierre Bourdieu, "Sociologues des mythologies et mythologies de sociologues," *Les temps modernes* 211/December (1963).
 7. See Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries*, trans. Richard Nice, 2 ed. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991 [1968]).
 8. See Pierre Mounier, *Pierre Bourdieu, une introduction*, 233.
 9. For example, one can find featured in the October 1998 issue of *The Magazine Littéraire* expressions of the popular criticisms of Bourdieu's political activities in the late nineties.
 10. See, for example, Jeannine Verdès-Leroux, *Deconstructing Pierre Bourdieu: Against Sociological Terrorism from the Left* (Paris: Algora, 2001 [1998]).
 11. This explanatory perspective overlaps to some extent with that of Louis Pinto, *Pierre Bourdieu et la théorie du monde social*.
 12. See David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 21–25 for a brief description of French sociology during the period.
 13. Bourdieu's early institutional mentor, Raymond Aron, was an important exception to these early patterns. Aron wrote a column for the French newspaper *Le Figaro* while teaching at the Sorbonne.
 14. Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries*.
 15. A point made by Pinto, *Pierre Bourdieu et la théorie social*.
 16. Bourdieu outlined an ambitious program of setting sociology on firm epistemological grounds and developing an approach to the study of the social world that seemed no less ambitious than that of Emile Durkheim in the early 20th century. The parallel to Durkheim has been drawn by several observers, such as Michel Offerlé, *Engagement sociologique: Pierre Bourdieu en politique, Regards sur l'actualité* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1999) and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology," *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
 17. One central theme in Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries* is epistemological not political, at least in

the usual sense of that distinction. Sociology needed to be set up on firm epistemological grounds as a science. But, as Wacquant, “The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology,” *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 50 points out, for Bourdieu, “even epistemology is fundamentally political.” Bourdieu writes in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 [1972]), 165: “The theory of knowledge is a dimension of political theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of construction of reality – in particular social reality – is a major dimension of political power.” In other words, the cognitive is political.

18. This is the view shared by many who have examined the ensemble of Bourdieu’s writings and political activities. See, for example, Craig Calhoun, “Pierre Bourdieu, the centrality of the social, and the possibility of politics,” *Bourdieu: Le colloq Cerisy*, eds. J. DuBois, P. Durant, and Y. Winkin (Paris: Seuil, Forthcoming), Philippe Fritsch, “Introduction,” *Propos sur le Champ Politique*, ed. Pierre Bourdieu (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000), 26, Gérard Mauger, “L’Engagement sociologique,” *Critique*, August–September (1995), 579–580, Louis Pinto, *Pierre Bourdieu et la théorie du monde social*, and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, “The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology,” *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, 47–59. This is also the view of Frank Poupeau (Personal Communication, Paris June 2002), one of the editors the most complete set of Bourdieu’s political writings: *Bourdieu, Interventions, 1961–2002*.
19. Pierre Bourdieu and Otto Hahn, “La théorie,” *VH 101 2/Summer* (1970): 15. Also see Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, 249–55, 59–62.
20. In a particularly pointed formulation of this idea of the political effects of science, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, 1977, 218 write: “If there is no science but of the hidden, then the science of society is, per se, critical, without the scientist who chooses science ever having to choose to make a critique: the hidden is, in this case, a secret, and a well-kept one, even when no one is commissioned to keep it, because it contributes to the reproduction of a ‘social order’ based on concealment of the most efficacious mechanisms of its reproduction and thereby serves the interests of those who have a vested interest in the conservation of that order.” My thanks to Elliot Weininger for reminding me of this passage.
21. Bourdieu and Hahn, “La théorie,” 20. See Swartz, *Culture and Power*, 247–69 for a discussion of how Bourdieu thinks that the sociologist, armed with the tools of critical science, can and should have a responsibility to play a key role in modern political life.
22. A fuller presentation of Bourdieu’s normative vision is beyond the scope of this chapter but his vision calls for protecting the autonomy of the scientific field from the distorting effects of politics while simultaneously orienting ones scientific research so that it will have the maximum effect in the public arena. It also calls for a reflexive practice of sociology, one that does not import the logic of political struggle into the scientific arena yet is able to produce symbolic effects that can shape political life. See Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* and Swartz, *Culture and Power* for a fuller discussion.
23. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” *From Max Weber*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1970). Bourdieu is sharply

- critical, however, of the “ethical neutrality” often attributed to Weber. “The ideal of ethical neutrality,” he writes in Bourdieu and Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, 218, is but “a mere non-aggression pact with the established order.”
24. Pierre Bourdieu, “The Attitude of the Algerian Peasant Toward Time,” *Mediterranean Countrymen*, ed. Julian Pitt-Rivers (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1964) and Pierre Bourdieu, *Algeria 1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
 25. Pierre Bourdieu, “Révolution dans la révolution,” *Esprit* 1/January (1961) and Pierre Bourdieu, “Les sous-prolétaires algériens,” *Les temps modernes*, 199 (1962).
 26. Bourdieu and Passeron, *The Inheritors: French Students and their Relation to Culture*.
 27. Bourdieu and Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*.
 28. See Pierre Bourdieu, “L’opinion publique n’existe pas,” *Norôit* (1971), 155–156 and Pierre Bourdieu, “Les doxosophes,” *Minuit* 1/November (1972).
 29. See Pierre Bourdieu, “Questions de politique,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 16/September (1977) and Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, 463–511.
 30. Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, trans. Loretta C. Clough (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996 [1989]).
 31. Bourdieu et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*.
 32. Though an agrégé, Bourdieu never defended a doctoral thesis, which was a prerequisite (a necessary but not sufficient condition) for obtaining a chair in the French university at that time.
 33. The Collège stands at the summit of the research sector of French intellectual life. Bourdieu was elected to the Chair of Sociology, a position held earlier by Marcel Mauss and Raymond Aron.
 34. This was the golden age of post-World War II French sociology. The social sciences captured much of the attraction that had previously been accorded to philosophy and the humanities. The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss emerged to become a significant opposing intellectual reference in France to the philosopher/literary figure Sartre. Bourdieu recounts in Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays toward a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 3–33 and Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990 [1980]), 1–21 how the success of Lévi-Strauss was important in shaping his intellectual outlook. Bourdieu used structuralism, as did many other aspiring French social scientists of the period, as a strategy for legitimating his intellectual identity as a social scientist against the dominating literary/humanist/philosophical culture represented by Sartre. See Pierre Bourdieu, “The Berber House,” *Rules and Meanings*, ed. Mary Douglas (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) as one illustration of the influence of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism on Bourdieu’s early work.
 35. An International Sociological Association 1997 survey placed *Distinction* as the 6th most important social scientific work of the 20th century. *The Logic of Practice* was ranked 4th and *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* 48th. The only other French thinkers to make it into the top 50 were Emile Durkheim’s *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (13th), *The Divi-*

- sion of Labor in Society* (34th), *The Rules of Sociological Method* (35th), and Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (16th). See <http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/books/>. Accessed April 1, 2004. *Contemporary Sociology* (May 1996) reviewed *Outline of a Theory of Practice* as one of the 10 most influential books of the past 25 years.
36. Lévi-Strauss is the only other social scientist having received this coveted award.
 37. This was the view, for example, of Raymond Boudon (Personal Communication, Paris 1988).
 38. This point is suggested by Mounier, *Pierre Bourdieu, une introduction*, 217–18.
 39. See Luc Boltanski, "L'espace positionnel, multiplicité des positions institutionnelles et habitus de classe," *Revue française de sociologie* 14/1 (1973).
 40. Anecdotal reports suggests that it was becoming more acceptable, indeed well viewed, by a growing number of French academics (particularly those teaching within political science institutes) to write for and appear in the mass media. Attitudes had changed considerably from the days when Raymond Aron's appointment at the Sorbonne had caused concern among some French scholars precisely because Aron wrote a column for *Le Figaro*.
 41. Patrick Champagne, *Faire l'opinion. Le nouvel espace politique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979).
 42. See Pierre Bourdieu, "The Market of Symbolic Goods," *Poetics* 14/April (1985), Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television* (New York: New Press, 1998 [1996]), and Régis Debray, *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: the Intellectuals of Modern France* (London: Verso, 1981).
 43. The social movement of December 1995 had its origins in three different crises: beginning in November, student protest within the universities, a strike by railway employees in reaction to government plans to institute cutbacks in retirement benefits, and protests against the Prime Minister Juppé's plan to reform social security by reducing public expenditure in this area. See Julien Duval, Christophe Gaubert, Frédéric Lebaron, Dominique Marchetti, and Fabienne Pavis, *Le "décembre" des intellectuels français* (Paris: Liber-Raisons D'Agir, 1998), 12–14.
 44. See Julien Duval, Christophe Gaubert, Frédéric Lebaron, Dominique Marchetti, and Fabienne Pavis, *Le "décembre" des intellectuels français* for an insightful if controversial sociological analysis of the two lists.
 45. For example, many of the contributors in the October 1998 issue of *Magazine Littéraire* featuring critical commentary on Bourdieu's work observe that 1995 brought a change in Bourdieu's political activities.
 46. It is ironical that Bourdieu, whose sociological investigations had not focused on social movements, as for example had his rival Alain Touraine, became in his later years politically catalyzed by a social movement just as it was also enhanced by Bourdieu's presence.
 47. This is not to suggest that Bourdieu became in his later years a "mediacrate" shuttling from one public appearance to another in the manner of some French intellectuals. Bourdieu in fact was very selective in his public appearances; he turned down many more invitations than he accepted (Personal Communication, Franck Poupeau, Paris, June 2002).
 48. Bourdieu, *les structures sociales de l'économie* (Paris, Édition du Seuil, 2000).

49. There is a certain irony here in contrasting Bourdieu's political aims with some of the criticism traditionally leveled against Bourdieu's sociological theory of action. Many critics have charged his sociology with being too deterministic. Yet Bourdieu's attacks against neoliberalism seem precisely to call attention to the determining forces of globalization and to raise the hope and possibility of choosing some alternative course of action rather than their sublime acceptance.
50. Bourdieu later sharply criticized the way this report was used by Mitterrand largely to legitimate his presidential campaign in 1988 rather than adopting any substantial reforms proposed by the report.
51. Bourdieu accepted to work with the commission despite his frustration with the first report because of his respect for the socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard (Personal Communication, Franck Poupeau, Paris, June 2002).
52. In this respect, he was quite different from Anthony Giddens who accepted to play a formal role in Tony Blair's labor government in the U.K.
53. His reluctance to break totally with the regime before the early nineties can be seen in the famous statement "La vertu civile" that he wrote in September 1988 in *Le monde* in which he comes to the support of the prime minister Michel Rocard for the way Rocard handled the movement for independence in New Caledonia. The statement, however, also reflects a growing concern of his relationship to the Mitterrand presidency, a concern that asks what conditions can be created or under what conditions is it likely that the voice of science and rationality will be heard by political leaders. This theme shows both his growing skepticism and lingering hope for the French left at the end of the eighties and very early nineties to do something different.
54. Indicative of Bourdieu's changing consciousness regarding the political vocation of the sociologist is his observation that the professionalization of sociology as science resulted in the loss of the classical political function emphasized by the early social theorists. Bourdieu (*Propos sur le Champ Politique*, 104) writes: "In fact, one can say, to simplify a little, that the social sciences paid dearly to gain recognition as science (which remains contested): by a self censure that constitutes a veritable self mutilation, sociologists – beginning with me, who frequently denounced the temptation of social prophesizing and philosophizing – refused all opportunity to propose "ideal and global" representations of the social world, as if such would signal a lack of sufficient embrace of scientific morality and thereby discredit the author." Here Bourdieu speaks of that loss in terms of a regrettable sacrifice both personally and professionally. By the late eighties, he no longer accepts this "scientistic abdication, which ruins political conviction," and argues that "the time has come when scholars are needed to intervene in politics, with all their competence, to impose utopias based in truth and rationality" (*Propos sur le Champ Politique*, 104–105) – my translations.
55. I recall a conversation with Bourdieu in Paris in 1993 when in response to my query about the reception of *The State Nobility* he shrugged and pointed out that while nothing significant had happened in France, by contrast, the book was receiving considerable attention in Germany.
56. See Christophe Charle, *Naissance des "intellectuels," 1880–1900* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1990) for a history of that intellectual tradition.
57. Pinto, *Pierre Bourdieu et la théorie du monde social*, 182–83 makes a similar point.

58. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance. Against the Tyranny of the Market*, trans. Richard Nice (New York: The New Press, 1998) and Pierre Bourdieu, *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market*, trans. Loic Wacquant (New York: New Press, 2003 [2001]).
59. See Pierre Bourdieu and Hans Haacke, *Free Exchange*, trans. Hans Haacke and Randal Johnson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995 [1994]). I am indebted to Gérard Mauger (Personal Communication, Paris, June 2002) for bringing to my attention how much Bourdieu looked to the artist world as a way of breaking through the taken-for-granted assumptions of power relations.
60. See Pierre Bourdieu, "The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World," *Telos* 81/ Fall (1989), Pierre Bourdieu, "Pour une Internationale des intellectuels," *Interventions, 1961–2001*, 257–266, and Pierre Bourdieu, "Il faudrait réinventer une sorte d'intellectuel collectif sur le modèle de ce qu'ont été les encyclopédistes," *Le Monde*, 7 December 1993.
61. Pierre Bourdieu, "For a Corporatism of the Universal," *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 399–48. As Mounier, *Pierre Bourdieu, une introduction*, 221, notes, the activist tone of this "post-scriptum" contrasts sharply with the sociological analysis of the book.
62. Pierre Bourdieu, "Une révolution conservatrice dans l'édition," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 126–127 (1999).
63. See Pierre Bourdieu, "Le pouvoir n'est plus rue-d'Ulm mais à l'ENA," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 9–15 March 1989 where he indicates that underlying the monopolizing power of corporate and administrative elites is a shift in power from the Ecole Normale Supérieure (formative site of traditional intellectuals, such as Sartre, Foucault and Bourdieu himself) toward the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (formative site of senior public and private managers in France today).
64. Pierre Bourdieu, *Interventions, 1961–2002*, 253.
65. ARESER, *Quelques diagnostics et remèdes urgents pour une université en péril* (Paris: Liber-Raisons D'Agir, 1997).
66. Pierre Bourdieu, "Un parlement des écrivains pour quoi faire?," *Interventions, 1961–2001*, 289–92 and Bourdieu, *Interventions, 1961–2002*, 254.
67. Bourdieu, *On Television* (New York: New Press, 1998 [1996]).
68. The article is co-signed with Christophe Charle, Frédéric Lebaron, Gérard Mauger and Bernard Lacroix and was elaborated within the framework of the Raisons d'agir group.
69. The Raisons d'agir group publishes regularly in *Le monde diplomatique* and in numerous other publications. See the Raisons d'agir website for both a history and current agenda of political actions since Bourdieu's death: www.raisonsdagir.org.
70. Pierre Bourdieu, "Penser la politique," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 71/72 (1988): 2–3.
71. Julien Duval et al., *Le "décembre" des intellectuels français*, 60–61.
72. Offerlé, *Engagement sociologique: Pierre Bourdieu en politique*.
73. In the summer of 2003 large street demonstrations again responded to a new initiative by the Chirac center right government to implement similar kinds of welfare state reforms as were proposed in 1995.

74. In a brief reflection published in 1983 in *Lire*, Bourdieu assesses the significance of May 1968 as entirely of the “symbolic order” with “hardly any effect” on the political field. See Bourdieu, *Interventions, 1961–2002*, 62.

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